--- /dev/null
+From c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 14:50:26 +0200
+Subject: can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates
+
+From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+
+commit c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 upstream.
+
+The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via
+hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed
+resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero.
+
+Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe'
+can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx().
+Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN
+slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh.
+
+At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into
+the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts
+too.
+
+Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
+Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/can/bcm.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/can/bcm.c
++++ b/net/can/bcm.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+ #include <linux/can/skb.h>
+ #include <linux/can/bcm.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+
+@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ struct bcm_op {
+ struct canfd_frame last_sframe;
+ struct sock *sk;
+ struct net_device *rx_reg_dev;
++ spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */
+ };
+
+ struct bcm_sock {
+@@ -273,13 +275,18 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ struct net_device *dev;
+- struct canfd_frame *cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe;
++ struct canfd_frame *cf;
+ int err;
+
+ /* no target device? => exit */
+ if (!op->ifindex)
+ return;
+
++ /* read currframe under lock protection */
++ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
++ cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe;
++ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
++
+ dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk), op->ifindex);
+ if (!dev) {
+ /* RFC: should this bcm_op remove itself here? */
+@@ -300,6 +307,10 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op
+ skb->dev = dev;
+ can_skb_set_owner(skb, op->sk);
+ err = can_send(skb, 1);
++
++ /* update currframe and count under lock protection */
++ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
++
+ if (!err)
+ op->frames_abs++;
+
+@@ -308,6 +319,11 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op
+ /* reached last frame? */
+ if (op->currframe >= op->nframes)
+ op->currframe = 0;
++
++ if (op->count > 0)
++ op->count--;
++
++ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ out:
+ dev_put(dev);
+ }
+@@ -404,7 +420,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeo
+ struct bcm_msg_head msg_head;
+
+ if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) {
+- op->count--;
++ bcm_can_tx(op);
+ if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) {
+
+ /* create notification to user */
+@@ -419,7 +435,6 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeo
+
+ bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0);
+ }
+- bcm_can_tx(op);
+
+ } else if (op->kt_ival2) {
+ bcm_can_tx(op);
+@@ -914,6 +929,27 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
+ }
+ op->flags = msg_head->flags;
+
++ /* only lock for unlikely count/nframes/currframe changes */
++ if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
++ op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX ||
++ op->flags & SETTIMER) {
++
++ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
++
++ if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
++ op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
++ /* potentially update changed nframes */
++ op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
++ /* restart multiple frame transmission */
++ op->currframe = 0;
++ }
++
++ if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
++ op->count = msg_head->count;
++
++ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
++ }
++
+ } else {
+ /* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */
+
+@@ -921,9 +957,14 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
+ if (!op)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
++ spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ op->can_id = msg_head->can_id;
+ op->cfsiz = CFSIZ(msg_head->flags);
+ op->flags = msg_head->flags;
++ op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
++
++ if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
++ op->count = msg_head->count;
+
+ /* create array for CAN frames and copy the data */
+ if (msg_head->nframes > 1) {
+@@ -982,22 +1023,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
+
+ } /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */
+
+- if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes) {
+- op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
+- /* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */
+- op->currframe = 0;
+- }
+-
+- /* check flags */
+-
+- if (op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
+- /* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */
+- op->currframe = 0;
+- }
+-
+ if (op->flags & SETTIMER) {
+ /* set timer values */
+- op->count = msg_head->count;
+ op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1;
+ op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2;
+ op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1);
+@@ -1014,11 +1041,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
+ op->flags |= TX_ANNOUNCE;
+ }
+
+- if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) {
++ if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE)
+ bcm_can_tx(op);
+- if (op->count)
+- op->count--;
+- }
+
+ if (op->flags & STARTTIMER)
+ bcm_tx_start_timer(op);
--- /dev/null
+From dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 14:50:27 +0200
+Subject: can: bcm: add missing rcu read protection for procfs content
+
+From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+
+commit dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb upstream.
+
+When the procfs content is generated for a bcm_op which is in the process
+to be removed the procfs output might show unreliable data (UAF).
+
+As the removal of bcm_op's is already implemented with rcu handling this
+patch adds the missing rcu_read_lock() and makes sure the list entries
+are properly removed under rcu protection.
+
+Fixes: f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()")
+Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Suggested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
+Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-2-socketcan@hartkopp.net
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # >= 5.4
+Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/can/bcm.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/can/bcm.c
++++ b/net/can/bcm.c
+@@ -207,7 +207,9 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file
+ seq_printf(m, " / bound %s", bcm_proc_getifname(net, ifname, bo->ifindex));
+ seq_printf(m, " <<<\n");
+
+- list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
++ rcu_read_lock();
++
++ list_for_each_entry_rcu(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
+
+ unsigned long reduction;
+
+@@ -263,6 +265,9 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file
+ seq_printf(m, "# sent %ld\n", op->frames_abs);
+ }
+ seq_putc(m, '\n');
++
++ rcu_read_unlock();
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+@@ -816,7 +821,7 @@ static int bcm_delete_rx_op(struct list_
+ REGMASK(op->can_id),
+ bcm_rx_handler, op);
+
+- list_del(&op->list);
++ list_del_rcu(&op->list);
+ bcm_remove_op(op);
+ return 1; /* done */
+ }
+@@ -836,7 +841,7 @@ static int bcm_delete_tx_op(struct list_
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(op, n, ops, list) {
+ if ((op->can_id == mh->can_id) && (op->ifindex == ifindex) &&
+ (op->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) == (mh->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME)) {
+- list_del(&op->list);
++ list_del_rcu(&op->list);
+ bcm_remove_op(op);
+ return 1; /* done */
+ }
+@@ -1258,7 +1263,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
+ bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk);
+ if (err) {
+ /* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
+- list_del(&op->list);
++ list_del_rcu(&op->list);
+ bcm_remove_op(op);
+ return err;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From ef0841e4cb08754be6cb42bf97739fce5d086e5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlos Sanchez <carlossanchez@geotab.com>
+Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 12:23:05 +0200
+Subject: can: slcan: allow reception of short error messages
+
+From: Carlos Sanchez <carlossanchez@geotab.com>
+
+commit ef0841e4cb08754be6cb42bf97739fce5d086e5f upstream.
+
+Allows slcan to receive short messages (typically errors) from the serial
+interface.
+
+When error support was added to slcan protocol in
+b32ff4668544e1333b694fcc7812b2d7397b4d6a ("can: slcan: extend the protocol
+with error info") the minimum valid message size changed from 5 (minimum
+standard can frame tIII0) to 3 ("e1a" is a valid protocol message, it is
+one of the examples given in the comments for slcan_bump_err() ), but the
+check for minimum message length prodicating all decoding was not adjusted.
+This makes short error messages discarded and error frames not being
+generated.
+
+This patch changes the minimum length to the new minimum (3 characters,
+excluding terminator, is now a valid message).
+
+Signed-off-by: Carlos Sanchez <carlossanchez@geotab.com>
+Fixes: b32ff4668544 ("can: slcan: extend the protocol with error info")
+Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250520102305.1097494-1-carlossanchez@geotab.com
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/can/slcan/slcan-core.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/can/slcan/slcan-core.c
++++ b/drivers/net/can/slcan/slcan-core.c
+@@ -71,12 +71,21 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Dario Binacchi <dario.bin
+ #define SLCAN_CMD_LEN 1
+ #define SLCAN_SFF_ID_LEN 3
+ #define SLCAN_EFF_ID_LEN 8
++#define SLCAN_DATA_LENGTH_LEN 1
++#define SLCAN_ERROR_LEN 1
+ #define SLCAN_STATE_LEN 1
+ #define SLCAN_STATE_BE_RXCNT_LEN 3
+ #define SLCAN_STATE_BE_TXCNT_LEN 3
+-#define SLCAN_STATE_FRAME_LEN (1 + SLCAN_CMD_LEN + \
+- SLCAN_STATE_BE_RXCNT_LEN + \
+- SLCAN_STATE_BE_TXCNT_LEN)
++#define SLCAN_STATE_MSG_LEN (SLCAN_CMD_LEN + \
++ SLCAN_STATE_LEN + \
++ SLCAN_STATE_BE_RXCNT_LEN + \
++ SLCAN_STATE_BE_TXCNT_LEN)
++#define SLCAN_ERROR_MSG_LEN_MIN (SLCAN_CMD_LEN + \
++ SLCAN_ERROR_LEN + \
++ SLCAN_DATA_LENGTH_LEN)
++#define SLCAN_FRAME_MSG_LEN_MIN (SLCAN_CMD_LEN + \
++ SLCAN_SFF_ID_LEN + \
++ SLCAN_DATA_LENGTH_LEN)
+ struct slcan {
+ struct can_priv can;
+
+@@ -176,6 +185,9 @@ static void slcan_bump_frame(struct slca
+ u32 tmpid;
+ char *cmd = sl->rbuff;
+
++ if (sl->rcount < SLCAN_FRAME_MSG_LEN_MIN)
++ return;
++
+ skb = alloc_can_skb(sl->dev, &cf);
+ if (unlikely(!skb)) {
+ sl->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
+@@ -281,7 +293,7 @@ static void slcan_bump_state(struct slca
+ return;
+ }
+
+- if (state == sl->can.state || sl->rcount < SLCAN_STATE_FRAME_LEN)
++ if (state == sl->can.state || sl->rcount != SLCAN_STATE_MSG_LEN)
+ return;
+
+ cmd += SLCAN_STATE_BE_RXCNT_LEN + SLCAN_CMD_LEN + 1;
+@@ -328,6 +340,9 @@ static void slcan_bump_err(struct slcan
+ bool rx_errors = false, tx_errors = false, rx_over_errors = false;
+ int i, len;
+
++ if (sl->rcount < SLCAN_ERROR_MSG_LEN_MIN)
++ return;
++
+ /* get len from sanitized ASCII value */
+ len = cmd[1];
+ if (len >= '0' && len < '9')
+@@ -456,8 +471,7 @@ static void slcan_bump(struct slcan *sl)
+ static void slcan_unesc(struct slcan *sl, unsigned char s)
+ {
+ if ((s == '\r') || (s == '\a')) { /* CR or BEL ends the pdu */
+- if (!test_and_clear_bit(SLF_ERROR, &sl->flags) &&
+- sl->rcount > 4)
++ if (!test_and_clear_bit(SLF_ERROR, &sl->flags))
+ slcan_bump(sl);
+
+ sl->rcount = 0;
--- /dev/null
+From 3e14c7207a975eefcda1929b2134a9f4119dde45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Draszik?= <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
+Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2025 12:08:00 +0000
+Subject: clk: s2mps11: initialise clk_hw_onecell_data::num before accessing ::hws[] in probe()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
+
+commit 3e14c7207a975eefcda1929b2134a9f4119dde45 upstream.
+
+With UBSAN enabled, we're getting the following trace:
+
+ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in .../drivers/clk/clk-s2mps11.c:186:3
+ index 0 is out of range for type 'struct clk_hw *[] __counted_by(num)' (aka 'struct clk_hw *[]')
+
+This is because commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct
+clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") annotated the hws member of
+that struct with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer about
+the number of elements in hws, so that it can warn when hws is accessed
+out of bounds.
+
+As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be initialised
+with the number of elements before the first array access happens,
+otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the
+initialisation because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in
+s2mps11_clk_probe() due to ::num being assigned after ::hws access.
+
+Move the assignment to satisfy the requirement of assign-before-access.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by")
+Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250326-s2mps11-ubsan-v1-1-fcc6fce5c8a9@linaro.org
+Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/clk/clk-s2mps11.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/clk/clk-s2mps11.c b/drivers/clk/clk-s2mps11.c
+index 014db6386624..8ddf3a9a53df 100644
+--- a/drivers/clk/clk-s2mps11.c
++++ b/drivers/clk/clk-s2mps11.c
+@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ static int s2mps11_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ if (!clk_data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
++ clk_data->num = S2MPS11_CLKS_NUM;
++
+ switch (hwid) {
+ case S2MPS11X:
+ s2mps11_reg = S2MPS11_REG_RTC_CTRL;
+@@ -186,7 +188,6 @@ static int s2mps11_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ clk_data->hws[i] = &s2mps11_clks[i].hw;
+ }
+
+- clk_data->num = S2MPS11_CLKS_NUM;
+ of_clk_add_hw_provider(s2mps11_clks->clk_np, of_clk_hw_onecell_get,
+ clk_data);
+
+--
+2.49.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 18 May 2025 18:41:02 -0400
+Subject: crypto: algif_hash - fix double free in hash_accept
+
+From: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official@gmail.com>
+
+commit b2df03ed4052e97126267e8c13ad4204ea6ba9b6 upstream.
+
+If accept(2) is called on socket type algif_hash with
+MSG_MORE flag set and crypto_ahash_import fails,
+sk2 is freed. However, it is also freed in af_alg_release,
+leading to slab-use-after-free error.
+
+Fixes: fe869cdb89c9 ("crypto: algif_hash - User-space interface for hash operations")
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ crypto/algif_hash.c | 4 ----
+ 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
++++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
+@@ -265,10 +265,6 @@ static int hash_accept(struct socket *so
+ goto out_free_state;
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_import(&ctx2->req, state);
+- if (err) {
+- sock_orphan(sk2);
+- sock_put(sk2);
+- }
+
+ out_free_state:
+ kfree_sensitive(state);
--- /dev/null
+From d6ebcde6d4ecf34f8495fb30516645db3aea8993 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dominik Grzegorzek <dominik.grzegorzek@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 18 May 2025 19:45:31 +0200
+Subject: padata: do not leak refcount in reorder_work
+
+From: Dominik Grzegorzek <dominik.grzegorzek@oracle.com>
+
+commit d6ebcde6d4ecf34f8495fb30516645db3aea8993 upstream.
+
+A recent patch that addressed a UAF introduced a reference count leak:
+the parallel_data refcount is incremented unconditionally, regardless
+of the return value of queue_work(). If the work item is already queued,
+the incremented refcount is never decremented.
+
+Fix this by checking the return value of queue_work() and decrementing
+the refcount when necessary.
+
+Resolves:
+
+Unreferenced object 0xffff9d9f421e3d80 (size 192):
+ comm "cryptomgr_probe", pid 157, jiffies 4294694003
+ hex dump (first 32 bytes):
+ 80 8b cf 41 9f 9d ff ff b8 97 e0 89 ff ff ff ff ...A............
+ d0 97 e0 89 ff ff ff ff 19 00 00 00 1f 88 23 00 ..............#.
+ backtrace (crc 838fb36):
+ __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x284/0x320
+ padata_alloc_pd+0x20/0x1e0
+ padata_alloc_shell+0x3b/0xa0
+ 0xffffffffc040a54d
+ cryptomgr_probe+0x43/0xc0
+ kthread+0xf6/0x1f0
+ ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
+ ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
+
+Fixes: dd7d37ccf6b1 ("padata: avoid UAF for reorder_work")
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dominik Grzegorzek <dominik.grzegorzek@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/padata.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/padata.c
++++ b/kernel/padata.c
+@@ -358,7 +358,8 @@ static void padata_reorder(struct parall
+ * To avoid UAF issue, add pd ref here, and put pd ref after reorder_work finish.
+ */
+ padata_get_pd(pd);
+- queue_work(pinst->serial_wq, &pd->reorder_work);
++ if (!queue_work(pinst->serial_wq, &pd->reorder_work))
++ padata_put_pd(pd);
+ }
+ }
+
net-tipc-fix-slab-use-after-free-read-in-tipc_aead_e.patch
octeontx2-af-set-lmt_ena-bit-for-apr-table-entries.patch
octeontx2-af-fix-apr-entry-mapping-based-on-apr_lmt_.patch
+clk-s2mps11-initialise-clk_hw_onecell_data-num-before-accessing-hws-in-probe.patch
+crypto-algif_hash-fix-double-free-in-hash_accept.patch
+padata-do-not-leak-refcount-in-reorder_work.patch
+can-slcan-allow-reception-of-short-error-messages.patch
+can-bcm-add-locking-for-bcm_op-runtime-updates.patch
+can-bcm-add-missing-rcu-read-protection-for-procfs-content.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
