--- /dev/null
+From d0cb6d5a49bf5f40ef27d1524bce3713046b4046 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:46 -0800
+Subject: csky: Fix function name in csky_alignment() and die()
+
+From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
+
+commit 751971af2e3615dc5bd12674080bc795505fefeb upstream.
+
+When building ARCH=csky defconfig:
+
+arch/csky/kernel/traps.c: In function 'die':
+arch/csky/kernel/traps.c:112:17: error: implicit declaration of function
+'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
+ 112 | make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
+ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more
+build error.
+
+Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
+Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211227184851.2297759-4-nathan@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c | 2 +-
+ arch/csky/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c b/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c
+index 5e2fb45d605c..2df115d0e210 100644
+--- a/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c
++++ b/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ void csky_alignment(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ __func__, opcode, rz, rx, imm, addr);
+ show_regs(regs);
+ bust_spinlocks(0);
+- make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)addr);
+diff --git a/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c b/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c
+index af7562907f7f..8cdbbcb5ed87 100644
+--- a/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int nr)
+ pr_err("%s: %08x\n", str, nr);
+ show_regs(regs);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+- make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ void buserr(struct pt_regs *regs)
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From d7248c44de6060bf42abeb393b72bd0ee104599a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:54 -0800
+Subject: docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count
+
+From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+
+commit 00dd027f721e0458418f7750d8a5a664ed3e5994 upstream.
+
+Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was
+duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":
+
+ Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
+ ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0
+ ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0
+
+Fix the typo.
+
+Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/202212110529.A3Qav8aR-lkp@intel.com
+Fixes: 8b05aa263361 ("panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs")
+Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
+index 08f083d2fd51..90a029813717 100644
+--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
++++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-What: /sys/kernel/oops_count
++What: /sys/kernel/warn_count
+ Date: November 2022
+ KernelVersion: 6.2.0
+ Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 522a1673d1ea0c4c148c11486f3ba9c40456b8b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:42 -0800
+Subject: exit: Add and use make_task_dead.
+
+From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+
+commit 0e25498f8cd43c1b5aa327f373dd094e9a006da7 upstream.
+
+There are two big uses of do_exit. The first is it's design use to be
+the guts of the exit(2) system call. The second use is to terminate
+a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer
+in kernel code.
+
+Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as
+do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle
+catastrophic failure. In time this can probably be reduced to just a
+light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so
+that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new
+concept.
+
+Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic
+task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code
+is doing.
+
+As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
+rewind_stack_and_make_dead.
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c | 6 +++---
+ arch/alpha/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c | 2 +-
+ arch/csky/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/h8300/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c | 2 +-
+ arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/ia64/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/m68k/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c | 4 ++--
+ arch/mips/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c | 2 +-
+ arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c | 8 ++++----
+ arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c | 4 ++--
+ arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/riscv/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c | 2 +-
+ arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c | 2 +-
+ arch/sh/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c | 4 +---
+ arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c | 4 +---
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 6 +++---
+ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 +++---
+ arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 4 ++--
+ arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ include/linux/sched/task.h | 1 +
+ kernel/exit.c | 9 +++++++++
+ tools/objtool/check.c | 3 ++-
+ 38 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
+index f6b9664ac504..f87d8e1fcfe4 100644
+--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15)
+ local_irq_enable();
+ while (1);
+ }
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ #ifndef CONFIG_MATHEMU
+@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ do_entUna(void * va, unsigned long opcode, unsigned long reg,
+
+ printk("Bad unaligned kernel access at %016lx: %p %lx %lu\n",
+ pc, va, opcode, reg);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+
+ got_exception:
+ /* Ok, we caught the exception, but we don't want it. Is there
+@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ do_entUna(void * va, unsigned long opcode, unsigned long reg,
+ local_irq_enable();
+ while (1);
+ }
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c b/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
+index 741e61ef9d3f..a86286d2d3f3 100644
+--- a/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
+@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, unsigned long mmcsr,
+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request at "
+ "virtual address %016lx\n", address);
+ die_if_kernel("Oops", regs, cause, (unsigned long*)regs - 16);
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+
+ /* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that
+ made us unable to handle the page fault gracefully. */
+diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+index 207ef9a797bd..03dfeb120843 100644
+--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+ if (signr)
+- do_exit(signr);
++ make_task_dead(signr);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+index bd0f4821f7e1..d62393243720 100644
+--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ __do_kernel_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
+ show_pte(KERN_ALERT, mm, addr);
+ die("Oops", regs, fsr);
+ bust_spinlocks(0);
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+index 4e3e9d9c8151..a436a6972ced 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&die_lock, flags);
+
+ if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+index 2a7339aeb1ad..a8e9c98147a1 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,
+ show_pte(addr);
+ die("Oops", regs, esr);
+ bust_spinlocks(0);
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+diff --git a/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c b/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c
+index cb2a0d94a144..5e2fb45d605c 100644
+--- a/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c
++++ b/arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ void csky_alignment(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ __func__, opcode, rz, rx, imm, addr);
+ show_regs(regs);
+ bust_spinlocks(0);
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)addr);
+diff --git a/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c b/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c
+index 63715cb90ee9..af7562907f7f 100644
+--- a/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/csky/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int nr)
+ pr_err("%s: %08x\n", str, nr);
+ show_regs(regs);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ void buserr(struct pt_regs *regs)
+diff --git a/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c b/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
+index e47a9e0dc278..a284c126f07a 100644
+--- a/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, unsigned long err)
+ dump(fp);
+
+ spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ static int kstack_depth_to_print = 24;
+diff --git a/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c b/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
+index fabffb83930a..a8d8fc63780e 100644
+--- a/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
+ printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+ die("Oops", regs, error_code);
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+index 69c623b14ddd..bfd04a388bca 100644
+--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+
+ oops_exit();
+- do_exit(err);
++ make_dead_task(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c
+index 2a40268c3d49..d9ee3b186249 100644
+--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c
++++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c
+@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ mca_handler_bh(unsigned long paddr, void *iip, unsigned long ipsr)
+ spin_unlock(&mca_bh_lock);
+
+ /* This process is about to be killed itself */
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+ /**
+diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
+index e13cb905930f..753642366e12 100644
+--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c b/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
+index c2f299fe9e04..7f8c49579a2c 100644
+--- a/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
+@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *re
+ regs = NULL;
+ bust_spinlocks(0);
+ if (regs)
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ return;
+
+ out_of_memory:
+diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
+index 344f93d36a9a..a245c1933d41 100644
+--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, int nr)
+ pr_crit("%s: %08x\n", str, nr);
+ show_registers(fp);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ asmlinkage void set_esp0(unsigned long ssp)
+diff --git a/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c b/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c
+index e9b1d7585b43..03ebb67b413e 100644
+--- a/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int send_fault_sig(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel access");
+ pr_cont(" at virtual address %p\n", addr);
+ die_if_kernel("Oops", regs, 0 /*error_code*/);
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c b/arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c
+index cf99c411503e..6d3a6a644220 100644
+--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c
++++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c
+@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, long err)
+ pr_warn("Oops: %s, sig: %ld\n", str, err);
+ show_regs(fp);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
+- /* do_exit() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
++ /* make_task_dead() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
+ * context so we don't handle it here
+ */
+- do_exit(err);
++ make_task_dead(err);
+ }
+
+ /* for user application debugging */
+diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
+index 749089c25d5e..5a491eca456f 100644
+--- a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ if (regs && kexec_should_crash(current))
+ crash_kexec(regs);
+
+- do_exit(sig);
++ make_task_dead(sig);
+ }
+
+ extern struct exception_table_entry __start___dbe_table[];
+diff --git a/arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c b/arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c
+index 62bdafbc53f4..26c62d5a55c1 100644
+--- a/arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c
++++ b/arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c
+@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ inline void handle_fpu_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ }
+ } else if (fpcsr & FPCSR_mskRIT) {
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+- do_exit(SIGILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGILL);
+ si_signo = SIGILL;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c
+index f4d386b52622..f6648845aae7 100644
+--- a/arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
+
+ bust_spinlocks(0);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(die);
+@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ void unhandled_interruption(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ pr_emerg("unhandled_interruption\n");
+ show_regs(regs);
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ force_sig(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ void unhandled_exceptions(unsigned long entry, unsigned long addr,
+ addr, type);
+ show_regs(regs);
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+ force_sig(SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ void do_revinsn(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ pr_emerg("Reserved Instruction\n");
+ show_regs(regs);
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+- do_exit(SIGILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGILL);
+ force_sig(SIGILL);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c b/arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c
+index 486db793923c..8e192d656426 100644
+--- a/arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+ show_regs(regs);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
+ /*
+- * do_exit() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
++ * make_task_dead() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
+ * context so we don't handle it here
+ */
+- do_exit(err);
++ make_task_dead(err);
+ }
+
+ void _exception(int signo, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
+diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c
+index 932a8ec2b520..2804852a5592 100644
+--- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+ __asm__ __volatile__("l.nop 1");
+ do {} while (1);
+ #endif
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ /* This is normally the 'Oops' routine */
+diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+index 2a1060d747a5..37988f7f3abc 100644
+--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+
+ oops_exit();
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ /* gdb uses break 4,8 */
+diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
+index ecfa460f66d1..70b99246dec4 100644
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs,
+
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+- do_exit(signr);
++ make_task_dead(signr);
+ }
+ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
+
+diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
+index ae462037910b..c28d4debf592 100644
+--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+ if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code, unsigned long addr)
+diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
+index 247b8c859c44..1cfce62caa11 100644
+--- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
+@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ (addr < PAGE_SIZE) ? "NULL pointer dereference" :
+ "paging request", addr);
+ die(regs, "Oops");
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+
+ /*
+ * We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return the userspace
+diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c
+index 34bdc60c0b11..2100833adfb6 100644
+--- a/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c
++++ b/arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c
+@@ -210,5 +210,5 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception: panic_on_oops");
+ oops_exit();
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
+index 0a487fae763e..d8951274658b 100644
+--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
++++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ void s390_handle_mcck(void)
+ "malfunction (code 0x%016lx).\n", mcck.mcck_code);
+ printk(KERN_EMERG "mcck: task: %s, pid: %d.\n",
+ current->comm, current->pid);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_handle_mcck);
+diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
+index 63cf17bc760d..6a228c00b73f 100644
+--- a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ void die_if_kernel(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
+index 4ceecad556a9..dbf068ac54ff 100644
+--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
+@@ -86,9 +86,7 @@ void __noreturn die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ }
+ printk("Instruction DUMP:");
+ instruction_dump ((unsigned long *) regs->pc);
+- if(regs->psr & PSR_PS)
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead((regs->psr & PSR_PS) ? SIGKILL : SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ void do_hw_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long type)
+diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
+index f2b22c496fb9..17768680cbae 100644
+--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
++++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
+@@ -2564,9 +2564,7 @@ void __noreturn die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ }
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+- if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
+- do_exit(SIGKILL);
+- do_exit(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead((regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)? SIGKILL : SIGSEGV);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(die_if_kernel);
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+index 2d837fb54c31..740df9cc2196 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+@@ -1659,13 +1659,13 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
+ END(async_page_fault)
+ #endif
+
+-ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
++ENTRY(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
+ /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
+ xorl %ebp, %ebp
+
+ movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
+ leal -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
+
+- call do_exit
++ call make_task_dead
+ 1: jmp 1b
+-END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
++END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
+diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+index c82136030d58..bd7a4ad0937c 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+@@ -1757,7 +1757,7 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
+ END(ignore_sysret)
+ #endif
+
+-ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
++ENTRY(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+ /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
+ xorl %ebp, %ebp
+@@ -1766,5 +1766,5 @@ ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+ leaq -PTREGS_SIZE(%rax), %rsp
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS
+
+- call do_exit
+-END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
++ call make_task_dead
++END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+index e07424e19274..e72042dc9487 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ unsigned long oops_begin(void)
+ }
+ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin);
+
+-void __noreturn rewind_stack_do_exit(int signr);
++void __noreturn rewind_stack_and_make_dead(int signr);
+
+ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
+ {
+@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
+ * reuse the task stack and that existing poisons are invalid.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison_task_stack(current);
+- rewind_stack_do_exit(signr);
++ rewind_stack_and_make_dead(signr);
+ }
+ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
+
+diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
+index 4a6c495ce9b6..16af8e514cb3 100644
+--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -543,5 +543,5 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
+ if (panic_on_oops)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+
+- do_exit(err);
++ make_task_dead(err);
+ }
+diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h
+index 36f3011ab601..6f33a07858cf 100644
+--- a/include/linux/sched/task.h
++++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ extern int sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p);
+ extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p);
+
+ void __noreturn do_task_dead(void);
++void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr);
+
+ extern void proc_caches_init(void);
+
+diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
+index ece64771a31f..6512d82b4d9b 100644
+--- a/kernel/exit.c
++++ b/kernel/exit.c
+@@ -864,6 +864,15 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
+
++void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
++{
++ /*
++ * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
++ * happened.
++ */
++ do_exit(signr);
++}
++
+ void complete_and_exit(struct completion *comp, long code)
+ {
+ if (comp)
+diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
+index ccf5580442d2..14be7d261ae7 100644
+--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
++++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
+ "panic",
+ "do_exit",
+ "do_task_dead",
++ "make_task_dead",
+ "__module_put_and_exit",
+ "complete_and_exit",
+ "__reiserfs_panic",
+@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
+ "fortify_panic",
+ "usercopy_abort",
+ "machine_real_restart",
+- "rewind_stack_do_exit",
++ "rewind_stack_and_make_dead"
+ "cpu_bringup_and_idle",
+ };
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 2962d7d0fa03f3f5f41d2a6024509f61931eb93b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:50 -0800
+Subject: exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled
+
+From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+
+commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.
+
+In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit,
+have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.
+
+Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
+Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
+Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 5 +++--
+ kernel/exit.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+index 4bdf845c79aa..bc31c4a88f20 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+@@ -561,8 +561,9 @@ oops_limit
+ ==========
+
+ Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
+-``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 or 1 has the same effect
+-as setting ``panic_on_oops=1``.
++``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
++the count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
++``panic_on_oops=1``. The default value is 10000.
+
+
+ osrelease, ostype & version:
+diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
+index 48ac68ebab72..381282fb756c 100644
+--- a/kernel/exit.c
++++ b/kernel/exit.c
+@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
+ * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
+ * kernel may oops without panic().
+ */
+- if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit))
++ if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit)
+ panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
+
+ do_exit(signr);
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 9fc82c6acf48a3279160e668ec7b050c11d54156 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:49 -0800
+Subject: exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs
+
+From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+
+commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.
+
+Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
+the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.
+
+Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-3-keescook@chromium.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ .../ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count | 6 +++++
+ kernel/exit.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..156cca9dbc96
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++What: /sys/kernel/oops_count
++Date: November 2022
++KernelVersion: 6.2.0
++Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
++Description:
++ Shows how many times the system has Oopsed since last boot.
+diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
+index 4236970aa438..48ac68ebab72 100644
+--- a/kernel/exit.c
++++ b/kernel/exit.c
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
+ #include <linux/random.h>
+ #include <linux/rcuwait.h>
+ #include <linux/compat.h>
++#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
+@@ -96,6 +97,25 @@ static __init int kernel_exit_sysctls_init(void)
+ late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysctls_init);
+ #endif
+
++static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
++static ssize_t oops_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
++ char *page)
++{
++ return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&oops_count));
++}
++
++static struct kobj_attribute oops_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(oops_count);
++
++static __init int kernel_exit_sysfs_init(void)
++{
++ sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &oops_count_attr.attr, NULL);
++ return 0;
++}
++late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysfs_init);
++#endif
++
+ static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
+ {
+ nr_threads--;
+@@ -893,8 +913,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
+
+ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
+ {
+- static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+-
+ /*
+ * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
+ * happened.
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6c39914d084a6df601134c72fd6596bf9ffa847b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:48 -0800
+Subject: exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops
+
+From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+
+commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.
+
+Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
+attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
+completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
+each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
+this causes a counter to eventually overflow.
+
+The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
+refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
+platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
+that much nowadays.)
+
+So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.
+
+The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
+how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
+important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
+a text console that oopses will be printed to.
+In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
+child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
+when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
+oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
+run.
+(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
+happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
+of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
+contention.)
+
+It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
+with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
+environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
+normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.
+
+12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
+longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
+desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
+violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
+of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
+pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
+Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 8 ++++
+ kernel/exit.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+index 9715685be6e3..4bdf845c79aa 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+@@ -557,6 +557,14 @@ numa_balancing_scan_size_mb is how many megabytes worth of pages are
+ scanned for a given scan.
+
+
++oops_limit
++==========
++
++Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
++``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 or 1 has the same effect
++as setting ``panic_on_oops=1``.
++
++
+ osrelease, ostype & version:
+ ============================
+
+diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
+index 6512d82b4d9b..4236970aa438 100644
+--- a/kernel/exit.c
++++ b/kernel/exit.c
+@@ -69,6 +69,33 @@
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+
++/*
++ * The default value should be high enough to not crash a system that randomly
++ * crashes its kernel from time to time, but low enough to at least not permit
++ * overflowing 32-bit refcounts or the ldsem writer count.
++ */
++static unsigned int oops_limit = 10000;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++static struct ctl_table kern_exit_table[] = {
++ {
++ .procname = "oops_limit",
++ .data = &oops_limit,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(oops_limit),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_douintvec,
++ },
++ { }
++};
++
++static __init int kernel_exit_sysctls_init(void)
++{
++ register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_exit_table);
++ return 0;
++}
++late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysctls_init);
++#endif
++
+ static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
+ {
+ nr_threads--;
+@@ -866,10 +893,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
+
+ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
+ {
++ static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
++
+ /*
+ * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
+ * happened.
+ */
++
++ /*
++ * Every time the system oopses, if the oops happens while a reference
++ * to an object was held, the reference leaks.
++ * If the oops doesn't also leak memory, repeated oopsing can cause
++ * reference counters to wrap around (if they're not using refcount_t).
++ * This means that repeated oopsing can make unexploitable-looking bugs
++ * exploitable through repeated oopsing.
++ * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
++ * kernel may oops without panic().
++ */
++ if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit))
++ panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
++
+ do_exit(signr);
+ }
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0f5528fb04788e4d25e4ef3fafca704d0753a6c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:55 -0800
+Subject: exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads
+
+From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+
+commit 7535b832c6399b5ebfc5b53af5c51dd915ee2538 upstream.
+
+Use a temporary variable to take full advantage of READ_ONCE() behavior.
+Without this, the report (and even the test) might be out of sync with
+the initial test.
+
+Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y5x7GXeluFmZ8E0E@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
+Fixes: 9fc9e278a5c0 ("panic: Introduce warn_limit")
+Fixes: d4ccd54d28d3 ("exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops")
+Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
+Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
+Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ kernel/exit.c | 6 ++++--
+ kernel/panic.c | 7 +++++--
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
+index 381282fb756c..563bdaa76694 100644
+--- a/kernel/exit.c
++++ b/kernel/exit.c
+@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
+ * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
+ * happened.
+ */
++ unsigned int limit;
+
+ /*
+ * Every time the system oopses, if the oops happens while a reference
+@@ -928,8 +929,9 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
+ * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
+ * kernel may oops without panic().
+ */
+- if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit)
+- panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
++ limit = READ_ONCE(oops_limit);
++ if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= limit && limit)
++ panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", limit);
+
+ do_exit(signr);
+ }
+diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
+index 2c118645e740..cef79466f941 100644
+--- a/kernel/panic.c
++++ b/kernel/panic.c
+@@ -199,12 +199,15 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
+
+ void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
+ {
++ unsigned int limit;
++
+ if (panic_on_warn)
+ panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
+
+- if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit)
++ limit = READ_ONCE(warn_limit);
++ if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= limit && limit)
+ panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
+- origin, warn_limit);
++ origin, limit);
+ }
+
+ /**
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From b8c1fe48c46744e1b17d1be27727d2af7753091b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:45 -0800
+Subject: h8300: Fix build errors from do_exit() to make_task_dead() transition
+
+From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
+
+commit ab4ababdf77ccc56c7301c751dff49c79709c51c upstream.
+
+When building ARCH=h8300 defconfig:
+
+arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c: In function 'die':
+arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c:109:2: error: implicit declaration of function
+'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
+ 109 | make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
+ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+arch/h8300/mm/fault.c: In function 'do_page_fault':
+arch/h8300/mm/fault.c:54:2: error: implicit declaration of function
+'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
+ 54 | make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
+ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more
+build error.
+
+Additionally, include linux/sched/task.h in arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
+to avoid the same error because do_exit()'s declaration is in kernel.h
+but make_task_dead()'s is in task.h, which is not included in traps.c.
+
+Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
+Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211227184851.2297759-3-nathan@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c | 3 ++-
+ arch/h8300/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c b/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
+index a284c126f07a..090adaee4b84 100644
+--- a/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
++#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+ #include <linux/mm_types.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, unsigned long err)
+ dump(fp);
+
+ spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
+- make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
++ make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
+ }
+
+ static int kstack_depth_to_print = 24;
+diff --git a/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c b/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
+index a8d8fc63780e..573825c3cb70 100644
+--- a/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
++++ b/arch/h8300/mm/fault.c
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
+ printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
+ if (!user_mode(regs))
+ die("Oops", regs, error_code);
+- make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
++ make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From dee9818e0f6291086f82afe049ad56a4593825e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:44 -0800
+Subject: hexagon: Fix function name in die()
+
+From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
+
+commit 4f0712ccec09c071e221242a2db9a6779a55a949 upstream.
+
+When building ARCH=hexagon defconfig:
+
+arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c:217:2: error: implicit declaration of
+function 'make_dead_task' [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
+ make_dead_task(err);
+ ^
+
+The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more
+build error.
+
+Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
+Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211227184851.2297759-2-nathan@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+index bfd04a388bca..f69eae3f32bd 100644
+--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
+ panic("Fatal exception");
+
+ oops_exit();
+- make_dead_task(err);
++ make_task_dead(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From f81916088fa9f02a2f38089513d7b65253bc765c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:47 -0800
+Subject: ia64: make IA64_MCA_RECOVERY bool instead of tristate
+
+From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
+
+commit dbecf9b8b8ce580f4e11afed9d61e8aa294cddd2 upstream.
+
+In linux-next, IA64_MCA_RECOVERY uses the (new) function
+make_task_dead(), which is not exported for use by modules. Instead of
+exporting it for one user, convert IA64_MCA_RECOVERY to be a bool
+Kconfig symbol.
+
+In a config file from "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>" for a
+different problem, this linker error was exposed when
+CONFIG_IA64_MCA_RECOVERY=m.
+
+Fixes this build error:
+
+ ERROR: modpost: "make_task_dead" [arch/ia64/kernel/mca_recovery.ko] undefined!
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124213129.29306-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
+Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
+Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
+Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
+Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
+Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/ia64/Kconfig | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+index 16714477eef4..6a6036f16abe 100644
+--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ config ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT
+ depends on PROC_KCORE
+
+ config IA64_MCA_RECOVERY
+- tristate "MCA recovery from errors other than TLB."
++ bool "MCA recovery from errors other than TLB."
+
+ config PERFMON
+ bool "Performance monitor support"
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 010b2f73bd54561b35cc25e8c6824a6e62e634a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:41 -0800
+Subject: mm: kasan: do not panic if both panic_on_warn and kasan_multishot set
+
+From: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
+
+commit be4f1ae978ffe98cc95ec49ceb95386fb4474974 upstream.
+
+KASAN errors will currently trigger a panic when panic_on_warn is set.
+This renders kasan_multishot useless, as further KASAN errors won't be
+reported if the kernel has already paniced. By making kasan_multishot
+disable this behaviour for KASAN errors, we can still have the benefits of
+panic_on_warn for non-KASAN warnings, yet be able to use kasan_multishot.
+
+This is particularly important when running KASAN tests, which need to
+trigger multiple KASAN errors: previously these would panic the system if
+panic_on_warn was set, now they can run (and will panic the system should
+non-KASAN warnings show up).
+
+Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
+Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
+Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
+Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
+Cc: Patricia Alfonso <trishalfonso@google.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
+Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
+Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915035828.570483-6-davidgow@google.com
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910070331.3358048-6-davidgow@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ mm/kasan/report.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
+index 621782100eaa..a05ff1922d49 100644
+--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
++++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
+@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
+ pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+ add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
+- if (panic_on_warn)
++ if (panic_on_warn && !test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
+ panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+ kasan_enable_current();
+ }
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 62c7b72c063b8235ed3c2f4d0b2f22fcac2a0c85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:43 -0800
+Subject: objtool: Add a missing comma to avoid string concatenation
+
+From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+
+commit 1fb466dff904e4a72282af336f2c355f011eec61 upstream.
+
+Recently the kbuild robot reported two new errors:
+
+>> lib/kunit/kunit-example-test.o: warning: objtool: .text.unlikely: unexpected end of section
+>> arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.o: warning: objtool: oops_end() falls through to next function show_opcodes()
+
+I don't know why they did not occur in my test setup but after digging
+it I realized I had accidentally dropped a comma in
+tools/objtool/check.c when I renamed rewind_stack_do_exit to
+rewind_stack_and_make_dead.
+
+Add that comma back to fix objtool errors.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202112140949.Uq5sFKR1-lkp@intel.com
+Fixes: 0e25498f8cd4 ("exit: Add and use make_task_dead.")
+Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
+index 14be7d261ae7..dfd67243faac 100644
+--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
++++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
+@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
+ "fortify_panic",
+ "usercopy_abort",
+ "machine_real_restart",
+- "rewind_stack_and_make_dead"
++ "rewind_stack_and_make_dead",
+ "cpu_bringup_and_idle",
+ };
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 985ba80c3f29d8e34ca7572602b620213f242eff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:51 -0800
+Subject: panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks
+
+From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+
+commit 79cc1ba7badf9e7a12af99695a557e9ce27ee967 upstream.
+
+Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll
+their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this
+into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in
+a single location.
+
+Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
+Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
+Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
+Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
+Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
+Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
+Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
+Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
+Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
+Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
+Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
+Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
+Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
+Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
+Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
+Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
+Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
+Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-4-keescook@chromium.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ include/linux/kernel.h | 1 +
+ kernel/panic.c | 9 +++++++--
+ kernel/sched/core.c | 3 +--
+ mm/kasan/report.c | 4 ++--
+ 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
+index 77c86a2236da..1fdb251947ed 100644
+--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
++++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
+@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ extern long (*panic_blink)(int state);
+ __printf(1, 2)
+ void panic(const char *fmt, ...) __noreturn __cold;
+ void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg);
++void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin);
+ extern void oops_enter(void);
+ extern void oops_exit(void);
+ void print_oops_end_marker(void);
+diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
+index 5e2b764ff5d5..7e4900eb25ac 100644
+--- a/kernel/panic.c
++++ b/kernel/panic.c
+@@ -156,6 +156,12 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
+ ftrace_dump(DUMP_ALL);
+ }
+
++void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
++{
++ if (panic_on_warn)
++ panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
++}
++
+ /**
+ * panic - halt the system
+ * @fmt: The text string to print
+@@ -581,8 +587,7 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
+ if (args)
+ vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
+
+- if (panic_on_warn)
+- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
++ check_panic_on_warn("kernel");
+
+ print_modules();
+
+diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
+index 06b686ef36e6..8ab239fd1c8d 100644
+--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
++++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
+@@ -3964,8 +3964,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
+ print_ip_sym(preempt_disable_ip);
+ pr_cont("\n");
+ }
+- if (panic_on_warn)
+- panic("scheduling while atomic\n");
++ check_panic_on_warn("scheduling while atomic");
+
+ dump_stack();
+ add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
+index a05ff1922d49..4d87df96acc1 100644
+--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
++++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
+@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
+ pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+ add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
+- if (panic_on_warn && !test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
+- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
++ if (!test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
++ check_panic_on_warn("KASAN");
+ kasan_enable_current();
+ }
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 78a7f8a709542c419ca2bd5ac180bb82f515ee6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:53 -0800
+Subject: panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs
+
+From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+
+commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.
+
+Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add
+the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.
+
+Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
+Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
+Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
+Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-6-keescook@chromium.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ .../ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count | 6 +++++
+ kernel/panic.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
+new file mode 100644
+index 000000000000..08f083d2fd51
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++What: /sys/kernel/oops_count
++Date: November 2022
++KernelVersion: 6.2.0
++Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
++Description:
++ Shows how many times the system has Warned since last boot.
+diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
+index 8f72305dd501..2c118645e740 100644
+--- a/kernel/panic.c
++++ b/kernel/panic.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <linux/bug.h>
+ #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+ #include <linux/debugfs.h>
++#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+ #include <asm/sections.h>
+
+ #define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
+@@ -81,6 +82,25 @@ static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void)
+ late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
+ #endif
+
++static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
++static ssize_t warn_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
++ char *page)
++{
++ return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&warn_count));
++}
++
++static struct kobj_attribute warn_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(warn_count);
++
++static __init int kernel_panic_sysfs_init(void)
++{
++ sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &warn_count_attr.attr, NULL);
++ return 0;
++}
++late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysfs_init);
++#endif
++
+ static long no_blink(int state)
+ {
+ return 0;
+@@ -179,8 +199,6 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
+
+ void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
+ {
+- static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+-
+ if (panic_on_warn)
+ panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From a2b1c03ad605cd2d8e8122d340905e1118fec43e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:52 -0800
+Subject: panic: Introduce warn_limit
+
+From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+
+commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.
+
+Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when
+panic_on_warn is not set.
+
+Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
+Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
+Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
+Cc: tangmeng <tangmeng@uniontech.com>
+Cc: "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
+Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
+Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-5-keescook@chromium.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 10 ++++++++
+ kernel/panic.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+index bc31c4a88f20..568c24ff00a7 100644
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+@@ -1186,6 +1186,16 @@ entry will default to 2 instead of 0.
+ 2 Unprivileged calls to ``bpf()`` are disabled
+ = =============================================================
+
++
++warn_limit
++==========
++
++Number of kernel warnings after which the kernel should panic when
++``panic_on_warn`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
++the warning count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
++``panic_on_warn=1``. The default value is 0.
++
++
+ watchdog:
+ =========
+
+diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
+index 7e4900eb25ac..8f72305dd501 100644
+--- a/kernel/panic.c
++++ b/kernel/panic.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static int pause_on_oops_flag;
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
+ bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
+ int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
++static unsigned int warn_limit __read_mostly;
+
+ int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
+@@ -60,6 +61,26 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
+
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
++ {
++ .procname = "warn_limit",
++ .data = &warn_limit,
++ .maxlen = sizeof(warn_limit),
++ .mode = 0644,
++ .proc_handler = proc_douintvec,
++ },
++ { }
++};
++
++static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void)
++{
++ register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_panic_table);
++ return 0;
++}
++late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
++#endif
++
+ static long no_blink(int state)
+ {
+ return 0;
+@@ -158,8 +179,14 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
+
+ void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
+ {
++ static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
++
+ if (panic_on_warn)
+ panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
++
++ if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit)
++ panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
++ origin, warn_limit);
+ }
+
+ /**
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 9084f463b9d9c0bf4dc057469aa8852079f11861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:40 -0800
+Subject: panic: unset panic_on_warn inside panic()
+
+From: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
+
+commit 1a2383e8b84c0451fd9b1eec3b9aab16f30b597c upstream.
+
+In the current code, the following three places need to unset
+panic_on_warn before calling panic() to avoid recursive panics:
+
+kernel/kcsan/report.c: print_report()
+kernel/sched/core.c: __schedule_bug()
+mm/kfence/report.c: kfence_report_error()
+
+In order to avoid copy-pasting "panic_on_warn = 0" all over the places,
+it is better to move it inside panic() and then remove it from the other
+places.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1644324666-15947-4-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
+Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
+Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
+Cc: Xuefeng Li <lixuefeng@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ kernel/panic.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
+index f470a038b05b..5e2b764ff5d5 100644
+--- a/kernel/panic.c
++++ b/kernel/panic.c
+@@ -173,6 +173,16 @@ void panic(const char *fmt, ...)
+ int old_cpu, this_cpu;
+ bool _crash_kexec_post_notifiers = crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
+
++ if (panic_on_warn) {
++ /*
++ * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
++ * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
++ * system on this thread. Other threads are blocked by the
++ * panic_mutex in panic().
++ */
++ panic_on_warn = 0;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Disable local interrupts. This will prevent panic_smp_self_stop
+ * from deadlocking the first cpu that invokes the panic, since
+@@ -571,16 +581,8 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
+ if (args)
+ vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
+
+- if (panic_on_warn) {
+- /*
+- * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
+- * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
+- * system on this thread. Other threads are blocked by the
+- * panic_mutex in panic().
+- */
+- panic_on_warn = 0;
++ if (panic_on_warn)
+ panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+- }
+
+ print_modules();
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
bpf-skip-task-with-pid-1-in-send_signal_common.patch
blk-cgroup-fix-missing-pd_online_fn-while-activating.patch
dmaengine-imx-sdma-fix-a-possible-memory-leak-in-sdm.patch
+sysctl-add-a-new-register_sysctl_init-interface.patch
+panic-unset-panic_on_warn-inside-panic.patch
+mm-kasan-do-not-panic-if-both-panic_on_warn-and-kasa.patch
+exit-add-and-use-make_task_dead.patch
+objtool-add-a-missing-comma-to-avoid-string-concaten.patch
+hexagon-fix-function-name-in-die.patch
+h8300-fix-build-errors-from-do_exit-to-make_task_dea.patch
+csky-fix-function-name-in-csky_alignment-and-die.patch
+ia64-make-ia64_mca_recovery-bool-instead-of-tristate.patch
+exit-put-an-upper-limit-on-how-often-we-can-oops.patch
+exit-expose-oops_count-to-sysfs.patch
+exit-allow-oops_limit-to-be-disabled.patch
+panic-consolidate-open-coded-panic_on_warn-checks.patch
+panic-introduce-warn_limit.patch
+panic-expose-warn_count-to-sysfs.patch
+docs-fix-path-paste-o-for-sys-kernel-warn_count.patch
+exit-use-read_once-for-all-oops-warn-limit-reads.patch
--- /dev/null
+From fc87d3783fd29ccf7027329c98185849622ed7cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 20:42:39 -0800
+Subject: sysctl: add a new register_sysctl_init() interface
+
+From: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
+
+commit 3ddd9a808cee7284931312f2f3e854c9617f44b2 upstream.
+
+Patch series "sysctl: first set of kernel/sysctl cleanups", v2.
+
+Finally had time to respin the series of the work we had started last
+year on cleaning up the kernel/sysct.c kitchen sink. People keeps
+stuffing their sysctls in that file and this creates a maintenance
+burden. So this effort is aimed at placing sysctls where they actually
+belong.
+
+I'm going to split patches up into series as there is quite a bit of
+work.
+
+This first set adds register_sysctl_init() for uses of registerting a
+sysctl on the init path, adds const where missing to a few places,
+generalizes common values so to be more easy to share, and starts the
+move of a few kernel/sysctl.c out where they belong.
+
+The majority of rework on v2 in this first patch set is 0-day fixes.
+Eric Biederman's feedback is later addressed in subsequent patch sets.
+
+I'll only post the first two patch sets for now. We can address the
+rest once the first two patch sets get completely reviewed / Acked.
+
+This patch (of 9):
+
+The kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty
+dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain.
+
+To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places
+where they actually belong. The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to
+know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we
+just care about the core logic.
+
+Today though folks heavily rely on tables on kernel/sysctl.c so they can
+easily just extend this table with their needed sysctls. In order to
+help users move their sysctls out we need to provide a helper which can
+be used during code initialization.
+
+We special-case the initialization use of register_sysctl() since it
+*is* safe to fail, given all that sysctls do is provide a dynamic
+interface to query or modify at runtime an existing variable. So the
+use case of register_sysctl() on init should *not* stop if the sysctls
+don't end up getting registered. It would be counter productive to stop
+boot if a simple sysctl registration failed.
+
+Provide a helper for init then, and document the recommended init levels
+to use for callers of this routine. We will later use this in
+subsequent patches to start slimming down kernel/sysctl.c tables and
+moving sysctl registration to the code which actually needs these
+sysctls.
+
+[mcgrof@kernel.org: major commit log and documentation rephrasing also moved to fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c ]
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-1-mcgrof@kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123202347.818157-2-mcgrof@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
+Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
+Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
+Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
+Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
+Cc: Qing Wang <wangqing@vivo.com>
+Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
+Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
+Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
+Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
+Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
+Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
+Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
+Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
+Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
+Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>
+Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel@tuxforce.de>
+Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
+Cc: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk>
+Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
+Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
+Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
+Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
+Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
+Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
+Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/linux/sysctl.h | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+index d80989b6c344..f4264dd4ea31 100644
+--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
++++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
++#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+ #include "internal.h"
+
+ static const struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations;
+@@ -1397,6 +1398,38 @@ struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl(const char *path, struct ctl_table *tab
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_sysctl);
+
++/**
++ * __register_sysctl_init() - register sysctl table to path
++ * @path: path name for sysctl base
++ * @table: This is the sysctl table that needs to be registered to the path
++ * @table_name: The name of sysctl table, only used for log printing when
++ * registration fails
++ *
++ * The sysctl interface is used by userspace to query or modify at runtime
++ * a predefined value set on a variable. These variables however have default
++ * values pre-set. Code which depends on these variables will always work even
++ * if register_sysctl() fails. If register_sysctl() fails you'd just loose the
++ * ability to query or modify the sysctls dynamically at run time. Chances of
++ * register_sysctl() failing on init are extremely low, and so for both reasons
++ * this function does not return any error as it is used by initialization code.
++ *
++ * Context: Can only be called after your respective sysctl base path has been
++ * registered. So for instance, most base directories are registered early on
++ * init before init levels are processed through proc_sys_init() and
++ * sysctl_init().
++ */
++void __init __register_sysctl_init(const char *path, struct ctl_table *table,
++ const char *table_name)
++{
++ struct ctl_table_header *hdr = register_sysctl(path, table);
++
++ if (unlikely(!hdr)) {
++ pr_err("failed when register_sysctl %s to %s\n", table_name, path);
++ return;
++ }
++ kmemleak_not_leak(hdr);
++}
++
+ static char *append_path(const char *path, char *pos, const char *name)
+ {
+ int namelen;
+diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
+index 6df477329b76..aa615a0863f5 100644
+--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
++++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
+@@ -208,6 +208,9 @@ struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl_paths(const struct ctl_path *path,
+ void unregister_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header * table);
+
+ extern int sysctl_init(void);
++extern void __register_sysctl_init(const char *path, struct ctl_table *table,
++ const char *table_name);
++#define register_sysctl_init(path, table) __register_sysctl_init(path, table, #table)
+
+ extern struct ctl_table sysctl_mount_point[];
+
+--
+2.39.0
+