Instead of storing an opaque string, call security_secctx_to_secid()
right in the "secctx" command handler and store only the numeric
"secid". This eliminates an unnecessary string allocation and allows
the daemon to receive errors when writing the "secctx" command instead
of postponing the error to the "bind" command handler. For example,
if the kernel was built without `CONFIG_SECURITY`, "bind" will return
`EOPNOTSUPP`, but the daemon doesn't know why. With this patch, the
"secctx" will instead return `EOPNOTSUPP` which is the right context
for this error.
This patch adds a boolean flag `have_secid` because I'm not sure if we
can safely assume that zero is the special secid value for "not set".
This appears to be true for SELinux, Smack and AppArmor, but since
this attribute is not documented, I'm unable to derive a stable
guarantee for that.
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241209141554.638708-1-max.kellermann@ionos.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241213135013.2964079-6-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/statfs.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
*/
static int cachefiles_daemon_secctx(struct cachefiles_cache *cache, char *args)
{
- char *secctx;
+ int err;
_enter(",%s", args);
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (cache->secctx) {
+ if (cache->have_secid) {
pr_err("Second security context specified\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
- secctx = kstrdup(args, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!secctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(args, strlen(args), &cache->secid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- cache->secctx = secctx;
+ cache->have_secid = true;
return 0;
}
put_cred(cache->cache_cred);
kfree(cache->rootdirname);
- kfree(cache->secctx);
kfree(cache->tag);
_leave("");
#define CACHEFILES_STATE_CHANGED 3 /* T if state changed (poll trigger) */
#define CACHEFILES_ONDEMAND_MODE 4 /* T if in on-demand read mode */
char *rootdirname; /* name of cache root directory */
- char *secctx; /* LSM security context */
char *tag; /* cache binding tag */
refcount_t unbind_pincount;/* refcount to do daemon unbind */
struct xarray reqs; /* xarray of pending on-demand requests */
struct xarray ondemand_ids; /* xarray for ondemand_id allocation */
u32 ondemand_id_next;
u32 msg_id_next;
+ u32 secid; /* LSM security id */
+ bool have_secid; /* whether "secid" was set */
};
static inline bool cachefiles_in_ondemand_mode(struct cachefiles_cache *cache)
struct cred *new;
int ret;
- _enter("{%s}", cache->secctx);
+ _enter("{%u}", cache->have_secid ? cache->secid : 0);
new = prepare_kernel_cred(current);
if (!new) {
goto error;
}
- if (cache->secctx) {
- ret = set_security_override_from_ctx(new, cache->secctx);
+ if (cache->have_secid) {
+ ret = set_security_override(new, cache->secid);
if (ret < 0) {
put_cred(new);
pr_err("Security denies permission to nominate security context: error %d\n",