--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 09:03:00 PDT 2014
+From: Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2014 23:47:41 +0300
+Subject: arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c: drop stray break operator
+
+From: Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 093758e3daede29cb4ce6aedb111becf9d4bfc57 ]
+
+This commit is a guesswork, but it seems to make sense to drop this
+break, as otherwise the following line is never executed and becomes
+dead code. And that following line actually saves the result of
+local calculation by the pointer given in function argument. So the
+proposed change makes sense if this code in the whole makes sense (but I
+am unable to analyze it in the whole).
+
+Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=81641
+Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c
++++ b/arch/sparc/math-emu/math_32.c
+@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static int do_one_mathemu(u32 insn, unsi
+ case 0: fsr = *pfsr;
+ if (IR == -1) IR = 2;
+ /* fcc is always fcc0 */
+- fsr &= ~0xc00; fsr |= (IR << 10); break;
++ fsr &= ~0xc00; fsr |= (IR << 10);
+ *pfsr = fsr;
+ break;
+ case 1: rd->s = IR; break;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 17:21:39 +0200
+Subject: batman-adv: Fix out-of-order fragmentation support
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit d9124268d84a836f14a6ead54ff9d8eee4c43be5 ]
+
+batadv_frag_insert_packet was unable to handle out-of-order packets because it
+dropped them directly. This is caused by the way the fragmentation lists is
+checked for the correct place to insert a fragmentation entry.
+
+The fragmentation code keeps the fragments in lists. The fragmentation entries
+are kept in descending order of sequence number. The list is traversed and each
+entry is compared with the new fragment. If the current entry has a smaller
+sequence number than the new fragment then the new one has to be inserted
+before the current entry. This ensures that the list is still in descending
+order.
+
+An out-of-order packet with a smaller sequence number than all entries in the
+list still has to be added to the end of the list. The used hlist has no
+information about the last entry in the list inside hlist_head and thus the
+last entry has to be calculated differently. Currently the code assumes that
+the iterator variable of hlist_for_each_entry can be used for this purpose
+after the hlist_for_each_entry finished. This is obviously wrong because the
+iterator variable is always NULL when the list was completely traversed.
+
+Instead the information about the last entry has to be stored in a different
+variable.
+
+This problem was introduced in 610bfc6bc99bc83680d190ebc69359a05fc7f605
+("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge").
+
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@meshcoding.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static bool batadv_frag_insert_packet(st
+ {
+ struct batadv_frag_table_entry *chain;
+ struct batadv_frag_list_entry *frag_entry_new = NULL, *frag_entry_curr;
++ struct batadv_frag_list_entry *frag_entry_last = NULL;
+ struct batadv_frag_packet *frag_packet;
+ uint8_t bucket;
+ uint16_t seqno, hdr_size = sizeof(struct batadv_frag_packet);
+@@ -180,11 +181,14 @@ static bool batadv_frag_insert_packet(st
+ ret = true;
+ goto out;
+ }
++
++ /* store current entry because it could be the last in list */
++ frag_entry_last = frag_entry_curr;
+ }
+
+- /* Reached the end of the list, so insert after 'frag_entry_curr'. */
+- if (likely(frag_entry_curr)) {
+- hlist_add_after(&frag_entry_curr->list, &frag_entry_new->list);
++ /* Reached the end of the list, so insert after 'frag_entry_last'. */
++ if (likely(frag_entry_last)) {
++ hlist_add_after(&frag_entry_last->list, &frag_entry_new->list);
+ chain->size += skb->len - hdr_size;
+ chain->timestamp = jiffies;
+ ret = true;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 09:03:00 PDT 2014
+From: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
+Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2014 15:44:52 +0200
+Subject: bbc-i2c: Fix BBC I2C envctrl on SunBlade 2000
+
+From: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5cdceab3d5e02eb69ea0f5d8fa9181800baf6f77 ]
+
+Fix regression in bbc i2c temperature and fan control on some Sun systems
+that causes the driver to refuse to load due to the bbc_i2c_bussel resource not
+being present on the (second) i2c bus where the temperature sensors and fan
+control are located. (The check for the number of resources was removed when
+the driver was ported to a pure OF driver in mid 2008.)
+
+Signed-off-by: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/sbus/char/bbc_envctrl.c | 6 ++++++
+ drivers/sbus/char/bbc_i2c.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_envctrl.c
++++ b/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_envctrl.c
+@@ -452,6 +452,9 @@ static void attach_one_temp(struct bbc_i
+ if (!tp)
+ return;
+
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp->bp_list);
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp->glob_list);
++
+ tp->client = bbc_i2c_attach(bp, op);
+ if (!tp->client) {
+ kfree(tp);
+@@ -497,6 +500,9 @@ static void attach_one_fan(struct bbc_i2
+ if (!fp)
+ return;
+
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->bp_list);
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->glob_list);
++
+ fp->client = bbc_i2c_attach(bp, op);
+ if (!fp->client) {
+ kfree(fp);
+--- a/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_i2c.c
++++ b/drivers/sbus/char/bbc_i2c.c
+@@ -300,13 +300,18 @@ static struct bbc_i2c_bus * attach_one_i
+ if (!bp)
+ return NULL;
+
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bp->temps);
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bp->fans);
++
+ bp->i2c_control_regs = of_ioremap(&op->resource[0], 0, 0x2, "bbc_i2c_regs");
+ if (!bp->i2c_control_regs)
+ goto fail;
+
+- bp->i2c_bussel_reg = of_ioremap(&op->resource[1], 0, 0x1, "bbc_i2c_bussel");
+- if (!bp->i2c_bussel_reg)
+- goto fail;
++ if (op->num_resources == 2) {
++ bp->i2c_bussel_reg = of_ioremap(&op->resource[1], 0, 0x1, "bbc_i2c_bussel");
++ if (!bp->i2c_bussel_reg)
++ goto fail;
++ }
+
+ bp->waiting = 0;
+ init_waitqueue_head(&bp->wq);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 16:29:30 +0200
+Subject: bna: fix performance regression
+
+From: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit c36c9d50cc6af5c5bfcc195f21b73f55520c15f9 ]
+
+The recent commit "e29aa33 bna: Enable Multi Buffer RX" is causing
+a performance regression. It does not properly update 'cmpl' pointer
+at the end of the loop in NAPI handler bnad_cq_process(). The result is
+only one packet / per NAPI-schedule is processed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad.c
+@@ -600,9 +600,9 @@ bnad_cq_process(struct bnad *bnad, struc
+ prefetch(bnad->netdev);
+
+ cq = ccb->sw_q;
+- cmpl = &cq[ccb->producer_index];
+
+ while (packets < budget) {
++ cmpl = &cq[ccb->producer_index];
+ if (!cmpl->valid)
+ break;
+ /* The 'valid' field is set by the adapter, only after writing
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Dmitry Kravkov <Dmitry.Kravkov@qlogic.com>
+Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 18:54:47 +0300
+Subject: bnx2x: fix crash during TSO tunneling
+
+From: Dmitry Kravkov <Dmitry.Kravkov@qlogic.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit fe26566d8a05151ba1dce75081f6270f73ec4ae1 ]
+
+When TSO packet is transmitted additional BD w/o mapping is used
+to describe the packed. The BD needs special handling in tx
+completion.
+
+kernel: Call Trace:
+kernel: <IRQ> [<ffffffff815e19ba>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
+kernel: [<ffffffff8105dee1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x61/0x80
+kernel: [<ffffffff8105df5c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80
+kernel: [<ffffffff814a8c0d>] ? find_iova+0x4d/0x90
+kernel: [<ffffffff814ab0e2>] intel_unmap_page.part.36+0x142/0x160
+kernel: [<ffffffff814ad0e6>] intel_unmap_page+0x26/0x30
+kernel: [<ffffffffa01f55d7>] bnx2x_free_tx_pkt+0x157/0x2b0 [bnx2x]
+kernel: [<ffffffffa01f8dac>] bnx2x_tx_int+0xac/0x220 [bnx2x]
+kernel: [<ffffffff8101a0d9>] ? read_tsc+0x9/0x20
+kernel: [<ffffffffa01f8fdb>] bnx2x_poll+0xbb/0x3c0 [bnx2x]
+kernel: [<ffffffff814d041a>] net_rx_action+0x15a/0x250
+kernel: [<ffffffff81067047>] __do_softirq+0xf7/0x290
+kernel: [<ffffffff815f3a5c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
+kernel: [<ffffffff81014d25>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90
+kernel: [<ffffffff810673e5>] irq_exit+0x115/0x120
+kernel: [<ffffffff815f4358>] do_IRQ+0x58/0xf0
+kernel: [<ffffffff815e94ad>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d
+kernel: <EOI> [<ffffffff810bbff7>] ? clockevents_notify+0x127/0x140
+kernel: [<ffffffff814834df>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x4f/0xc0
+kernel: [<ffffffff81483615>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xc5/0x200
+kernel: [<ffffffff8101bc7e>] arch_cpu_idle+0xe/0x30
+kernel: [<ffffffff810b4725>] cpu_startup_entry+0xf5/0x290
+kernel: [<ffffffff815cfee1>] start_secondary+0x265/0x27b
+kernel: ---[ end trace 11aa7726f18d7e80 ]---
+
+Fixes: a848ade408b ("bnx2x: add CSUM and TSO support for encapsulation protocols")
+Reported-by: Yulong Pei <ypei@redhat.com>
+Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kravkov <Dmitry.Kravkov@qlogic.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h | 1 +
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x.h
+@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ struct sw_tx_bd {
+ u8 flags;
+ /* Set on the first BD descriptor when there is a split BD */
+ #define BNX2X_TSO_SPLIT_BD (1<<0)
++#define BNX2X_HAS_SECOND_PBD (1<<1)
+ };
+
+ struct sw_rx_page {
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c
+@@ -227,6 +227,12 @@ static u16 bnx2x_free_tx_pkt(struct bnx2
+ --nbd;
+ bd_idx = TX_BD(NEXT_TX_IDX(bd_idx));
+
++ if (tx_buf->flags & BNX2X_HAS_SECOND_PBD) {
++ /* Skip second parse bd... */
++ --nbd;
++ bd_idx = TX_BD(NEXT_TX_IDX(bd_idx));
++ }
++
+ /* TSO headers+data bds share a common mapping. See bnx2x_tx_split() */
+ if (tx_buf->flags & BNX2X_TSO_SPLIT_BD) {
+ tx_data_bd = &txdata->tx_desc_ring[bd_idx].reg_bd;
+@@ -3877,6 +3883,9 @@ netdev_tx_t bnx2x_start_xmit(struct sk_b
+ /* set encapsulation flag in start BD */
+ SET_FLAG(tx_start_bd->general_data,
+ ETH_TX_START_BD_TUNNEL_EXIST, 1);
++
++ tx_buf->flags |= BNX2X_HAS_SECOND_PBD;
++
+ nbd++;
+ } else if (xmit_type & XMIT_CSUM) {
+ /* Set PBD in checksum offload case w/o encapsulation */
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 05:26:03 -0700
+Subject: inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8c1074ac6327e0abd1169e95eb66463 ]
+
+Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
+generator.
+
+linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
+cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.
+
+1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes
+
+2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
+ with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.
+
+3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
+ is about 20.
+
+4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
+ not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
+ the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())
+
+5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.
+
+IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'
+
+Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
+so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
+fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
+with a recycled ID.
+
+We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
+as a key.
+
+ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
+belongs (it is only used from this file)
+
+secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.
+
+Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
+unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 2 -
+ include/net/inetpeer.h | 16 ++------------
+ include/net/ip.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ include/net/ipv6.h | 2 -
+ include/net/secure_seq.h | 2 -
+ net/core/secure_seq.c | 25 ----------------------
+ net/ipv4/igmp.c | 4 +--
+ net/ipv4/inetpeer.c | 18 ----------------
+ net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 7 ++----
+ net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c | 2 -
+ net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 2 -
+ net/ipv4/raw.c | 2 -
+ net/ipv4/route.c | 45 ++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ net/ipv4/xfrm4_mode_tunnel.c | 2 -
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 12 ++++++++++
+ net/ipv6/output_core.c | 25 ----------------------
+ net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c | 2 -
+ 17 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 143 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c
+@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel
+ nf_reset(skb);
+
+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
+- ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
+ ip_send_check(iph);
+
+ ip_local_out(skb);
+--- a/include/net/inetpeer.h
++++ b/include/net/inetpeer.h
+@@ -41,14 +41,13 @@ struct inet_peer {
+ struct rcu_head gc_rcu;
+ };
+ /*
+- * Once inet_peer is queued for deletion (refcnt == -1), following fields
+- * are not available: rid, ip_id_count
++ * Once inet_peer is queued for deletion (refcnt == -1), following field
++ * is not available: rid
+ * We can share memory with rcu_head to help keep inet_peer small.
+ */
+ union {
+ struct {
+ atomic_t rid; /* Frag reception counter */
+- atomic_t ip_id_count; /* IP ID for the next packet */
+ };
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct inet_peer *gc_next;
+@@ -165,7 +164,7 @@ bool inet_peer_xrlim_allow(struct inet_p
+ void inetpeer_invalidate_tree(struct inet_peer_base *);
+
+ /*
+- * temporary check to make sure we dont access rid, ip_id_count, tcp_ts,
++ * temporary check to make sure we dont access rid, tcp_ts,
+ * tcp_ts_stamp if no refcount is taken on inet_peer
+ */
+ static inline void inet_peer_refcheck(const struct inet_peer *p)
+@@ -173,13 +172,4 @@ static inline void inet_peer_refcheck(co
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&p->refcnt) <= 0);
+ }
+
+-
+-/* can be called with or without local BH being disabled */
+-static inline int inet_getid(struct inet_peer *p, int more)
+-{
+- more++;
+- inet_peer_refcheck(p);
+- return atomic_add_return(more, &p->ip_id_count) - more;
+-}
+-
+ #endif /* _NET_INETPEER_H */
+--- a/include/net/ip.h
++++ b/include/net/ip.h
+@@ -310,9 +310,19 @@ static inline unsigned int ip_skb_dst_mt
+ }
+ }
+
+-void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, struct dst_entry *dst, int more);
++#define IP_IDENTS_SZ 2048u
++extern atomic_t *ip_idents;
+
+-static inline void ip_select_ident(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk)
++static inline u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs)
++{
++ atomic_t *id_ptr = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
++
++ return atomic_add_return(segs, id_ptr) - segs;
++}
++
++void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs);
++
++static inline void ip_select_ident_segs(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, int segs)
+ {
+ struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+
+@@ -322,24 +332,20 @@ static inline void ip_select_ident(struc
+ * does not change, they drop every other packet in
+ * a TCP stream using header compression.
+ */
+- iph->id = (sk && inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr) ?
+- htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_id++) : 0;
+- } else
+- __ip_select_ident(iph, dst, 0);
+-}
+-
+-static inline void ip_select_ident_more(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, int more)
+-{
+- struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+-
+- if ((iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) && !skb->local_df) {
+ if (sk && inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr) {
+ iph->id = htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_id);
+- inet_sk(sk)->inet_id += 1 + more;
+- } else
++ inet_sk(sk)->inet_id += segs;
++ } else {
+ iph->id = 0;
+- } else
+- __ip_select_ident(iph, dst, more);
++ }
++ } else {
++ __ip_select_ident(iph, segs);
++ }
++}
++
++static inline void ip_select_ident(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
++{
++ ip_select_ident_segs(skb, sk, 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+--- a/include/net/ipv6.h
++++ b/include/net/ipv6.h
+@@ -660,8 +660,6 @@ static inline int ipv6_addr_diff(const s
+ return __ipv6_addr_diff(a1, a2, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ }
+
+-void ipv6_select_ident(struct frag_hdr *fhdr, struct rt6_info *rt);
+-
+ int ip6_dst_hoplimit(struct dst_entry *dst);
+
+ /*
+--- a/include/net/secure_seq.h
++++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
+@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@
+
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+
+-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
+-__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
+ u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+ u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+ __be16 dport);
+--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
++++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
+@@ -85,31 +85,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_INET
+-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
+-{
+- u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+-
+- net_secret_init();
+- hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr;
+- hash[1] = net_secret[13];
+- hash[2] = net_secret[14];
+- hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+-
+- md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+-
+- return hash[0];
+-}
+-
+-__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
+-{
+- __u32 hash[4];
+-
+- net_secret_init();
+- memcpy(hash, daddr, 16);
+- md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+-
+- return hash[0];
+-}
+
+ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *igmpv3_newpack(st
+ pip->saddr = fl4.saddr;
+ pip->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP;
+ pip->tot_len = 0; /* filled in later */
+- ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
+ ((u8 *)&pip[1])[0] = IPOPT_RA;
+ ((u8 *)&pip[1])[1] = 4;
+ ((u8 *)&pip[1])[2] = 0;
+@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static int igmp_send_report(struct in_de
+ iph->daddr = dst;
+ iph->saddr = fl4.saddr;
+ iph->protocol = IPPROTO_IGMP;
+- ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
+ ((u8 *)&iph[1])[0] = IPOPT_RA;
+ ((u8 *)&iph[1])[1] = 4;
+ ((u8 *)&iph[1])[2] = 0;
+--- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+@@ -26,20 +26,7 @@
+ * Theory of operations.
+ * We keep one entry for each peer IP address. The nodes contains long-living
+ * information about the peer which doesn't depend on routes.
+- * At this moment this information consists only of ID field for the next
+- * outgoing IP packet. This field is incremented with each packet as encoded
+- * in inet_getid() function (include/net/inetpeer.h).
+- * At the moment of writing this notes identifier of IP packets is generated
+- * to be unpredictable using this code only for packets subjected
+- * (actually or potentially) to defragmentation. I.e. DF packets less than
+- * PMTU in size when local fragmentation is disabled use a constant ID and do
+- * not use this code (see ip_select_ident() in include/net/ip.h).
+ *
+- * Route cache entries hold references to our nodes.
+- * New cache entries get references via lookup by destination IP address in
+- * the avl tree. The reference is grabbed only when it's needed i.e. only
+- * when we try to output IP packet which needs an unpredictable ID (see
+- * __ip_select_ident() in net/ipv4/route.c).
+ * Nodes are removed only when reference counter goes to 0.
+ * When it's happened the node may be removed when a sufficient amount of
+ * time has been passed since its last use. The less-recently-used entry can
+@@ -62,7 +49,6 @@
+ * refcnt: atomically against modifications on other CPU;
+ * usually under some other lock to prevent node disappearing
+ * daddr: unchangeable
+- * ip_id_count: atomic value (no lock needed)
+ */
+
+ static struct kmem_cache *peer_cachep __read_mostly;
+@@ -497,10 +483,6 @@ relookup:
+ p->daddr = *daddr;
+ atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
+ atomic_set(&p->rid, 0);
+- atomic_set(&p->ip_id_count,
+- (daddr->family == AF_INET) ?
+- secure_ip_id(daddr->addr.a4) :
+- secure_ipv6_id(daddr->addr.a6));
+ p->metrics[RTAX_LOCK-1] = INETPEER_METRICS_NEW;
+ p->rate_tokens = 0;
+ /* 60*HZ is arbitrary, but chosen enough high so that the first
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int ip_build_and_send_pkt(struct sk_buff
+ iph->daddr = (opt && opt->opt.srr ? opt->opt.faddr : daddr);
+ iph->saddr = saddr;
+ iph->protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
+- ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, sk);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, sk);
+
+ if (opt && opt->opt.optlen) {
+ iph->ihl += opt->opt.optlen>>2;
+@@ -430,8 +430,7 @@ packet_routed:
+ ip_options_build(skb, &inet_opt->opt, inet->inet_daddr, rt, 0);
+ }
+
+- ip_select_ident_more(skb, &rt->dst, sk,
+- (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs ?: 1) - 1);
++ ip_select_ident_segs(skb, sk, skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs ?: 1);
+
+ /* TODO : should we use skb->sk here instead of sk ? */
+ skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
+@@ -1379,7 +1378,7 @@ struct sk_buff *__ip_make_skb(struct soc
+ iph->ttl = ttl;
+ iph->protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
+ ip_copy_addrs(iph, fl4);
+- ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, sk);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, sk);
+
+ if (opt) {
+ iph->ihl += opt->optlen>>2;
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int iptunnel_xmit(struct sock *sk, struc
+ iph->daddr = dst;
+ iph->saddr = src;
+ iph->ttl = ttl;
+- __ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->dst, (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs ?: 1) - 1);
++ __ip_select_ident(iph, skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs ?: 1);
+
+ err = ip_local_out_sk(sk, skb);
+ if (unlikely(net_xmit_eval(err)))
+--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+@@ -1663,7 +1663,7 @@ static void ip_encap(struct sk_buff *skb
+ iph->protocol = IPPROTO_IPIP;
+ iph->ihl = 5;
+ iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
+- ip_select_ident(skb, skb_dst(skb), NULL);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
+ ip_send_check(iph);
+
+ memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt));
+--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
+@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *
+ iph->check = 0;
+ iph->tot_len = htons(length);
+ if (!iph->id)
+- ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
+
+ iph->check = ip_fast_csum((unsigned char *)iph, iph->ihl);
+ }
+--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
+@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@
+ #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+ #include <linux/times.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/jhash.h>
+ #include <net/dst.h>
+ #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+ #include <net/protocol.h>
+@@ -456,39 +457,19 @@ static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_look
+ return neigh_create(&arp_tbl, pkey, dev);
+ }
+
+-/*
+- * Peer allocation may fail only in serious out-of-memory conditions. However
+- * we still can generate some output.
+- * Random ID selection looks a bit dangerous because we have no chances to
+- * select ID being unique in a reasonable period of time.
+- * But broken packet identifier may be better than no packet at all.
+- */
+-static void ip_select_fb_ident(struct iphdr *iph)
+-{
+- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ip_fb_id_lock);
+- static u32 ip_fallback_id;
+- u32 salt;
++atomic_t *ip_idents __read_mostly;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents);
+
+- spin_lock_bh(&ip_fb_id_lock);
+- salt = secure_ip_id((__force __be32)ip_fallback_id ^ iph->daddr);
+- iph->id = htons(salt & 0xFFFF);
+- ip_fallback_id = salt;
+- spin_unlock_bh(&ip_fb_id_lock);
+-}
+-
+-void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, struct dst_entry *dst, int more)
++void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
+ {
+- struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
+- struct inet_peer *peer;
++ static u32 ip_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
++ u32 hash, id;
+
+- peer = inet_getpeer_v4(net->ipv4.peers, iph->daddr, 1);
+- if (peer) {
+- iph->id = htons(inet_getid(peer, more));
+- inet_putpeer(peer);
+- return;
+- }
++ net_get_random_once(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
+
+- ip_select_fb_ident(iph);
++ hash = jhash_1word((__force u32)iph->daddr, ip_idents_hashrnd);
++ id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
++ iph->id = htons(id);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ip_select_ident);
+
+@@ -2705,6 +2686,12 @@ int __init ip_rt_init(void)
+ {
+ int rc = 0;
+
++ ip_idents = kmalloc(IP_IDENTS_SZ * sizeof(*ip_idents), GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!ip_idents)
++ panic("IP: failed to allocate ip_idents\n");
++
++ prandom_bytes(ip_idents, IP_IDENTS_SZ * sizeof(*ip_idents));
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
+ ip_rt_acct = __alloc_percpu(256 * sizeof(struct ip_rt_acct), __alignof__(struct ip_rt_acct));
+ if (!ip_rt_acct)
+--- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_mode_tunnel.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_mode_tunnel.c
+@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ static int xfrm4_mode_tunnel_output(stru
+
+ top_iph->frag_off = (flags & XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC) ?
+ 0 : (XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->frag_off & htons(IP_DF));
+- ip_select_ident(skb, dst->child, NULL);
+
+ top_iph->ttl = ip4_dst_hoplimit(dst->child);
+
+ top_iph->saddr = x->props.saddr.a4;
+ top_iph->daddr = x->id.daddr.a4;
++ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -537,6 +537,18 @@ static void ip6_copy_metadata(struct sk_
+ skb_copy_secmark(to, from);
+ }
+
++static void ipv6_select_ident(struct frag_hdr *fhdr, struct rt6_info *rt)
++{
++ static u32 ip6_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
++ u32 hash, id;
++
++ net_get_random_once(&ip6_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip6_idents_hashrnd));
++
++ hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(&rt->rt6i_dst.addr, ip6_idents_hashrnd);
++ id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
++ fhdr->identification = htonl(id);
++}
++
+ int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *))
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *frag;
+--- a/net/ipv6/output_core.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/output_core.c
+@@ -8,31 +8,6 @@
+ #include <net/addrconf.h>
+ #include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+-void ipv6_select_ident(struct frag_hdr *fhdr, struct rt6_info *rt)
+-{
+- static atomic_t ipv6_fragmentation_id;
+- struct in6_addr addr;
+- int ident;
+-
+-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+- struct inet_peer *peer;
+- struct net *net;
+-
+- net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev);
+- peer = inet_getpeer_v6(net->ipv6.peers, &rt->rt6i_dst.addr, 1);
+- if (peer) {
+- fhdr->identification = htonl(inet_getid(peer, 0));
+- inet_putpeer(peer);
+- return;
+- }
+-#endif
+- ident = atomic_inc_return(&ipv6_fragmentation_id);
+-
+- addr = rt->rt6i_dst.addr;
+- addr.s6_addr32[0] ^= (__force __be32)ident;
+- fhdr->identification = htonl(secure_ipv6_id(addr.s6_addr32));
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipv6_select_ident);
+
+ int ip6_find_1stfragopt(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 **nexthdr)
+ {
+--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c
+@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ ip_vs_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, s
+ iph->daddr = cp->daddr.ip;
+ iph->saddr = saddr;
+ iph->ttl = old_iph->ttl;
+- ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
++ ip_select_ident(skb, NULL);
+
+ /* Another hack: avoid icmp_send in ip_fragment */
+ skb->local_df = 1;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 23:00:35 -0400
+Subject: iovec: make sure the caller actually wants anything in memcpy_fromiovecend
+
+From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 06ebb06d49486676272a3c030bfeef4bd969a8e6 ]
+
+Check for cases when the caller requests 0 bytes instead of running off
+and dereferencing potentially invalid iovecs.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/iovec.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/core/iovec.c
++++ b/net/core/iovec.c
+@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_toiovecend);
+ int memcpy_fromiovecend(unsigned char *kdata, const struct iovec *iov,
+ int offset, int len)
+ {
++ /* No data? Done! */
++ if (len == 0)
++ return 0;
++
+ /* Skip over the finished iovecs */
+ while (offset >= iov->iov_len) {
+ offset -= iov->iov_len;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 08:58:10 +0200
+Subject: ip: make IP identifiers less predictable
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7c1a0d8537f2d9906a0cf8e69886d75 ]
+
+In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
+Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
+infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.
+
+With commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
+changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
+side-channel technique.
+
+This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
+for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
+an idle period.
+
+Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
+once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
+increase collision probability.
+
+This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
+rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.
+
+We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
+on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
+used to infer information for other protocols.
+
+For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.
+
+If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.
+
+21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
+ A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
+21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
+ target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64
+
+21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
+ A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
+21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
+ target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64
+
+21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
+ A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
+21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
+ target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64
+
+[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu>
+Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu>
+Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/ip.h | 11 +----------
+ net/ipv4/route.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/ip.h
++++ b/include/net/ip.h
+@@ -310,16 +310,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ip_skb_dst_mt
+ }
+ }
+
+-#define IP_IDENTS_SZ 2048u
+-extern atomic_t *ip_idents;
+-
+-static inline u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs)
+-{
+- atomic_t *id_ptr = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
+-
+- return atomic_add_return(segs, id_ptr) - segs;
+-}
+-
++u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs);
+ void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs);
+
+ static inline void ip_select_ident_segs(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, int segs)
+--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
+@@ -457,8 +457,31 @@ static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_look
+ return neigh_create(&arp_tbl, pkey, dev);
+ }
+
+-atomic_t *ip_idents __read_mostly;
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents);
++#define IP_IDENTS_SZ 2048u
++struct ip_ident_bucket {
++ atomic_t id;
++ u32 stamp32;
++};
++
++static struct ip_ident_bucket *ip_idents __read_mostly;
++
++/* In order to protect privacy, we add a perturbation to identifiers
++ * if one generator is seldom used. This makes hard for an attacker
++ * to infer how many packets were sent between two points in time.
++ */
++u32 ip_idents_reserve(u32 hash, int segs)
++{
++ struct ip_ident_bucket *bucket = ip_idents + hash % IP_IDENTS_SZ;
++ u32 old = ACCESS_ONCE(bucket->stamp32);
++ u32 now = (u32)jiffies;
++ u32 delta = 0;
++
++ if (old != now && cmpxchg(&bucket->stamp32, old, now) == old)
++ delta = prandom_u32_max(now - old);
++
++ return atomic_add_return(segs + delta, &bucket->id) - segs;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents_reserve);
+
+ void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
+ {
+@@ -467,7 +490,10 @@ void __ip_select_ident(struct iphdr *iph
+
+ net_get_random_once(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
+
+- hash = jhash_1word((__force u32)iph->daddr, ip_idents_hashrnd);
++ hash = jhash_3words((__force u32)iph->daddr,
++ (__force u32)iph->saddr,
++ iph->protocol,
++ ip_idents_hashrnd);
+ id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
+ iph->id = htons(id);
+ }
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -545,6 +545,8 @@ static void ipv6_select_ident(struct fra
+ net_get_random_once(&ip6_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip6_idents_hashrnd));
+
+ hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(&rt->rt6i_dst.addr, ip6_idents_hashrnd);
++ hash = __ipv6_addr_jhash(&rt->rt6i_src.addr, hash);
++
+ id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1);
+ fhdr->identification = htonl(id);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Dmitry Popov <ixaphire@qrator.net>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 03:07:52 +0400
+Subject: ip_tunnel(ipv4): fix tunnels with "local any remote $remote_ip"
+
+From: Dmitry Popov <ixaphire@qrator.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit 95cb5745983c222867cc9ac593aebb2ad67d72c0 ]
+
+Ipv4 tunnels created with "local any remote $ip" didn't work properly since
+7d442fab0 (ipv4: Cache dst in tunnels). 99% of packets sent via those tunnels
+had src addr = 0.0.0.0. That was because only dst_entry was cached, although
+fl4.saddr has to be cached too. Every time ip_tunnel_xmit used cached dst_entry
+(tunnel_rtable_get returned non-NULL), fl4.saddr was initialized with
+tnl_params->saddr (= 0 in our case), and wasn't changed until iptunnel_xmit().
+
+This patch adds saddr to ip_tunnel->dst_cache, fixing this issue.
+
+Reported-by: Sergey Popov <pinkbyte@gentoo.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov <ixaphire@qrator.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 1 +
+ net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
++++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry {
+
+ struct ip_tunnel_dst {
+ struct dst_entry __rcu *dst;
++ __be32 saddr;
+ };
+
+ struct ip_tunnel {
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
+@@ -69,23 +69,25 @@ static unsigned int ip_tunnel_hash(__be3
+ }
+
+ static void __tunnel_dst_set(struct ip_tunnel_dst *idst,
+- struct dst_entry *dst)
++ struct dst_entry *dst, __be32 saddr)
+ {
+ struct dst_entry *old_dst;
+
+ dst_clone(dst);
+ old_dst = xchg((__force struct dst_entry **)&idst->dst, dst);
+ dst_release(old_dst);
++ idst->saddr = saddr;
+ }
+
+-static void tunnel_dst_set(struct ip_tunnel *t, struct dst_entry *dst)
++static void tunnel_dst_set(struct ip_tunnel *t,
++ struct dst_entry *dst, __be32 saddr)
+ {
+- __tunnel_dst_set(this_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache), dst);
++ __tunnel_dst_set(this_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache), dst, saddr);
+ }
+
+ static void tunnel_dst_reset(struct ip_tunnel *t)
+ {
+- tunnel_dst_set(t, NULL);
++ tunnel_dst_set(t, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ void ip_tunnel_dst_reset_all(struct ip_tunnel *t)
+@@ -93,20 +95,25 @@ void ip_tunnel_dst_reset_all(struct ip_t
+ int i;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(i)
+- __tunnel_dst_set(per_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache, i), NULL);
++ __tunnel_dst_set(per_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache, i), NULL, 0);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_tunnel_dst_reset_all);
+
+-static struct rtable *tunnel_rtable_get(struct ip_tunnel *t, u32 cookie)
++static struct rtable *tunnel_rtable_get(struct ip_tunnel *t,
++ u32 cookie, __be32 *saddr)
+ {
++ struct ip_tunnel_dst *idst;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+- dst = rcu_dereference(this_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache)->dst);
++ idst = this_cpu_ptr(t->dst_cache);
++ dst = rcu_dereference(idst->dst);
+ if (dst && !atomic_inc_not_zero(&dst->__refcnt))
+ dst = NULL;
+ if (dst) {
+- if (dst->obsolete && dst->ops->check(dst, cookie) == NULL) {
++ if (!dst->obsolete || dst->ops->check(dst, cookie)) {
++ *saddr = idst->saddr;
++ } else {
+ tunnel_dst_reset(t);
+ dst_release(dst);
+ dst = NULL;
+@@ -366,7 +373,7 @@ static int ip_tunnel_bind_dev(struct net
+
+ if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
+ tdev = rt->dst.dev;
+- tunnel_dst_set(tunnel, &rt->dst);
++ tunnel_dst_set(tunnel, &rt->dst, fl4.saddr);
+ ip_rt_put(rt);
+ }
+ if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER)
+@@ -610,7 +617,7 @@ void ip_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ init_tunnel_flow(&fl4, protocol, dst, tnl_params->saddr,
+ tunnel->parms.o_key, RT_TOS(tos), tunnel->parms.link);
+
+- rt = connected ? tunnel_rtable_get(tunnel, 0) : NULL;
++ rt = connected ? tunnel_rtable_get(tunnel, 0, &fl4.saddr) : NULL;
+
+ if (!rt) {
+ rt = ip_route_output_key(tunnel->net, &fl4);
+@@ -620,7 +627,7 @@ void ip_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ goto tx_error;
+ }
+ if (connected)
+- tunnel_dst_set(tunnel, &rt->dst);
++ tunnel_dst_set(tunnel, &rt->dst, fl4.saddr);
+ }
+
+ if (rt->dst.dev == dev) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 10:30:25 -0400
+Subject: macvlan: Initialize vlan_features to turn on offload support.
+
+From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 081e83a78db9b0ae1f5eabc2dedecc865f509b98 ]
+
+Macvlan devices do not initialize vlan_features. As a result,
+any vlan devices configured on top of macvlans perform very poorly.
+Initialize vlan_features based on the vlan features of the lower-level
+device.
+
+Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/macvlan.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/macvlan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/macvlan.c
+@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ static int macvlan_init(struct net_devic
+ (lowerdev->state & MACVLAN_STATE_MASK);
+ dev->features = lowerdev->features & MACVLAN_FEATURES;
+ dev->features |= ALWAYS_ON_FEATURES;
++ dev->vlan_features = lowerdev->vlan_features & MACVLAN_FEATURES;
+ dev->gso_max_size = lowerdev->gso_max_size;
+ dev->iflink = lowerdev->ifindex;
+ dev->hard_header_len = lowerdev->hard_header_len;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 11:01:52 -0700
+Subject: net: bcmgenet: correctly pad short packets
+
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 474ea9cafc459976827a477f2c30eaf6313cb7c1 ]
+
+Packets shorter than ETH_ZLEN were not padded with zeroes, hence leaking
+potentially sensitive information. This bug has been present since the
+driver got accepted in commit 1c1008c793fa46703a2fee469f4235e1c7984333
+("net: bcmgenet: add main driver file").
+
+Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet.c
+@@ -1149,6 +1149,11 @@ static netdev_tx_t bcmgenet_xmit(struct
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (skb_padto(skb, ETH_ZLEN)) {
++ ret = NETDEV_TX_OK;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ /* set the SKB transmit checksum */
+ if (priv->desc_64b_en) {
+ ret = bcmgenet_put_tx_csum(dev, skb);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 10:33:06 -0400
+Subject: net: Correctly set segment mac_len in skb_segment().
+
+From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit fcdfe3a7fa4cb74391d42b6a26dc07c20dab1d82 ]
+
+When performing segmentation, the mac_len value is copied right
+out of the original skb. However, this value is not always set correctly
+(like when the packet is VLAN-tagged) and we'll end up copying a bad
+value.
+
+One way to demonstrate this is to configure a VM which tags
+packets internally and turn off VLAN acceleration on the forwarding
+bridge port. The packets show up corrupt like this:
+16:18:24.985548 52:54:00:ab:be:25 > 52:54:00:26:ce:a3, ethertype 802.1Q
+(0x8100), length 1518: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype 0x05e0,
+ 0x0000: 8cdb 1c7c 8cdb 0064 4006 b59d 0a00 6402 ...|...d@.....d.
+ 0x0010: 0a00 6401 9e0d b441 0a5e 64ec 0330 14fa ..d....A.^d..0..
+ 0x0020: 29e3 01c9 f871 0000 0101 080a 000a e833)....q.........3
+ 0x0030: 000f 8c75 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 ...unetperf.netp
+ 0x0040: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
+ 0x0050: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
+ 0x0060: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
+ ...
+
+This also leads to awful throughput as GSO packets are dropped and
+cause retransmissions.
+
+The solution is to set the mac_len using the values already available
+in then new skb. We've already adjusted all of the header offset, so we
+might as well correctly figure out the mac_len using skb_reset_mac_len().
+After this change, packets are segmented correctly and performance
+is restored.
+
+CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
++++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
+@@ -2968,9 +2968,9 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_bu
+ tail = nskb;
+
+ __copy_skb_header(nskb, head_skb);
+- nskb->mac_len = head_skb->mac_len;
+
+ skb_headers_offset_update(nskb, skb_headroom(nskb) - headroom);
++ skb_reset_mac_len(nskb);
+
+ skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(head_skb, -tnl_hlen,
+ nskb->data - tnl_hlen,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 16:28:07 -0700
+Subject: net: phy: re-apply PHY fixups during phy_register_device
+
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit d92f5dec6325079c550889883af51db1b77d5623 ]
+
+Commit 87aa9f9c61ad ("net: phy: consolidate PHY reset in phy_init_hw()")
+moved the call to phy_scan_fixups() in phy_init_hw() after a software
+reset is performed.
+
+By the time phy_init_hw() is called in phy_device_register(), no driver
+has been bound to this PHY yet, so all the checks in phy_init_hw()
+against the PHY driver and the PHY driver's config_init function will
+return 0. We will therefore never call phy_scan_fixups() as we should.
+
+Fix this by calling phy_scan_fixups() and check for its return value to
+restore the intended functionality.
+
+This broke PHY drivers which do register an early PHY fixup callback to
+intercept the PHY probing and do things like changing the 32-bits unique
+PHY identifier when a pseudo-PHY address has been used, as well as
+board-specific PHY fixups that need to be applied during driver probe
+time.
+
+Reported-by: Hauke Merthens <hauke-m@hauke-m.de>
+Reported-by: Jonas Gorski <jogo@openwrt.org>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c
++++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c
+@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ int phy_device_register(struct phy_devic
+ phydev->bus->phy_map[phydev->addr] = phydev;
+
+ /* Run all of the fixups for this PHY */
+- err = phy_init_hw(phydev);
++ err = phy_scan_fixups(phydev);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("PHY %d failed to initialize\n", phydev->addr);
+ goto out;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 15:22:45 +0200
+Subject: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
+
+From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1be9a950c646c9092fb3618197f7b6bfb50e82aa ]
+
+Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
+SCTP authentication enabled:
+
+Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
+CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
+task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
+PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
+LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
+pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
+sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
+r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
+r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
+r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
+Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
+Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
+Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
+Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
+[...]
+Backtrace:
+[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
+[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
+[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
+[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
+[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
+[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
+[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
+[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
+
+While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
+ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
+we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
+auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
+kind.
+
+Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
+needed can be found in RFC4895:
+
+ SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
+ blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
+ lifetime of an SCTP association.
+
+ Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
+ method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
+ the original peer that started the association and not by a
+ malicious attacker.
+
+To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
+peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
+authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
+parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
+
+ ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
+ <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
+ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
+ <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
+
+RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
+number and the peer's random number *after* the association
+has been established. The local and peer's random number along
+with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
+calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
+
+Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
+SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
+and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
+sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
+thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
+
+ ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
+ <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
+ <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
+ -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
+ ...
+
+Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
+the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
+
+ In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
+ of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
+ the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
+ RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
+ Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
+ has been established.
+
+In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
+
+ B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
+ association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
+ started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
+ INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
+ being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
+ The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
+ state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
+ the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
+ running and send a COOKIE ACK.
+
+In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
+same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
+Action B of section 5.2.4.
+
+Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
+case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
+side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
+peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
+association to update the existing one.
+
+Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
+the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
+However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
+asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
+that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
+return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
+leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
+authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
+
+That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
+
+ <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
+
+... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
+sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
+being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
+
+Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
+endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
+asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
+and dereferences it in ...
+
+ crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
+
+... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
+called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
+and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
+sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
+the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
+its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
+in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
+are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
+SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
+*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
+association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
+since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
+was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
+throw away each time.
+
+The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
+value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
+so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
+sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
+the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
+
+Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
+Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
+Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/associola.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
++++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
+@@ -1151,6 +1151,7 @@ void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_assoc
+ asoc->c = new->c;
+ asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
+ asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
++ asoc->peer.auth_capable = new->peer.auth_capable;
+ asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
+ sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
+ asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2014 21:26:58 +0400
+Subject: net: sendmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference
+
+From: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 40eea803c6b2cfaab092f053248cbeab3f368412 ]
+
+Sasha's report:
+ > While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running the latest -next
+ > kernel with the KASAN patchset, I've stumbled on the following spew:
+ >
+ > [ 4448.949424] ==================================================================
+ > [ 4448.951737] AddressSanitizer: user-memory-access on address 0
+ > [ 4448.952988] Read of size 2 by thread T19638:
+ > [ 4448.954510] CPU: 28 PID: 19638 Comm: trinity-c76 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140711-sasha-00046-g07d3099-dirty #813
+ > [ 4448.956823] ffff88046d86ca40 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37e78 ffff880082f37a40
+ > [ 4448.958233] ffffffffb6e47068 ffff880082f37a68 ffff880082f37a58 ffffffffb242708d
+ > [ 4448.959552] 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37a88 ffffffffb24255b1 0000000000000000
+ > [ 4448.961266] Call Trace:
+ > [ 4448.963158] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
+ > [ 4448.964244] kasan_report_user_access (mm/kasan/report.c:184)
+ > [ 4448.965507] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/kasan.c:352)
+ > [ 4448.966482] ? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
+ > [ 4448.967541] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
+ > [ 4448.968537] ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2555)
+ > [ 4448.970103] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:654)
+ > [ 4448.971584] ? might_fault (mm/memory.c:3741)
+ > [ 4448.972526] ? might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3740)
+ > [ 4448.973596] ? verify_iovec (net/core/iovec.c:64)
+ > [ 4448.974522] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2096)
+ > [ 4448.975797] ? put_lock_stats.isra.13 (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:254)
+ > [ 4448.977030] ? lock_release_holdtime (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:273)
+ > [ 4448.978197] ? lock_release_non_nested (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3434 (discriminator 1))
+ > [ 4448.979346] ? check_chain_key (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188)
+ > [ 4448.980535] __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2181)
+ > [ 4448.981592] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
+ > [ 4448.982773] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2607)
+ > [ 4448.984458] ? syscall_trace_enter (arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1500 (discriminator 2))
+ > [ 4448.985621] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
+ > [ 4448.986754] SyS_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2201)
+ > [ 4448.987708] tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:542)
+ > [ 4448.988929] ==================================================================
+
+This reports means that we've come to netlink_sendmsg() with msg->msg_name == NULL and msg->msg_namelen > 0.
+
+After this report there was no usual "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference"
+and this gave me a clue that address 0 is mapped and contains valid socket address structure in it.
+
+This bug was introduced in f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
+(net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic).
+Commit message states that:
+ "Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
+ non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
+ affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
+ address."
+But in fact this affects sendto when address 0 is mapped and contains
+socket address structure in it. In such case copy-in address will succeed,
+verify_iovec() function will successfully exit with msg->msg_namelen > 0
+and msg->msg_name == NULL.
+
+This patch fixes it by setting msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name == NULL.
+
+Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
+Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/compat.c | 9 +++++----
+ net/core/iovec.c | 6 +++---
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/compat.c
++++ b/net/compat.c
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int verify_compat_iovec(struct msghdr *k
+ {
+ int tot_len;
+
+- if (kern_msg->msg_namelen) {
++ if (kern_msg->msg_name && kern_msg->msg_namelen) {
+ if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
+ int err = move_addr_to_kernel(kern_msg->msg_name,
+ kern_msg->msg_namelen,
+@@ -93,10 +93,11 @@ int verify_compat_iovec(struct msghdr *k
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+- if (kern_msg->msg_name)
+- kern_msg->msg_name = kern_address;
+- } else
++ kern_msg->msg_name = kern_address;
++ } else {
+ kern_msg->msg_name = NULL;
++ kern_msg->msg_namelen = 0;
++ }
+
+ tot_len = iov_from_user_compat_to_kern(kern_iov,
+ (struct compat_iovec __user *)kern_msg->msg_iov,
+--- a/net/core/iovec.c
++++ b/net/core/iovec.c
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struc
+ {
+ int size, ct, err;
+
+- if (m->msg_namelen) {
++ if (m->msg_name && m->msg_namelen) {
+ if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
+ void __user *namep;
+ namep = (void __user __force *) m->msg_name;
+@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struc
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+- if (m->msg_name)
+- m->msg_name = address;
++ m->msg_name = address;
+ } else {
+ m->msg_name = NULL;
++ m->msg_namelen = 0;
+ }
+
+ size = m->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2014 16:49:52 +0200
+Subject: sctp: fix possible seqlock seadlock in sctp_packet_transmit()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 757efd32d5ce31f67193cc0e6a56e4dffcc42fb1 ]
+
+Dave reported following splat, caused by improper use of
+IP_INC_STATS_BH() in process context.
+
+BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: trinity-c117/14551
+caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
+CPU: 3 PID: 14551 Comm: trinity-c117 Not tainted 3.16.0+ #33
+ ffffffff9ec898f0 0000000047ea7e23 ffff88022d32f7f0 ffffffff9e7ee207
+ 0000000000000003 ffff88022d32f818 ffffffff9e397eaa ffff88023ee70b40
+ ffff88022d32f970 ffff8801c026d580 ffff88022d32f828 ffffffff9e397ee3
+Call Trace:
+ [<ffffffff9e7ee207>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
+ [<ffffffff9e397eaa>] check_preemption_disabled+0xfa/0x100
+ [<ffffffff9e397ee3>] __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
+ [<ffffffffc0839872>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x692/0x710 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffffc082a7f2>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2a2/0xc30 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffff9e0d985c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x7c/0xb0
+ [<ffffffff9e7f8c6d>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80
+ [<ffffffffc082b99a>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1a/0x20 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffffc081e112>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.23+0x1142/0x13f0 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffffc081c86b>] sctp_do_sm+0xdb/0x330 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffff9e0b8f1b>] ? preempt_count_sub+0xab/0x100
+ [<ffffffffc083b350>] ? sctp_cname+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffffc08389ca>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x3a/0x50 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffffc083358f>] sctp_sendmsg+0x88f/0xe30 [sctp]
+ [<ffffffff9e0d673a>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.28+0x9a/0x160
+ [<ffffffff9e0d62ce>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.27+0xe/0x30
+ [<ffffffff9e73b624>] inet_sendmsg+0x104/0x220
+ [<ffffffff9e73b525>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x220
+ [<ffffffff9e68ac4e>] sock_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0
+ [<ffffffff9e1c0c09>] ? might_fault+0xb9/0xc0
+ [<ffffffff9e1c0bae>] ? might_fault+0x5e/0xc0
+ [<ffffffff9e68b234>] SYSC_sendto+0x124/0x1c0
+ [<ffffffff9e0136b0>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x250/0x330
+ [<ffffffff9e68c3ce>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
+ [<ffffffff9e7f9be4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
+
+This is a followup of commits f1d8cba61c3c4b ("inet: fix possible
+seqlock deadlocks") and 7f88c6b23afbd315 ("ipv6: fix possible seqlock
+deadlock in ip6_finish_output2")
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/output.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/output.c
++++ b/net/sctp/output.c
+@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ out:
+ return err;
+ no_route:
+ kfree_skb(nskb);
+- IP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(asoc->base.sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
++ IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(asoc->base.sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
+
+ /* FIXME: Returning the 'err' will effect all the associations
+ * associated with a socket, although only one of the paths of the
iovec-make-sure-the-caller-actually-wants-anything-in-memcpy_fromiovecend.patch
batman-adv-fix-out-of-order-fragmentation-support.patch
sctp-fix-possible-seqlock-seadlock-in-sctp_packet_transmit.patch
+sparc-hook-up-renameat2-syscall.patch
+sparc64-do-not-insert-non-valid-ptes-into-the-tsb-hash-table.patch
+sparc64-guard-against-flushing-openfirmware-mappings.patch
+bbc-i2c-fix-bbc-i2c-envctrl-on-sunblade-2000.patch
+sunsab-fix-detection-of-break-on-sunsab-serial-console.patch
+sparc64-ldc_connect-should-not-return-einval-when-handshake-is-in-progress.patch
+arch-sparc-math-emu-math_32.c-drop-stray-break-operator.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 09:03:00 PDT 2014
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 22:27:56 -0700
+Subject: sparc: Hook up renameat2 syscall.
+
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit 26053926feb1c16ade9c30bc7443bf28d829d08e ]
+
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 3 ++-
+ arch/sparc/kernel/sys32.S | 1 +
+ arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_32.S | 1 +
+ arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_64.S | 2 ++
+ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
++++ b/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
+@@ -410,8 +410,9 @@
+ #define __NR_finit_module 342
+ #define __NR_sched_setattr 343
+ #define __NR_sched_getattr 344
++#define __NR_renameat2 345
+
+-#define NR_syscalls 345
++#define NR_syscalls 346
+
+ /* Bitmask values returned from kern_features system call. */
+ #define KERN_FEATURE_MIXED_MODE_STACK 0x00000001
+--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/sys32.S
++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/sys32.S
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SIGN1(sys32_futex, compat_sys_futex, %o1
+ SIGN1(sys32_recvfrom, compat_sys_recvfrom, %o0)
+ SIGN1(sys32_recvmsg, compat_sys_recvmsg, %o0)
+ SIGN1(sys32_sendmsg, compat_sys_sendmsg, %o0)
++SIGN2(sys32_renameat2, sys_renameat2, %o0, %o2)
+
+ .globl sys32_mmap2
+ sys32_mmap2:
+--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_32.S
++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_32.S
+@@ -86,3 +86,4 @@ sys_call_table:
+ /*330*/ .long sys_fanotify_mark, sys_prlimit64, sys_name_to_handle_at, sys_open_by_handle_at, sys_clock_adjtime
+ /*335*/ .long sys_syncfs, sys_sendmmsg, sys_setns, sys_process_vm_readv, sys_process_vm_writev
+ /*340*/ .long sys_ni_syscall, sys_kcmp, sys_finit_module, sys_sched_setattr, sys_sched_getattr
++/*345*/ .long sys_renameat2
+--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_64.S
++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_64.S
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ sys_call_table32:
+ /*330*/ .word compat_sys_fanotify_mark, sys_prlimit64, sys_name_to_handle_at, compat_sys_open_by_handle_at, compat_sys_clock_adjtime
+ .word sys_syncfs, compat_sys_sendmmsg, sys_setns, compat_sys_process_vm_readv, compat_sys_process_vm_writev
+ /*340*/ .word sys_kern_features, sys_kcmp, sys_finit_module, sys_sched_setattr, sys_sched_getattr
++ .word sys32_renameat2
+
+ #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+@@ -165,3 +166,4 @@ sys_call_table:
+ /*330*/ .word sys_fanotify_mark, sys_prlimit64, sys_name_to_handle_at, sys_open_by_handle_at, sys_clock_adjtime
+ .word sys_syncfs, sys_sendmmsg, sys_setns, sys_process_vm_readv, sys_process_vm_writev
+ /*340*/ .word sys_kern_features, sys_kcmp, sys_finit_module, sys_sched_setattr, sys_sched_getattr
++ .word sys_renameat2
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 09:03:00 PDT 2014
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2014 16:34:01 -0700
+Subject: sparc64: Do not insert non-valid PTEs into the TSB hash table.
+
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit 18f38132528c3e603c66ea464727b29e9bbcb91b ]
+
+The assumption was that update_mmu_cache() (and the equivalent for PMDs) would
+only be called when the PTE being installed will be accessible by the user.
+
+This is not true for code paths originating from remove_migration_pte().
+
+There are dire consequences for placing a non-valid PTE into the TSB. The TLB
+miss frramework assumes thatwhen a TSB entry matches we can just load it into
+the TLB and return from the TLB miss trap.
+
+So if a non-valid PTE is in there, we will deadlock taking the TLB miss over
+and over, never satisfying the miss.
+
+Just exit early from update_mmu_cache() and friends in this situation.
+
+Based upon a report and patch from Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze.
+
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
++++ b/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
+@@ -350,6 +350,10 @@ void update_mmu_cache(struct vm_area_str
+
+ mm = vma->vm_mm;
+
++ /* Don't insert a non-valid PTE into the TSB, we'll deadlock. */
++ if (!pte_accessible(mm, pte))
++ return;
++
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&mm->context.lock, flags);
+
+ #if defined(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE) || defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)
+@@ -2614,6 +2618,10 @@ void update_mmu_cache_pmd(struct vm_area
+
+ pte = pmd_val(entry);
+
++ /* Don't insert a non-valid PMD into the TSB, we'll deadlock. */
++ if (!(pte & _PAGE_VALID))
++ return;
++
+ /* We are fabricating 8MB pages using 4MB real hw pages. */
+ pte |= (addr & (1UL << REAL_HPAGE_SHIFT));
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 09:03:00 PDT 2014
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2014 20:07:37 -0700
+Subject: sparc64: Guard against flushing openfirmware mappings.
+
+From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4ca9a23765da3260058db3431faf5b4efd8cf926 ]
+
+Based almost entirely upon a patch by Christopher Alexander Tobias
+Schulze.
+
+In commit db64fe02258f1507e13fe5212a989922323685ce ("mm: rewrite vmap
+layer") lazy VMAP tlb flushing was added to the vmalloc layer. This
+causes problems on sparc64.
+
+Sparc64 has two VMAP mapped regions and they are not contiguous with
+eachother. First we have the malloc mapping area, then another
+unrelated region, then the vmalloc region.
+
+This "another unrelated region" is where the firmware is mapped.
+
+If the lazy TLB flushing logic in the vmalloc code triggers after
+we've had both a module unload and a vfree or similar, it will pass an
+address range that goes from somewhere inside the malloc region to
+somewhere inside the vmalloc region, and thus covering the
+openfirmware area entirely.
+
+The sparc64 kernel learns about openfirmware's dynamic mappings in
+this region early in the boot, and then services TLB misses in this
+area. But openfirmware has some locked TLB entries which are not
+mentioned in those dynamic mappings and we should thus not disturb
+them.
+
+These huge lazy TLB flush ranges causes those openfirmware locked TLB
+entries to be removed, resulting in all kinds of problems including
+hard hangs and crashes during reboot/reset.
+
+Besides causing problems like this, such huge TLB flush ranges are
+also incredibly inefficient. A plea has been made with the author of
+the VMAP lazy TLB flushing code, but for now we'll put a safety guard
+into our flush_tlb_kernel_range() implementation.
+
+Since the implementation has become non-trivial, stop defining it as a
+macro and instead make it a function in a C source file.
+
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/sparc/include/asm/tlbflush_64.h | 12 ++----------
+ arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/tlbflush_64.h
++++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/tlbflush_64.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_range(struc
+ {
+ }
+
++void flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
++
+ #define __HAVE_ARCH_ENTER_LAZY_MMU_MODE
+
+ extern void flush_tlb_pending(void);
+@@ -48,11 +50,6 @@ extern void __flush_tlb_kernel_range(uns
+
+ #ifndef CONFIG_SMP
+
+-#define flush_tlb_kernel_range(start,end) \
+-do { flush_tsb_kernel_range(start,end); \
+- __flush_tlb_kernel_range(start,end); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+ static inline void global_flush_tlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr)
+ {
+ __flush_tlb_page(CTX_HWBITS(mm->context), vaddr);
+@@ -63,11 +60,6 @@ static inline void global_flush_tlb_page
+ extern void smp_flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
+ extern void smp_flush_tlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr);
+
+-#define flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end) \
+-do { flush_tsb_kernel_range(start,end); \
+- smp_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end); \
+-} while (0)
+-
+ #define global_flush_tlb_page(mm, vaddr) \
+ smp_flush_tlb_page(mm, vaddr)
+
+--- a/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
++++ b/arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c
+@@ -2702,3 +2702,26 @@ void hugetlb_setup(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
++#define do_flush_tlb_kernel_range smp_flush_tlb_kernel_range
++#else
++#define do_flush_tlb_kernel_range __flush_tlb_kernel_range
++#endif
++
++void flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
++{
++ if (start < HI_OBP_ADDRESS && end > LOW_OBP_ADDRESS) {
++ if (start < LOW_OBP_ADDRESS) {
++ flush_tsb_kernel_range(start, LOW_OBP_ADDRESS);
++ do_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, LOW_OBP_ADDRESS);
++ }
++ if (end > HI_OBP_ADDRESS) {
++ flush_tsb_kernel_range(end, HI_OBP_ADDRESS);
++ do_flush_tlb_kernel_range(end, HI_OBP_ADDRESS);
++ }
++ } else {
++ flush_tsb_kernel_range(start, end);
++ do_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end);
++ }
++}
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 09:03:00 PDT 2014
+From: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2014 09:50:40 -0400
+Subject: sparc64: ldc_connect() should not return EINVAL when handshake is in progress.
+
+From: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4ec1b01029b4facb651b8ef70bc20a4be4cebc63 ]
+
+The LDC handshake could have been asynchronously triggered
+after ldc_bind() enables the ldc_rx() receive interrupt-handler
+(and thus intercepts incoming control packets)
+and before vio_port_up() calls ldc_connect(). If that is the case,
+ldc_connect() should return 0 and let the state-machine
+progress.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
+Acked-by: Karl Volz <karl.volz@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/sparc/kernel/ldc.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/ldc.c
++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/ldc.c
+@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ int ldc_connect(struct ldc_channel *lp)
+ if (!(lp->flags & LDC_FLAG_ALLOCED_QUEUES) ||
+ !(lp->flags & LDC_FLAG_REGISTERED_QUEUES) ||
+ lp->hs_state != LDC_HS_OPEN)
+- err = -EINVAL;
++ err = ((lp->hs_state > LDC_HS_OPEN) ? 0 : -EINVAL);
+ else
+ err = start_handshake(lp);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 09:03:00 PDT 2014
+From: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
+Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2014 16:01:53 +0200
+Subject: sunsab: Fix detection of BREAK on sunsab serial console
+
+From: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit fe418231b195c205701c0cc550a03f6c9758fd9e ]
+
+Fix detection of BREAK on sunsab serial console: BREAK detection was only
+performed when there were also serial characters received simultaneously.
+To handle all BREAKs correctly, the check for BREAK and the corresponding
+call to uart_handle_break() must also be done if count == 0, therefore
+duplicate this code fragment and pull it out of the loop over the received
+characters.
+
+Patch applies to 3.16-rc6.
+
+Signed-off-by: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/tty/serial/sunsab.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/tty/serial/sunsab.c
++++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sunsab.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,15 @@ receive_chars(struct uart_sunsab_port *u
+ (up->port.line == up->port.cons->index))
+ saw_console_brk = 1;
+
++ if (count == 0) {
++ if (unlikely(stat->sreg.isr1 & SAB82532_ISR1_BRK)) {
++ stat->sreg.isr0 &= ~(SAB82532_ISR0_PERR |
++ SAB82532_ISR0_FERR);
++ up->port.icount.brk++;
++ uart_handle_break(&up->port);
++ }
++ }
++
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ unsigned char ch = buf[i], flag;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 13:40:57 +0200
+Subject: tcp: Fix integer-overflow in TCP vegas
+
+From: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1f74e613ded11517db90b2bd57e9464d9e0fb161 ]
+
+In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
+may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
+need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.
+
+Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches.
+
+Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
+Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
+Cc: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie>
+Fixes: 8d3a564da34e (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix)
+Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_vegas.c
+@@ -219,7 +219,8 @@ static void tcp_vegas_cong_avoid(struct
+ * This is:
+ * (actual rate in segments) * baseRTT
+ */
+- target_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd * vegas->baseRTT / rtt;
++ target_cwnd = (u64)tp->snd_cwnd * vegas->baseRTT;
++ do_div(target_cwnd, rtt);
+
+ /* Calculate the difference between the window we had,
+ * and the window we would like to have. This quantity
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 12:07:27 +0200
+Subject: tcp: Fix integer-overflows in TCP veno
+
+From: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
+
+[ Upstream commit 45a07695bc64b3ab5d6d2215f9677e5b8c05a7d0 ]
+
+In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
+may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
+need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.
+
+A first attempt at fixing 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion
+control) was made by 159131149c2 (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it
+failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid().
+
+Fixes: 76f1017757aa0 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control)
+Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_veno.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_veno.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_veno.c
+@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static void tcp_veno_cong_avoid(struct s
+
+ rtt = veno->minrtt;
+
+- target_cwnd = (tp->snd_cwnd * veno->basertt);
++ target_cwnd = (u64)tp->snd_cwnd * veno->basertt;
+ target_cwnd <<= V_PARAM_SHIFT;
+ do_div(target_cwnd, rtt);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2014 15:12:45 +0200
+Subject: xfrm: Fix installation of AH IPsec SAs
+
+From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit a0e5ef53aac8e5049f9344857d8ec5237d31e58b ]
+
+The SPI check introduced in ea9884b3acf3311c8a11db67bfab21773f6f82ba
+was intended for IPComp SAs but actually prevented AH SAs from getting
+installed (depending on the SPI).
+
+Fixes: ea9884b3acf3 ("xfrm: check user specified spi for IPComp")
+Cc: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+@@ -177,9 +177,7 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm
+ attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD] ||
+ attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT] ||
+ attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP] ||
+- attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD] ||
+- (ntohl(p->id.spi) >= 0x10000))
+-
++ attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD])
+ goto out;
+ break;
+
+@@ -207,7 +205,8 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm
+ attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH] ||
+ attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC] ||
+ attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT] ||
+- attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD])
++ attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD] ||
++ (ntohl(p->id.spi) >= 0x10000))
+ goto out;
+ break;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri Aug 8 08:56:13 PDT 2014
+From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 12:34:21 +0200
+Subject: xfrm: Fix refcount imbalance in xfrm_lookup
+
+From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit b7eea4545ea775df957460f58eb56085a8892856 ]
+
+xfrm_lookup must return a dst_entry with a refcount for the caller.
+Git commit 1a1ccc96abb ("xfrm: Remove caching of xfrm_policy_sk_bundles")
+removed this refcount for the socket policy case accidentally.
+This patch restores it and sets DST_NOCACHE flag to make sure
+that the dst_entry is freed when the refcount becomes null.
+
+Fixes: 1a1ccc96abb ("xfrm: Remove caching of xfrm_policy_sk_bundles")
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+@@ -2107,6 +2107,8 @@ struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup(struct net
+ goto no_transform;
+ }
+
++ dst_hold(&xdst->u.dst);
++ xdst->u.dst.flags |= DST_NOCACHE;
+ route = xdst->route;
+ }
+ }
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
