Fix remotely-triggerable ASSERT() on malformed IPv6 packet.

Correct sanity checks on IPv6 packet length in mss_fixup_ipv6(),
and change the ASSERT() check in mss_fixup_dowork() into a simple
"return" (= the TCP header will simply not be inspected further).

CVE-2017-7508 has been assigned due to the serious nature of the
bug: it can be used to remotely shutdown an openvpn server or
client, if IPv6 and --mssfix are enabled and the IPv6 networks used
inside the VPN are known.

Found by Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>.

v2: style changes

CVE: 2017-7508
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Message-Id: <20170613200832.15027-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20170613200832.15027-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
(cherry picked from commit c3f47077a7756de5929094569421a95aa66f2022)

diff --git a/src/openvpn/mss.c b/src/openvpn/mss.c
index 7c596d7812ab554c1c8636f54fb25a68cc0ce54f..c36e004648ec998aa803dfed1e236d3a0cbe7dcf 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/mss.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/mss.c
@@ -119,8 +119,12 @@ mss_fixup_ipv6(struct buffer *buf, int maxmss)
         return;
     }
 
+    /* skip IPv6 header (40 bytes),
+     * verify remainder is large enough to contain a full TCP header
+     */
     newbuf = *buf;
-    if (buf_advance( &newbuf, 40 ) )
+    if (buf_advance( &newbuf, 40 )
+        && BLEN(&newbuf) >= (int) sizeof(struct openvpn_tcphdr))
     {
         struct openvpn_tcphdr *tc = (struct openvpn_tcphdr *) BPTR(&newbuf);
         if (tc->flags & OPENVPN_TCPH_SYN_MASK)
@@ -144,7 +148,10 @@ mss_fixup_dowork(struct buffer *buf, uint16_t maxmss)
     int accumulate;
     struct openvpn_tcphdr *tc;
 
-    ASSERT(BLEN(buf) >= (int) sizeof(struct openvpn_tcphdr));
+    if (BLEN(buf) < (int) sizeof(struct openvpn_tcphdr))
+    {
+       return;
+    }
 
     verify_align_4(buf);
     tc = (struct openvpn_tcphdr *) BPTR(buf);