--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: dingtianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 16:30:02 +0800
+Subject: bonding: correct the MAC address for "follow" fail_over_mac policy
+
+From: dingtianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit a951bc1e6ba58f11df5ed5ddc41311e10f5fd20b ]
+
+The "follow" fail_over_mac policy is useful for multiport devices that
+either become confused or incur a performance penalty when multiple
+ports are programmed with the same MAC address, but the same MAC
+address still may happened by this steps for this policy:
+
+1) echo +eth0 > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/slaves
+ bond0 has the same mac address with eth0, it is MAC1.
+
+2) echo +eth1 > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/slaves
+ eth1 is backup, eth1 has MAC2.
+
+3) ifconfig eth0 down
+ eth1 became active slave, bond will swap MAC for eth0 and eth1,
+ so eth1 has MAC1, and eth0 has MAC2.
+
+4) ifconfig eth1 down
+ there is no active slave, and eth1 still has MAC1, eth2 has MAC2.
+
+5) ifconfig eth0 up
+ the eth0 became active slave again, the bond set eth0 to MAC1.
+
+Something wrong here, then if you set eth1 up, the eth0 and eth1 will have the same
+MAC address, it will break this policy for ACTIVE_BACKUP mode.
+
+This patch will fix this problem by finding the old active slave and
+swap them MAC address before change active slave.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
+Tested-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+@@ -876,6 +876,22 @@ static void bond_mc_swap(struct bonding
+ }
+ }
+
++static struct slave *bond_get_old_active(struct bonding *bond,
++ struct slave *new_active)
++{
++ struct slave *slave;
++
++ bond_for_each_slave(bond, slave) {
++ if (slave == new_active)
++ continue;
++
++ if (ether_addr_equal(bond->dev->dev_addr, slave->dev->dev_addr))
++ return slave;
++ }
++
++ return NULL;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * bond_do_fail_over_mac
+ *
+@@ -919,6 +935,9 @@ static void bond_do_fail_over_mac(struct
+ write_unlock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
+ read_unlock(&bond->lock);
+
++ if (!old_active)
++ old_active = bond_get_old_active(bond, new_active);
++
+ if (old_active) {
+ memcpy(tmp_mac, new_active->dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ memcpy(saddr.sa_data, old_active->dev->dev_addr,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:52:51 +0200
+Subject: bonding: fix destruction of bond with devices different from arphrd_ether
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 06f6d1094aa0992432b1e2a0920b0ee86ccd83bf ]
+
+When the bonding is being unloaded and the netdevice notifier is
+unregistered it executes NETDEV_UNREGISTER for each device which should
+remove the bond's proc entry but if the device enslaved is not of
+ARPHRD_ETHER type and is in front of the bonding, it may execute
+bond_release_and_destroy() first which would release the last slave and
+destroy the bond device leaving the proc entry and thus we will get the
+following error (with dynamic debug on for bond_netdev_event to see the
+events order):
+[ 908.963051] eql: event: 9
+[ 908.963052] eql: IFF_SLAVE
+[ 908.963054] eql: event: 2
+[ 908.963056] eql: IFF_SLAVE
+[ 908.963058] eql: event: 6
+[ 908.963059] eql: IFF_SLAVE
+[ 908.963110] bond0: Releasing active interface eql
+[ 908.976168] bond0: Destroying bond bond0
+[ 908.976266] bond0 (unregistering): Released all slaves
+[ 908.984097] ------------[ cut here ]------------
+[ 908.984107] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1787 at fs/proc/generic.c:575
+remove_proc_entry+0x112/0x160()
+[ 908.984110] remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory
+'net/bonding', leaking at least 'bond0'
+[ 908.984111] Modules linked in: bonding(-) eql(O) 9p nfsd auth_rpcgss
+oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul
+crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev qxl drm_kms_helper
+snd_hda_codec_generic aesni_intel ttm aes_x86_64 glue_helper pcspkr lrw
+gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_intel virtio_console snd_hda_codec
+psmouse serio_raw snd_hwdep snd_hda_core 9pnet_virtio 9pnet evdev joydev
+drm virtio_balloon snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore i2c_piix4 i2c_core
+pvpanic acpi_cpufreq parport_pc parport processor thermal_sys button
+autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 hid_generic usbhid hid sg sr_mod cdrom
+ata_generic virtio_blk virtio_net floppy ata_piix e1000 libata ehci_pci
+virtio_pci scsi_mod uhci_hcd ehci_hcd virtio_ring virtio usbcore
+usb_common [last unloaded: bonding]
+
+[ 908.984168] CPU: 0 PID: 1787 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W O
+4.2.0-rc2+ #8
+[ 908.984170] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
+[ 908.984172] 0000000000000000 ffffffff81732d41 ffffffff81525b34
+ffff8800358dfda8
+[ 908.984175] ffffffff8106c521 ffff88003595af78 ffff88003595af40
+ffff88003e3a4280
+[ 908.984178] ffffffffa058d040 0000000000000000 ffffffff8106c59a
+ffffffff8172ebd0
+[ 908.984181] Call Trace:
+[ 908.984188] [<ffffffff81525b34>] ? dump_stack+0x40/0x50
+[ 908.984193] [<ffffffff8106c521>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x81/0xb0
+[ 908.984196] [<ffffffff8106c59a>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4a/0x50
+[ 908.984199] [<ffffffff81218352>] ? remove_proc_entry+0x112/0x160
+[ 908.984205] [<ffffffffa05850e6>] ? bond_destroy_proc_dir+0x26/0x30
+[bonding]
+[ 908.984208] [<ffffffffa057540e>] ? bond_net_exit+0x8e/0xa0 [bonding]
+[ 908.984217] [<ffffffff8142f407>] ? ops_exit_list.isra.4+0x37/0x70
+[ 908.984225] [<ffffffff8142f52d>] ?
+unregister_pernet_operations+0x8d/0xd0
+[ 908.984228] [<ffffffff8142f58d>] ?
+unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1d/0x30
+[ 908.984232] [<ffffffffa0585269>] ? bonding_exit+0x23/0xdba [bonding]
+[ 908.984236] [<ffffffff810e28ba>] ? SyS_delete_module+0x18a/0x250
+[ 908.984241] [<ffffffff81086f99>] ? task_work_run+0x89/0xc0
+[ 908.984244] [<ffffffff8152b732>] ?
+entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
+[ 908.984247] ---[ end trace 7c006ed4abbef24b ]---
+
+Thus remove the proc entry manually if bond_release_and_destroy() is
+used. Because of the checks in bond_remove_proc_entry() it's not a
+problem for a bond device to change namespaces (the bug fixed by the
+Fixes commit) but since commit
+f9399814927ad ("bonding: Don't allow bond devices to change network
+namespaces.") that can't happen anyway.
+
+Reported-by: Carol Soto <clsoto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Fixes: a64d49c3dd50 ("bonding: Manage /proc/net/bonding/ entries from
+ the netdev events")
+Tested-by: Carol L Soto <clsoto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+@@ -2188,6 +2188,7 @@ static int bond_release_and_destroy(str
+ bond_dev->priv_flags |= IFF_DISABLE_NETPOLL;
+ pr_info("%s: destroying bond %s.\n",
+ bond_dev->name, bond_dev->name);
++ bond_remove_proc_entry(bond);
+ unregister_netdevice(bond_dev);
+ }
+ return ret;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 06:36:19 -0700
+Subject: bridge: mdb: fix double add notification
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5ebc784625ea68a9570d1f70557e7932988cd1b4 ]
+
+Since the mdb add/del code was introduced there have been 2 br_mdb_notify
+calls when doing br_mdb_add() resulting in 2 notifications on each add.
+
+Example:
+ Command: bridge mdb add dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+ Before patch:
+ root@debian:~# bridge monitor all
+ [MDB]dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+ [MDB]dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+
+ After patch:
+ root@debian:~# bridge monitor all
+ [MDB]dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Fixes: cfd567543590 ("bridge: add support of adding and deleting mdb entries")
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bridge/br_mdb.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
++++ b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
+@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ static int br_mdb_add_group(struct net_b
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p);
+
+- br_mdb_notify(br->dev, port, group, RTM_NEWMDB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:55:56 +0200
+Subject: bridge: mdb: zero out the local br_ip variable before use
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit f1158b74e54f2e2462ba5e2f45a118246d9d5b43 ]
+
+Since commit b0e9a30dd669 ("bridge: Add vlan id to multicast groups")
+there's a check in br_ip_equal() for a matching vlan id, but the mdb
+functions were not modified to use (or at least zero it) so when an
+entry was added it would have a garbage vlan id (from the local br_ip
+variable in __br_mdb_add/del) and this would prevent it from being
+matched and also deleted. So zero out the whole local ip var to protect
+ourselves from future changes and also to fix the current bug, since
+there's no vlan id support in the mdb uapi - use always vlan id 0.
+Example before patch:
+root@debian:~# bridge mdb add dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+root@debian:~# bridge mdb
+dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+root@debian:~# bridge mdb del dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
+
+After patch:
+root@debian:~# bridge mdb add dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+root@debian:~# bridge mdb
+dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+root@debian:~# bridge mdb del dev br0 port eth1 grp 239.0.0.1 permanent
+root@debian:~# bridge mdb
+
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
+Fixes: b0e9a30dd669 ("bridge: Add vlan id to multicast groups")
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bridge/br_mdb.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
++++ b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
+@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ static int __br_mdb_add(struct net *net,
+ if (!p || p->br != br || p->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ memset(&ip, 0, sizeof(ip));
+ ip.proto = entry->addr.proto;
+ if (ip.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ ip.u.ip4 = entry->addr.u.ip4;
+@@ -417,6 +418,7 @@ static int __br_mdb_del(struct net_bridg
+ if (timer_pending(&br->multicast_querier_timer))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
++ memset(&ip, 0, sizeof(ip));
+ ip.proto = entry->addr.proto;
+ if (ip.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ ip.u.ip4 = entry->addr.u.ip4;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Edward Hyunkoo Jee <edjee@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 09:43:59 +0200
+Subject: inet: frags: fix defragmented packet's IP header for af_packet
+
+From: Edward Hyunkoo Jee <edjee@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0848f6428ba3a2e42db124d41ac6f548655735bf ]
+
+When ip_frag_queue() computes positions, it assumes that the passed
+sk_buff does not contain L2 headers.
+
+However, when PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_DEFRAG is used, IP reassembly
+functions can be called on outgoing packets that contain L2 headers.
+
+Also, IPv4 checksum is not corrected after reassembly.
+
+Fixes: 7736d33f4262 ("packet: Add pre-defragmentation support for ipv4 fanouts.")
+Signed-off-by: Edward Hyunkoo Jee <edjee@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c
+@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static int ip_frag_queue(struct ipq *qp,
+ ihl = ip_hdrlen(skb);
+
+ /* Determine the position of this fragment. */
+- end = offset + skb->len - ihl;
++ end = offset + skb->len - skb_network_offset(skb) - ihl;
+ err = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Is this the final fragment? */
+@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static int ip_frag_queue(struct ipq *qp,
+ goto err;
+
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+- if (pskb_pull(skb, ihl) == NULL)
++ if (!pskb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + ihl))
+ goto err;
+
+ err = pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset);
+@@ -627,6 +627,9 @@ static int ip_frag_reasm(struct ipq *qp,
+ iph->frag_off = qp->q.max_size ? htons(IP_DF) : 0;
+ iph->tot_len = htons(len);
+ iph->tos |= ecn;
++
++ ip_send_check(iph);
++
+ IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMOKS);
+ qp->q.fragments = NULL;
+ qp->q.fragments_tail = NULL;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 08:10:22 +0200
+Subject: ipv6: lock socket in ip6_datagram_connect()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 03645a11a570d52e70631838cb786eb4253eb463 ]
+
+ip6_datagram_connect() is doing a lot of socket changes without
+socket being locked.
+
+This looks wrong, at least for udp_lib_rehash() which could corrupt
+lists because of concurrent udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash accesses.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/ip.h | 1 +
+ net/ipv4/datagram.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ net/ipv6/datagram.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/ip.h
++++ b/include/net/ip.h
+@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *ip_finish_
+ }
+
+ /* datagram.c */
++int __ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len);
+ extern int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len);
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/datagram.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/datagram.c
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ #include <net/route.h>
+ #include <net/tcp_states.h>
+
+-int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
++int __ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
+ {
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr;
+@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk
+
+ sk_dst_reset(sk);
+
+- lock_sock(sk);
+-
+ oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
+ saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
+ if (ipv4_is_multicast(usin->sin_addr.s_addr)) {
+@@ -81,9 +79,19 @@ int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk
+ sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
+ err = 0;
+ out:
+- release_sock(sk);
+ return err;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ip4_datagram_connect);
++
++int ip4_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
++{
++ int res;
++
++ lock_sock(sk);
++ res = __ip4_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
++ release_sock(sk);
++ return res;
++}
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip4_datagram_connect);
+
+ /* Because UDP xmit path can manipulate sk_dst_cache without holding
+--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static bool ipv6_mapped_addr_any(const s
+ return ipv6_addr_v4mapped(a) && (a->s6_addr32[3] == 0);
+ }
+
+-int ip6_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
++static int __ip6_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
+ {
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int ip6_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk
+ if (usin->sin6_family == AF_INET) {
+ if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+- err = ip4_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
++ err = __ip4_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
+ goto ipv4_connected;
+ }
+
+@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ int ip6_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk
+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = daddr->s6_addr32[3];
+ sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
+
+- err = ip4_datagram_connect(sk,
+- (struct sockaddr *) &sin,
+- sizeof(sin));
++ err = __ip4_datagram_connect(sk,
++ (struct sockaddr *) &sin,
++ sizeof(sin));
+
+ ipv4_connected:
+ if (err)
+@@ -204,6 +204,16 @@ out:
+ fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
+ return err;
+ }
++
++int ip6_datagram_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
++{
++ int res;
++
++ lock_sock(sk);
++ res = __ip6_datagram_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
++ release_sock(sk);
++ return res;
++}
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ip6_datagram_connect);
+
+ void ipv6_icmp_error(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int err,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Angga <Hermin.Anggawijaya@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
+Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2015 14:40:52 +1200
+Subject: ipv6: Make MLD packets to only be processed locally
+
+From: Angga <Hermin.Anggawijaya@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4c938d22c88a9ddccc8c55a85e0430e9c62b1ac5 ]
+
+Before commit daad151263cf ("ipv6: Make ipv6_is_mld() inline and use it
+from ip6_mc_input().") MLD packets were only processed locally. After the
+change, a copy of MLD packet goes through ip6_mr_input, causing
+MRT6MSG_NOCACHE message to be generated to user space.
+
+Make MLD packet only processed locally.
+
+Fixes: daad151263cf ("ipv6: Make ipv6_is_mld() inline and use it from ip6_mc_input().")
+Signed-off-by: Hermin Anggawijaya <hermin.anggawijaya@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
+@@ -325,10 +325,10 @@ int ip6_mc_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ if (offset < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+- if (!ipv6_is_mld(skb, nexthdr, offset))
+- goto out;
++ if (ipv6_is_mld(skb, nexthdr, offset))
++ deliver = true;
+
+- deliver = true;
++ goto out;
+ }
+ /* unknown RA - process it normally */
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 00:37:13 +0200
+Subject: isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
+
+From: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
+
+[ Upstream commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c ]
+
+Commit 79901317ce80 ("n_tty: Don't flush buffer when closing ldisc"),
+first merged in kernel release 3.10, caused the following regression
+in the Gigaset M101 driver:
+
+Before that commit, when closing the N_TTY line discipline in
+preparation to switching to N_GIGASET_M101, receive_room would be
+reset to a non-zero value by the call to n_tty_flush_buffer() in
+n_tty's close method. With the removal of that call, receive_room
+might be left at zero, blocking data reception on the serial line.
+
+The present patch fixes that regression by setting receive_room
+to an appropriate value in the ldisc open method.
+
+Fixes: 79901317ce80 ("n_tty: Don't flush buffer when closing ldisc")
+Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/isdn/gigaset/ser-gigaset.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/isdn/gigaset/ser-gigaset.c
++++ b/drivers/isdn/gigaset/ser-gigaset.c
+@@ -524,9 +524,18 @@ gigaset_tty_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
+ cs->hw.ser->tty = tty;
+ atomic_set(&cs->hw.ser->refcnt, 1);
+ init_completion(&cs->hw.ser->dead_cmp);
+-
+ tty->disc_data = cs;
+
++ /* Set the amount of data we're willing to receive per call
++ * from the hardware driver to half of the input buffer size
++ * to leave some reserve.
++ * Note: We don't do flow control towards the hardware driver.
++ * If more data is received than will fit into the input buffer,
++ * it will be dropped and an error will be logged. This should
++ * never happen as the device is slow and the buffer size ample.
++ */
++ tty->receive_room = RBUFSIZE/2;
++
+ /* OK.. Initialization of the datastructures and the HW is done.. Now
+ * startup system and notify the LL that we are ready to run
+ */
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
+Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 09:59:10 +0300
+Subject: net: call rcu_read_lock early in process_backlog
+
+From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
+
+[ Upstream commit 2c17d27c36dcce2b6bf689f41a46b9e909877c21 ]
+
+Incoming packet should be either in backlog queue or
+in RCU read-side section. Otherwise, the final sequence of
+flush_backlog() and synchronize_net() may miss packets
+that can run without device reference:
+
+CPU 1 CPU 2
+ skb->dev: no reference
+ process_backlog:__skb_dequeue
+ process_backlog:local_irq_enable
+
+on_each_cpu for
+flush_backlog => IPI(hardirq): flush_backlog
+ - packet not found in backlog
+
+ CPU delayed ...
+synchronize_net
+- no ongoing RCU
+read-side sections
+
+netdev_run_todo,
+rcu_barrier: no
+ongoing callbacks
+ __netif_receive_skb_core:rcu_read_lock
+ - too late
+free dev
+ process packet for freed dev
+
+Fixes: 6e583ce5242f ("net: eliminate refcounting in backlog queue")
+Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/dev.c | 29 ++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/dev.c
++++ b/net/core/dev.c
+@@ -3443,8 +3443,6 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(stru
+
+ pt_prev = NULL;
+
+- rcu_read_lock();
+-
+ another_round:
+ skb->skb_iif = skb->dev->ifindex;
+
+@@ -3454,7 +3452,7 @@ another_round:
+ skb->protocol == cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_8021AD)) {
+ skb = vlan_untag(skb);
+ if (unlikely(!skb))
+- goto unlock;
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT
+@@ -3479,7 +3477,7 @@ skip_taps:
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT
+ skb = handle_ing(skb, &pt_prev, &ret, orig_dev);
+ if (!skb)
+- goto unlock;
++ goto out;
+ ncls:
+ #endif
+
+@@ -3494,7 +3492,7 @@ ncls:
+ if (vlan_do_receive(&skb))
+ goto another_round;
+ else if (unlikely(!skb))
+- goto unlock;
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rx_handler = rcu_dereference(skb->dev->rx_handler);
+@@ -3506,7 +3504,7 @@ ncls:
+ switch (rx_handler(&skb)) {
+ case RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED:
+ ret = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
+- goto unlock;
++ goto out;
+ case RX_HANDLER_ANOTHER:
+ goto another_round;
+ case RX_HANDLER_EXACT:
+@@ -3558,8 +3556,6 @@ drop:
+ ret = NET_RX_DROP;
+ }
+
+-unlock:
+- rcu_read_unlock();
+ out:
+ return ret;
+ }
+@@ -3606,29 +3602,30 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb(struct sk
+ */
+ int netif_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
++ int ret;
++
+ net_timestamp_check(netdev_tstamp_prequeue, skb);
+
+ if (skb_defer_rx_timestamp(skb))
+ return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
+
++ rcu_read_lock();
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_RPS
+ if (static_key_false(&rps_needed)) {
+ struct rps_dev_flow voidflow, *rflow = &voidflow;
+- int cpu, ret;
+-
+- rcu_read_lock();
+-
+- cpu = get_rps_cpu(skb->dev, skb, &rflow);
++ int cpu = get_rps_cpu(skb->dev, skb, &rflow);
+
+ if (cpu >= 0) {
+ ret = enqueue_to_backlog(skb, cpu, &rflow->last_qtail);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
+ }
+- rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+ #endif
+- return __netif_receive_skb(skb);
++ ret = __netif_receive_skb(skb);
++ rcu_read_unlock();
++ return ret;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_receive_skb);
+
+@@ -4038,8 +4035,10 @@ static int process_backlog(struct napi_s
+ unsigned int qlen;
+
+ while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&sd->process_queue))) {
++ rcu_read_lock();
+ local_irq_enable();
+ __netif_receive_skb(skb);
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ local_irq_disable();
+ input_queue_head_incr(sd);
+ if (++work >= quota) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 16:04:13 +0800
+Subject: net: Clone skb before setting peeked flag
+
+From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+
+[ Upstream commit 738ac1ebb96d02e0d23bc320302a6ea94c612dec ]
+
+Shared skbs must not be modified and this is crucial for broadcast
+and/or multicast paths where we use it as an optimisation to avoid
+unnecessary cloning.
+
+The function skb_recv_datagram breaks this rule by setting peeked
+without cloning the skb first. This causes funky races which leads
+to double-free.
+
+This patch fixes this by cloning the skb and replacing the skb
+in the list when setting skb->peeked.
+
+Fixes: a59322be07c9 ("[UDP]: Only increment counter on first peek/recv")
+Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/datagram.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/datagram.c
++++ b/net/core/datagram.c
+@@ -128,6 +128,35 @@ out_noerr:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++static int skb_set_peeked(struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++ struct sk_buff *nskb;
++
++ if (skb->peeked)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* We have to unshare an skb before modifying it. */
++ if (!skb_shared(skb))
++ goto done;
++
++ nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
++ if (!nskb)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ skb->prev->next = nskb;
++ skb->next->prev = nskb;
++ nskb->prev = skb->prev;
++ nskb->next = skb->next;
++
++ consume_skb(skb);
++ skb = nskb;
++
++done:
++ skb->peeked = 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ /**
+ * __skb_recv_datagram - Receive a datagram skbuff
+ * @sk: socket
+@@ -162,7 +191,9 @@ out_noerr:
+ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags,
+ int *peeked, int *off, int *err)
+ {
++ struct sk_buff_head *queue = &sk->sk_receive_queue;
+ struct sk_buff *skb, *last;
++ unsigned long cpu_flags;
+ long timeo;
+ /*
+ * Caller is allowed not to check sk->sk_err before skb_recv_datagram()
+@@ -181,8 +212,6 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
+ * Look at current nfs client by the way...
+ * However, this function was correct in any case. 8)
+ */
+- unsigned long cpu_flags;
+- struct sk_buff_head *queue = &sk->sk_receive_queue;
+ int _off = *off;
+
+ last = (struct sk_buff *)queue;
+@@ -196,7 +225,11 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
+ _off -= skb->len;
+ continue;
+ }
+- skb->peeked = 1;
++
++ error = skb_set_peeked(skb);
++ if (error)
++ goto unlock_err;
++
+ atomic_inc(&skb->users);
+ } else
+ __skb_unlink(skb, queue);
+@@ -216,6 +249,8 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
+
+ return NULL;
+
++unlock_err:
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->lock, cpu_flags);
+ no_packet:
+ *err = error;
+ return NULL;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 20:01:42 +0800
+Subject: net: Fix skb csum races when peeking
+
+From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+
+[ Upstream commit 89c22d8c3b278212eef6a8cc66b570bc840a6f5a ]
+
+When we calculate the checksum on the recv path, we store the
+result in the skb as an optimisation in case we need the checksum
+again down the line.
+
+This is in fact bogus for the MSG_PEEK case as this is done without
+any locking. So multiple threads can peek and then store the result
+to the same skb, potentially resulting in bogus skb states.
+
+This patch fixes this by only storing the result if the skb is not
+shared. This preserves the optimisations for the few cases where
+it can be done safely due to locking or other reasons, e.g., SIOCINQ.
+
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/datagram.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/datagram.c
++++ b/net/core/datagram.c
+@@ -700,7 +700,8 @@ __sum16 __skb_checksum_complete_head(str
+ if (likely(!sum)) {
+ if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE))
+ netdev_rx_csum_fault(skb->dev);
+- skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
++ if (!skb_shared(skb))
++ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
+ }
+ return sum;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 15:42:47 +0800
+Subject: net: Fix skb_set_peeked use-after-free bug
+
+From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+
+[ Upstream commit a0a2a6602496a45ae838a96db8b8173794b5d398 ]
+
+The commit 738ac1ebb96d02e0d23bc320302a6ea94c612dec ("net: Clone
+skb before setting peeked flag") introduced a use-after-free bug
+in skb_recv_datagram. This is because skb_set_peeked may create
+a new skb and free the existing one. As it stands the caller will
+continue to use the old freed skb.
+
+This patch fixes it by making skb_set_peeked return the new skb
+(or the old one if unchanged).
+
+Fixes: 738ac1ebb96d ("net: Clone skb before setting peeked flag")
+Reported-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Tested-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
+Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/datagram.c | 13 +++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/datagram.c
++++ b/net/core/datagram.c
+@@ -128,12 +128,12 @@ out_noerr:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+-static int skb_set_peeked(struct sk_buff *skb)
++static struct sk_buff *skb_set_peeked(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *nskb;
+
+ if (skb->peeked)
+- return 0;
++ return skb;
+
+ /* We have to unshare an skb before modifying it. */
+ if (!skb_shared(skb))
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static int skb_set_peeked(struct sk_buff
+
+ nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!nskb)
+- return -ENOMEM;
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ skb->prev->next = nskb;
+ skb->next->prev = nskb;
+@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static int skb_set_peeked(struct sk_buff
+ done:
+ skb->peeked = 1;
+
+- return 0;
++ return skb;
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -226,8 +226,9 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_recv_datagram(stru
+ continue;
+ }
+
+- error = skb_set_peeked(skb);
+- if (error)
++ skb = skb_set_peeked(skb);
++ error = PTR_ERR(skb);
++ if (IS_ERR(skb))
+ goto unlock_err;
+
+ atomic_inc(&skb->users);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 21:42:11 +0200
+Subject: net: pktgen: fix race between pktgen_thread_worker() and kthread_stop()
+
+From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit fecdf8be2d91e04b0a9a4f79ff06499a36f5d14f ]
+
+pktgen_thread_worker() is obviously racy, kthread_stop() can come
+between the kthread_should_stop() check and set_current_state().
+
+Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/pktgen.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/pktgen.c
++++ b/net/core/pktgen.c
+@@ -3377,8 +3377,10 @@ static int pktgen_thread_worker(void *ar
+ pktgen_rem_thread(t);
+
+ /* Wait for kthread_stop */
+- while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
++ for (;;) {
+ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
++ if (kthread_should_stop())
++ break;
+ schedule();
+ }
+ __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 09:43:45 -0400
+Subject: net/tipc: initialize security state for new connection socket
+
+From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+
+[ Upstream commit fdd75ea8df370f206a8163786e7470c1277a5064 ]
+
+Calling connect() with an AF_TIPC socket would trigger a series
+of error messages from SELinux along the lines of:
+SELinux: Invalid class 0
+type=AVC msg=audit(1434126658.487:34500): avc: denied { <unprintable> }
+ for pid=292 comm="kworker/u16:5" scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0
+ tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=<unprintable>
+ permissive=0
+
+This was due to a failure to initialize the security state of the new
+connection sock by the tipc code, leaving it with junk in the security
+class field and an unlabeled secid. Add a call to security_sk_clone()
+to inherit the security state from the parent socket.
+
+Reported-by: Tim Shearer <tim.shearer@overturenetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/tipc/socket.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/socket.c
++++ b/net/tipc/socket.c
+@@ -1528,6 +1528,7 @@ static int accept(struct socket *sock, s
+ res = tipc_create(sock_net(sock->sk), new_sock, 0, 0);
+ if (res)
+ goto exit;
++ security_sk_clone(sock->sk, new_sock->sk);
+
+ new_sk = new_sock->sk;
+ new_tsock = tipc_sk(new_sk);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 16:33:50 +0200
+Subject: netlink: don't hold mutex in rcu callback when releasing mmapd ring
+
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0470eb99b4721586ccac954faac3fa4472da0845 ]
+
+Kirill A. Shutemov says:
+
+This simple test-case trigers few locking asserts in kernel:
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned int block_size = 16 * 4096;
+ struct nl_mmap_req req = {
+ .nm_block_size = block_size,
+ .nm_block_nr = 64,
+ .nm_frame_size = 16384,
+ .nm_frame_nr = 64 * block_size / 16384,
+ };
+ unsigned int ring_size;
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_GENERIC);
+ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_TX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+
+ ring_size = req.nm_block_nr * req.nm_block_size;
+ mmap(NULL, 2 * ring_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
++++ exited with 0 +++
+BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /home/kas/git/public/linux-mm/kernel/locking/mutex.c:616
+in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1, name: init
+3 locks held by init/1:
+ #0: (reboot_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81080959>] SyS_reboot+0xa9/0x220
+ #1: ((reboot_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8107f379>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x39/0x70
+ #2: (rcu_callback){......}, at: [<ffffffff810d32e0>] rcu_do_batch.isra.49+0x160/0x10c0
+Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff8145365f>] __delay+0xf/0x20
+
+CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 4.1.0-00009-gbddf4c4818e0 #253
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014
+ ffff88017b3d8000 ffff88027bc03c38 ffffffff81929ceb 0000000000000102
+ 0000000000000000 ffff88027bc03c68 ffffffff81085a9d 0000000000000002
+ ffffffff81ca2a20 0000000000000268 0000000000000000 ffff88027bc03c98
+Call Trace:
+ <IRQ> [<ffffffff81929ceb>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
+ [<ffffffff81085a9d>] ___might_sleep+0x16d/0x270
+ [<ffffffff81085bed>] __might_sleep+0x4d/0x90
+ [<ffffffff8192e96f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2f/0x430
+ [<ffffffff81932fed>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80
+ [<ffffffff81464143>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
+ [<ffffffff8182fc3d>] netlink_set_ring+0x1ed/0x350
+ [<ffffffff8182e000>] ? netlink_undo_bind+0x70/0x70
+ [<ffffffff8182fe20>] netlink_sock_destruct+0x80/0x150
+ [<ffffffff817e484d>] __sk_free+0x1d/0x160
+ [<ffffffff817e49a9>] sk_free+0x19/0x20
+[..]
+
+Cong Wang says:
+
+We can't hold mutex lock in a rcu callback, [..]
+
+Thomas Graf says:
+
+The socket should be dead at this point. It might be simpler to
+add a netlink_release_ring() function which doesn't require
+locking at all.
+
+Reported-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
+Diagnosed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
+Suggested-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
+ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+@@ -214,25 +214,52 @@ err1:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
++
++static void
++__netlink_set_ring(struct sock *sk, struct nl_mmap_req *req, bool tx_ring, void **pg_vec,
++ unsigned int order)
++{
++ struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
++ struct sk_buff_head *queue;
++ struct netlink_ring *ring;
++
++ queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
++ ring = tx_ring ? &nlk->tx_ring : &nlk->rx_ring;
++
++ spin_lock_bh(&queue->lock);
++
++ ring->frame_max = req->nm_frame_nr - 1;
++ ring->head = 0;
++ ring->frame_size = req->nm_frame_size;
++ ring->pg_vec_pages = req->nm_block_size / PAGE_SIZE;
++
++ swap(ring->pg_vec_len, req->nm_block_nr);
++ swap(ring->pg_vec_order, order);
++ swap(ring->pg_vec, pg_vec);
++
++ __skb_queue_purge(queue);
++ spin_unlock_bh(&queue->lock);
++
++ WARN_ON(atomic_read(&nlk->mapped));
++
++ if (pg_vec)
++ free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->nm_block_nr);
++}
++
+ static int netlink_set_ring(struct sock *sk, struct nl_mmap_req *req,
+- bool closing, bool tx_ring)
++ bool tx_ring)
+ {
+ struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
+ struct netlink_ring *ring;
+- struct sk_buff_head *queue;
+ void **pg_vec = NULL;
+ unsigned int order = 0;
+- int err;
+
+ ring = tx_ring ? &nlk->tx_ring : &nlk->rx_ring;
+- queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
+
+- if (!closing) {
+- if (atomic_read(&nlk->mapped))
+- return -EBUSY;
+- if (atomic_read(&ring->pending))
+- return -EBUSY;
+- }
++ if (atomic_read(&nlk->mapped))
++ return -EBUSY;
++ if (atomic_read(&ring->pending))
++ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (req->nm_block_nr) {
+ if (ring->pg_vec != NULL)
+@@ -264,31 +291,19 @@ static int netlink_set_ring(struct sock
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- err = -EBUSY;
+ mutex_lock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
+- if (closing || atomic_read(&nlk->mapped) == 0) {
+- err = 0;
+- spin_lock_bh(&queue->lock);
+-
+- ring->frame_max = req->nm_frame_nr - 1;
+- ring->head = 0;
+- ring->frame_size = req->nm_frame_size;
+- ring->pg_vec_pages = req->nm_block_size / PAGE_SIZE;
+-
+- swap(ring->pg_vec_len, req->nm_block_nr);
+- swap(ring->pg_vec_order, order);
+- swap(ring->pg_vec, pg_vec);
+-
+- __skb_queue_purge(queue);
+- spin_unlock_bh(&queue->lock);
+-
+- WARN_ON(atomic_read(&nlk->mapped));
++ if (atomic_read(&nlk->mapped) == 0) {
++ __netlink_set_ring(sk, req, tx_ring, pg_vec, order);
++ mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
++ return 0;
+ }
++
+ mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
+
+ if (pg_vec)
+ free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->nm_block_nr);
+- return err;
++
++ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ static void netlink_mm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+@@ -762,10 +777,10 @@ static void netlink_sock_destruct(struct
+
+ memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+ if (nlk->rx_ring.pg_vec)
+- netlink_set_ring(sk, &req, true, false);
++ __netlink_set_ring(sk, &req, false, NULL, 0);
+ memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+ if (nlk->tx_ring.pg_vec)
+- netlink_set_ring(sk, &req, true, true);
++ __netlink_set_ring(sk, &req, true, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
+
+@@ -2017,7 +2032,7 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct soc
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (copy_from_user(&req, optval, sizeof(req)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+- err = netlink_set_ring(sk, &req, false,
++ err = netlink_set_ring(sk, &req,
+ optname == NETLINK_TX_RING);
+ break;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sat Sep 26 11:20:32 PDT 2015
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2015 15:33:26 +0300
+Subject: rds: fix an integer overflow test in rds_info_getsockopt()
+
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 468b732b6f76b138c0926eadf38ac88467dcd271 ]
+
+"len" is a signed integer. We check that len is not negative, so it
+goes from zero to INT_MAX. PAGE_SIZE is unsigned long so the comparison
+is type promoted to unsigned long. ULONG_MAX - 4095 is a higher than
+INT_MAX so the condition can never be true.
+
+I don't know if this is harmful but it seems safe to limit "len" to
+INT_MAX - 4095.
+
+Fixes: a8c879a7ee98 ('RDS: Info and stats')
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rds/info.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/rds/info.c
++++ b/net/rds/info.c
+@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int rds_info_getsockopt(struct socket *s
+
+ /* check for all kinds of wrapping and the like */
+ start = (unsigned long)optval;
+- if (len < 0 || len + PAGE_SIZE - 1 < len || start + len < start) {
++ if (len < 0 || len > INT_MAX - PAGE_SIZE + 1 || start + len < start) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
sctp-fix-asconf-list-handling.patch
vhost-scsi-potential-memory-corruption.patch
x86-bpf_jit-fix-compilation-of-large-bpf-programs.patch
+ipv6-make-mld-packets-to-only-be-processed-locally.patch
+net-tipc-initialize-security-state-for-new-connection-socket.patch
+bridge-mdb-zero-out-the-local-br_ip-variable-before-use.patch
+net-pktgen-fix-race-between-pktgen_thread_worker-and-kthread_stop.patch
+net-call-rcu_read_lock-early-in-process_backlog.patch
+net-clone-skb-before-setting-peeked-flag.patch
+net-fix-skb-csum-races-when-peeking.patch
+net-fix-skb_set_peeked-use-after-free-bug.patch
+bridge-mdb-fix-double-add-notification.patch
+isdn-gigaset-reset-tty-receive_room-when-attaching-ser_gigaset.patch
+ipv6-lock-socket-in-ip6_datagram_connect.patch
+bonding-fix-destruction-of-bond-with-devices-different-from-arphrd_ether.patch
+bonding-correct-the-mac-address-for-follow-fail_over_mac-policy.patch
+inet-frags-fix-defragmented-packet-s-ip-header-for-af_packet.patch
+netlink-don-t-hold-mutex-in-rcu-callback-when-releasing-mmapd-ring.patch
+rds-fix-an-integer-overflow-test-in-rds_info_getsockopt.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
