--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
+Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 13:30:57 +0200
+Subject: 8139too: Use disable_irq_nosync() in rtl8139_poll_controller()
+
+From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
+
+[ Upstream commit af3e0fcf78879f718c5f73df0814951bd7057d34 ]
+
+Use disable_irq_nosync() instead of disable_irq() as this might be
+called in atomic context with netpoll.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139too.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139too.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/8139too.c
+@@ -2224,7 +2224,7 @@ static void rtl8139_poll_controller(stru
+ struct rtl8139_private *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
+ const int irq = tp->pci_dev->irq;
+
+- disable_irq(irq);
++ disable_irq_nosync(irq);
+ rtl8139_interrupt(irq, dev);
+ enable_irq(irq);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 19:32:10 -0400
+Subject: bonding: do not allow rlb updates to invalid mac
+
+From: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4fa8667ca3989ce14cf66301fa251544fbddbdd0 ]
+
+Make sure multicast, broadcast, and zero mac's cannot be the output of rlb
+updates, which should all be directed arps. Receive load balancing will be
+collapsed if any of these happen, as the switch will broadcast.
+
+Signed-off-by: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
+@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static void rlb_update_client(struct rlb
+ {
+ int i;
+
+- if (!client_info->slave)
++ if (!client_info->slave || !is_valid_ether_addr(client_info->mac_dst))
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < RLB_ARP_BURST_SIZE; i++) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 19:32:11 -0400
+Subject: bonding: send learning packets for vlans on slave
+
+From: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 21706ee8a47d3ede7fdae0be6d7c0a0e31a83229 ]
+
+There was a regression at some point from the intended functionality of
+commit f60c3704e87d ("bonding: Fix alb mode to only use first level
+vlans.")
+
+Given the return value vlan_get_encap_level() we need to store the nest
+level of the bond device, and then compare the vlan's encap level to
+this. Without this, this check always fails and learning packets are
+never sent.
+
+In addition, this same commit caused a regression in the behavior of
+balance_alb, which requires learning packets be sent for all interfaces
+using the slave's mac in order to load balance properly. For vlan's
+that have not set a user mac, we can send after checking one bit.
+Otherwise we need send the set mac, albeit defeating rx load balancing
+for that vlan.
+
+Signed-off-by: Debabrata Banerjee <dbanerje@akamai.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 2 ++
+ include/net/bonding.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
+@@ -943,6 +943,10 @@ static void alb_send_lp_vid(struct slave
+ skb->priority = TC_PRIO_CONTROL;
+ skb->dev = slave->dev;
+
++ netdev_dbg(slave->bond->dev,
++ "Send learning packet: dev %s mac %pM vlan %d\n",
++ slave->dev->name, mac_addr, vid);
++
+ if (vid)
+ __vlan_hwaccel_put_tag(skb, vlan_proto, vid);
+
+@@ -965,14 +969,13 @@ static int alb_upper_dev_walk(struct net
+ u8 *mac_addr = data->mac_addr;
+ struct bond_vlan_tag *tags;
+
+- if (is_vlan_dev(upper) && vlan_get_encap_level(upper) == 0) {
+- if (strict_match &&
+- ether_addr_equal_64bits(mac_addr,
+- upper->dev_addr)) {
++ if (is_vlan_dev(upper) &&
++ bond->nest_level == vlan_get_encap_level(upper) - 1) {
++ if (upper->addr_assign_type == NET_ADDR_STOLEN) {
+ alb_send_lp_vid(slave, mac_addr,
+ vlan_dev_vlan_proto(upper),
+ vlan_dev_vlan_id(upper));
+- } else if (!strict_match) {
++ } else {
+ alb_send_lp_vid(slave, upper->dev_addr,
+ vlan_dev_vlan_proto(upper),
+ vlan_dev_vlan_id(upper));
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+@@ -1734,6 +1734,8 @@ int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond
+ if (bond_mode_uses_xmit_hash(bond))
+ bond_update_slave_arr(bond, NULL);
+
++ bond->nest_level = dev_get_nest_level(bond_dev);
++
+ netdev_info(bond_dev, "Enslaving %s as %s interface with %s link\n",
+ slave_dev->name,
+ bond_is_active_slave(new_slave) ? "an active" : "a backup",
+--- a/include/net/bonding.h
++++ b/include/net/bonding.h
+@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ struct bonding {
+ struct slave __rcu *primary_slave;
+ struct bond_up_slave __rcu *slave_arr; /* Array of usable slaves */
+ bool force_primary;
++ u32 nest_level;
+ s32 slave_cnt; /* never change this value outside the attach/detach wrappers */
+ int (*recv_probe)(const struct sk_buff *, struct bonding *,
+ struct slave *);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2018 20:59:24 +0800
+Subject: bridge: check iface upper dev when setting master via ioctl
+
+From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e8238fc2bd7b4c3c7554fa2df067e796610212fc ]
+
+When we set a bond slave's master to bridge via ioctl, we only check
+the IFF_BRIDGE_PORT flag. Although we will find the slave's real master
+at netdev_master_upper_dev_link() later, it already does some settings
+and allocates some resources. It would be better to return as early
+as possible.
+
+v1 -> v2:
+use netdev_master_upper_dev_get() instead of netdev_has_any_upper_dev()
+to check if we have a master, because not all upper devs are masters,
+e.g. vlan device.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+de73361ee4971b6e6f75@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bridge/br_if.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/br_if.c
++++ b/net/bridge/br_if.c
+@@ -503,8 +503,8 @@ int br_add_if(struct net_bridge *br, str
+ if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_start_xmit == br_dev_xmit)
+ return -ELOOP;
+
+- /* Device is already being bridged */
+- if (br_port_exists(dev))
++ /* Device has master upper dev */
++ if (netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ /* No bridging devices that dislike that (e.g. wireless) */
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 09:39:20 -0700
+Subject: dccp: fix tasklet usage
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit a8d7aa17bbc970971ccdf71988ea19230ab368b1 ]
+
+syzbot reported a crash in tasklet_action_common() caused by dccp.
+
+dccp needs to make sure socket wont disappear before tasklet handler
+has completed.
+
+This patch takes a reference on the socket when arming the tasklet,
+and moves the sock_put() from dccp_write_xmit_timer() to dccp_write_xmitlet()
+
+kernel BUG at kernel/softirq.c:514!
+invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
+Dumping ftrace buffer:
+ (ftrace buffer empty)
+Modules linked in:
+CPU: 1 PID: 17 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #30
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+RIP: 0010:tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0x6db/0x700 kernel/softirq.c:515
+RSP: 0018:ffff8801d9b3faf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
+dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
+RAX: 1ffff1003b367f6b RBX: ffff8801daf1f3f0 RCX: 0000000000000000
+RDX: ffff8801cf895498 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000000
+RBP: ffff8801d9b3fc40 R08: ffffed0039f12a95 R09: ffffed0039f12a94
+dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
+R10: ffffed0039f12a94 R11: ffff8801cf8954a3 R12: 0000000000000000
+R13: ffff8801d9b3fc18 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801cf895490
+FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: 0000001b2bc28000 CR3: 00000001a08a9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
+DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+Call Trace:
+ tasklet_action+0x1d/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:533
+ __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
+dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
+ run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:646
+ smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164
+ kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:238
+ ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
+Code: 48 8b 85 e8 fe ff ff 48 8b 95 f0 fe ff ff e9 94 fb ff ff 48 89 95 f0 fe ff ff e8 81 53 6e 00 48 8b 95 f0 fe ff ff e9 62 fb ff ff <0f> 0b 48 89 cf 48 89 8d e8 fe ff ff e8 64 53 6e 00 48 8b 8d e8
+RIP: tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0x6db/0x700 kernel/softirq.c:515 RSP: ffff8801d9b3faf8
+
+Fixes: dc841e30eaea ("dccp: Extend CCID packet dequeueing interface")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
+Cc: dccp@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ net/dccp/timer.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
++++ b/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
+@@ -126,6 +126,16 @@ static void ccid2_change_l_seq_window(st
+ DCCPF_SEQ_WMAX));
+ }
+
++static void dccp_tasklet_schedule(struct sock *sk)
++{
++ struct tasklet_struct *t = &dccp_sk(sk)->dccps_xmitlet;
++
++ if (!test_and_set_bit(TASKLET_STATE_SCHED, &t->state)) {
++ sock_hold(sk);
++ __tasklet_schedule(t);
++ }
++}
++
+ static void ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire(unsigned long data)
+ {
+ struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)data;
+@@ -166,7 +176,7 @@ static void ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire(unsig
+
+ /* if we were blocked before, we may now send cwnd=1 packet */
+ if (sender_was_blocked)
+- tasklet_schedule(&dccp_sk(sk)->dccps_xmitlet);
++ dccp_tasklet_schedule(sk);
+ /* restart backed-off timer */
+ sk_reset_timer(sk, &hc->tx_rtotimer, jiffies + hc->tx_rto);
+ out:
+@@ -706,7 +716,7 @@ static void ccid2_hc_tx_packet_recv(stru
+ done:
+ /* check if incoming Acks allow pending packets to be sent */
+ if (sender_was_blocked && !ccid2_cwnd_network_limited(hc))
+- tasklet_schedule(&dccp_sk(sk)->dccps_xmitlet);
++ dccp_tasklet_schedule(sk);
+ dccp_ackvec_parsed_cleanup(&hc->tx_av_chunks);
+ }
+
+--- a/net/dccp/timer.c
++++ b/net/dccp/timer.c
+@@ -230,12 +230,12 @@ static void dccp_write_xmitlet(unsigned
+ else
+ dccp_write_xmit(sk);
+ bh_unlock_sock(sk);
++ sock_put(sk);
+ }
+
+ static void dccp_write_xmit_timer(unsigned long data)
+ {
+ dccp_write_xmitlet(data);
+- sock_put((struct sock *)data);
+ }
+
+ void dccp_init_xmit_timers(struct sock *sk)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 14:09:04 -0700
+Subject: hv_netvsc: set master device
+
+From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 97f3efb64323beb0690576e9d74e94998ad6e82a ]
+
+The hyper-v transparent bonding should have used master_dev_link.
+The netvsc device should look like a master bond device not
+like the upper side of a tunnel.
+
+This makes the semantics the same so that userspace applications
+looking at network devices see the correct master relationshipship.
+
+Fixes: 0c195567a8f6 ("netvsc: transparent VF management")
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
++++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
+@@ -1742,7 +1742,8 @@ static int netvsc_vf_join(struct net_dev
+ goto rx_handler_failed;
+ }
+
+- ret = netdev_upper_dev_link(vf_netdev, ndev);
++ ret = netdev_master_upper_dev_link(vf_netdev, ndev,
++ NULL, NULL);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ netdev_err(vf_netdev,
+ "can not set master device %s (err = %d)\n",
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
+Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 09:41:19 +0300
+Subject: ipv4: fix fnhe usage by non-cached routes
+
+From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
+
+[ Upstream commit 94720e3aee6884d8c8beb678001629da60ec6366 ]
+
+Allow some non-cached routes to use non-expired fnhe:
+
+1. ip_del_fnhe: moved above and now called by find_exception.
+The 4.5+ commit deed49df7390 expires fnhe only when caching
+routes. Change that to:
+
+1.1. use fnhe for non-cached local output routes, with the help
+from (2)
+
+1.2. allow __mkroute_input to detect expired fnhe (outdated
+fnhe_gw, for example) when do_cache is false, eg. when itag!=0
+for unicast destinations.
+
+2. __mkroute_output: keep fi to allow local routes with orig_oif != 0
+to use fnhe info even when the new route will not be cached into fnhe.
+After commit 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib
+result for local traffic") it means all local routes will be affected
+because they are not cached. This change is used to solve a PMTU
+problem with IPVS (and probably Netfilter DNAT) setups that redirect
+local clients from target local IP (local route to Virtual IP)
+to new remote IP target, eg. IPVS TUN real server. Loopback has
+64K MTU and we need to create fnhe on the local route that will
+keep the reduced PMTU for the Virtual IP. Without this change
+fnhe_pmtu is updated from ICMP but never exposed to non-cached
+local routes. This includes routes with flowi4_oif!=0 for 4.6+ and
+with flowi4_oif=any for 4.14+).
+
+3. update_or_create_fnhe: make sure fnhe_expires is not 0 for
+new entries
+
+Fixes: 839da4d98960 ("net: ipv4: set orig_oif based on fib result for local traffic")
+Fixes: d6d5e999e5df ("route: do not cache fib route info on local routes with oif")
+Fixes: deed49df7390 ("route: check and remove route cache when we get route")
+Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
+Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
+Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/route.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
+@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static void update_or_create_fnhe(struct
+ fnhe->fnhe_daddr = daddr;
+ fnhe->fnhe_gw = gw;
+ fnhe->fnhe_pmtu = pmtu;
+- fnhe->fnhe_expires = expires;
++ fnhe->fnhe_expires = max(1UL, expires);
+
+ /* Exception created; mark the cached routes for the nexthop
+ * stale, so anyone caching it rechecks if this exception
+@@ -1286,6 +1286,36 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_mtu(const struc
+ return mtu - lwtunnel_headroom(dst->lwtstate, mtu);
+ }
+
++static void ip_del_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
++{
++ struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
++ struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, __rcu **fnhe_p;
++ u32 hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
++
++ spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
++
++ hash = rcu_dereference_protected(nh->nh_exceptions,
++ lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
++ hash += hval;
++
++ fnhe_p = &hash->chain;
++ fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
++ while (fnhe) {
++ if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
++ rcu_assign_pointer(*fnhe_p, rcu_dereference_protected(
++ fnhe->fnhe_next, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)));
++ fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
++ kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu);
++ break;
++ }
++ fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next;
++ fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(fnhe->fnhe_next,
++ lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
++ }
++
++ spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
++}
++
+ static struct fib_nh_exception *find_exception(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
+ {
+ struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash = rcu_dereference(nh->nh_exceptions);
+@@ -1299,8 +1329,14 @@ static struct fib_nh_exception *find_exc
+
+ for (fnhe = rcu_dereference(hash[hval].chain); fnhe;
+ fnhe = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_next)) {
+- if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr)
++ if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
++ if (fnhe->fnhe_expires &&
++ time_after(jiffies, fnhe->fnhe_expires)) {
++ ip_del_fnhe(nh, daddr);
++ break;
++ }
+ return fnhe;
++ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+@@ -1620,36 +1656,6 @@ static void ip_handle_martian_source(str
+ #endif
+ }
+
+-static void ip_del_fnhe(struct fib_nh *nh, __be32 daddr)
+-{
+- struct fnhe_hash_bucket *hash;
+- struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe, __rcu **fnhe_p;
+- u32 hval = fnhe_hashfun(daddr);
+-
+- spin_lock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+-
+- hash = rcu_dereference_protected(nh->nh_exceptions,
+- lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+- hash += hval;
+-
+- fnhe_p = &hash->chain;
+- fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(*fnhe_p, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+- while (fnhe) {
+- if (fnhe->fnhe_daddr == daddr) {
+- rcu_assign_pointer(*fnhe_p, rcu_dereference_protected(
+- fnhe->fnhe_next, lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock)));
+- fnhe_flush_routes(fnhe);
+- kfree_rcu(fnhe, rcu);
+- break;
+- }
+- fnhe_p = &fnhe->fnhe_next;
+- fnhe = rcu_dereference_protected(fnhe->fnhe_next,
+- lockdep_is_held(&fnhe_lock));
+- }
+-
+- spin_unlock_bh(&fnhe_lock);
+-}
+-
+ static void set_lwt_redirect(struct rtable *rth)
+ {
+ if (lwtunnel_output_redirect(rth->dst.lwtstate)) {
+@@ -1716,20 +1722,10 @@ static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buf
+
+ fnhe = find_exception(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
+ if (do_cache) {
+- if (fnhe) {
++ if (fnhe)
+ rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
+- if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
+- time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
+- ip_del_fnhe(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
+- fnhe = NULL;
+- } else {
+- goto rt_cache;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
+-
+-rt_cache:
++ else
++ rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
+ if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
+ skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
+ goto out;
+@@ -2206,39 +2202,31 @@ static struct rtable *__mkroute_output(c
+ * the loopback interface and the IP_PKTINFO ipi_ifindex will
+ * be set to the loopback interface as well.
+ */
+- fi = NULL;
++ do_cache = false;
+ }
+
+ fnhe = NULL;
+ do_cache &= fi != NULL;
+- if (do_cache) {
++ if (fi) {
+ struct rtable __rcu **prth;
+ struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(*res);
+
+ fnhe = find_exception(nh, fl4->daddr);
++ if (!do_cache)
++ goto add;
+ if (fnhe) {
+ prth = &fnhe->fnhe_rth_output;
+- rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
+- if (rth && rth->dst.expires &&
+- time_after(jiffies, rth->dst.expires)) {
+- ip_del_fnhe(nh, fl4->daddr);
+- fnhe = NULL;
+- } else {
+- goto rt_cache;
++ } else {
++ if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
++ FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
++ !(nh->nh_gw &&
++ nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
++ do_cache = false;
++ goto add;
+ }
++ prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
+ }
+-
+- if (unlikely(fl4->flowi4_flags &
+- FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH &&
+- !(nh->nh_gw &&
+- nh->nh_scope == RT_SCOPE_LINK))) {
+- do_cache = false;
+- goto add;
+- }
+- prth = raw_cpu_ptr(nh->nh_pcpu_rth_output);
+ rth = rcu_dereference(*prth);
+-
+-rt_cache:
+ if (rt_cache_valid(rth) && dst_hold_safe(&rth->dst))
+ return rth;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 10:59:34 -0700
+Subject: ipv4: fix memory leaks in udp_sendmsg, ping_v4_sendmsg
+
+From: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1b97013bfb11d66f041de691de6f0fec748ce016 ]
+
+Fix more memory leaks in ip_cmsg_send() callers. Part of them were fixed
+earlier in 919483096bfe.
+
+* udp_sendmsg one was there since the beginning when linux sources were
+ first added to git;
+* ping_v4_sendmsg one was copy/pasted in c319b4d76b9e.
+
+Whenever return happens in udp_sendmsg() or ping_v4_sendmsg() IP options
+have to be freed if they were allocated previously.
+
+Add label so that future callers (if any) can use it instead of kfree()
+before return that is easy to forget.
+
+Fixes: c319b4d76b9e (net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind)
+Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/ping.c | 7 +++++--
+ net/ipv4/udp.c | 7 +++++--
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
+@@ -775,8 +775,10 @@ static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock *
+ ipc.addr = faddr = daddr;
+
+ if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
+- if (!daddr)
+- return -EINVAL;
++ if (!daddr) {
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto out_free;
++ }
+ faddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
+ }
+ tos = get_rttos(&ipc, inet);
+@@ -842,6 +844,7 @@ back_from_confirm:
+
+ out:
+ ip_rt_put(rt);
++out_free:
+ if (free)
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
+ if (!err) {
+--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+@@ -978,8 +978,10 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct
+ sock_tx_timestamp(sk, ipc.sockc.tsflags, &ipc.tx_flags);
+
+ if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
+- if (!daddr)
+- return -EINVAL;
++ if (!daddr) {
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto out_free;
++ }
+ faddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
+ connected = 0;
+ }
+@@ -1087,6 +1089,7 @@ do_append_data:
+
+ out:
+ ip_rt_put(rt);
++out_free:
+ if (free)
+ kfree(ipc.opt);
+ if (!err)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Sun, 29 Apr 2018 09:54:59 -0700
+Subject: ipv6: fix uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit cea67a2dd6b2419dcc13a39309b9a79a1f773193 ]
+
+syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys(),
+root caused to a bad assumption of ICMP header being already
+pulled in skb->head
+
+ip_multipath_l3_keys() does the correct thing, so it is an IPv6 only bug.
+
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_multipath_l3_keys net/ipv6/route.c:1830 [inline]
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rt6_multipath_hash+0x5c4/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:1858
+CPU: 0 PID: 4507 Comm: syz-executor661 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
+ kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
+ __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
+ ip6_multipath_l3_keys net/ipv6/route.c:1830 [inline]
+ rt6_multipath_hash+0x5c4/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:1858
+ ip6_route_input+0x65a/0x920 net/ipv6/route.c:1884
+ ip6_rcv_finish+0x413/0x6e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
+ NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
+ ipv6_rcv+0x1e16/0x2340 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:208
+ __netif_receive_skb_core+0x47df/0x4a90 net/core/dev.c:4562
+ __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4627 [inline]
+ netif_receive_skb_internal+0x49d/0x630 net/core/dev.c:4701
+ netif_receive_skb+0x230/0x240 net/core/dev.c:4725
+ tun_rx_batched drivers/net/tun.c:1555 [inline]
+ tun_get_user+0x740f/0x7c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1962
+ tun_chr_write_iter+0x1d4/0x330 drivers/net/tun.c:1990
+ call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1782 [inline]
+ new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline]
+ __vfs_write+0x7fb/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:482
+ vfs_write+0x463/0x8d0 fs/read_write.c:544
+ SYSC_write+0x172/0x360 fs/read_write.c:589
+ SyS_write+0x55/0x80 fs/read_write.c:581
+ do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
+
+Fixes: 23aebdacb05d ("ipv6: Compute multipath hash for ICMP errors from offending packet")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/route.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
+@@ -1222,11 +1222,16 @@ static void ip6_multipath_l3_keys(const
+ const struct ipv6hdr *inner_iph;
+ const struct icmp6hdr *icmph;
+ struct ipv6hdr _inner_iph;
++ struct icmp6hdr _icmph;
+
+ if (likely(outer_iph->nexthdr != IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
+ goto out;
+
+- icmph = icmp6_hdr(skb);
++ icmph = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb),
++ sizeof(_icmph), &_icmph);
++ if (!icmph)
++ goto out;
++
+ if (icmph->icmp6_type != ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH &&
+ icmph->icmp6_type != ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG &&
+ icmph->icmp6_type != ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED &&
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 09:02:25 -0700
+Subject: llc: better deal with too small mtu
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 2c5d5b13c6eb79f5677e206b8aad59b3a2097f60 ]
+
+syzbot loves to set very small mtu on devices, since it brings joy.
+We must make llc_ui_sendmsg() fool proof.
+
+usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to wrapped address (offset 0, size 18446612139802320068)!
+
+kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:100!
+invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
+Dumping ftrace buffer:
+ (ftrace buffer empty)
+Modules linked in:
+CPU: 0 PID: 17464 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #36
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88
+RSP: 0018:ffff8801868bf800 EFLAGS: 00010282
+RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffffffff87d2fb00 RCX: 0000000000000000
+RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: ffffffff81610731 RDI: ffffed0030d17ef6
+RBP: ffff8801868bf858 R08: ffff88018daa4200 R09: ffffed003b5c4fb0
+R10: ffffed003b5c4fb0 R11: ffff8801dae27d87 R12: ffffffff87d2f8e0
+R13: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R14: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R15: ffffffff87d2f7a0
+FS: 00007f56a14ac700(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: 0000001b2bc21000 CR3: 00000001abeb1000 CR4: 00000000001426f0
+DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000030602
+Call Trace:
+ check_bogus_address mm/usercopy.c:153 [inline]
+ __check_object_size+0x5d9/0x5d9 mm/usercopy.c:256
+ check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:108 [inline]
+ check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:139 [inline]
+ copy_from_iter_full include/linux/uio.h:121 [inline]
+ memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3305 [inline]
+ llc_ui_sendmsg+0x4b1/0x1530 net/llc/af_llc.c:941
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
+ __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
+ __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
+ do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
+RIP: 0033:0x455979
+RSP: 002b:00007f56a14abc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f56a14ac6d4 RCX: 0000000000455979
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
+RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 00000000200012c0 R09: 0000000000000010
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
+R13: 0000000000000548 R14: 00000000006fbf60 R15: 0000000000000000
+Code: 55 c0 e8 c0 55 bb ff ff 75 c8 48 8b 55 c0 4d 89 f9 ff 75 d0 4d 89 e8 48 89 d9 4c 89 e6 41 56 48 c7 c7 80 fa d2 87 e8 a0 0b a3 ff <0f> 0b e8 95 55 bb ff e8 c0 a8 f7 ff 8b 95 14 ff ff ff 4d 89 e8
+RIP: usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88 RSP: ffff8801868bf800
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/llc/af_llc.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/llc/af_llc.c
++++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c
+@@ -930,6 +930,9 @@ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket
+ if (size > llc->dev->mtu)
+ size = llc->dev->mtu;
+ copied = size - hdrlen;
++ rc = -EINVAL;
++ if (copied < 0)
++ goto release;
+ release_sock(sk);
+ skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc);
+ lock_sock(sk);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Rob Taglang <rob@taglang.io>
+Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 17:13:06 -0400
+Subject: net: ethernet: sun: niu set correct packet size in skb
+
+From: Rob Taglang <rob@taglang.io>
+
+[ Upstream commit 14224923c3600bae2ac4dcae3bf0c3d4dc2812be ]
+
+Currently, skb->len and skb->data_len are set to the page size, not
+the packet size. This causes the frame check sequence to not be
+located at the "end" of the packet resulting in ethernet frame check
+errors. The driver does work currently, but stricter kernel facing
+networking solutions like OpenVSwitch will drop these packets as
+invalid.
+
+These changes set the packet size correctly so that these errors no
+longer occur. The length does not include the frame check sequence, so
+that subtraction was removed.
+
+Tested on Oracle/SUN Multithreaded 10-Gigabit Ethernet Network
+Controller [108e:abcd] and validated in wireshark.
+
+Signed-off-by: Rob Taglang <rob@taglang.io>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
+@@ -3442,7 +3442,7 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct nap
+
+ len = (val & RCR_ENTRY_L2_LEN) >>
+ RCR_ENTRY_L2_LEN_SHIFT;
+- len -= ETH_FCS_LEN;
++ append_size = len + ETH_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN;
+
+ addr = (val & RCR_ENTRY_PKT_BUF_ADDR) <<
+ RCR_ENTRY_PKT_BUF_ADDR_SHIFT;
+@@ -3452,7 +3452,6 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct nap
+ RCR_ENTRY_PKTBUFSZ_SHIFT];
+
+ off = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+- append_size = rcr_size;
+ if (num_rcr == 1) {
+ int ptype;
+
+@@ -3465,7 +3464,7 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct nap
+ else
+ skb_checksum_none_assert(skb);
+ } else if (!(val & RCR_ENTRY_MULTI))
+- append_size = len - skb->len;
++ append_size = append_size - skb->len;
+
+ niu_rx_skb_append(skb, page, off, append_size, rcr_size);
+ if ((page->index + rp->rbr_block_size) - rcr_size == addr) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 May 2018 12:41:22 -0500
+Subject: net: ethernet: ti: cpsw: fix packet leaking in dual_mac mode
+
+From: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5e5add172ea81152d518b161ec5706503ad3d799 ]
+
+In dual_mac mode packets arrived on one port should not be forwarded by
+switch hw to another port. Only Linux Host can forward packets between
+ports. The below test case (reported in [1]) shows that packet arrived on
+one port can be leaked to anoter (reproducible with dual port evms):
+ - connect port 1 (eth0) to linux Host 0 and run tcpdump or Wireshark
+ - connect port 2 (eth1) to linux Host 1 with vlan 1 configured
+ - ping <IPx> from Host 1 through vlan 1 interface.
+ARP packets will be seen on Host 0.
+
+Issue happens because dual_mac mode is implemnted using two vlans: 1 (Port
+1+Port 0) and 2 (Port 2+Port 0), so there are vlan records created for for
+each vlan. By default, the ALE will find valid vlan record in its table
+when vlan 1 tagged packet arrived on Port 2 and so forwards packet to all
+ports which are vlan 1 members (like Port.
+
+To avoid such behaviorr the ALE VLAN ID Ingress Check need to be enabled
+for each external CPSW port (ALE_PORTCTLn.VID_INGRESS_CHECK) so ALE will
+drop ingress packets if Rx port is not VLAN member.
+
+Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c
+@@ -1260,6 +1260,8 @@ static inline void cpsw_add_dual_emac_de
+ cpsw_ale_add_ucast(cpsw->ale, priv->mac_addr,
+ HOST_PORT_NUM, ALE_VLAN |
+ ALE_SECURE, slave->port_vlan);
++ cpsw_ale_control_set(cpsw->ale, slave_port,
++ ALE_PORT_DROP_UNKNOWN_VLAN, 1);
+ }
+
+ static void soft_reset_slave(struct cpsw_slave *slave)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
+Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 09:06:04 +0200
+Subject: net/mlx4_en: Fix an error handling path in 'mlx4_en_init_netdev()'
+
+From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
+
+[ Upstream commit a577d868b768a3baf16cdd4841ab8cfb165521d6 ]
+
+If an error occurs, 'mlx4_en_destroy_netdev()' is called.
+It then calls 'mlx4_en_free_resources()' which does the needed resources
+cleanup.
+
+So, doing some explicit kfree in the error handling path would lead to
+some double kfree.
+
+Simplify code to avoid such a case.
+
+Fixes: 67f8b1dcb9ee ("net/mlx4_en: Refactor the XDP forwarding rings scheme")
+Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
+Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c | 8 +-------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_netdev.c
+@@ -3318,12 +3318,11 @@ int mlx4_en_init_netdev(struct mlx4_en_d
+ MAX_TX_RINGS, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!priv->tx_ring[t]) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+- goto err_free_tx;
++ goto out;
+ }
+ priv->tx_cq[t] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mlx4_en_cq *) *
+ MAX_TX_RINGS, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!priv->tx_cq[t]) {
+- kfree(priv->tx_ring[t]);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+@@ -3576,11 +3575,6 @@ int mlx4_en_init_netdev(struct mlx4_en_d
+
+ return 0;
+
+-err_free_tx:
+- while (t--) {
+- kfree(priv->tx_ring[t]);
+- kfree(priv->tx_cq[t]);
+- }
+ out:
+ mlx4_en_destroy_netdev(dev);
+ return err;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 18:35:13 +0300
+Subject: net/mlx4_en: Verify coalescing parameters are in range
+
+From: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6ad4e91c6d796b38a7f0e724db1de28eeb122bad ]
+
+Add check of coalescing parameters received through ethtool are within
+range of values supported by the HW.
+Driver gets the coalescing rx/tx-usecs and rx/tx-frames as set by the
+users through ethtool. The ethtool support up to 32 bit value for each.
+However, mlx4 modify cq limits the coalescing time parameter and
+coalescing frames parameters to 16 bits.
+Return out of range error if user tries to set these parameters to
+higher values.
+Change type of sample-interval and adaptive_rx_coal parameters in mlx4
+driver to u32 as the ethtool holds them as u32 and these parameters are
+not limited due to mlx4 HW.
+
+Fixes: c27a02cd94d6 ('mlx4_en: Add driver for Mellanox ConnectX 10GbE NIC')
+Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4_en.h | 7 +++++--
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c
+@@ -1013,6 +1013,22 @@ static int mlx4_en_set_coalesce(struct n
+ if (!coal->tx_max_coalesced_frames_irq)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (coal->tx_coalesce_usecs > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME ||
++ coal->rx_coalesce_usecs > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME ||
++ coal->rx_coalesce_usecs_low > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME ||
++ coal->rx_coalesce_usecs_high > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME) {
++ netdev_info(dev, "%s: maximum coalesce time supported is %d usecs\n",
++ __func__, MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME);
++ return -ERANGE;
++ }
++
++ if (coal->tx_max_coalesced_frames > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS ||
++ coal->rx_max_coalesced_frames > MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS) {
++ netdev_info(dev, "%s: maximum coalesced frames supported is %d\n",
++ __func__, MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS);
++ return -ERANGE;
++ }
++
+ priv->rx_frames = (coal->rx_max_coalesced_frames ==
+ MLX4_EN_AUTO_CONF) ?
+ MLX4_EN_RX_COAL_TARGET :
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4_en.h
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mlx4_en.h
+@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@
+ #define MLX4_EN_TX_COAL_PKTS 16
+ #define MLX4_EN_TX_COAL_TIME 0x10
+
++#define MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_PKTS U16_MAX
++#define MLX4_EN_MAX_COAL_TIME U16_MAX
++
+ #define MLX4_EN_RX_RATE_LOW 400000
+ #define MLX4_EN_RX_COAL_TIME_LOW 0
+ #define MLX4_EN_RX_RATE_HIGH 450000
+@@ -547,8 +550,8 @@ struct mlx4_en_priv {
+ u16 rx_usecs_low;
+ u32 pkt_rate_high;
+ u16 rx_usecs_high;
+- u16 sample_interval;
+- u16 adaptive_rx_coal;
++ u32 sample_interval;
++ u32 adaptive_rx_coal;
+ u32 msg_enable;
+ u32 loopback_ok;
+ u32 validate_loopback;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Talat Batheesh <talatb@mellanox.com>
+Date: Sun, 15 Apr 2018 11:26:19 +0300
+Subject: net/mlx5: Avoid cleaning flow steering table twice during error flow
+
+From: Talat Batheesh <talatb@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 9c26f5f89d01ca21560c6b8a8e4054c271cc3a9c ]
+
+When we fail to initialize the RX root namespace, we need
+to clean only that and not the entire flow steering.
+
+Currently the code may try to clean the flow steering twice
+on error witch leads to null pointer deference.
+Make sure we clean correctly.
+
+Fixes: fba53f7b5719 ("net/mlx5: Introduce mlx5_flow_steering structure")
+Signed-off-by: Talat Batheesh <talatb@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static void del_flow_group(struct fs_nod
+ static void del_fte(struct fs_node *node);
+ static bool mlx5_flow_dests_cmp(struct mlx5_flow_destination *d1,
+ struct mlx5_flow_destination *d2);
++static void cleanup_root_ns(struct mlx5_flow_root_namespace *root_ns);
+ static struct mlx5_flow_rule *
+ find_flow_rule(struct fs_fte *fte,
+ struct mlx5_flow_destination *dest);
+@@ -2041,23 +2042,27 @@ static int create_anchor_flow_table(stru
+
+ static int init_root_ns(struct mlx5_flow_steering *steering)
+ {
++ int err;
++
+ steering->root_ns = create_root_ns(steering, FS_FT_NIC_RX);
+ if (!steering->root_ns)
+- goto cleanup;
++ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- if (init_root_tree(steering, &root_fs, &steering->root_ns->ns.node))
+- goto cleanup;
++ err = init_root_tree(steering, &root_fs, &steering->root_ns->ns.node);
++ if (err)
++ goto out_err;
+
+ set_prio_attrs(steering->root_ns);
+-
+- if (create_anchor_flow_table(steering))
+- goto cleanup;
++ err = create_anchor_flow_table(steering);
++ if (err)
++ goto out_err;
+
+ return 0;
+
+-cleanup:
+- mlx5_cleanup_fs(steering->dev);
+- return -ENOMEM;
++out_err:
++ cleanup_root_ns(steering->root_ns);
++ steering->root_ns = NULL;
++ return err;
+ }
+
+ static void clean_tree(struct fs_node *node)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Adi Nissim <adin@mellanox.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 11:21:32 +0300
+Subject: net/mlx5: E-Switch, Include VF RDMA stats in vport statistics
+
+From: Adi Nissim <adin@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 88d725bbb43cd63a40c8ef70dd373f1d38ead2e3 ]
+
+The host side reporting of VF vport statistics didn't include the VF
+RDMA traffic.
+
+Fixes: 3b751a2a418a ("net/mlx5: E-Switch, Introduce get vf statistics")
+Signed-off-by: Adi Nissim <adin@mellanox.com>
+Reported-by: Ariel Almog <ariela@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c
+@@ -2054,26 +2054,35 @@ int mlx5_eswitch_get_vport_stats(struct
+ memset(vf_stats, 0, sizeof(*vf_stats));
+ vf_stats->rx_packets =
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_unicast.packets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_unicast.packets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.packets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_multicast.packets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_broadcast.packets);
+
+ vf_stats->rx_bytes =
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_unicast.octets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_unicast.octets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.octets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_multicast.octets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_broadcast.octets);
+
+ vf_stats->tx_packets =
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_unicast.packets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_unicast.packets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_multicast.packets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_multicast.packets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_broadcast.packets);
+
+ vf_stats->tx_bytes =
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_unicast.octets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_unicast.octets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_multicast.octets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_ib_multicast.octets) +
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, transmitted_eth_broadcast.octets);
+
+ vf_stats->multicast =
+- MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.packets);
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_multicast.packets) +
++ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_ib_multicast.packets);
+
+ vf_stats->broadcast =
+ MLX5_GET_CTR(out, received_eth_broadcast.packets);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Jianbo Liu <jianbol@mellanox.com>
+Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 09:22:16 +0000
+Subject: net/mlx5e: Allow offloading ipv4 header re-write for icmp
+
+From: Jianbo Liu <jianbol@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1ccef350db2f13715040a10df77ae672206004cf ]
+
+For ICMPv4, the checksum is calculated from the ICMP headers and data.
+Since the ICMPv4 checksum doesn't cover the IP header, we can allow to
+do L3 header re-write for this protocol.
+
+Fixes: bdd66ac0aeed ('net/mlx5e: Disallow TC offloading of unsupported match/action combinations')
+Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <jianbol@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
+@@ -1387,7 +1387,8 @@ static bool modify_header_match_supporte
+ }
+
+ ip_proto = MLX5_GET(fte_match_set_lyr_2_4, headers_v, ip_protocol);
+- if (modify_ip_header && ip_proto != IPPROTO_TCP && ip_proto != IPPROTO_UDP) {
++ if (modify_ip_header && ip_proto != IPPROTO_TCP &&
++ ip_proto != IPPROTO_UDP && ip_proto != IPPROTO_ICMP) {
+ pr_info("can't offload re-write of ip proto %d\n", ip_proto);
+ return false;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 18:51:37 +0200
+Subject: net/mlx5e: Err if asked to offload TC match on frag being first
+
+From: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit f85900c3e13fdb61f040c9feecbcda601e0cdcfb ]
+
+The HW doesn't support matching on frag first/later, return error if we are
+asked to offload that.
+
+Fixes: 3f7d0eb42d59 ("net/mlx5e: Offload TC matching on packets being IP fragments")
+Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,10 @@ static int __parse_cls_flower(struct mlx
+ f->mask);
+ addr_type = key->addr_type;
+
++ /* the HW doesn't support frag first/later */
++ if (mask->flags & FLOW_DIS_FIRST_FRAG)
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++
+ if (mask->flags & FLOW_DIS_IS_FRAGMENT) {
+ MLX5_SET(fte_match_set_lyr_2_4, headers_c, frag, 1);
+ MLX5_SET(fte_match_set_lyr_2_4, headers_v, frag,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 18:17:25 +0200
+Subject: net/mlx5e: TX, Use correct counter in dma_map error flow
+
+From: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit d9a96ec362e3da878c378854e25321c85bac52c2 ]
+
+In case of a dma_mapping_error, do not use wi->num_dma
+as a parameter for dma unmap function because it's yet
+to be set, and holds an out-of-date value.
+Use actual value (local variable num_dma) instead.
+
+Fixes: 34802a42b352 ("net/mlx5e: Do not modify the TX SKB")
+Fixes: e586b3b0baee ("net/mlx5: Ethernet Datapath files")
+Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tx.c
+@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(struct mlx5e_txq
+ dma_addr = dma_map_single(sq->pdev, skb_data, headlen,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(sq->pdev, dma_addr)))
+- return -ENOMEM;
++ goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
+
+ dseg->addr = cpu_to_be64(dma_addr);
+ dseg->lkey = sq->mkey_be;
+@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(struct mlx5e_txq
+ dma_addr = skb_frag_dma_map(sq->pdev, frag, 0, fsz,
+ DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(sq->pdev, dma_addr)))
+- return -ENOMEM;
++ goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
+
+ dseg->addr = cpu_to_be64(dma_addr);
+ dseg->lkey = sq->mkey_be;
+@@ -264,6 +264,10 @@ mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(struct mlx5e_txq
+ }
+
+ return num_dma;
++
++dma_unmap_wqe_err:
++ mlx5e_dma_unmap_wqe_err(sq, num_dma);
++ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ static inline void
+@@ -355,17 +359,15 @@ static netdev_tx_t mlx5e_sq_xmit(struct
+ num_dma = mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(sq, skb, skb_data, headlen,
+ (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *)cseg + ds_cnt);
+ if (unlikely(num_dma < 0))
+- goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
++ goto err_drop;
+
+ mlx5e_txwqe_complete(sq, skb, opcode, ds_cnt + num_dma,
+ num_bytes, num_dma, wi, cseg);
+
+ return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+
+-dma_unmap_wqe_err:
++err_drop:
+ sq->stats.dropped++;
+- mlx5e_dma_unmap_wqe_err(sq, wi->num_dma);
+-
+ dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
+
+ return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+@@ -594,17 +596,15 @@ netdev_tx_t mlx5i_sq_xmit(struct mlx5e_t
+ num_dma = mlx5e_txwqe_build_dsegs(sq, skb, skb_data, headlen,
+ (struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg *)cseg + ds_cnt);
+ if (unlikely(num_dma < 0))
+- goto dma_unmap_wqe_err;
++ goto err_drop;
+
+ mlx5e_txwqe_complete(sq, skb, opcode, ds_cnt + num_dma,
+ num_bytes, num_dma, wi, cseg);
+
+ return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+
+-dma_unmap_wqe_err:
++err_drop:
+ sq->stats.dropped++;
+- mlx5e_dma_unmap_wqe_err(sq, wi->num_dma);
+-
+ dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
+
+ return NETDEV_TX_OK;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 May 2018 14:35:33 -0400
+Subject: net sched actions: fix refcnt leak in skbmod
+
+From: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit a52956dfc503f8cc5cfe6454959b7049fddb4413 ]
+
+When application fails to pass flags in netlink TLV when replacing
+existing skbmod action, the kernel will leak refcnt:
+
+$ tc actions get action skbmod index 1
+total acts 0
+
+ action order 0: skbmod pipe set smac 00:11:22:33:44:55
+ index 1 ref 1 bind 0
+
+For example, at this point a buggy application replaces the action with
+index 1 with new smac 00:aa:22:33:44:55, it fails because of zero flags,
+however refcnt gets bumped:
+
+$ tc actions get actions skbmod index 1
+total acts 0
+
+ action order 0: skbmod pipe set smac 00:11:22:33:44:55
+ index 1 ref 2 bind 0
+$
+
+Tha patch fixes this by calling tcf_idr_release() on existing actions.
+
+Fixes: 86da71b57383d ("net_sched: Introduce skbmod action")
+Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
+Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sched/act_skbmod.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sched/act_skbmod.c
++++ b/net/sched/act_skbmod.c
+@@ -131,8 +131,11 @@ static int tcf_skbmod_init(struct net *n
+ if (exists && bind)
+ return 0;
+
+- if (!lflags)
++ if (!lflags) {
++ if (exists)
++ tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
+ return -EINVAL;
++ }
+
+ if (!exists) {
+ ret = tcf_idr_create(tn, parm->index, est, a,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 May 2018 17:45:32 +0200
+Subject: net: sched: fix error path in tcf_proto_create() when modules are not configured
+
+From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit d68d75fdc34b0253c2bded7ed18cd60eb5a9599b ]
+
+In case modules are not configured, error out when tp->ops is null
+and prevent later null pointer dereference.
+
+Fixes: 33a48927c193 ("sched: push TC filter protocol creation into a separate function")
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sched/cls_api.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sched/cls_api.c
++++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c
+@@ -151,8 +151,8 @@ static struct tcf_proto *tcf_proto_creat
+ } else {
+ err = -ENOENT;
+ }
+- goto errout;
+ #endif
++ goto errout;
+ }
+ tp->classify = tp->ops->classify;
+ tp->protocol = protocol;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Lance Richardson <lance.richardson.net@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 10:21:54 -0400
+Subject: net: support compat 64-bit time in {s,g}etsockopt
+
+From: Lance Richardson <lance.richardson.net@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 988bf7243e03ef69238381594e0334a79cef74a6 ]
+
+For the x32 ABI, struct timeval has two 64-bit fields. However
+the kernel currently interprets the user-space values used for
+the SO_RCVTIMEO and SO_SNDTIMEO socket options as having a pair
+of 32-bit fields.
+
+When the seconds portion of the requested timeout is less than 2**32,
+the seconds portion of the effective timeout is correct but the
+microseconds portion is zero. When the seconds portion of the
+requested timeout is zero and the microseconds portion is non-zero,
+the kernel interprets the timeout as zero (never timeout).
+
+Fix by using 64-bit time for SO_RCVTIMEO/SO_SNDTIMEO as required
+for the ABI.
+
+The code included below demonstrates the problem.
+
+Results before patch:
+ $ gcc -m64 -Wall -O2 -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
+ recv time: 2.008181 seconds
+ send time: 2.015985 seconds
+
+ $ gcc -m32 -Wall -O2 -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
+ recv time: 2.016763 seconds
+ send time: 2.016062 seconds
+
+ $ gcc -mx32 -Wall -O2 -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
+ recv time: 1.007239 seconds
+ send time: 1.023890 seconds
+
+Results after patch:
+ $ gcc -m64 -O2 -Wall -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
+ recv time: 2.010062 seconds
+ send time: 2.015836 seconds
+
+ $ gcc -m32 -O2 -Wall -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
+ recv time: 2.013974 seconds
+ send time: 2.015981 seconds
+
+ $ gcc -mx32 -O2 -Wall -o socktmo socktmo.c && ./socktmo
+ recv time: 2.030257 seconds
+ send time: 2.013383 seconds
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/time.h>
+
+ void checkrc(char *str, int rc)
+ {
+ if (rc >= 0)
+ return;
+
+ perror(str);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ static char buf[1024];
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ int rc;
+ int socks[2];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ struct timeval start, end, delta;
+
+ rc = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);
+ checkrc("socketpair", rc);
+
+ /* set timeout to 1.999999 seconds */
+ tv.tv_sec = 1;
+ tv.tv_usec = 999999;
+ rc = setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ rc = setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ checkrc("setsockopt", rc);
+
+ /* measure actual receive timeout */
+ gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
+ rc = recv(socks[0], buf, sizeof buf, 0);
+ gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
+ timersub(&end, &start, &delta);
+
+ printf("recv time: %ld.%06ld seconds\n",
+ (long)delta.tv_sec, (long)delta.tv_usec);
+
+ /* fill send buffer */
+ do {
+ rc = send(socks[0], buf, sizeof buf, 0);
+ } while (rc > 0);
+
+ /* measure actual send timeout */
+ gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
+ rc = send(socks[0], buf, sizeof buf, 0);
+ gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
+ timersub(&end, &start, &delta);
+
+ printf("send time: %ld.%06ld seconds\n",
+ (long)delta.tv_sec, (long)delta.tv_usec);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+Fixes: 515c7af85ed9 ("x32: Use compat shims for {g,s}etsockopt")
+Reported-by: Gopal RajagopalSai <gopalsr83@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Lance Richardson <lance.richardson.net@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/compat.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/compat.c
++++ b/net/compat.c
+@@ -377,7 +377,8 @@ static int compat_sock_setsockopt(struct
+ optname == SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_CBPF)
+ return do_set_attach_filter(sock, level, optname,
+ optval, optlen);
+- if (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO)
++ if (!COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME &&
++ (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO))
+ return do_set_sock_timeout(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+
+ return sock_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+@@ -442,7 +443,8 @@ static int do_get_sock_timeout(struct so
+ static int compat_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
+ char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
+ {
+- if (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO)
++ if (!COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME &&
++ (optname == SO_RCVTIMEO || optname == SO_SNDTIMEO))
+ return do_get_sock_timeout(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+ return sock_getsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 May 2018 13:05:39 -0700
+Subject: net/tls: Don't recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks
+
+From: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit c212d2c7fc4736d49be102fb7a1a545cdc2f1fea ]
+
+It is reported that in some cases, write_space may be called in
+do_tcp_sendpages, such that we recursively invoke do_tcp_sendpages again:
+
+[ 660.468802] ? do_tcp_sendpages+0x8d/0x580
+[ 660.468826] ? tls_push_sg+0x74/0x130 [tls]
+[ 660.468852] ? tls_push_record+0x24a/0x390 [tls]
+[ 660.468880] ? tls_write_space+0x6a/0x80 [tls]
+...
+
+tls_push_sg already does a loop over all sending sg's, so ignore
+any tls_write_space notifications until we are done sending.
+We then have to call the previous write_space to wake up
+poll() waiters after we are done with the send loop.
+
+Reported-by: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/tls.h | 1 +
+ net/tls/tls_main.c | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/include/net/tls.h
++++ b/include/net/tls.h
+@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct tls_context {
+ struct scatterlist *partially_sent_record;
+ u16 partially_sent_offset;
+ unsigned long flags;
++ bool in_tcp_sendpages;
+
+ u16 pending_open_record_frags;
+ int (*push_pending_record)(struct sock *sk, int flags);
+--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
++++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
+@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ int tls_push_sg(struct sock *sk,
+ size = sg->length - offset;
+ offset += sg->offset;
+
++ ctx->in_tcp_sendpages = true;
+ while (1) {
+ if (sg_is_last(sg))
+ sendpage_flags = flags;
+@@ -121,6 +122,8 @@ retry:
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD, &ctx->flags);
++ ctx->in_tcp_sendpages = false;
++ ctx->sk_write_space(sk);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -190,6 +193,10 @@ static void tls_write_space(struct sock
+ {
+ struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+
++ /* We are already sending pages, ignore notification */
++ if (ctx->in_tcp_sendpages)
++ return;
++
+ if (!sk->sk_write_pending && tls_is_pending_closed_record(ctx)) {
+ gfp_t sk_allocation = sk->sk_allocation;
+ int rc;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
+Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 04:24:39 +0200
+Subject: net/tls: Fix connection stall on partial tls record
+
+From: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit 080324c36ade319f57e505633ab54f6f53289b45 ]
+
+In the case of writing a partial tls record we forgot to clear the
+ctx->in_tcp_sendpages flag, causing some connections to stall.
+
+Fixes: c212d2c7fc47 ("net/tls: Don't recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks")
+Signed-off-by: Andre Tomt <andre@tomt.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/tls/tls_main.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
++++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
+@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ retry:
+ offset -= sg->offset;
+ ctx->partially_sent_offset = offset;
+ ctx->partially_sent_record = (void *)sg;
++ ctx->in_tcp_sendpages = false;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 10:03:30 -0700
+Subject: net_sched: fq: take care of throttled flows before reuse
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 7df40c2673a1307c3260aab6f9d4b9bf97ca8fd7 ]
+
+Normally, a socket can not be freed/reused unless all its TX packets
+left qdisc and were TX-completed. However connect(AF_UNSPEC) allows
+this to happen.
+
+With commit fc59d5bdf1e3 ("pkt_sched: fq: clear time_next_packet for
+reused flows") we cleared f->time_next_packet but took no special
+action if the flow was still in the throttled rb-tree.
+
+Since f->time_next_packet is the key used in the rb-tree searches,
+blindly clearing it might break rb-tree integrity. We need to make
+sure the flow is no longer in the rb-tree to avoid this problem.
+
+Fixes: fc59d5bdf1e3 ("pkt_sched: fq: clear time_next_packet for reused flows")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sched/sch_fq.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sched/sch_fq.c
++++ b/net/sched/sch_fq.c
+@@ -128,6 +128,28 @@ static bool fq_flow_is_detached(const st
+ return f->next == &detached;
+ }
+
++static bool fq_flow_is_throttled(const struct fq_flow *f)
++{
++ return f->next == &throttled;
++}
++
++static void fq_flow_add_tail(struct fq_flow_head *head, struct fq_flow *flow)
++{
++ if (head->first)
++ head->last->next = flow;
++ else
++ head->first = flow;
++ head->last = flow;
++ flow->next = NULL;
++}
++
++static void fq_flow_unset_throttled(struct fq_sched_data *q, struct fq_flow *f)
++{
++ rb_erase(&f->rate_node, &q->delayed);
++ q->throttled_flows--;
++ fq_flow_add_tail(&q->old_flows, f);
++}
++
+ static void fq_flow_set_throttled(struct fq_sched_data *q, struct fq_flow *f)
+ {
+ struct rb_node **p = &q->delayed.rb_node, *parent = NULL;
+@@ -155,15 +177,6 @@ static void fq_flow_set_throttled(struct
+
+ static struct kmem_cache *fq_flow_cachep __read_mostly;
+
+-static void fq_flow_add_tail(struct fq_flow_head *head, struct fq_flow *flow)
+-{
+- if (head->first)
+- head->last->next = flow;
+- else
+- head->first = flow;
+- head->last = flow;
+- flow->next = NULL;
+-}
+
+ /* limit number of collected flows per round */
+ #define FQ_GC_MAX 8
+@@ -267,6 +280,8 @@ static struct fq_flow *fq_classify(struc
+ f->socket_hash != sk->sk_hash)) {
+ f->credit = q->initial_quantum;
+ f->socket_hash = sk->sk_hash;
++ if (fq_flow_is_throttled(f))
++ fq_flow_unset_throttled(q, f);
+ f->time_next_packet = 0ULL;
+ }
+ return f;
+@@ -438,9 +453,7 @@ static void fq_check_throttled(struct fq
+ q->time_next_delayed_flow = f->time_next_packet;
+ break;
+ }
+- rb_erase(p, &q->delayed);
+- q->throttled_flows--;
+- fq_flow_add_tail(&q->old_flows, f);
++ fq_flow_unset_throttled(q, f);
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 13:37:54 -0700
+Subject: nsh: fix infinite loop
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit af50e4ba34f4c45e92535364133d4deb5931c1c5 ]
+
+syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().
+
+Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
+reasonable length.
+
+BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
+turning off the locking correctness validator.
+depth: 48 max: 48!
+48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
+ #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
+ #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
+ #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+ #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
+ #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
+INFO: lockdep is turned off.
+CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
+ __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
+ lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
+ rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
+ rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
+ skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
+ __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
+ skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
+ validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
+ validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
+ sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
+ qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
+ __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
+ __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
+ __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
+ dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
+ packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
+ packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
+ __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
+ __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
+ do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
+
+Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/nsh/nsh.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/nsh/nsh.c
++++ b/net/nsh/nsh.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(s
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, NSH_BASE_HDR_LEN)))
+ goto out;
+ nsh_len = nsh_hdr_len(nsh_hdr(skb));
++ if (nsh_len < NSH_BASE_HDR_LEN)
++ goto out;
+ if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, nsh_len)))
+ goto out;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 18:13:25 +0200
+Subject: openvswitch: Don't swap table in nlattr_set() after OVS_ATTR_NESTED is found
+
+From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 72f17baf2352ded6a1d3f4bb2d15da8c678cd2cb ]
+
+If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking
+through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively
+passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if
+different from the current one.
+
+However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we
+should continue walking through attributes using the current
+table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested
+attributes.
+
+For example, given this sequence:
+
+1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY
+2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL
+3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID
+4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC
+5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST
+6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL
+7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC
+8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST
+9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT
+10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK
+11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS
+
+we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3,
+and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting
+attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS
+evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is
+15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the
+wrong table:
+
+[ 7654.586496] ==================================================================
+[ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
+[ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430
+[ 7654.610983]
+[ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1
+[ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016
+[ 7654.631379] Call Trace:
+[ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
+[ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290
+[ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
+[ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330
+[ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40
+[ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch]
+[ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch]
+[ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40
+[ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590
+[ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch]
+[ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0
+[ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21
+[ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
+[ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370
+[ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
+[ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0
+[ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
+[ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40
+[ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch]
+
+[snip]
+
+[ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
+[ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch]
+[ 7655.145507]
+[ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address:
+[ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa
+[ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+[ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa
+[ 7655.176701] ^
+[ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05
+[ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+[ 7655.200490] ==================================================================
+
+Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Fixes: 982b52700482 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.")
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c | 9 +++------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
++++ b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
+@@ -1404,13 +1404,10 @@ static void nlattr_set(struct nlattr *at
+
+ /* The nlattr stream should already have been validated */
+ nla_for_each_nested(nla, attr, rem) {
+- if (tbl[nla_type(nla)].len == OVS_ATTR_NESTED) {
+- if (tbl[nla_type(nla)].next)
+- tbl = tbl[nla_type(nla)].next;
+- nlattr_set(nla, val, tbl);
+- } else {
++ if (tbl[nla_type(nla)].len == OVS_ATTR_NESTED)
++ nlattr_set(nla, val, tbl[nla_type(nla)].next ? : tbl);
++ else
+ memset(nla_data(nla), val, nla_len(nla));
+- }
+
+ if (nla_type(nla) == OVS_KEY_ATTR_CT_STATE)
+ *(u32 *)nla_data(nla) &= CT_SUPPORTED_MASK;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: "Bjørn Mork" <bjorn@mork.no>
+Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 22:22:54 +0200
+Subject: qmi_wwan: do not steal interfaces from class drivers
+
+From: "Bjørn Mork" <bjorn@mork.no>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5697db4a696c41601a1d15c1922150b4dbf5726c ]
+
+The USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER matching macro assumes that
+the { vendorid, productid, interfacenumber } set uniquely
+identifies one specific function. This has proven to fail
+for some configurable devices. One example is the Quectel
+EM06/EP06 where the same interface number can be either
+QMI or MBIM, without the device ID changing either.
+
+Fix by requiring the vendor-specific class for interface number
+based matching. Functions of other classes can and should use
+class based matching instead.
+
+Fixes: 03304bcb5ec4 ("net: qmi_wwan: use fixed interface number matching")
+Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+@@ -1338,6 +1338,18 @@ static int qmi_wwan_probe(struct usb_int
+ id->driver_info = (unsigned long)&qmi_wwan_info;
+ }
+
++ /* There are devices where the same interface number can be
++ * configured as different functions. We should only bind to
++ * vendor specific functions when matching on interface number
++ */
++ if (id->match_flags & USB_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_INT_NUMBER &&
++ desc->bInterfaceClass != USB_CLASS_VENDOR_SPEC) {
++ dev_dbg(&intf->dev,
++ "Rejecting interface number match for class %02x\n",
++ desc->bInterfaceClass);
++ return -ENODEV;
++ }
++
+ /* Quectel EC20 quirk where we've QMI on interface 4 instead of 0 */
+ if (quectel_ec20_detected(intf) && desc->bInterfaceNumber == 0) {
+ dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Quectel EC20 quirk, skipping interface 0\n");
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 7 May 2018 21:11:21 +0200
+Subject: r8169: fix powering up RTL8168h
+
+From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 3148dedfe79e422f448a10250d3e2cdf8b7ee617 ]
+
+Since commit a92a08499b1f "r8169: improve runtime pm in general and
+suspend unused ports" interfaces w/o link are runtime-suspended after
+10s. On systems where drivers take longer to load this can lead to the
+situation that the interface is runtime-suspended already when it's
+initially brought up.
+This shouldn't be a problem because rtl_open() resumes MAC/PHY.
+However with at least one chip version the interface doesn't properly
+come up, as reported here:
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199549
+
+The vendor driver uses a delay to give certain chip versions some
+time to resume before starting the PHY configuration. So let's do
+the same. I don't know which chip versions may be affected,
+therefore apply this delay always.
+
+This patch was reported to fix the issue for RTL8168h.
+I was able to reproduce the issue on an Asus H310I-Plus which also
+uses a RTL8168h. Also in my case the patch fixed the issue.
+
+Reported-by: Slava Kardakov <ojab@ojab.ru>
+Tested-by: Slava Kardakov <ojab@ojab.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
+@@ -4886,6 +4886,9 @@ static void rtl_pll_power_down(struct rt
+ static void rtl_pll_power_up(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
+ {
+ rtl_generic_op(tp, tp->pll_power_ops.up);
++
++ /* give MAC/PHY some time to resume */
++ msleep(20);
+ }
+
+ static void rtl_init_pll_power_ops(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 14:53:39 -0700
+Subject: rds: do not leak kernel memory to user land
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit eb80ca476ec11f67a62691a93604b405ffc7d80c ]
+
+syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in put_cmsg(), originating
+from rds_cmsg_recv().
+
+Simply clear the structure, since we have holes there, or since
+rx_traces might be smaller than RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX.
+
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in put_cmsg+0x600/0x870 net/core/scm.c:242
+CPU: 0 PID: 4459 Comm: syz-executor582 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
+ kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
+ kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x135/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1157
+ kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
+ copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
+ put_cmsg+0x600/0x870 net/core/scm.c:242
+ rds_cmsg_recv net/rds/recv.c:570 [inline]
+ rds_recvmsg+0x2db5/0x3170 net/rds/recv.c:657
+ sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:803 [inline]
+ sock_recvmsg+0x1d0/0x230 net/socket.c:810
+ ___sys_recvmsg+0x3fb/0x810 net/socket.c:2205
+ __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2250 [inline]
+ SYSC_recvmsg+0x298/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2262
+ SyS_recvmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2257
+ do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
+
+Fixes: 3289025aedc0 ("RDS: add receive message trace used by application")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
+Cc: linux-rdma <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rds/recv.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/rds/recv.c
++++ b/net/rds/recv.c
+@@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ static int rds_cmsg_recv(struct rds_inco
+ struct rds_cmsg_rx_trace t;
+ int i, j;
+
++ memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
+ inc->i_rx_lat_trace[RDS_MSG_RX_CMSG] = local_clock();
+ t.rx_traces = rs->rs_rx_traces;
+ for (i = 0; i < rs->rs_rx_traces; i++) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 5 May 2018 14:59:47 +0800
+Subject: sctp: delay the authentication for the duplicated cookie-echo chunk
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 59d8d4434f429b4fa8a346fd889058bda427a837 ]
+
+Now sctp only delays the authentication for the normal cookie-echo
+chunk by setting chunk->auth_chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(). But
+for the duplicated one with auth, in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(), it does
+authentication first based on the old asoc, which will definitely
+fail due to the different auth info in the old asoc.
+
+The duplicated cookie-echo chunk will create a new asoc with the
+auth info from this chunk, and the authentication should also be
+done with the new asoc's auth info for all of the collision 'A',
+'B' and 'D'. Otherwise, the duplicated cookie-echo chunk with auth
+will never pass the authentication and create the new connection.
+
+This issue exists since very beginning, and this fix is to make
+sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() follow the way sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() does
+for the normal cookie-echo chunk to delay the authentication.
+
+While at it, remove the unused params from sctp_sf_authenticate()
+and define sctp_auth_chunk_verify() used for all the places that
+do the delayed authentication.
+
+v1->v2:
+ fix the typo in changelog as Marcelo noticed.
+
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/associola.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++
+ net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
++++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
+@@ -1025,8 +1025,9 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct wor
+ struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
+ struct sctp_inq *inqueue;
+- int state;
++ int first_time = 1; /* is this the first time through the loop */
+ int error = 0;
++ int state;
+
+ /* The association should be held so we should be safe. */
+ ep = asoc->ep;
+@@ -1037,6 +1038,30 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct wor
+ state = asoc->state;
+ subtype = SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type);
+
++ /* If the first chunk in the packet is AUTH, do special
++ * processing specified in Section 6.3 of SCTP-AUTH spec
++ */
++ if (first_time && subtype.chunk == SCTP_CID_AUTH) {
++ struct sctp_chunkhdr *next_hdr;
++
++ next_hdr = sctp_inq_peek(inqueue);
++ if (!next_hdr)
++ goto normal;
++
++ /* If the next chunk is COOKIE-ECHO, skip the AUTH
++ * chunk while saving a pointer to it so we can do
++ * Authentication later (during cookie-echo
++ * processing).
++ */
++ if (next_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
++ chunk->auth_chunk = skb_clone(chunk->skb,
++ GFP_ATOMIC);
++ chunk->auth = 1;
++ continue;
++ }
++ }
++
++normal:
+ /* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
+ * The receiver has a list of chunk types which it expects
+ * to be received only after an AUTH-chunk. This list has
+@@ -1075,6 +1100,9 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct wor
+ /* If there is an error on chunk, discard this packet. */
+ if (error && chunk)
+ chunk->pdiscard = 1;
++
++ if (first_time)
++ first_time = 0;
+ }
+ sctp_association_put(asoc);
+ }
+--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+@@ -150,10 +150,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_vio
+ struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands);
+
+ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_sf_authenticate(
+- struct net *net,
+- const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+- const union sctp_subtype type,
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
+
+ static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(
+@@ -618,6 +615,38 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ac
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+ }
+
++static bool sctp_auth_chunk_verify(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
++ const struct sctp_association *asoc)
++{
++ struct sctp_chunk auth;
++
++ if (!chunk->auth_chunk)
++ return true;
++
++ /* SCTP-AUTH: auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
++ * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
++ * authentication. We've just recreated the association using
++ * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
++ * do the authentication.
++ */
++
++ /* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
++ if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
++ return false;
++
++ /* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
++ auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
++ auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
++ auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
++ auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
++ skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
++ sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
++ skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
++ auth.transport = chunk->transport;
++
++ return sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, &auth) == SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Respond to a normal COOKIE ECHO chunk.
+ * We are the side that is being asked for an association.
+@@ -755,37 +784,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce
+ if (error)
+ goto nomem_init;
+
+- /* SCTP-AUTH: auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
+- * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
+- * authentication. We've just recreated the association using
+- * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
+- * do the authentication.
+- */
+- if (chunk->auth_chunk) {
+- struct sctp_chunk auth;
+- enum sctp_ierror ret;
+-
+- /* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
+- if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !new_asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
+- sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
+- return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+- }
+-
+- /* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
+- auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
+- auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
+- auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
+- auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
+- skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
+- sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+- skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+- auth.transport = chunk->transport;
+-
+- ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
+- if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
+- sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
+- return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+- }
++ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc)) {
++ sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
++ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ }
+
+ repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
+@@ -1755,13 +1756,15 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
+ GFP_ATOMIC))
+ goto nomem;
+
++ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
++ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
++
+ /* Make sure no new addresses are being added during the
+ * restart. Though this is a pretty complicated attack
+ * since you'd have to get inside the cookie.
+ */
+- if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands)) {
++ if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands))
+ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+- }
+
+ /* If the endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state and recognizes
+ * the peer has restarted (Action A), it MUST NOT setup a new
+@@ -1867,6 +1870,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
+ GFP_ATOMIC))
+ goto nomem;
+
++ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
++ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
++
+ /* Update the content of current association. */
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
+@@ -1961,6 +1967,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
+ * a COOKIE ACK.
+ */
+
++ if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, asoc))
++ return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
++
+ /* Don't accidentally move back into established state. */
+ if (asoc->state < SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
+@@ -4111,10 +4120,7 @@ gen_shutdown:
+ * The return value is the disposition of the chunk.
+ */
+ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_sf_authenticate(
+- struct net *net,
+- const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+- const union sctp_subtype type,
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
+ {
+ struct sctp_authhdr *auth_hdr;
+@@ -4212,7 +4218,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_eat_auth(s
+ commands);
+
+ auth_hdr = (struct sctp_authhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
+- error = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, asoc, type, chunk);
++ error = sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, chunk);
+ switch (error) {
+ case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_HMAC:
+ /* Generate the ERROR chunk and discard the rest
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 13:45:12 +0800
+Subject: sctp: fix the issue that the cookie-ack with auth can't get processed
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit ce402f044e4e432c296f90eaabb8dbe8f3624391 ]
+
+When auth is enabled for cookie-ack chunk, in sctp_inq_pop, sctp
+processes auth chunk first, then continues to the next chunk in
+this packet if chunk_end + chunk_hdr size < skb_tail_pointer().
+Otherwise, it will go to the next packet or discard this chunk.
+
+However, it missed the fact that cookie-ack chunk's size is equal
+to chunk_hdr size, which couldn't match that check, and thus this
+chunk would not get processed.
+
+This patch fixes it by changing the check to chunk_end + chunk_hdr
+size <= skb_tail_pointer().
+
+Fixes: 26b87c788100 ("net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing")
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/inqueue.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
++++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ new_skb:
+ skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(*ch));
+ chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */
+
+- if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
++ if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) <= skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
+ /* This is not a singleton */
+ chunk->singleton = 0;
+ } else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 14:13:57 +0800
+Subject: sctp: handle two v4 addrs comparison in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit d625329b06e46bd20baf9ee40847d11982569204 ]
+
+Since sctp ipv6 socket also supports v4 addrs, it's possible to
+compare two v4 addrs in pf v6 .cmp_addr, sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.
+
+However after Commit 1071ec9d453a ("sctp: do not check port in
+sctp_inet6_cmp_addr"), it no longer calls af1->cmp_addr, which
+in this case is sctp_v4_cmp_addr, but calls __sctp_v6_cmp_addr
+where it handles them as two v6 addrs. It would cause a out of
+bounds crash.
+
+syzbot found this crash when trying to bind two v4 addrs to a
+v6 socket.
+
+This patch fixes it by adding the process for two v4 addrs in
+sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.
+
+Fixes: 1071ec9d453a ("sctp: do not check port in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr")
+Reported-by: syzbot+cd494c1dd681d4d93ebb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/ipv6.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
++++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+@@ -865,6 +865,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6_cmp_addr(const uni
+ if (sctp_is_any(sk, addr1) || sctp_is_any(sk, addr2))
+ return 1;
+
++ if (addr1->sa.sa_family == AF_INET && addr2->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
++ return addr1->v4.sin_addr.s_addr == addr2->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
++
+ return __sctp_v6_cmp_addr(addr1, addr2);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 17:34:13 +0800
+Subject: sctp: remove sctp_chunk_put from fail_mark err path in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6910e25de2257e2c82c7a2d126e3463cd8e50810 ]
+
+In Commit 1f45f78f8e51 ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too"),
+it held the chunk in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg to access it safely later
+in recvmsg. However, it also added sctp_chunk_put in fail_mark err path,
+which is only triggered before holding the chunk.
+
+syzbot reported a use-after-free crash happened on this err path, where
+it shouldn't call sctp_chunk_put.
+
+This patch simply removes this call.
+
+Fixes: 1f45f78f8e51 ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too")
+Reported-by: syzbot+141d898c5f24489db4aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
++++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+@@ -717,7 +717,6 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make
+ return event;
+
+ fail_mark:
+- sctp_chunk_put(chunk);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ fail:
+ return NULL;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 13:39:46 +0800
+Subject: sctp: use the old asoc when making the cookie-ack chunk in dupcook_d
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 46e16d4b956867013e0bbd7f2bad206f4aa55752 ]
+
+When processing a duplicate cookie-echo chunk, for case 'D', sctp will
+not process the param from this chunk. It means old asoc has nothing
+to be updated, and the new temp asoc doesn't have the complete info.
+
+So there's no reason to use the new asoc when creating the cookie-ack
+chunk. Otherwise, like when auth is enabled for cookie-ack, the chunk
+can not be set with auth, and it will definitely be dropped by peer.
+
+This issue is there since very beginning, and we fix it by using the
+old asoc instead.
+
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+@@ -2009,7 +2009,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
+ }
+ }
+
+- repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
++ repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(asoc, chunk);
+ if (!repl)
+ goto nomem;
+
--- /dev/null
+8139too-use-disable_irq_nosync-in-rtl8139_poll_controller.patch
+bridge-check-iface-upper-dev-when-setting-master-via-ioctl.patch
+dccp-fix-tasklet-usage.patch
+ipv4-fix-fnhe-usage-by-non-cached-routes.patch
+ipv4-fix-memory-leaks-in-udp_sendmsg-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch
+llc-better-deal-with-too-small-mtu.patch
+net-ethernet-sun-niu-set-correct-packet-size-in-skb.patch
+net-ethernet-ti-cpsw-fix-packet-leaking-in-dual_mac-mode.patch
+net-mlx4_en-fix-an-error-handling-path-in-mlx4_en_init_netdev.patch
+net-mlx4_en-verify-coalescing-parameters-are-in-range.patch
+net-mlx5e-err-if-asked-to-offload-tc-match-on-frag-being-first.patch
+net-mlx5-e-switch-include-vf-rdma-stats-in-vport-statistics.patch
+net-sched-actions-fix-refcnt-leak-in-skbmod.patch
+net_sched-fq-take-care-of-throttled-flows-before-reuse.patch
+net-support-compat-64-bit-time-in-s-g-etsockopt.patch
+net-tls-don-t-recursively-call-push_record-during-tls_write_space-callbacks.patch
+net-tls-fix-connection-stall-on-partial-tls-record.patch
+openvswitch-don-t-swap-table-in-nlattr_set-after-ovs_attr_nested-is-found.patch
+qmi_wwan-do-not-steal-interfaces-from-class-drivers.patch
+r8169-fix-powering-up-rtl8168h.patch
+rds-do-not-leak-kernel-memory-to-user-land.patch
+sctp-delay-the-authentication-for-the-duplicated-cookie-echo-chunk.patch
+sctp-fix-the-issue-that-the-cookie-ack-with-auth-can-t-get-processed.patch
+sctp-handle-two-v4-addrs-comparison-in-sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.patch
+sctp-remove-sctp_chunk_put-from-fail_mark-err-path-in-sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg.patch
+sctp-use-the-old-asoc-when-making-the-cookie-ack-chunk-in-dupcook_d.patch
+tcp_bbr-fix-to-zero-idle_restart-only-upon-s-acked-data.patch
+tcp-ignore-fast-open-on-repair-mode.patch
+tg3-fix-vunmap-bug_on-triggered-from-tg3_free_consistent.patch
+bonding-do-not-allow-rlb-updates-to-invalid-mac.patch
+bonding-send-learning-packets-for-vlans-on-slave.patch
+net-sched-fix-error-path-in-tcf_proto_create-when-modules-are-not-configured.patch
+net-mlx5e-tx-use-correct-counter-in-dma_map-error-flow.patch
+net-mlx5-avoid-cleaning-flow-steering-table-twice-during-error-flow.patch
+hv_netvsc-set-master-device.patch
+ipv6-fix-uninit-value-in-ip6_multipath_l3_keys.patch
+net-mlx5e-allow-offloading-ipv4-header-re-write-for-icmp.patch
+nsh-fix-infinite-loop.patch
+udp-fix-so_bindtodevice.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 11:33:08 -0700
+Subject: tcp: ignore Fast Open on repair mode
+
+From: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 16ae6aa1705299789f71fdea59bfb119c1fbd9c0 ]
+
+The TCP repair sequence of operation is to first set the socket in
+repair mode, then inject the TCP stats into the socket with repair
+socket options, then call connect() to re-activate the socket. The
+connect syscall simply returns and set state to ESTABLISHED
+mode. As a result Fast Open is meaningless for TCP repair.
+
+However allowing sendto() system call with MSG_FASTOPEN flag half-way
+during the repair operation could unexpectedly cause data to be
+sent, before the operation finishes changing the internal TCP stats
+(e.g. MSS). This in turn triggers TCP warnings on inconsistent
+packet accounting.
+
+The fix is to simply disallow Fast Open operation once the socket
+is in the repair mode.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+@@ -1194,7 +1194,8 @@ int tcp_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk,
+ uarg->zerocopy = 0;
+ }
+
+- if (unlikely(flags & MSG_FASTOPEN || inet_sk(sk)->defer_connect)) {
++ if (unlikely(flags & MSG_FASTOPEN || inet_sk(sk)->defer_connect) &&
++ !tp->repair) {
+ err = tcp_sendmsg_fastopen(sk, msg, &copied_syn, size);
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS && copied_syn > 0)
+ goto out;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 May 2018 21:45:41 -0400
+Subject: tcp_bbr: fix to zero idle_restart only upon S/ACKed data
+
+From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e6e6a278b1eaffa19d42186bfacd1ffc15a50b3f ]
+
+Previously the bbr->idle_restart tracking was zeroing out the
+bbr->idle_restart bit upon ACKs that did not SACK or ACK anything,
+e.g. receiving incoming data or receiver window updates. In such
+situations BBR would forget that this was a restart-from-idle
+situation, and if the min_rtt had expired it would unnecessarily enter
+PROBE_RTT (even though we were actually restarting from idle but had
+merely forgotten that fact).
+
+The fix is simple: we need to remember we are restarting from idle
+until we receive a S/ACK for some data (a S/ACK for the first flight
+of data we send as we are restarting).
+
+This commit is a stable candidate for kernels back as far as 4.9.
+
+Fixes: 0f8782ea1497 ("tcp_bbr: add BBR congestion control")
+Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yousuk Seung <ysseung@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c
+@@ -802,7 +802,9 @@ static void bbr_update_min_rtt(struct so
+ }
+ }
+ }
+- bbr->idle_restart = 0;
++ /* Restart after idle ends only once we process a new S/ACK for data */
++ if (rs->delivered > 0)
++ bbr->idle_restart = 0;
+ }
+
+ static void bbr_update_model(struct sock *sk, const struct rate_sample *rs)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 20:04:27 -0400
+Subject: tg3: Fix vunmap() BUG_ON() triggered from tg3_free_consistent().
+
+From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit d89a2adb8bfe6f8949ff389acdb9fa298b6e8e12 ]
+
+tg3_free_consistent() calls dma_free_coherent() to free tp->hw_stats
+under spinlock and can trigger BUG_ON() in vunmap() because vunmap()
+may sleep. Fix it by removing the spinlock and relying on the
+TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE flag to prevent race conditions between
+tg3_get_stats64() and tg3_free_consistent(). TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE
+is always cleared under tp->lock before tg3_free_consistent()
+and therefore tg3_get_stats64() can safely access tp->hw_stats
+under tp->lock if TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE is set.
+
+Fixes: f5992b72ebe0 ("tg3: Fix race condition in tg3_get_stats64().")
+Reported-by: Zumeng Chen <zumeng.chen@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 9 +++++----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
+@@ -8723,14 +8723,15 @@ static void tg3_free_consistent(struct t
+ tg3_mem_rx_release(tp);
+ tg3_mem_tx_release(tp);
+
+- /* Protect tg3_get_stats64() from reading freed tp->hw_stats. */
+- tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
++ /* tp->hw_stats can be referenced safely:
++ * 1. under rtnl_lock
++ * 2. or under tp->lock if TG3_FLAG_INIT_COMPLETE is set.
++ */
+ if (tp->hw_stats) {
+ dma_free_coherent(&tp->pdev->dev, sizeof(struct tg3_hw_stats),
+ tp->hw_stats, tp->stats_mapping);
+ tp->hw_stats = NULL;
+ }
+- tg3_full_unlock(tp);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -14167,7 +14168,7 @@ static void tg3_get_stats64(struct net_d
+ struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
+- if (!tp->hw_stats) {
++ if (!tp->hw_stats || !tg3_flag(tp, INIT_COMPLETE)) {
+ *stats = tp->net_stats_prev;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
+ return;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Wed May 16 10:38:48 CEST 2018
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 12:42:34 +0200
+Subject: udp: fix SO_BINDTODEVICE
+
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 69678bcd4d2dedbc3e8fcd6d7d99f283d83c531a ]
+
+Damir reported a breakage of SO_BINDTODEVICE for UDP sockets.
+In absence of VRF devices, after commit fb74c27735f0 ("net:
+ipv4: add second dif to udp socket lookups") the dif mismatch
+isn't fatal anymore for UDP socket lookup with non null
+sk_bound_dev_if, breaking SO_BINDTODEVICE semantics.
+
+This changeset addresses the issue making the dif match mandatory
+again in the above scenario.
+
+Reported-by: Damir Mansurov <dnman@oktetlabs.ru>
+Fixes: fb74c27735f0 ("net: ipv4: add second dif to udp socket lookups")
+Fixes: 1801b570dd2a ("net: ipv6: add second dif to udp socket lookups")
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/udp.c | 4 ++--
+ net/ipv6/udp.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
+@@ -413,9 +413,9 @@ static int compute_score(struct sock *sk
+ bool dev_match = (sk->sk_bound_dev_if == dif ||
+ sk->sk_bound_dev_if == sdif);
+
+- if (exact_dif && !dev_match)
++ if (!dev_match)
+ return -1;
+- if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev_match)
++ if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
+ score += 4;
+ }
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
+@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ static int compute_score(struct sock *sk
+ bool dev_match = (sk->sk_bound_dev_if == dif ||
+ sk->sk_bound_dev_if == sdif);
+
+- if (exact_dif && !dev_match)
++ if (!dev_match)
+ return -1;
+- if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev_match)
++ if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
+ score++;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+8139too-use-disable_irq_nosync-in-rtl8139_poll_controller.patch
+bridge-check-iface-upper-dev-when-setting-master-via-ioctl.patch
+dccp-fix-tasklet-usage.patch
+ipv4-fix-fnhe-usage-by-non-cached-routes.patch
+ipv4-fix-memory-leaks-in-udp_sendmsg-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch
+llc-better-deal-with-too-small-mtu.patch
+net-ethernet-sun-niu-set-correct-packet-size-in-skb.patch
+net-ethernet-ti-cpsw-fix-packet-leaking-in-dual_mac-mode.patch
+net-mlx4_en-fix-an-error-handling-path-in-mlx4_en_init_netdev.patch
+net-mlx4_en-verify-coalescing-parameters-are-in-range.patch
+net-mlx5e-err-if-asked-to-offload-tc-match-on-frag-being-first.patch
+net-mlx5-e-switch-include-vf-rdma-stats-in-vport-statistics.patch
+net-sched-actions-fix-refcnt-leak-in-skbmod.patch
+net_sched-fq-take-care-of-throttled-flows-before-reuse.patch
+net-smc-restrict-non-blocking-connect-finish.patch
+net-support-compat-64-bit-time-in-s-g-etsockopt.patch
+net-tls-don-t-recursively-call-push_record-during-tls_write_space-callbacks.patch
+net-tls-fix-connection-stall-on-partial-tls-record.patch
+openvswitch-don-t-swap-table-in-nlattr_set-after-ovs_attr_nested-is-found.patch
+qmi_wwan-do-not-steal-interfaces-from-class-drivers.patch
+r8169-fix-powering-up-rtl8168h.patch
+rds-do-not-leak-kernel-memory-to-user-land.patch
+sctp-delay-the-authentication-for-the-duplicated-cookie-echo-chunk.patch
+sctp-fix-the-issue-that-the-cookie-ack-with-auth-can-t-get-processed.patch
+sctp-handle-two-v4-addrs-comparison-in-sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.patch
+sctp-remove-sctp_chunk_put-from-fail_mark-err-path-in-sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg.patch
+sctp-use-the-old-asoc-when-making-the-cookie-ack-chunk-in-dupcook_d.patch
+tcp_bbr-fix-to-zero-idle_restart-only-upon-s-acked-data.patch
+tcp-ignore-fast-open-on-repair-mode.patch
+tg3-fix-vunmap-bug_on-triggered-from-tg3_free_consistent.patch
+bonding-do-not-allow-rlb-updates-to-invalid-mac.patch
+bonding-send-learning-packets-for-vlans-on-slave.patch
+net-sched-fix-error-path-in-tcf_proto_create-when-modules-are-not-configured.patch
+net-mlx5e-tx-use-correct-counter-in-dma_map-error-flow.patch
+net-mlx5-avoid-cleaning-flow-steering-table-twice-during-error-flow.patch
+hv_netvsc-set-master-device.patch
+ipv6-fix-uninit-value-in-ip6_multipath_l3_keys.patch
+net-mlx5e-allow-offloading-ipv4-header-re-write-for-icmp.patch
+nsh-fix-infinite-loop.patch
+udp-fix-so_bindtodevice.patch
+mlxsw-spectrum_switchdev-do-not-remove-mrouter-port-from-mdb-s-ports-list.patch
+net-mlx5e-dcbnl-fix-min-inline-header-size-for-dscp.patch
+net-systemport-correclty-disambiguate-driver-instances.patch
+nfp-flower-set-tunnel-ttl-value-to-net-default.patch
+sctp-clear-the-new-asoc-s-stream-outcnt-in-sctp_stream_update.patch
+tcp-restore-autocorking.patch
+tipc-fix-one-byte-leak-in-tipc_sk_set_orig_addr.patch
+hv_netvsc-fix-net-device-attach-on-older-windows-hosts.patch
+ipv4-reset-fnhe_mtu_locked-after-cache-route-flushed.patch
+mlxsw-core-fix-an-error-handling-path-in-mlxsw_core_bus_device_register.patch
+net-mlx5-fix-mlx5_get_vector_affinity-function.patch
+net-phy-sfp-fix-the-br-min-computation.patch
+net-smc-keep-clcsock-reference-in-smc_tcp_listen_work.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
