--- /dev/null
+From f05819df10d7b09f6d1eb6f8534a8f68e5a4fe61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2015 17:21:37 +0100
+Subject: KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit f05819df10d7b09f6d1eb6f8534a8f68e5a4fe61 upstream.
+
+The following sequence of commands:
+
+ i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
+ keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
+ keyctl unlink $i @s
+
+tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
+exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall
+fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
+other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
+function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
+on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
+Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
+list - which oopses like this:
+
+ BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
+ IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
+ ...
+ Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
+ ...
+ RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
+ RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203
+ RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
+ RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
+ RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
+ R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
+ R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
+ ...
+ CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
+ ...
+ Call Trace:
+ [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
+ [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
+ [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
+ [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
+ [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
+ [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
+ [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
+ [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
+ [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
+
+Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.
+
+The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully
+instantiated.
+
+Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/gc.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/keys/gc.c
++++ b/security/keys/gc.c
+@@ -134,8 +134,10 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(
+ kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
+ key_check(key);
+
+- /* Throw away the key data */
+- if (key->type->destroy)
++ /* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
++ !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) &&
++ key->type->destroy)
+ key->type->destroy(key);
+
+ security_key_free(key);
--- /dev/null
+From 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
+Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:09:04 +0000
+Subject: KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()
+
+From: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
+
+commit 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 upstream.
+
+This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
+
+If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
+set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
+
+This can be tested with the following program:
+
+ #include <stddef.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <keyutils.h>
+
+ int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
+ {
+ int i = 0;
+ key_serial_t serial;
+
+ serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
+ "leaked-keyring");
+ if (serial < 0) {
+ perror("keyctl");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
+ KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
+ perror("keyctl");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+ serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
+ "leaked-keyring");
+ if (serial < 0) {
+ perror("keyctl");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
+/proc/keys:
+
+3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
+
+with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
+then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
+has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
+
+Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
++++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
+@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *na
+ ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
+ goto error2;
+ } else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
++ key_put(keyring);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto error2;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 94c4554ba07adbdde396748ee7ae01e86cf2d8d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 16:30:08 +0100
+Subject: KEYS: Fix race between key destruction and finding a keyring by name
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit 94c4554ba07adbdde396748ee7ae01e86cf2d8d7 upstream.
+
+There appears to be a race between:
+
+ (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls
+ keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list
+
+ (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
+ key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
+ (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).
+
+Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
+including key->security.
+
+Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/gc.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/keys/gc.c
++++ b/security/keys/gc.c
+@@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(
+ kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
+ key_check(key);
+
++ /* Throw away the key data */
++ if (key->type->destroy)
++ key->type->destroy(key);
++
+ security_key_free(key);
+
+ /* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
+@@ -148,10 +152,6 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+ atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
+
+- /* now throw away the key memory */
+- if (key->type->destroy)
+- key->type->destroy(key);
+-
+ key_user_put(key->user);
+
+ kfree(key->description);
--- /dev/null
+From b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 01:34:26 +0000
+Subject: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+commit b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d upstream.
+
+This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
+
+There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
+happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
+semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
+
+This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
+its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
+and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
+
+Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
+semaphore instead of before.
+
+I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
+
+This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
+(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <keyutils.h>
+ #include <pthread.h>
+ void *thr0(void *arg)
+ {
+ key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
+ keyctl_revoke(key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ void *thr1(void *arg)
+ {
+ key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
+ char buffer[16];
+ keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ int main()
+ {
+ key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
+ pthread_t th[5];
+ pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
+ pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
+ pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
+ pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
+ pthread_join(th[0], 0);
+ pthread_join(th[1], 0);
+ pthread_join(th[2], 0);
+ pthread_join(th[3], 0);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+Build as:
+
+ cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
+
+Run as:
+
+ while keyctl-race; do :; done
+
+as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
+summarised as:
+
+ BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
+ IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
+ ...
+ Call Trace:
+ [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
+ [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
+ [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
+
+Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/keyctl.c | 18 +++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
++++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
+@@ -757,16 +757,16 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid,
+
+ /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
+ can_read_key:
+- ret = key_validate(key);
+- if (ret == 0) {
+- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+- if (key->type->read) {
+- /* read the data with the semaphore held (since we
+- * might sleep) */
+- down_read(&key->sem);
++ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
++ if (key->type->read) {
++ /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
++ * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
++ */
++ down_read(&key->sem);
++ ret = key_validate(key);
++ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
+- up_read(&key->sem);
+- }
++ up_read(&key->sem);
+ }
+
+ error2:
--- /dev/null
+From d3600bcf9d64d88dc1d189a754dcfab960ce751f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2015 08:34:46 -0500
+Subject: KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings
+
+From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+commit d3600bcf9d64d88dc1d189a754dcfab960ce751f upstream.
+
+Userspace should not be allowed to remove keys from certain keyrings
+(eg. blacklist), though the keys themselves can expire.
+
+This patch defines a new key flag named KEY_FLAG_KEEP to prevent
+userspace from being able to unlink, revoke, invalidate or timed
+out a key on a keyring. When this flag is set on the keyring, all
+keys subsequently added are flagged.
+
+In addition, when this flag is set, the keyring itself can not be
+cleared.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ include/linux/key.h | 1
+ security/keys/key.c | 6 ++++-
+ security/keys/keyctl.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/key.h
++++ b/include/linux/key.h
+@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ struct key {
+ #define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
+ #define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 10 /* set if key is builtin */
+ #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 11 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
++#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 12 /* set if key should not be removed */
+
+ /* the key type and key description string
+ * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
+--- a/security/keys/key.c
++++ b/security/keys/key.c
+@@ -429,8 +429,12 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(st
+ awaken = 1;
+
+ /* and link it into the destination keyring */
+- if (keyring)
++ if (keyring) {
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
++ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
++
+ __key_link(key, _edit);
++ }
+
+ /* disable the authorisation key */
+ if (authkey)
+--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
++++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
+@@ -364,11 +364,14 @@ error:
+ * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
+ * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
+ *
++ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked.
++ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
+ {
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
++ struct key *key;
+ long ret;
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+@@ -383,8 +386,13 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
+ }
+ }
+
+- key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+- ret = 0;
++ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
++ return -EPERM;
++ else {
++ key_revoke(key);
++ ret = 0;
++ }
+
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+ error:
+@@ -398,11 +406,14 @@ error:
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * immediately.
+ *
++ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated.
++ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
+ {
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
++ struct key *key;
+ long ret;
+
+ kenter("%d", id);
+@@ -426,8 +437,13 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t
+ }
+
+ invalidate:
+- key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+- ret = 0;
++ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
++ ret = -EPERM;
++ else {
++ key_invalidate(key);
++ ret = 0;
++ }
+ error_put:
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+ error:
+@@ -439,12 +455,13 @@ error:
+ * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
+ * special keyring IDs is used.
+ *
+- * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work. If
+- * successful, 0 will be returned.
++ * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have
++ * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work. If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
+ {
+ key_ref_t keyring_ref;
++ struct key *keyring;
+ long ret;
+
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+@@ -466,7 +483,11 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t r
+ }
+
+ clear:
+- ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
++ keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
++ ret = -EPERM;
++ else
++ ret = keyring_clear(keyring);
+ error_put:
+ key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
+ error:
+@@ -517,11 +538,14 @@ error:
+ * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is
+ * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
+ *
++ * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked.
++ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
+ {
+ key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
++ struct key *keyring, *key;
+ long ret;
+
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
+@@ -536,7 +560,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t
+ goto error2;
+ }
+
+- ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
++ keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
++ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags) &&
++ test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
++ ret = -EPERM;
++ else
++ ret = key_unlink(keyring, key);
+
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+ error2:
+@@ -1295,6 +1325,8 @@ error:
+ * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically
+ * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
+ *
++ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out.
++ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
+@@ -1326,10 +1358,14 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id,
+
+ okay:
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+- key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
++ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
++ ret = -EPERM;
++ else {
++ key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
++ ret = 0;
++ }
+ key_put(key);
+
+- ret = 0;
+ error:
+ return ret;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 1d6d167c2efcfe9539d9cffb1a1be9c92e39c2c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 07:46:36 -0500
+Subject: KEYS: refcount bug fix
+
+From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+commit 1d6d167c2efcfe9539d9cffb1a1be9c92e39c2c0 upstream.
+
+This patch fixes the key_ref leak, removes the unnecessary KEY_FLAG_KEEP
+test before setting the flag, and cleans up the if/then brackets style
+introduced in commit:
+d3600bc KEYS: prevent keys from being removed from specified keyrings
+
+Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/key.c | 3 +--
+ security/keys/keyctl.c | 17 +++++++----------
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/keys/key.c
++++ b/security/keys/key.c
+@@ -430,8 +430,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(st
+
+ /* and link it into the destination keyring */
+ if (keyring) {
+- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
+- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
++ set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
+
+ __key_link(key, _edit);
+ }
+--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
++++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
+@@ -387,12 +387,11 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
+ }
+
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
++ ret = 0;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+- return -EPERM;
+- else {
++ ret = -EPERM;
++ else
+ key_revoke(key);
+- ret = 0;
+- }
+
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+ error:
+@@ -438,12 +437,11 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t
+
+ invalidate:
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
++ ret = 0;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+ ret = -EPERM;
+- else {
++ else
+ key_invalidate(key);
+- ret = 0;
+- }
+ error_put:
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+ error:
+@@ -1358,12 +1356,11 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id,
+
+ okay:
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
++ ret = 0;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+ ret = -EPERM;
+- else {
++ else
+ key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
+- ret = 0;
+- }
+ key_put(key);
+
+ error:
af_unix-revert-lock_interruptible-in-stream-receive-code.patch
tcp-restore-fastopen-with-no-data-in-syn-packet.patch
rhashtable-fix-walker-list-corruption.patch
+keys-fix-race-between-key-destruction-and-finding-a-keyring-by-name.patch
+keys-fix-crash-when-attempt-to-garbage-collect-an-uninstantiated-keyring.patch
+keys-fix-race-between-read-and-revoke.patch
+keys-prevent-keys-from-being-removed-from-specified-keyrings.patch
+keys-refcount-bug-fix.patch
+keys-fix-keyring-ref-leak-in-join_session_keyring.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
