Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher

(CVE-2006-4339)

Submitted by:  Ben Laurie, Google Security Team
Reviewed by: bmoeller, mjc, shenson

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 3cc791067181f6e3051c8d9cc3c1dabe79266dbf..50ececbe665064e3163c0c3600f43deb78cbdbc4 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
   *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
      [Ben Laurie]
 
@@ -962,6 +965,9 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
   *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
      possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
      undesirable limitations.

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 4cdfbf4377ba978537c687cc2e1f21535d97d865..6bda70f39b3e1ebba96aae04d34e886c092fea0f 100644 (file)
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c:
+
+      o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
+      o New cipher Camellia
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b:
 
       o Cipher string fixes.
@@ -17,7 +22,7 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
 
-      o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CAN-2005-2969
+      o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Extended Windows CE support
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
@@ -94,6 +99,10 @@
       o Added initial support for Win64.
       o Added alternate pkg-config files.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
+
+      o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
 
       o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
@@ -105,7 +114,7 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h:
 
-      o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CAN-2005-2969
+      o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
       o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
 

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index d302254bb1b1c1e1422dc642dddc45a885f43bba..ce6f54ffed5ea8bcdb847aea360201cfc8878adf 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q                      127
 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR                       121
 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED                      114
+#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT                   105
 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME                               128
 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME                               129
 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED              130

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 69cabd2716445bb1a88b2ef0273b6d498b8ecc41..d6e07a2c5c1c8448bc61b83bba2ada3c1de3f89c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -640,6 +640,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                {
        case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
                r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+               /* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
+                  this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
+                  signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
+                  small. */
+               if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
+                       {
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
                break;
        case RSA_X931_PADDING:
                r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index f82b2d6ad994692aa007f2e57d93013be97b1e1f..584adb02052e0dcea386edf1a7b69e54345079b5 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 230ec6d7ea2a981ead6a4a8fa45d1f38128298e5..71aabeea1bd73bca46c8a1657273dbedbffad4e0 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -185,6 +185,23 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
                sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
 
                if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+
+               /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+               if(p != s+i)
+                       {
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
+                  create forgeries */
+               if(sig->algor->parameter
+                  && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+                       {
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
                sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);