*
*/
+#include <common/base64.h>
+#include <common/config.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/uri_auth.h>
+
+#include <types/cache.h>
+
+#include <proto/acl.h>
+#include <proto/channel.h>
+#include <proto/checks.h>
+#include <proto/connection.h>
+#include <proto/filters.h>
+#include <proto/hdr_idx.h>
+#include <proto/log.h>
+#include <proto/proto_http.h>
+#include <proto/proxy.h>
+#include <proto/stream.h>
+#include <proto/stream_interface.h>
+#include <proto/stats.h>
+
+/* This stream analyser waits for a complete HTTP request. It returns 1 if the
+ * processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it either needs more
+ * data or wants to immediately abort the request (eg: timeout, error, ...). It
+ * is tied to AN_REQ_WAIT_HTTP and may may remove itself from s->req.analysers
+ * when it has nothing left to do, and may remove any analyser when it wants to
+ * abort.
+ */
+int htx_wait_for_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+ /*
+ * We will parse the partial (or complete) lines.
+ * We will check the request syntax, and also join multi-line
+ * headers. An index of all the lines will be elaborated while
+ * parsing.
+ *
+ * For the parsing, we use a 28 states FSM.
+ *
+ * Here is the information we currently have :
+ * ci_head(req) = beginning of request
+ * ci_head(req) + msg->eoh = end of processed headers / start of current one
+ * ci_tail(req) = end of input data
+ * msg->eol = end of current header or line (LF or CRLF)
+ * msg->next = first non-visited byte
+ *
+ * At end of parsing, we may perform a capture of the error (if any), and
+ * we will set a few fields (txn->meth, sn->flags/SF_REDIRECTABLE).
+ * We also check for monitor-uri, logging, HTTP/0.9 to 1.0 conversion, and
+ * finally headers capture.
+ */
+
+ int cur_idx;
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
+ struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+
+ DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+ now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+ s,
+ req,
+ req->rex, req->wex,
+ req->flags,
+ ci_data(req),
+ req->analysers);
+
+ /* we're speaking HTTP here, so let's speak HTTP to the client */
+ s->srv_error = http_return_srv_error;
+
+ /* If there is data available for analysis, log the end of the idle time. */
+ if (c_data(req) && s->logs.t_idle == -1)
+ s->logs.t_idle = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now) - s->logs.t_handshake;
+
+ /* There's a protected area at the end of the buffer for rewriting
+ * purposes. We don't want to start to parse the request if the
+ * protected area is affected, because we may have to move processed
+ * data later, which is much more complicated.
+ */
+ if (c_data(req) && msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR) {
+ if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST) {
+ if (unlikely(!channel_is_rewritable(req))) {
+ if (req->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT))
+ goto failed_keep_alive;
+ /* some data has still not left the buffer, wake us once that's done */
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+ req->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+ req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(ci_tail(req) < c_ptr(req, msg->next) ||
+ ci_tail(req) > b_wrap(&req->buf) - global.tune.maxrewrite))
+ channel_slow_realign(req, trash.area);
+ }
+
+ if (likely(msg->next < ci_data(req))) /* some unparsed data are available */
+ http_msg_analyzer(msg, &txn->hdr_idx);
+ }
+
+ /* 1: we might have to print this header in debug mode */
+ if (unlikely((global.mode & MODE_DEBUG) &&
+ (!(global.mode & MODE_QUIET) || (global.mode & MODE_VERBOSE)) &&
+ msg->msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+ char *eol, *sol;
+
+ sol = ci_head(req);
+ /* this is a bit complex : in case of error on the request line,
+ * we know that rq.l is still zero, so we display only the part
+ * up to the end of the line (truncated by debug_hdr).
+ */
+ eol = sol + (msg->sl.rq.l ? msg->sl.rq.l : ci_data(req));
+ debug_hdr("clireq", s, sol, eol);
+
+ sol += hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
+ cur_idx = hdr_idx_first_idx(&txn->hdr_idx);
+
+ while (cur_idx) {
+ eol = sol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].len;
+ debug_hdr("clihdr", s, sol, eol);
+ sol = eol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].cr + 1;
+ cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Now we quickly check if we have found a full valid request.
+ * If not so, we check the FD and buffer states before leaving.
+ * A full request is indicated by the fact that we have seen
+ * the double LF/CRLF, so the state is >= HTTP_MSG_BODY. Invalid
+ * requests are checked first. When waiting for a second request
+ * on a keep-alive stream, if we encounter and error, close, t/o,
+ * we note the error in the stream flags but don't set any state.
+ * Since the error will be noted there, it will not be counted by
+ * process_stream() as a frontend error.
+ * Last, we may increase some tracked counters' http request errors on
+ * the cases that are deliberately the client's fault. For instance,
+ * a timeout or connection reset is not counted as an error. However
+ * a bad request is.
+ */
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+ /*
+ * First, let's catch bad requests.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+ stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ /* 1: Since we are in header mode, if there's no space
+ * left for headers, we won't be able to free more
+ * later, so the stream will never terminate. We
+ * must terminate it now.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(channel_full(req, global.tune.maxrewrite))) {
+ /* FIXME: check if URI is set and return Status
+ * 414 Request URI too long instead.
+ */
+ stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+ if (msg->err_pos < 0)
+ msg->err_pos = ci_data(req);
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ /* 2: have we encountered a read error ? */
+ else if (req->flags & CF_READ_ERROR) {
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+
+ if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)
+ goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+ if (sess->fe->options & PR_O_IGNORE_PRB)
+ goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+ /* we cannot return any message on error */
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ }
+
+ txn->status = 400;
+ msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+ proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* 3: has the read timeout expired ? */
+ else if (req->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT || tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms)) {
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLITO;
+
+ if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)
+ goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+ if (sess->fe->options & PR_O_IGNORE_PRB)
+ goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+ /* read timeout : give up with an error message. */
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ }
+ txn->status = 408;
+ msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+
+ stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+ proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* 4: have we encountered a close ? */
+ else if (req->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+
+ if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)
+ goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+ if (sess->fe->options & PR_O_IGNORE_PRB)
+ goto failed_keep_alive;
+
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ txn->status = 400;
+ msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+ proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+ req->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+ s->res.flags &= ~CF_EXPECT_MORE; /* speed up sending a previous response */
+#ifdef TCP_QUICKACK
+ if (sess->listener->options & LI_O_NOQUICKACK && ci_data(req) &&
+ objt_conn(sess->origin) && conn_ctrl_ready(__objt_conn(sess->origin))) {
+ /* We need more data, we have to re-enable quick-ack in case we
+ * previously disabled it, otherwise we might cause the client
+ * to delay next data.
+ */
+ setsockopt(__objt_conn(sess->origin)->handle.fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_QUICKACK, &one, sizeof(one));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((msg->msg_state != HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE) && (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ)) {
+ /* If the client starts to talk, let's fall back to
+ * request timeout processing.
+ */
+ txn->flags &= ~TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ;
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ }
+
+ /* just set the request timeout once at the beginning of the request */
+ if (!tick_isset(req->analyse_exp)) {
+ if ((msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE) &&
+ (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ) &&
+ tick_isset(s->be->timeout.httpka))
+ req->analyse_exp = tick_add(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpka);
+ else
+ req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpreq);
+ }
+
+ /* we're not ready yet */
+ return 0;
+
+ failed_keep_alive:
+ /* Here we process low-level errors for keep-alive requests. In
+ * short, if the request is not the first one and it experiences
+ * a timeout, read error or shutdown, we just silently close so
+ * that the client can try again.
+ */
+ txn->status = 0;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE;
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ s->logs.logwait = 0;
+ s->logs.level = 0;
+ s->res.flags &= ~CF_EXPECT_MORE; /* speed up sending a previous response */
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* OK now we have a complete HTTP request with indexed headers. Let's
+ * complete the request parsing by setting a few fields we will need
+ * later. At this point, we have the last CRLF at req->buf.data + msg->eoh.
+ * If the request is in HTTP/0.9 form, the rule is still true, and eoh
+ * points to the CRLF of the request line. msg->next points to the first
+ * byte after the last LF. msg->sov points to the first byte of data.
+ * msg->eol cannot be trusted because it may have been left uninitialized
+ * (for instance in the absence of headers).
+ */
+
+ stream_inc_http_req_ctr(s);
+ proxy_inc_fe_req_ctr(sess->fe); /* one more valid request for this FE */
+
+ if (txn->flags & TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ) {
+ /* kill the pending keep-alive timeout */
+ txn->flags &= ~TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ;
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ }
+
+
+ /* Maybe we found in invalid header name while we were configured not
+ * to block on that, so we have to capture it now.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(msg->err_pos >= 0))
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+ /*
+ * 1: identify the method
+ */
+ txn->meth = find_http_meth(ci_head(req), msg->sl.rq.m_l);
+
+ /* we can make use of server redirect on GET and HEAD */
+ if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_GET || txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD)
+ s->flags |= SF_REDIRECTABLE;
+ else if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_OTHER &&
+ msg->sl.rq.m_l == 3 && memcmp(ci_head(req), "PRI", 3) == 0) {
+ /* PRI is reserved for the HTTP/2 preface */
+ msg->err_pos = 0;
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 2: check if the URI matches the monitor_uri.
+ * We have to do this for every request which gets in, because
+ * the monitor-uri is defined by the frontend.
+ */
+ if (unlikely((sess->fe->monitor_uri_len != 0) &&
+ (sess->fe->monitor_uri_len == msg->sl.rq.u_l) &&
+ !memcmp(ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u,
+ sess->fe->monitor_uri,
+ sess->fe->monitor_uri_len))) {
+ /*
+ * We have found the monitor URI
+ */
+ struct acl_cond *cond;
+
+ s->flags |= SF_MONITOR;
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.intercepted_req, 1);
+
+ /* Check if we want to fail this monitor request or not */
+ list_for_each_entry(cond, &sess->fe->mon_fail_cond, list) {
+ int ret = acl_exec_cond(cond, sess->fe, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+
+ ret = acl_pass(ret);
+ if (cond->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+ ret = !ret;
+
+ if (ret) {
+ /* we fail this request, let's return 503 service unavail */
+ txn->status = 503;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_LOCAL; /* we don't want a real error here */
+ goto return_prx_cond;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* nothing to fail, let's reply normaly */
+ txn->status = 200;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_LOCAL; /* we don't want a real error here */
+ goto return_prx_cond;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 3: Maybe we have to copy the original REQURI for the logs ?
+ * Note: we cannot log anymore if the request has been
+ * classified as invalid.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(s->logs.logwait & LW_REQ)) {
+ /* we have a complete HTTP request that we must log */
+ if ((txn->uri = pool_alloc(pool_head_requri)) != NULL) {
+ int urilen = msg->sl.rq.l;
+
+ if (urilen >= global.tune.requri_len )
+ urilen = global.tune.requri_len - 1;
+ memcpy(txn->uri, ci_head(req), urilen);
+ txn->uri[urilen] = 0;
+
+ if (!(s->logs.logwait &= ~(LW_REQ|LW_INIT)))
+ s->do_log(s);
+ } else {
+ ha_alert("HTTP logging : out of memory.\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* RFC7230#2.6 has enforced the format of the HTTP version string to be
+ * exactly one digit "." one digit. This check may be disabled using
+ * option accept-invalid-http-request.
+ */
+ if (!(sess->fe->options2 & PR_O2_REQBUG_OK)) {
+ if (msg->sl.rq.v_l != 8) {
+ msg->err_pos = msg->sl.rq.v;
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ if (ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 4] != '/' ||
+ !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 5]) ||
+ ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 6] != '.' ||
+ !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 7])) {
+ msg->err_pos = msg->sl.rq.v + 4;
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* 4. We may have to convert HTTP/0.9 requests to HTTP/1.0 */
+ if (unlikely(msg->sl.rq.v_l == 0) && !http_upgrade_v09_to_v10(txn))
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ /* ... and check if the request is HTTP/1.1 or above */
+ if ((msg->sl.rq.v_l == 8) &&
+ ((ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 5] > '1') ||
+ ((ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 5] == '1') &&
+ (ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.v + 7] >= '1'))))
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_VER_11;
+
+ /* "connection" has not been parsed yet */
+ txn->flags &= ~(TX_HDR_CONN_PRS | TX_HDR_CONN_CLO | TX_HDR_CONN_KAL | TX_HDR_CONN_UPG);
+
+ /* if the frontend has "option http-use-proxy-header", we'll check if
+ * we have what looks like a proxied connection instead of a connection,
+ * and in this case set the TX_USE_PX_CONN flag to use Proxy-connection.
+ * Note that this is *not* RFC-compliant, however browsers and proxies
+ * happen to do that despite being non-standard :-(
+ * We consider that a request not beginning with either '/' or '*' is
+ * a proxied connection, which covers both "scheme://location" and
+ * CONNECT ip:port.
+ */
+ if ((sess->fe->options2 & PR_O2_USE_PXHDR) &&
+ ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.u] != '/' && ci_head(req)[msg->sl.rq.u] != '*')
+ txn->flags |= TX_USE_PX_CONN;
+
+ /* transfer length unknown*/
+ msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+
+ /* 5: we may need to capture headers */
+ if (unlikely((s->logs.logwait & LW_REQHDR) && s->req_cap))
+ http_capture_headers(ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx,
+ s->req_cap, sess->fe->req_cap);
+
+ /* 6: determine the transfer-length according to RFC2616 #4.4, updated
+ * by RFC7230#3.3.3 :
+ *
+ * The length of a message body is determined by one of the following
+ * (in order of precedence):
+ *
+ * 1. Any response to a HEAD request and any response with a 1xx
+ * (Informational), 204 (No Content), or 304 (Not Modified) status
+ * code is always terminated by the first empty line after the
+ * header fields, regardless of the header fields present in the
+ * message, and thus cannot contain a message body.
+ *
+ * 2. Any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request implies that
+ * the connection will become a tunnel immediately after the empty
+ * line that concludes the header fields. A client MUST ignore any
+ * Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received in
+ * such a message.
+ *
+ * 3. If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present and the chunked
+ * transfer coding (Section 4.1) is the final encoding, the message
+ * body length is determined by reading and decoding the chunked
+ * data until the transfer coding indicates the data is complete.
+ *
+ * If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and
+ * the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the
+ * message body length is determined by reading the connection until
+ * it is closed by the server. If a Transfer-Encoding header field
+ * is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not
+ * the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined
+ * reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request)
+ * status code and then close the connection.
+ *
+ * If a message is received with both a Transfer-Encoding and a
+ * Content-Length header field, the Transfer-Encoding overrides the
+ * Content-Length. Such a message might indicate an attempt to
+ * perform request smuggling (Section 9.5) or response splitting
+ * (Section 9.4) and ought to be handled as an error. A sender MUST
+ * remove the received Content-Length field prior to forwarding such
+ * a message downstream.
+ *
+ * 4. If a message is received without Transfer-Encoding and with
+ * either multiple Content-Length header fields having differing
+ * field-values or a single Content-Length header field having an
+ * invalid value, then the message framing is invalid and the
+ * recipient MUST treat it as an unrecoverable error. If this is a
+ * request message, the server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request)
+ * status code and then close the connection. If this is a response
+ * message received by a proxy, the proxy MUST close the connection
+ * to the server, discard the received response, and send a 502 (Bad
+ * Gateway) response to the client. If this is a response message
+ * received by a user agent, the user agent MUST close the
+ * connection to the server and discard the received response.
+ *
+ * 5. If a valid Content-Length header field is present without
+ * Transfer-Encoding, its decimal value defines the expected message
+ * body length in octets. If the sender closes the connection or
+ * the recipient times out before the indicated number of octets are
+ * received, the recipient MUST consider the message to be
+ * incomplete and close the connection.
+ *
+ * 6. If this is a request message and none of the above are true, then
+ * the message body length is zero (no message body is present).
+ *
+ * 7. Otherwise, this is a response message without a declared message
+ * body length, so the message body length is determined by the
+ * number of octets received prior to the server closing the
+ * connection.
+ */
+
+ ctx.idx = 0;
+ /* set TE_CHNK and XFER_LEN only if "chunked" is seen last */
+ while (http_find_header2("Transfer-Encoding", 17, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+ if (ctx.vlen == 7 && strncasecmp(ctx.line + ctx.val, "chunked", 7) == 0)
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK;
+ else if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) {
+ /* chunked not last, return badreq */
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Chunked requests must have their content-length removed */
+ ctx.idx = 0;
+ if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) {
+ while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx))
+ http_remove_header2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
+ }
+ else while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+ signed long long cl;
+
+ if (!ctx.vlen) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ if (strl2llrc(ctx.line + ctx.val, ctx.vlen, &cl)) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+ goto return_bad_req; /* parse failure */
+ }
+
+ if (cl < 0) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN) && (msg->chunk_len != cl)) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(req);
+ goto return_bad_req; /* already specified, was different */
+ }
+
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN;
+ msg->body_len = msg->chunk_len = cl;
+ }
+
+ /* even bodyless requests have a known length */
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+
+ /* Until set to anything else, the connection mode is set as Keep-Alive. It will
+ * only change if both the request and the config reference something else.
+ * Option httpclose by itself sets tunnel mode where headers are mangled.
+ * However, if another mode is set, it will affect it (eg: server-close/
+ * keep-alive + httpclose = close). Note that we avoid to redo the same work
+ * if FE and BE have the same settings (common). The method consists in
+ * checking if options changed between the two calls (implying that either
+ * one is non-null, or one of them is non-null and we are there for the first
+ * time.
+ */
+ if (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_PRS) ||
+ ((sess->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) != (s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE)))
+ http_adjust_conn_mode(s, txn, msg);
+
+ /* we may have to wait for the request's body */
+ if ((s->be->options & PR_O_WREQ_BODY) &&
+ (msg->body_len || (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)))
+ req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC7234#4:
+ * A cache MUST write through requests with methods
+ * that are unsafe (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC7231]) to
+ * the origin server; i.e., a cache is not allowed
+ * to generate a reply to such a request before
+ * having forwarded the request and having received
+ * a corresponding response.
+ *
+ * RFC7231#4.2.1:
+ * Of the request methods defined by this
+ * specification, the GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and TRACE
+ * methods are defined to be safe.
+ */
+ if (likely(txn->meth == HTTP_METH_GET ||
+ txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD ||
+ txn->meth == HTTP_METH_OPTIONS ||
+ txn->meth == HTTP_METH_TRACE))
+ txn->flags |= TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK;
+
+ /* end of job, return OK */
+ req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ return 1;
+
+ return_bad_req:
+ /* We centralize bad requests processing here */
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+ /* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
+ * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+ */
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ }
+
+ txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+ txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ txn->status = 400;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ return_prx_cond:
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* This stream analyser runs all HTTP request processing which is common to
+ * frontends and backends, which means blocking ACLs, filters, connection-close,
+ * reqadd, stats and redirects. This is performed for the designated proxy.
+ * It returns 1 if the processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it
+ * either needs more data or wants to immediately abort the request (eg: deny,
+ * error, ...).
+ */
+int htx_process_req_common(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit, struct proxy *px)
+{
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
+ struct redirect_rule *rule;
+ struct cond_wordlist *wl;
+ enum rule_result verdict;
+ int deny_status = HTTP_ERR_403;
+ struct connection *conn = objt_conn(sess->origin);
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+ /* we need more data */
+ goto return_prx_yield;
+ }
+
+ DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+ now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+ s,
+ req,
+ req->rex, req->wex,
+ req->flags,
+ ci_data(req),
+ req->analysers);
+
+ /* just in case we have some per-backend tracking */
+ stream_inc_be_http_req_ctr(s);
+
+ /* evaluate http-request rules */
+ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&px->http_req_rules)) {
+ verdict = http_req_get_intercept_rule(px, &px->http_req_rules, s, &deny_status);
+
+ switch (verdict) {
+ case HTTP_RULE_RES_YIELD: /* some data miss, call the function later. */
+ goto return_prx_yield;
+
+ case HTTP_RULE_RES_CONT:
+ case HTTP_RULE_RES_STOP: /* nothing to do */
+ break;
+
+ case HTTP_RULE_RES_DENY: /* deny or tarpit */
+ if (txn->flags & TX_CLTARPIT)
+ goto tarpit;
+ goto deny;
+
+ case HTTP_RULE_RES_ABRT: /* abort request, response already sent. Eg: auth */
+ goto return_prx_cond;
+
+ case HTTP_RULE_RES_DONE: /* OK, but terminate request processing (eg: redirect) */
+ goto done;
+
+ case HTTP_RULE_RES_BADREQ: /* failed with a bad request */
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (conn && (conn->flags & CO_FL_EARLY_DATA) &&
+ (conn->flags & (CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE))) {
+ struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+
+ ctx.idx = 0;
+ if (!http_find_header2("Early-Data", strlen("Early-Data"),
+ ci_head(&s->req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req,
+ &txn->hdr_idx, "Early-Data: 1",
+ strlen("Early-Data: 1")) < 0)) {
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /* OK at this stage, we know that the request was accepted according to
+ * the http-request rules, we can check for the stats. Note that the
+ * URI is detected *before* the req* rules in order not to be affected
+ * by a possible reqrep, while they are processed *after* so that a
+ * reqdeny can still block them. This clearly needs to change in 1.6!
+ */
+ if (stats_check_uri(&s->si[1], txn, px)) {
+ s->target = &http_stats_applet.obj_type;
+ if (unlikely(!stream_int_register_handler(&s->si[1], objt_applet(s->target)))) {
+ txn->status = 500;
+ s->logs.tv_request = now;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_RESOURCE;
+ goto return_prx_cond;
+ }
+
+ /* parse the whole stats request and extract the relevant information */
+ http_handle_stats(s, req);
+ verdict = http_req_get_intercept_rule(px, &px->uri_auth->http_req_rules, s, &deny_status);
+ /* not all actions implemented: deny, allow, auth */
+
+ if (verdict == HTTP_RULE_RES_DENY) /* stats http-request deny */
+ goto deny;
+
+ if (verdict == HTTP_RULE_RES_ABRT) /* stats auth / stats http-request auth */
+ goto return_prx_cond;
+ }
+
+ /* evaluate the req* rules except reqadd */
+ if (px->req_exp != NULL) {
+ if (apply_filters_to_request(s, req, px) < 0)
+ goto return_bad_req;
+
+ if (txn->flags & TX_CLDENY)
+ goto deny;
+
+ if (txn->flags & TX_CLTARPIT) {
+ deny_status = HTTP_ERR_500;
+ goto tarpit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* add request headers from the rule sets in the same order */
+ list_for_each_entry(wl, &px->req_add, list) {
+ if (wl->cond) {
+ int ret = acl_exec_cond(wl->cond, px, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+ ret = acl_pass(ret);
+ if (((struct acl_cond *)wl->cond)->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+ ret = !ret;
+ if (!ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, wl->s, strlen(wl->s)) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+
+ /* Proceed with the stats now. */
+ if (unlikely(objt_applet(s->target) == &http_stats_applet) ||
+ unlikely(objt_applet(s->target) == &http_cache_applet)) {
+ /* process the stats request now */
+ if (sess->fe == s->be) /* report it if the request was intercepted by the frontend */
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.intercepted_req, 1);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK)) // this is not really an error but it is
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_LOCAL; // to mark that it comes from the proxy
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+ /* enable the minimally required analyzers to handle keep-alive and compression on the HTTP response */
+ req->analysers &= (AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY | AN_REQ_FLT_HTTP_HDRS | AN_REQ_FLT_END);
+ req->analysers &= ~AN_REQ_FLT_XFER_DATA;
+ req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* check whether we have some ACLs set to redirect this request */
+ list_for_each_entry(rule, &px->redirect_rules, list) {
+ if (rule->cond) {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = acl_exec_cond(rule->cond, px, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+ ret = acl_pass(ret);
+ if (rule->cond->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+ ret = !ret;
+ if (!ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!http_apply_redirect_rule(rule, s, txn))
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* POST requests may be accompanied with an "Expect: 100-Continue" header.
+ * If this happens, then the data will not come immediately, so we must
+ * send all what we have without waiting. Note that due to the small gain
+ * in waiting for the body of the request, it's easier to simply put the
+ * CF_SEND_DONTWAIT flag any time. It's a one-shot flag so it will remove
+ * itself once used.
+ */
+ req->flags |= CF_SEND_DONTWAIT;
+
+ done: /* done with this analyser, continue with next ones that the calling
+ * points will have set, if any.
+ */
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ done_without_exp: /* done with this analyser, but dont reset the analyse_exp. */
+ req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+ return 1;
+
+ tarpit:
+ /* Allow cookie logging
+ */
+ if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name)
+ manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
+
+ /* When a connection is tarpitted, we use the tarpit timeout,
+ * which may be the same as the connect timeout if unspecified.
+ * If unset, then set it to zero because we really want it to
+ * eventually expire. We build the tarpit as an analyser.
+ */
+ channel_erase(&s->req);
+
+ /* wipe the request out so that we can drop the connection early
+ * if the client closes first.
+ */
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+
+ txn->status = http_err_codes[deny_status];
+
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END; /* remove switching rules etc... */
+ req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_TARPIT;
+ req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.tarpit);
+ if (!req->analyse_exp)
+ req->analyse_exp = tick_add(now_ms, 0);
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_req, 1);
+ if (sess->fe != s->be)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_req, 1);
+ goto done_without_exp;
+
+ deny: /* this request was blocked (denied) */
+
+ /* Allow cookie logging
+ */
+ if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name)
+ manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
+
+ txn->flags |= TX_CLDENY;
+ txn->status = http_err_codes[deny_status];
+ s->logs.tv_request = now;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_req, 1);
+ if (sess->fe != s->be)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_req, 1);
+ goto return_prx_cond;
+
+ return_bad_req:
+ /* We centralize bad requests processing here */
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+ /* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
+ * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+ */
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ }
+
+ txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+ txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ txn->status = 400;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ return_prx_cond:
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ return 0;
+
+ return_prx_yield:
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function performs all the processing enabled for the current request.
+ * It returns 1 if the processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it
+ * needs more data, encounters an error, or wants to immediately abort the
+ * request. It relies on buffers flags, and updates s->req.analysers.
+ */
+int htx_process_request(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
+ struct connection *cli_conn = objt_conn(strm_sess(s)->origin);
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+ /* we need more data */
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+ now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+ s,
+ req,
+ req->rex, req->wex,
+ req->flags,
+ ci_data(req),
+ req->analysers);
+
+ /*
+ * Right now, we know that we have processed the entire headers
+ * and that unwanted requests have been filtered out. We can do
+ * whatever we want with the remaining request. Also, now we
+ * may have separate values for ->fe, ->be.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If HTTP PROXY is set we simply get remote server address parsing
+ * incoming request. Note that this requires that a connection is
+ * allocated on the server side.
+ */
+ if ((s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_PROXY) && !(s->flags & SF_ADDR_SET)) {
+ struct connection *conn;
+ char *path;
+
+ /* Note that for now we don't reuse existing proxy connections */
+ if (unlikely((conn = cs_conn(si_alloc_cs(&s->si[1], NULL))) == NULL)) {
+ txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+ txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ txn->status = 500;
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_RESOURCE;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ path = http_txn_get_path(txn);
+ if (url2sa(ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u,
+ path ? path - (ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u) : msg->sl.rq.u_l,
+ &conn->addr.to, NULL) == -1)
+ goto return_bad_req;
+
+ /* if the path was found, we have to remove everything between
+ * ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u and path (excluded). If it was not
+ * found, we need to replace from ci_head(req) + msg->sl.rq.u for
+ * u_l characters by a single "/".
+ */
+ if (path) {
+ char *cur_ptr = ci_head(req);
+ char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
+ int delta;
+
+ delta = b_rep_blk(&req->buf, cur_ptr + msg->sl.rq.u, path, NULL, 0);
+ http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
+ cur_end += delta;
+ if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH, cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ else {
+ char *cur_ptr = ci_head(req);
+ char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
+ int delta;
+
+ delta = b_rep_blk(&req->buf, cur_ptr + msg->sl.rq.u,
+ cur_ptr + msg->sl.rq.u + msg->sl.rq.u_l, "/", 1);
+ http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
+ cur_end += delta;
+ if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH, cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 7: Now we can work with the cookies.
+ * Note that doing so might move headers in the request, but
+ * the fields will stay coherent and the URI will not move.
+ * This should only be performed in the backend.
+ */
+ if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name)
+ manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
+
+ /* add unique-id if "header-unique-id" is specified */
+
+ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&sess->fe->format_unique_id) && !s->unique_id) {
+ if ((s->unique_id = pool_alloc(pool_head_uniqueid)) == NULL)
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ s->unique_id[0] = '\0';
+ build_logline(s, s->unique_id, UNIQUEID_LEN, &sess->fe->format_unique_id);
+ }
+
+ if (sess->fe->header_unique_id && s->unique_id) {
+ if (chunk_printf(&trash, "%s: %s", sess->fe->header_unique_id, s->unique_id) < 0)
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, trash.data) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 9: add X-Forwarded-For if either the frontend or the backend
+ * asks for it.
+ */
+ if ((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FWDFOR) {
+ struct hdr_ctx ctx = { .idx = 0 };
+ if (!((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FF_ALWAYS) &&
+ http_find_header2(s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name : sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name,
+ s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len : sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len,
+ ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+ /* The header is set to be added only if none is present
+ * and we found it, so don't do anything.
+ */
+ }
+ else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+ /* Add an X-Forwarded-For header unless the source IP is
+ * in the 'except' network range.
+ */
+ if ((!sess->fe->except_mask.s_addr ||
+ (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & sess->fe->except_mask.s_addr)
+ != sess->fe->except_net.s_addr) &&
+ (!s->be->except_mask.s_addr ||
+ (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask.s_addr)
+ != s->be->except_net.s_addr)) {
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *pn;
+ pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr;
+
+ /* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
+ * x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
+ * However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
+ * on the frontend's header name.
+ */
+ if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
+ len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+ memcpy(trash.area,
+ s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
+ } else {
+ len = sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+ memcpy(trash.area,
+ sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
+ }
+ len += snprintf(trash.area + len,
+ trash.size - len,
+ ": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1],
+ pn[2], pn[3]);
+
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, len) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+ /* FIXME: for the sake of completeness, we should also support
+ * 'except' here, although it is mostly useless in this case.
+ */
+ int len;
+ char pn[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+ inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
+ (const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&cli_conn->addr.from))->sin6_addr,
+ pn, sizeof(pn));
+
+ /* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
+ * x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
+ * However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
+ * on the frontend's header name.
+ */
+ if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
+ len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+ memcpy(trash.area, s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name,
+ len);
+ } else {
+ len = sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
+ memcpy(trash.area, sess->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name,
+ len);
+ }
+ len += snprintf(trash.area + len, trash.size - len,
+ ": %s", pn);
+
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, len) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 10: add X-Original-To if either the frontend or the backend
+ * asks for it.
+ */
+ if ((sess->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_ORGTO) {
+
+ /* FIXME: don't know if IPv6 can handle that case too. */
+ if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+ /* Add an X-Original-To header unless the destination IP is
+ * in the 'except' network range.
+ */
+ conn_get_to_addr(cli_conn);
+
+ if (cli_conn->addr.to.ss_family == AF_INET &&
+ ((!sess->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
+ (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & sess->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr)
+ != sess->fe->except_to.s_addr) &&
+ (!s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
+ (((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr)
+ != s->be->except_to.s_addr))) {
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *pn;
+ pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr;
+
+ /* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
+ * x-original-to, because the header is really meant for the backends.
+ * However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
+ * on the frontend's header name.
+ */
+ if (s->be->orgto_hdr_len) {
+ len = s->be->orgto_hdr_len;
+ memcpy(trash.area,
+ s->be->orgto_hdr_name, len);
+ } else {
+ len = sess->fe->orgto_hdr_len;
+ memcpy(trash.area,
+ sess->fe->orgto_hdr_name, len);
+ }
+ len += snprintf(trash.area + len,
+ trash.size - len,
+ ": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1],
+ pn[2], pn[3]);
+
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, len) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 11: add "Connection: close" or "Connection: keep-alive" if needed and not yet set.
+ * If an "Upgrade" token is found, the header is left untouched in order not to have
+ * to deal with some servers bugs : some of them fail an Upgrade if anything but
+ * "Upgrade" is present in the Connection header.
+ */
+ if (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_UPG) && (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) {
+ unsigned int want_flags = 0;
+
+ if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) >= TX_CON_WANT_SCL &&
+ !((sess->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
+ want_flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
+ } else {
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+ ((sess->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
+ want_flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
+ }
+
+ if (want_flags != (txn->flags & (TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET)))
+ http_change_connection_header(txn, msg, want_flags);
+ }
+
+
+ /* If we have no server assigned yet and we're balancing on url_param
+ * with a POST request, we may be interested in checking the body for
+ * that parameter. This will be done in another analyser.
+ */
+ if (!(s->flags & (SF_ASSIGNED|SF_DIRECT)) &&
+ s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST && s->be->url_param_name != NULL &&
+ (msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN|HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK))) {
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+ req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;
+ }
+
+ req->analysers &= ~AN_REQ_FLT_XFER_DATA;
+ req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
+#ifdef TCP_QUICKACK
+ /* We expect some data from the client. Unless we know for sure
+ * we already have a full request, we have to re-enable quick-ack
+ * in case we previously disabled it, otherwise we might cause
+ * the client to delay further data.
+ */
+ if ((sess->listener->options & LI_O_NOQUICKACK) &&
+ cli_conn && conn_ctrl_ready(cli_conn) &&
+ ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) ||
+ (msg->body_len > ci_data(req) - txn->req.eoh - 2)))
+ setsockopt(cli_conn->handle.fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_QUICKACK, &one, sizeof(one));
+#endif
+
+ /*************************************************************
+ * OK, that's finished for the headers. We have done what we *
+ * could. Let's switch to the DATA state. *
+ ************************************************************/
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+
+ s->logs.tv_request = now;
+ /* OK let's go on with the BODY now */
+ return 1;
+
+ return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
+ /* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
+ * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+ */
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ }
+
+ txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+ txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ txn->status = 400;
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which processes the HTTP tarpit. It always
+ * returns zero, at the beginning because it prevents any other processing
+ * from occurring, and at the end because it terminates the request.
+ */
+int htx_process_tarpit(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+
+ /* This connection is being tarpitted. The CLIENT side has
+ * already set the connect expiration date to the right
+ * timeout. We just have to check that the client is still
+ * there and that the timeout has not expired.
+ */
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+ if ((req->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_READ_ERROR)) == 0 &&
+ !tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We will set the queue timer to the time spent, just for
+ * logging purposes. We fake a 500 server error, so that the
+ * attacker will not suspect his connection has been tarpitted.
+ * It will not cause trouble to the logs because we can exclude
+ * the tarpitted connections by filtering on the 'PT' status flags.
+ */
+ s->logs.t_queue = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
+
+ if (!(req->flags & CF_READ_ERROR))
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_T;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which waits for the HTTP request body. It waits
+ * for either the buffer to be full, or the full advertised contents to have
+ * reached the buffer. It must only be called after the standard HTTP request
+ * processing has occurred, because it expects the request to be parsed and will
+ * look for the Expect header. It may send a 100-Continue interim response. It
+ * takes in input any state starting from HTTP_MSG_BODY and leaves with one of
+ * HTTP_MSG_CHK_SIZE, HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS. It returns zero if it
+ * needs to read more data, or 1 once it has completed its analysis.
+ */
+int htx_wait_for_request_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
+
+ /* We have to parse the HTTP request body to find any required data.
+ * "balance url_param check_post" should have been the only way to get
+ * into this. We were brought here after HTTP header analysis, so all
+ * related structures are ready.
+ */
+
+ if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
+ /* This is the first call */
+ if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)
+ goto missing_data;
+
+ if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_100_SENT) {
+ /* If we have HTTP/1.1 and Expect: 100-continue, then we must
+ * send an HTTP/1.1 100 Continue intermediate response.
+ */
+ if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
+ struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+ ctx.idx = 0;
+ /* Expect is allowed in 1.1, look for it */
+ if (http_find_header2("Expect", 6, ci_head(req), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx) &&
+ unlikely(ctx.vlen == 12 && strncasecmp(ctx.line+ctx.val, "100-continue", 12) == 0)) {
+ co_inject(&s->res, HTTP_100.ptr, HTTP_100.len);
+ http_remove_header2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
+ }
+ }
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_100_SENT;
+ }
+
+ /* we have msg->sov which points to the first byte of message body.
+ * ci_head(req) still points to the beginning of the message. We
+ * must save the body in msg->next because it survives buffer
+ * re-alignments.
+ */
+ msg->next = msg->sov;
+
+ if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE;
+ else
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)) {
+ /* We're in content-length mode, we just have to wait for enough data. */
+ if (http_body_bytes(msg) < msg->body_len)
+ goto missing_data;
+
+ /* OK we have everything we need now */
+ goto http_end;
+ }
+
+ /* OK here we're parsing a chunked-encoded message */
+
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
+ /* read the chunk size and assign it to ->chunk_len, then
+ * set ->sov and ->next to point to the body and switch to DATA or
+ * TRAILERS state.
+ */
+ unsigned int chunk;
+ int ret = h1_parse_chunk_size(&req->buf, co_data(req) + msg->next, c_data(req), &chunk);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ goto missing_data;
+ else if (ret < 0) {
+ msg->err_pos = ci_data(req) + ret;
+ if (msg->err_pos < 0)
+ msg->err_pos += req->buf.size;
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ msg->chunk_len = chunk;
+ msg->body_len += chunk;
+
+ msg->sol = ret;
+ msg->next += ret;
+ msg->msg_state = msg->chunk_len ? HTTP_MSG_DATA : HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we're in HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS state.
+ * We have the first data byte is in msg->sov + msg->sol. We're waiting
+ * for at least a whole chunk or the whole content length bytes after
+ * msg->sov + msg->sol.
+ */
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS)
+ goto http_end;
+
+ if (http_body_bytes(msg) >= msg->body_len) /* we have enough bytes now */
+ goto http_end;
+
+ missing_data:
+ /* we get here if we need to wait for more data. If the buffer is full,
+ * we have the maximum we can expect.
+ */
+ if (channel_full(req, global.tune.maxrewrite))
+ goto http_end;
+
+ if ((req->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT) || tick_is_expired(req->analyse_exp, now_ms)) {
+ txn->status = 408;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLITO;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+ goto return_err_msg;
+ }
+
+ /* we get here if we need to wait for more data */
+ if (!(req->flags & (CF_SHUTR | CF_READ_ERROR))) {
+ /* Not enough data. We'll re-use the http-request
+ * timeout here. Ideally, we should set the timeout
+ * relative to the accept() date. We just set the
+ * request timeout once at the beginning of the
+ * request.
+ */
+ channel_dont_connect(req);
+ if (!tick_isset(req->analyse_exp))
+ req->analyse_exp = tick_add_ifset(now_ms, s->be->timeout.httpreq);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ http_end:
+ /* The situation will not evolve, so let's give up on the analysis. */
+ s->logs.tv_request = now; /* update the request timer to reflect full request */
+ req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+ req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ return 1;
+
+ return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
+ txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+ txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ txn->status = 400;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_R;
+
+ return_err_msg:
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which forwards request body (including chunk
+ * sizes if any). It is called as soon as we must forward, even if we forward
+ * zero byte. The only situation where it must not be called is when we're in
+ * tunnel mode and we want to forward till the close. It's used both to forward
+ * remaining data and to resync after end of body. It expects the msg_state to
+ * be between MSG_BODY and MSG_DONE (inclusive). It returns zero if it needs to
+ * read more data, or 1 once we can go on with next request or end the stream.
+ * When in MSG_DATA or MSG_TRAILERS, it will automatically forward chunk_len
+ * bytes of pending data + the headers if not already done.
+ */
+int htx_request_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
+{
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
+ int ret;
+
+ DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+ now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+ s,
+ req,
+ req->rex, req->wex,
+ req->flags,
+ ci_data(req),
+ req->analysers);
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((req->flags & (CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_TIMEOUT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) ||
+ ((req->flags & CF_SHUTW) && (req->to_forward || co_data(req)))) {
+ /* Output closed while we were sending data. We must abort and
+ * wake the other side up.
+ */
+ msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ http_resync_states(s);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Note that we don't have to send 100-continue back because we don't
+ * need the data to complete our job, and it's up to the server to
+ * decide whether to return 100, 417 or anything else in return of
+ * an "Expect: 100-continue" header.
+ */
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_BODY) {
+ msg->msg_state = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+ ? HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE
+ : HTTP_MSG_DATA);
+
+ /* TODO/filters: when http-buffer-request option is set or if a
+ * rule on url_param exists, the first chunk size could be
+ * already parsed. In that case, msg->next is after the chunk
+ * size (including the CRLF after the size). So this case should
+ * be handled to */
+ }
+
+ /* Some post-connect processing might want us to refrain from starting to
+ * forward data. Currently, the only reason for this is "balance url_param"
+ * whichs need to parse/process the request after we've enabled forwarding.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN)) {
+ if (!(s->res.flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)) {
+ channel_auto_connect(req);
+ req->flags |= CF_WAKE_CONNECT;
+ channel_dont_close(req); /* don't fail on early shutr */
+ goto waiting;
+ }
+ msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN;
+ }
+
+ /* in most states, we should abort in case of early close */
+ channel_auto_close(req);
+
+ if (req->to_forward) {
+ /* We can't process the buffer's contents yet */
+ req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+ goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+ }
+
+ if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
+ ret = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+ ? http_msg_forward_chunked_body(s, msg)
+ : http_msg_forward_body(s, msg));
+ if (!ret)
+ goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+
+ /* other states, DONE...TUNNEL */
+ /* we don't want to forward closes on DONE except in tunnel mode. */
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN)
+ channel_dont_close(req);
+
+ http_resync_states(s);
+ if (!(req->analysers & an_bit)) {
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+ if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
+ /* request errors are most likely due to the
+ * server aborting the transfer. */
+ goto aborted_xfer;
+ }
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, s, msg, msg->err_state, s->be);
+ goto return_bad_req;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* If "option abortonclose" is set on the backend, we want to monitor
+ * the client's connection and forward any shutdown notification to the
+ * server, which will decide whether to close or to go on processing the
+ * request. We only do that in tunnel mode, and not in other modes since
+ * it can be abused to exhaust source ports. */
+ if ((s->be->options & PR_O_ABRT_CLOSE) && !(s->si[0].flags & SI_FL_CLEAN_ABRT)) {
+ channel_auto_read(req);
+ if ((req->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_READ_NULL)) &&
+ ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN))
+ s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+ channel_auto_close(req);
+ }
+ else if (s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST) {
+ /* POST requests may require to read extra CRLF sent by broken
+ * browsers and which could cause an RST to be sent upon close
+ * on some systems (eg: Linux). */
+ channel_auto_read(req);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ missing_data_or_waiting:
+ /* stop waiting for data if the input is closed before the end */
+ if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ENDING && req->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
+ if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+ else
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+ }
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+
+ goto return_bad_req_stats_ok;
+ }
+
+ waiting:
+ /* waiting for the last bits to leave the buffer */
+ if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW)
+ goto aborted_xfer;
+
+ /* When TE: chunked is used, we need to get there again to parse remaining
+ * chunks even if the client has closed, so we don't want to set CF_DONTCLOSE.
+ * And when content-length is used, we never want to let the possible
+ * shutdown be forwarded to the other side, as the state machine will
+ * take care of it once the client responds. It's also important to
+ * prevent TIME_WAITs from accumulating on the backend side, and for
+ * HTTP/2 where the last frame comes with a shutdown.
+ */
+ if (msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK|HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN))
+ channel_dont_close(req);
+
+ /* We know that more data are expected, but we couldn't send more that
+ * what we did. So we always set the CF_EXPECT_MORE flag so that the
+ * system knows it must not set a PUSH on this first part. Interactive
+ * modes are already handled by the stream sock layer. We must not do
+ * this in content-length mode because it could present the MSG_MORE
+ * flag with the last block of forwarded data, which would cause an
+ * additional delay to be observed by the receiver.
+ */
+ if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+ req->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
+
+ return_bad_req_stats_ok:
+ txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+ txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ if (txn->status) {
+ /* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+ } else {
+ txn->status = 400;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ }
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
+ if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+ else
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ aborted_xfer:
+ txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
+ txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ if (txn->status) {
+ /* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+ } else {
+ txn->status = 502;
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ }
+ req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
+ if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+ else
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This stream analyser waits for a complete HTTP response. It returns 1 if the
+ * processing can continue on next analysers, or zero if it either needs more
+ * data or wants to immediately abort the response (eg: timeout, error, ...). It
+ * is tied to AN_RES_WAIT_HTTP and may may remove itself from s->res.analysers
+ * when it has nothing left to do, and may remove any analyser when it wants to
+ * abort.
+ */
+int htx_wait_for_response(struct stream *s, struct channel *rep, int an_bit)
+{
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &txn->rsp;
+ struct hdr_ctx ctx;
+ int use_close_only;
+ int cur_idx;
+ int n;
+
+ DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+ now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+ s,
+ rep,
+ rep->rex, rep->wex,
+ rep->flags,
+ ci_data(rep),
+ rep->analysers);
+
+ /*
+ * Now parse the partial (or complete) lines.
+ * We will check the response syntax, and also join multi-line
+ * headers. An index of all the lines will be elaborated while
+ * parsing.
+ *
+ * For the parsing, we use a 28 states FSM.
+ *
+ * Here is the information we currently have :
+ * ci_head(rep) = beginning of response
+ * ci_head(rep) + msg->eoh = end of processed headers / start of current one
+ * ci_tail(rep) = end of input data
+ * msg->eol = end of current header or line (LF or CRLF)
+ * msg->next = first non-visited byte
+ */
+
+ next_one:
+ /* There's a protected area at the end of the buffer for rewriting
+ * purposes. We don't want to start to parse the request if the
+ * protected area is affected, because we may have to move processed
+ * data later, which is much more complicated.
+ */
+ if (c_data(rep) && msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR) {
+ if (unlikely(!channel_is_rewritable(rep))) {
+ /* some data has still not left the buffer, wake us once that's done */
+ if (rep->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT))
+ goto abort_response;
+ channel_dont_close(rep);
+ rep->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+ rep->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(ci_tail(rep) < c_ptr(rep, msg->next) ||
+ ci_tail(rep) > b_wrap(&rep->buf) - global.tune.maxrewrite))
+ channel_slow_realign(rep, trash.area);
+
+ if (likely(msg->next < ci_data(rep)))
+ http_msg_analyzer(msg, &txn->hdr_idx);
+ }
+
+ /* 1: we might have to print this header in debug mode */
+ if (unlikely((global.mode & MODE_DEBUG) &&
+ (!(global.mode & MODE_QUIET) || (global.mode & MODE_VERBOSE)) &&
+ msg->msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+ char *eol, *sol;
+
+ sol = ci_head(rep);
+ eol = sol + (msg->sl.st.l ? msg->sl.st.l : ci_data(rep));
+ debug_hdr("srvrep", s, sol, eol);
+
+ sol += hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
+ cur_idx = hdr_idx_first_idx(&txn->hdr_idx);
+
+ while (cur_idx) {
+ eol = sol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].len;
+ debug_hdr("srvhdr", s, sol, eol);
+ sol = eol + txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].cr + 1;
+ cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we quickly check if we have found a full valid response.
+ * If not so, we check the FD and buffer states before leaving.
+ * A full response is indicated by the fact that we have seen
+ * the double LF/CRLF, so the state is >= HTTP_MSG_BODY. Invalid
+ * responses are checked first.
+ *
+ * Depending on whether the client is still there or not, we
+ * may send an error response back or not. Note that normally
+ * we should only check for HTTP status there, and check I/O
+ * errors somewhere else.
+ */
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
+ /* Invalid response */
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+ /* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this response
+ * in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
+ */
+ hdr_response_bad:
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR || msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_HDRRSP);
+ }
+ abort_response:
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ txn->status = 502;
+ s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+ channel_truncate(rep);
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* too large response does not fit in buffer. */
+ else if (channel_full(rep, global.tune.maxrewrite)) {
+ if (msg->err_pos < 0)
+ msg->err_pos = ci_data(rep);
+ goto hdr_response_bad;
+ }
+
+ /* read error */
+ else if (rep->flags & CF_READ_ERROR) {
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ else if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST)
+ goto abort_keep_alive;
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_READ_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ txn->status = 502;
+
+ /* Check to see if the server refused the early data.
+ * If so, just send a 425
+ */
+ if (objt_cs(s->si[1].end)) {
+ struct connection *conn = objt_cs(s->si[1].end)->conn;
+
+ if (conn->err_code == CO_ER_SSL_EARLY_FAILED)
+ txn->status = 425;
+ }
+
+ s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+ channel_truncate(rep);
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* read timeout : return a 504 to the client. */
+ else if (rep->flags & CF_READ_TIMEOUT) {
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_READ_TIMEOUT);
+ }
+
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ txn->status = 504;
+ s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+ channel_truncate(rep);
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVTO;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* client abort with an abortonclose */
+ else if ((rep->flags & CF_SHUTR) && ((s->req.flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW)) == (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW))) {
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+
+ txn->status = 400;
+ channel_truncate(rep);
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+
+ /* process_stream() will take care of the error */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* close from server, capture the response if the server has started to respond */
+ else if (rep->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+ if (msg->msg_state >= HTTP_MSG_RPVER || msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ else if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST)
+ goto abort_keep_alive;
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_BROKEN_PIPE);
+ }
+
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ txn->status = 502;
+ s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+ channel_truncate(rep);
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* write error to client (we don't send any message then) */
+ else if (rep->flags & CF_WRITE_ERROR) {
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+ else if (txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST)
+ goto abort_keep_alive;
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+
+ /* process_stream() will take care of the error */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ channel_dont_close(rep);
+ rep->flags |= CF_READ_DONTWAIT; /* try to get back here ASAP */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* More interesting part now : we know that we have a complete
+ * response which at least looks like HTTP. We have an indicator
+ * of each header's length, so we can parse them quickly.
+ */
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->err_pos >= 0))
+ http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, sess->fe);
+
+ /*
+ * 1: get the status code
+ */
+ n = ci_head(rep)[msg->sl.st.c] - '0';
+ if (n < 1 || n > 5)
+ n = 0;
+ /* when the client triggers a 4xx from the server, it's most often due
+ * to a missing object or permission. These events should be tracked
+ * because if they happen often, it may indicate a brute force or a
+ * vulnerability scan.
+ */
+ if (n == 4)
+ stream_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
+
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.p.http.rsp[n], 1);
+
+ /* RFC7230#2.6 has enforced the format of the HTTP version string to be
+ * exactly one digit "." one digit. This check may be disabled using
+ * option accept-invalid-http-response.
+ */
+ if (!(s->be->options2 & PR_O2_RSPBUG_OK)) {
+ if (msg->sl.st.v_l != 8) {
+ msg->err_pos = 0;
+ goto hdr_response_bad;
+ }
+
+ if (ci_head(rep)[4] != '/' ||
+ !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(rep)[5]) ||
+ ci_head(rep)[6] != '.' ||
+ !isdigit((unsigned char)ci_head(rep)[7])) {
+ msg->err_pos = 4;
+ goto hdr_response_bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check if the response is HTTP/1.1 or above */
+ if ((msg->sl.st.v_l == 8) &&
+ ((ci_head(rep)[5] > '1') ||
+ ((ci_head(rep)[5] == '1') && (ci_head(rep)[7] >= '1'))))
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_VER_11;
+
+ /* "connection" has not been parsed yet */
+ txn->flags &= ~(TX_HDR_CONN_PRS|TX_HDR_CONN_CLO|TX_HDR_CONN_KAL|TX_HDR_CONN_UPG|TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET);
+
+ /* transfer length unknown*/
+ msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+
+ txn->status = strl2ui(ci_head(rep) + msg->sl.st.c, msg->sl.st.c_l);
+
+ /* Adjust server's health based on status code. Note: status codes 501
+ * and 505 are triggered on demand by client request, so we must not
+ * count them as server failures.
+ */
+ if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+ if (txn->status >= 100 && (txn->status < 500 || txn->status == 501 || txn->status == 505))
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_OK);
+ else
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_STS);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We may be facing a 100-continue response, or any other informational
+ * 1xx response which is non-final, in which case this is not the right
+ * response, and we're waiting for the next one. Let's allow this response
+ * to go to the client and wait for the next one. There's an exception for
+ * 101 which is used later in the code to switch protocols.
+ */
+ if (txn->status < 200 &&
+ (txn->status == 100 || txn->status >= 102)) {
+ hdr_idx_init(&txn->hdr_idx);
+ msg->next -= channel_forward(rep, msg->next);
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE;
+ txn->status = 0;
+ s->logs.t_data = -1; /* was not a response yet */
+ FLT_STRM_CB(s, flt_http_reset(s, msg));
+ goto next_one;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 2: check for cacheability.
+ */
+
+ switch (txn->status) {
+ case 200:
+ case 203:
+ case 204:
+ case 206:
+ case 300:
+ case 301:
+ case 404:
+ case 405:
+ case 410:
+ case 414:
+ case 501:
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* RFC7231#6.1:
+ * Responses with status codes that are defined as
+ * cacheable by default (e.g., 200, 203, 204, 206,
+ * 300, 301, 404, 405, 410, 414, and 501 in this
+ * specification) can be reused by a cache with
+ * heuristic expiration unless otherwise indicated
+ * by the method definition or explicit cache
+ * controls [RFC7234]; all other status codes are
+ * not cacheable by default.
+ */
+ txn->flags &= ~(TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 3: we may need to capture headers
+ */
+ s->logs.logwait &= ~LW_RESP;
+ if (unlikely((s->logs.logwait & LW_RSPHDR) && s->res_cap))
+ http_capture_headers(ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx,
+ s->res_cap, sess->fe->rsp_cap);
+
+ /* 4: determine the transfer-length according to RFC2616 #4.4, updated
+ * by RFC7230#3.3.3 :
+ *
+ * The length of a message body is determined by one of the following
+ * (in order of precedence):
+ *
+ * 1. Any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request implies that
+ * the connection will become a tunnel immediately after the empty
+ * line that concludes the header fields. A client MUST ignore
+ * any Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received
+ * in such a message. Any 101 response (Switching Protocols) is
+ * managed in the same manner.
+ *
+ * 2. Any response to a HEAD request and any response with a 1xx
+ * (Informational), 204 (No Content), or 304 (Not Modified) status
+ * code is always terminated by the first empty line after the
+ * header fields, regardless of the header fields present in the
+ * message, and thus cannot contain a message body.
+ *
+ * 3. If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present and the chunked
+ * transfer coding (Section 4.1) is the final encoding, the message
+ * body length is determined by reading and decoding the chunked
+ * data until the transfer coding indicates the data is complete.
+ *
+ * If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and
+ * the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the
+ * message body length is determined by reading the connection until
+ * it is closed by the server. If a Transfer-Encoding header field
+ * is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not
+ * the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined
+ * reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request)
+ * status code and then close the connection.
+ *
+ * If a message is received with both a Transfer-Encoding and a
+ * Content-Length header field, the Transfer-Encoding overrides the
+ * Content-Length. Such a message might indicate an attempt to
+ * perform request smuggling (Section 9.5) or response splitting
+ * (Section 9.4) and ought to be handled as an error. A sender MUST
+ * remove the received Content-Length field prior to forwarding such
+ * a message downstream.
+ *
+ * 4. If a message is received without Transfer-Encoding and with
+ * either multiple Content-Length header fields having differing
+ * field-values or a single Content-Length header field having an
+ * invalid value, then the message framing is invalid and the
+ * recipient MUST treat it as an unrecoverable error. If this is a
+ * request message, the server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request)
+ * status code and then close the connection. If this is a response
+ * message received by a proxy, the proxy MUST close the connection
+ * to the server, discard the received response, and send a 502 (Bad
+ * Gateway) response to the client. If this is a response message
+ * received by a user agent, the user agent MUST close the
+ * connection to the server and discard the received response.
+ *
+ * 5. If a valid Content-Length header field is present without
+ * Transfer-Encoding, its decimal value defines the expected message
+ * body length in octets. If the sender closes the connection or
+ * the recipient times out before the indicated number of octets are
+ * received, the recipient MUST consider the message to be
+ * incomplete and close the connection.
+ *
+ * 6. If this is a request message and none of the above are true, then
+ * the message body length is zero (no message body is present).
+ *
+ * 7. Otherwise, this is a response message without a declared message
+ * body length, so the message body length is determined by the
+ * number of octets received prior to the server closing the
+ * connection.
+ */
+
+ /* Skip parsing if no content length is possible. The response flags
+ * remain 0 as well as the chunk_len, which may or may not mirror
+ * the real header value, and we note that we know the response's length.
+ * FIXME: should we parse anyway and return an error on chunked encoding ?
+ */
+ if (unlikely((txn->meth == HTTP_METH_CONNECT && txn->status == 200) ||
+ txn->status == 101)) {
+ /* Either we've established an explicit tunnel, or we're
+ * switching the protocol. In both cases, we're very unlikely
+ * to understand the next protocols. We have to switch to tunnel
+ * mode, so that we transfer the request and responses then let
+ * this protocol pass unmodified. When we later implement specific
+ * parsers for such protocols, we'll want to check the Upgrade
+ * header which contains information about that protocol for
+ * responses with status 101 (eg: see RFC2817 about TLS).
+ */
+ txn->flags = (txn->flags & ~TX_CON_WANT_MSK) | TX_CON_WANT_TUN;
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_HEAD ||
+ (txn->status >= 100 && txn->status < 200) ||
+ txn->status == 204 || txn->status == 304) {
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+ goto skip_content_length;
+ }
+
+ use_close_only = 0;
+ ctx.idx = 0;
+ while (http_find_header2("Transfer-Encoding", 17, ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+ if (ctx.vlen == 7 && strncasecmp(ctx.line + ctx.val, "chunked", 7) == 0)
+ msg->flags |= (HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK | HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN);
+ else if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) {
+ /* bad transfer-encoding (chunked followed by something else) */
+ use_close_only = 1;
+ msg->flags &= ~(HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK | HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Chunked responses must have their content-length removed */
+ ctx.idx = 0;
+ if (use_close_only || (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)) {
+ while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx))
+ http_remove_header2(msg, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
+ }
+ else while (http_find_header2("Content-Length", 14, ci_head(rep), &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
+ signed long long cl;
+
+ if (!ctx.vlen) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+ goto hdr_response_bad;
+ }
+
+ if (strl2llrc(ctx.line + ctx.val, ctx.vlen, &cl)) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+ goto hdr_response_bad; /* parse failure */
+ }
+
+ if (cl < 0) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+ goto hdr_response_bad;
+ }
+
+ if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN) && (msg->chunk_len != cl)) {
+ msg->err_pos = ctx.line + ctx.val - ci_head(rep);
+ goto hdr_response_bad; /* already specified, was different */
+ }
+
+ msg->flags |= HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN | HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN;
+ msg->body_len = msg->chunk_len = cl;
+ }
+
+ skip_content_length:
+ /* Now we have to check if we need to modify the Connection header.
+ * This is more difficult on the response than it is on the request,
+ * because we can have two different HTTP versions and we don't know
+ * how the client will interprete a response. For instance, let's say
+ * that the client sends a keep-alive request in HTTP/1.0 and gets an
+ * HTTP/1.1 response without any header. Maybe it will bound itself to
+ * HTTP/1.0 because it only knows about it, and will consider the lack
+ * of header as a close, or maybe it knows HTTP/1.1 and can consider
+ * the lack of header as a keep-alive. Thus we will use two flags
+ * indicating how a request MAY be understood by the client. In case
+ * of multiple possibilities, we'll fix the header to be explicit. If
+ * ambiguous cases such as both close and keepalive are seen, then we
+ * will fall back to explicit close. Note that we won't take risks with
+ * HTTP/1.0 clients which may not necessarily understand keep-alive.
+ * See doc/internals/connection-header.txt for the complete matrix.
+ */
+ if ((txn->status >= 200) && !(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_PRS) &&
+ (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) {
+ int to_del = 0;
+
+ /* on unknown transfer length, we must close */
+ if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN))
+ txn->flags = (txn->flags & ~TX_CON_WANT_MSK) | TX_CON_WANT_CLO;
+
+ /* now adjust header transformations depending on current state */
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_CLO) {
+ to_del |= 2; /* remove "keep-alive" on any response */
+ if (!(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11))
+ to_del |= 1; /* remove "close" for HTTP/1.0 responses */
+ }
+ else { /* SCL / KAL */
+ to_del |= 1; /* remove "close" on any response */
+ if (txn->req.flags & msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11)
+ to_del |= 2; /* remove "keep-alive" on pure 1.1 responses */
+ }
+
+ /* Parse and remove some headers from the connection header */
+ http_parse_connection_header(txn, msg, to_del);
+
+ /* Some keep-alive responses are converted to Server-close if
+ * the server wants to close.
+ */
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL) {
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_CLO) ||
+ (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_KAL) && !(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11)))
+ txn->flags = (txn->flags & ~TX_CON_WANT_MSK) | TX_CON_WANT_SCL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ end:
+ /* we want to have the response time before we start processing it */
+ s->logs.t_data = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
+
+ /* end of job, return OK */
+ rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+ rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+ return 1;
+
+ abort_keep_alive:
+ /* A keep-alive request to the server failed on a network error.
+ * The client is required to retry. We need to close without returning
+ * any other information so that the client retries.
+ */
+ txn->status = 0;
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
+ channel_auto_close(rep);
+ s->logs.logwait = 0;
+ s->logs.level = 0;
+ s->res.flags &= ~CF_EXPECT_MORE; /* speed up sending a previous response */
+ channel_truncate(rep);
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function performs all the processing enabled for the current response.
+ * It normally returns 1 unless it wants to break. It relies on buffers flags,
+ * and updates s->res.analysers. It might make sense to explode it into several
+ * other functions. It works like process_request (see indications above).
+ */
+int htx_process_res_common(struct stream *s, struct channel *rep, int an_bit, struct proxy *px)
+{
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &txn->rsp;
+ struct proxy *cur_proxy;
+ struct cond_wordlist *wl;
+ enum rule_result ret = HTTP_RULE_RES_CONT;
+
+ DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+ now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+ s,
+ rep,
+ rep->rex, rep->wex,
+ rep->flags,
+ ci_data(rep),
+ rep->analysers);
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) /* we need more data */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* The stats applet needs to adjust the Connection header but we don't
+ * apply any filter there.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(objt_applet(s->target) == &http_stats_applet)) {
+ rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+ rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ goto skip_filters;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We will have to evaluate the filters.
+ * As opposed to version 1.2, now they will be evaluated in the
+ * filters order and not in the header order. This means that
+ * each filter has to be validated among all headers.
+ *
+ * Filters are tried with ->be first, then with ->fe if it is
+ * different from ->be.
+ *
+ * Maybe we are in resume condiion. In this case I choose the
+ * "struct proxy" which contains the rule list matching the resume
+ * pointer. If none of theses "struct proxy" match, I initialise
+ * the process with the first one.
+ *
+ * In fact, I check only correspondance betwwen the current list
+ * pointer and the ->fe rule list. If it doesn't match, I initialize
+ * the loop with the ->be.
+ */
+ if (s->current_rule_list == &sess->fe->http_res_rules)
+ cur_proxy = sess->fe;
+ else
+ cur_proxy = s->be;
+ while (1) {
+ struct proxy *rule_set = cur_proxy;
+
+ /* evaluate http-response rules */
+ if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_CONT) {
+ ret = http_res_get_intercept_rule(cur_proxy, &cur_proxy->http_res_rules, s);
+
+ if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_BADREQ)
+ goto return_srv_prx_502;
+
+ if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_DONE) {
+ rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+ rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* we need to be called again. */
+ if (ret == HTTP_RULE_RES_YIELD) {
+ channel_dont_close(rep);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* try headers filters */
+ if (rule_set->rsp_exp != NULL) {
+ if (apply_filters_to_response(s, rep, rule_set) < 0) {
+ return_bad_resp:
+ if (objt_server(s->target)) {
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_RSP);
+ }
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ return_srv_prx_502:
+ rep->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ txn->status = 502;
+ s->logs.t_data = -1; /* was not a valid response */
+ s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
+ channel_truncate(rep);
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* has the response been denied ? */
+ if (txn->flags & TX_SVDENY) {
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_secu, 1);
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_resp, 1);
+
+ goto return_srv_prx_502;
+ }
+
+ /* add response headers from the rule sets in the same order */
+ list_for_each_entry(wl, &rule_set->rsp_add, list) {
+ if (txn->status < 200 && txn->status != 101)
+ break;
+ if (wl->cond) {
+ int ret = acl_exec_cond(wl->cond, px, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_RES|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
+ ret = acl_pass(ret);
+ if (((struct acl_cond *)wl->cond)->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
+ ret = !ret;
+ if (!ret)
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx, wl->s, strlen(wl->s)) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_resp;
+ }
+
+ /* check whether we're already working on the frontend */
+ if (cur_proxy == sess->fe)
+ break;
+ cur_proxy = sess->fe;
+ }
+
+ /* After this point, this anayzer can't return yield, so we can
+ * remove the bit corresponding to this analyzer from the list.
+ *
+ * Note that the intermediate returns and goto found previously
+ * reset the analyzers.
+ */
+ rep->analysers &= ~an_bit;
+ rep->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
+
+ /* OK that's all we can do for 1xx responses */
+ if (unlikely(txn->status < 200 && txn->status != 101))
+ goto skip_header_mangling;
+
+ /*
+ * Now check for a server cookie.
+ */
+ if (s->be->cookie_name || sess->fe->capture_name || (s->be->options & PR_O_CHK_CACHE))
+ manage_server_side_cookies(s, rep);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for cache-control or pragma headers if required.
+ */
+ if ((s->be->options & PR_O_CHK_CACHE) || (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_NOC))
+ check_response_for_cacheability(s, rep);
+
+ /*
+ * Add server cookie in the response if needed
+ */
+ if (objt_server(s->target) && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_INS) &&
+ !((txn->flags & TX_SCK_FOUND) && (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_PSV)) &&
+ (!(s->flags & SF_DIRECT) ||
+ ((s->be->cookie_maxidle || txn->cookie_last_date) &&
+ (!txn->cookie_last_date || (txn->cookie_last_date - date.tv_sec) < 0)) ||
+ (s->be->cookie_maxlife && !txn->cookie_first_date) || // set the first_date
+ (!s->be->cookie_maxlife && txn->cookie_first_date)) && // remove the first_date
+ (!(s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_POST) || (txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST)) &&
+ !(s->flags & SF_IGNORE_PRST)) {
+ /* the server is known, it's not the one the client requested, or the
+ * cookie's last seen date needs to be refreshed. We have to
+ * insert a set-cookie here, except if we want to insert only on POST
+ * requests and this one isn't. Note that servers which don't have cookies
+ * (eg: some backup servers) will return a full cookie removal request.
+ */
+ if (!objt_server(s->target)->cookie) {
+ chunk_printf(&trash,
+ "Set-Cookie: %s=; Expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; path=/",
+ s->be->cookie_name);
+ }
+ else {
+ chunk_printf(&trash, "Set-Cookie: %s=%s", s->be->cookie_name, objt_server(s->target)->cookie);
+
+ if (s->be->cookie_maxidle || s->be->cookie_maxlife) {
+ /* emit last_date, which is mandatory */
+ trash.area[trash.data++] = COOKIE_DELIM_DATE;
+ s30tob64((date.tv_sec+3) >> 2,
+ trash.area + trash.data);
+ trash.data += 5;
+
+ if (s->be->cookie_maxlife) {
+ /* emit first_date, which is either the original one or
+ * the current date.
+ */
+ trash.area[trash.data++] = COOKIE_DELIM_DATE;
+ s30tob64(txn->cookie_first_date ?
+ txn->cookie_first_date >> 2 :
+ (date.tv_sec+3) >> 2,
+ trash.area + trash.data);
+ trash.data += 5;
+ }
+ }
+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "; path=/");
+ }
+
+ if (s->be->cookie_domain)
+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "; domain=%s", s->be->cookie_domain);
+
+ if (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_HTTPONLY)
+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "; HttpOnly");
+
+ if (s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_SECURE)
+ chunk_appendf(&trash, "; Secure");
+
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.area, trash.data) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_resp;
+
+ txn->flags &= ~TX_SCK_MASK;
+ if (__objt_server(s->target)->cookie && (s->flags & SF_DIRECT))
+ /* the server did not change, only the date was updated */
+ txn->flags |= TX_SCK_UPDATED;
+ else
+ txn->flags |= TX_SCK_INSERTED;
+
+ /* Here, we will tell an eventual cache on the client side that we don't
+ * want it to cache this reply because HTTP/1.0 caches also cache cookies !
+ * Some caches understand the correct form: 'no-cache="set-cookie"', but
+ * others don't (eg: apache <= 1.3.26). So we use 'private' instead.
+ */
+ if ((s->be->ck_opts & PR_CK_NOC) && (txn->flags & TX_CACHEABLE)) {
+
+ txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK;
+
+ if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx,
+ "Cache-control: private", 22) < 0))
+ goto return_bad_resp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if result will be cacheable with a cookie.
+ * We'll block the response if security checks have caught
+ * nasty things such as a cacheable cookie.
+ */
+ if (((txn->flags & (TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK | TX_SCK_PRESENT)) ==
+ (TX_CACHEABLE | TX_CACHE_COOK | TX_SCK_PRESENT)) &&
+ (s->be->options & PR_O_CHK_CACHE)) {
+ /* we're in presence of a cacheable response containing
+ * a set-cookie header. We'll block it as requested by
+ * the 'checkcache' option, and send an alert.
+ */
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_secu, 1);
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.denied_resp, 1);
+ if (sess->listener->counters)
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->denied_resp, 1);
+
+ ha_alert("Blocking cacheable cookie in response from instance %s, server %s.\n",
+ s->be->id, objt_server(s->target) ? objt_server(s->target)->id : "<dispatch>");
+ send_log(s->be, LOG_ALERT,
+ "Blocking cacheable cookie in response from instance %s, server %s.\n",
+ s->be->id, objt_server(s->target) ? objt_server(s->target)->id : "<dispatch>");
+ goto return_srv_prx_502;
+ }
+
+ skip_filters:
+ /*
+ * Adjust "Connection: close" or "Connection: keep-alive" if needed.
+ * If an "Upgrade" token is found, the header is left untouched in order
+ * not to have to deal with some client bugs : some of them fail an upgrade
+ * if anything but "Upgrade" is present in the Connection header. We don't
+ * want to touch any 101 response either since it's switching to another
+ * protocol.
+ */
+ if ((txn->status != 101) && !(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_UPG) &&
+ (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) {
+ unsigned int want_flags = 0;
+
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+ (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL) {
+ /* we want a keep-alive response here. Keep-alive header
+ * required if either side is not 1.1.
+ */
+ if (!(txn->req.flags & msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11))
+ want_flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
+ }
+ else { /* CLO */
+ /* we want a close response here. Close header required if
+ * the server is 1.1, regardless of the client.
+ */
+ if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11)
+ want_flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
+ }
+
+ if (want_flags != (txn->flags & (TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET)))
+ http_change_connection_header(txn, msg, want_flags);
+ }
+
+ skip_header_mangling:
+ /* Always enter in the body analyzer */
+ rep->analysers &= ~AN_RES_FLT_XFER_DATA;
+ rep->analysers |= AN_RES_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
+
+ /* if the user wants to log as soon as possible, without counting
+ * bytes from the server, then this is the right moment. We have
+ * to temporarily assign bytes_out to log what we currently have.
+ */
+ if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&sess->fe->logformat) && !(s->logs.logwait & LW_BYTES)) {
+ s->logs.t_close = s->logs.t_data; /* to get a valid end date */
+ s->logs.bytes_out = txn->rsp.eoh;
+ s->do_log(s);
+ s->logs.bytes_out = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* This function is an analyser which forwards response body (including chunk
+ * sizes if any). It is called as soon as we must forward, even if we forward
+ * zero byte. The only situation where it must not be called is when we're in
+ * tunnel mode and we want to forward till the close. It's used both to forward
+ * remaining data and to resync after end of body. It expects the msg_state to
+ * be between MSG_BODY and MSG_DONE (inclusive). It returns zero if it needs to
+ * read more data, or 1 once we can go on with next request or end the stream.
+ *
+ * It is capable of compressing response data both in content-length mode and
+ * in chunked mode. The state machines follows different flows depending on
+ * whether content-length and chunked modes are used, since there are no
+ * trailers in content-length :
+ *
+ * chk-mode cl-mode
+ * ,----- BODY -----.
+ * / \
+ * V size > 0 V chk-mode
+ * .--> SIZE -------------> DATA -------------> CRLF
+ * | | size == 0 | last byte |
+ * | v final crlf v inspected |
+ * | TRAILERS -----------> DONE |
+ * | |
+ * `----------------------------------------------'
+ *
+ * Compression only happens in the DATA state, and must be flushed in final
+ * states (TRAILERS/DONE) or when leaving on missing data. Normal forwarding
+ * is performed at once on final states for all bytes parsed, or when leaving
+ * on missing data.
+ */
+int htx_response_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *res, int an_bit)
+{
+ struct session *sess = s->sess;
+ struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
+ struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->rsp;
+ int ret;
+
+ DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%lu analysers=%02x\n",
+ now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
+ s,
+ res,
+ res->rex, res->wex,
+ res->flags,
+ ci_data(res),
+ res->analysers);
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((res->flags & (CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_TIMEOUT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) ||
+ ((res->flags & CF_SHUTW) && (res->to_forward || co_data(res))) ||
+ !s->req.analysers) {
+ /* Output closed while we were sending data. We must abort and
+ * wake the other side up.
+ */
+ msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ http_resync_states(s);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* in most states, we should abort in case of early close */
+ channel_auto_close(res);
+
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_BODY) {
+ msg->msg_state = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+ ? HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE
+ : HTTP_MSG_DATA);
+ }
+
+ if (res->to_forward) {
+ /* We can't process the buffer's contents yet */
+ res->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
+ goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+ }
+
+ if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
+ ret = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
+ ? http_msg_forward_chunked_body(s, msg)
+ : http_msg_forward_body(s, msg));
+ if (!ret)
+ goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto return_bad_res;
+ }
+
+ /* other states, DONE...TUNNEL */
+ /* for keep-alive we don't want to forward closes on DONE */
+ if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+ (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL)
+ channel_dont_close(res);
+
+ http_resync_states(s);
+ if (!(res->analysers & an_bit)) {
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
+ if (res->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
+ /* response errors are most likely due to the
+ * client aborting the transfer. */
+ goto aborted_xfer;
+ }
+ if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
+ http_capture_bad_message(s->be, s, msg, msg->err_state, strm_fe(s));
+ goto return_bad_res;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ missing_data_or_waiting:
+ if (res->flags & CF_SHUTW)
+ goto aborted_xfer;
+
+ /* stop waiting for data if the input is closed before the end. If the
+ * client side was already closed, it means that the client has aborted,
+ * so we don't want to count this as a server abort. Otherwise it's a
+ * server abort.
+ */
+ if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ENDING && res->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
+ if ((s->req.flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW)) == (CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTW))
+ goto aborted_xfer;
+ /* If we have some pending data, we continue the processing */
+ if (!ci_data(res)) {
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts, 1);
+ goto return_bad_res_stats_ok;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* we need to obey the req analyser, so if it leaves, we must too */
+ if (!s->req.analysers)
+ goto return_bad_res;
+
+ /* When TE: chunked is used, we need to get there again to parse
+ * remaining chunks even if the server has closed, so we don't want to
+ * set CF_DONTCLOSE. Similarly, if keep-alive is set on the client side
+ * or if there are filters registered on the stream, we don't want to
+ * forward a close
+ */
+ if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) ||
+ HAS_DATA_FILTERS(s, res) ||
+ (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
+ (txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL)
+ channel_dont_close(res);
+
+ /* We know that more data are expected, but we couldn't send more that
+ * what we did. So we always set the CF_EXPECT_MORE flag so that the
+ * system knows it must not set a PUSH on this first part. Interactive
+ * modes are already handled by the stream sock layer. We must not do
+ * this in content-length mode because it could present the MSG_MORE
+ * flag with the last block of forwarded data, which would cause an
+ * additional delay to be observed by the receiver.
+ */
+ if ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) || (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_COMPRESSING))
+ res->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
+
+ /* the stream handler will take care of timeouts and errors */
+ return 0;
+
+ return_bad_res: /* let's centralize all bad responses */
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.failed_resp, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.failed_resp, 1);
+
+ return_bad_res_stats_ok:
+ txn->rsp.err_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
+ txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ /* don't send any error message as we're in the body */
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+ res->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ health_adjust(objt_server(s->target), HANA_STATUS_HTTP_HDRRSP);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+ return 0;
+
+ aborted_xfer:
+ txn->rsp.err_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
+ txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
+ /* don't send any error message as we're in the body */
+ http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
+ res->analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
+ s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
+
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+ if (objt_server(s->target))
+ HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts, 1);
+
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
+ if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK))
+ s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
+ return 0;
+}
+
__attribute__((constructor))
static void __htx_protocol_init(void)
{
projects / thirdparty / haproxy.git / commitdiff
