4.9-stable patches

added patches:
	ecryptfs-fix-dereference-of-null-user_key_payload.patch

diff --git a/queue-4.9/ecryptfs-fix-dereference-of-null-user_key_payload.patch b/queue-4.9/ecryptfs-fix-dereference-of-null-user_key_payload.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..5c7da02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-4.9/ecryptfs-fix-dereference-of-null-user_key_payload.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+From f66665c09ab489a11ca490d6a82df57cfc1bea3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 12:51:27 -0700
+Subject: ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit f66665c09ab489a11ca490d6a82df57cfc1bea3e upstream.
+
+In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are
+not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic
+because the payload of a revoked key is NULL.  request_key() *does* skip
+revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked
+before we acquire the key semaphore.
+
+Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return
+-EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL.  For completeness we check this
+for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys
+cannot be revoked currently.
+
+Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to
+fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it
+seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer.
+
+Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
+Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+
+---
+ fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h |   24 +++++++++++++++++-------
+ fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c        |    9 ++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
++++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
+@@ -84,11 +84,16 @@ struct ecryptfs_page_crypt_context {
+ static inline struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *
+ ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
+ {
+-      if (key->type == &key_type_encrypted)
+-              return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)
+-                      (&((struct encrypted_key_payload *)key->payload.data[0])->payload_data);
+-      else
++      struct encrypted_key_payload *payload;
++
++      if (key->type != &key_type_encrypted)
+               return NULL;
++
++      payload = key->payload.data[0];
++      if (!payload)
++              return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
++
++      return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)payload->payload_data;
+ }
+ 
+ static inline struct key *ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(char *sig)
+@@ -114,12 +119,17 @@ static inline struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *
+ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
+ {
+       struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok;
++      const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+ 
+       auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(key);
+-      if (!auth_tok)
+-              return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)user_key_payload(key)->data;
+-      else
++      if (auth_tok)
+               return auth_tok;
++
++      ukp = user_key_payload(key);
++      if (!ukp)
++              return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
++
++      return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)ukp->data;
+ }
+ 
+ #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE 1024
+--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
++++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+@@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ out:
+  * @auth_tok_key: key containing the authentication token
+  * @auth_tok: authentication token
+  *
+- * Returns zero on valid auth tok; -EINVAL otherwise
++ * Returns zero on valid auth tok; -EINVAL if the payload is invalid; or
++ * -EKEYREVOKED if the key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore.
+  */
+ static int
+ ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct key *auth_tok_key,
+@@ -468,6 +469,12 @@ ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct
+       int rc = 0;
+ 
+       (*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(auth_tok_key);
++      if (IS_ERR(*auth_tok)) {
++              rc = PTR_ERR(*auth_tok);
++              *auth_tok = NULL;
++              goto out;
++      }
++
+       if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) {
+               printk(KERN_ERR "Data structure version mismatch. Userspace "
+                      "tools must match eCryptfs kernel module with major "

diff --git a/queue-4.9/series b/queue-4.9/series
index 51501dfcbf5c2ee39f2a968d28d3133eed6189db..c62e0b3b0b8d95695cb3f713e00176fb6f8caf5e 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-4.9/series
+++ b/queue-4.9/series
@@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ can-kvaser_usb-ignore-cmd_flush_queue_reply-messages.patch
 cfg80211-fix-connect-disconnect-edge-cases.patch
 ipsec-fix-aborted-xfrm-policy-dump-crash.patch
 regulator-fan53555-fix-i2c-device-ids.patch
+ecryptfs-fix-dereference-of-null-user_key_payload.patch