Currently, when bpf_struct_ops_map_update_elem() fails, the programs'
st_ops_assoc will remain set. They may become dangling pointers if the
map is freed later, but they will never be dereferenced since the
struct_ops attachment did not succeed. However, if one of the programs
is subsequently attached as part of another struct_ops map, its
st_ops_assoc will be poisoned even though its old st_ops_assoc was stale
from a failed attachment.
Fix the spurious poisoned st_ops_assoc by dissociating struct_ops
programs with a map if the attachment fails. Move
bpf_prog_assoc_struct_ops() to after *plink++ to make sure
bpf_prog_disassoc_struct_ops() will not miss a program when iterating
st_map->links.
Note that, dissociating a program from a map requires some attention as
it must not reset a poisoned st_ops_assoc or a st_ops_assoc pointing to
another map. The former is already guarded in
bpf_prog_disassoc_struct_ops(). The latter also will not happen since
st_ops_assoc of programs in st_map->links are set by
bpf_prog_assoc_struct_ops(), which can only be poisoned or pointing to
the current map.
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260417174900.2895486-1-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
goto reset_unlock;
}
- /* Poison pointer on error instead of return for backward compatibility */
- bpf_prog_assoc_struct_ops(prog, &st_map->map);
-
link = kzalloc_obj(*link, GFP_USER);
if (!link) {
bpf_prog_put(prog);
&bpf_struct_ops_link_lops, prog, prog->expected_attach_type);
*plink++ = &link->link;
+ /* Poison pointer on error instead of return for backward compatibility */
+ bpf_prog_assoc_struct_ops(prog, &st_map->map);
+
ksym = kzalloc_obj(*ksym, GFP_USER);
if (!ksym) {
err = -ENOMEM;
reset_unlock:
bpf_struct_ops_map_free_ksyms(st_map);
bpf_struct_ops_map_free_image(st_map);
+ bpf_struct_ops_map_dissoc_progs(st_map);
bpf_struct_ops_map_put_progs(st_map);
memset(uvalue, 0, map->value_size);
memset(kvalue, 0, map->value_size);