[ Upstream commit
a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ]
The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never
checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf'
parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed
length is less than the encoded length.
Add a check to prevent that.
Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c7 ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(len < secret.len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id));
ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(¶ms->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))