#define STUB_PAYLOAD_GUID \
{ 0x55c5d1f8, 0x04cd, 0x46b5, { 0x8a, 0x20, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0xbb, 0x30, 0x52, 0xd0 } }
+static EFI_STATUS load_via_boot_services(
+ EFI_HANDLE parent,
+ EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL* parent_loaded_image,
+ uint32_t compat_entry_point,
+ const struct iovec *kernel,
+ const struct iovec *initrd) {
+ _cleanup_(unload_imagep) EFI_HANDLE kernel_image = NULL;
+ EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL* loaded_image = NULL;
+ EFI_STATUS err;
+
+ VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH device_node = {
+ .Header = {
+ .Type = MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ .SubType = MEDIA_VENDOR_DP,
+ .Length = sizeof(device_node),
+ },
+ .Guid = STUB_PAYLOAD_GUID,
+ };
+
+ _cleanup_free_ EFI_DEVICE_PATH* file_path = device_path_replace_node(parent_loaded_image->FilePath, NULL, &device_node.Header);
+
+ err = BS->LoadImage(/* BootPolicy= */false,
+ parent,
+ file_path,
+ kernel->iov_base,
+ kernel->iov_len,
+ &kernel_image);
+
+ if (err != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return log_error_status(EFI_LOAD_ERROR, "Error loading inner kernel with shim: %m");
+
+ err = BS->HandleProtocol(
+ kernel_image, MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL), (void **) &loaded_image);
+ if (err != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return log_error_status(EFI_LOAD_ERROR, "Error getting kernel image from protocol from shim: %m");
+
+ _cleanup_(cleanup_initrd) EFI_HANDLE initrd_handle = NULL;
+ err = initrd_register(initrd->iov_base, initrd->iov_len, &initrd_handle);
+ if (err != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return log_error_status(err, "Error registering initrd: %m");
+
+ log_wait();
+
+ err = BS->StartImage(kernel_image, NULL, NULL);
+ /* Try calling the kernel compat entry point if one exists. */
+ if (err == EFI_UNSUPPORTED && compat_entry_point > 0) {
+ EFI_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT compat_entry =
+ (EFI_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT) ((const uint8_t *) loaded_image->ImageBase + compat_entry_point);
+ err = compat_entry(kernel_image, ST);
+ }
+
+ return log_error_status(err, "Error starting kernel image with shim: %m");
+}
+
EFI_STATUS linux_exec(
EFI_HANDLE parent,
const char16_t *cmdline,
if (err != EFI_SUCCESS)
return log_error_status(err, "Cannot get parent loaded image: %m");
+ /* If shim provides LoadImage, it comes from version 16.1 or later and does the following:
+ * - It keeps a database of all PE sections that it already authenticated.
+ * - shim's LoadImage always verifies PE images against denylists: dbx, mokx, sbat.
+ * - If the PE image was not authenticated as a PE section it will also:
+ * + verify it against allowlists: db, mok
+ * + measure it on PCR 4
+ *
+ * In our case, we are loading a PE section that was already authenticated as part of the UKI.
+ * So in contrast to a normal UEFI LoadImage, shim will verify extra denylists (mokx, sbat),
+ * while skipping all allowlists and measurements.
+ *
+ * See https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/README.md#shim-loader-protocol
+ */
+ if (secure_boot_enabled() && shim_loader_available())
+ return load_via_boot_services(
+ parent,
+ parent_loaded_image,
+ compat_entry_point,
+ kernel,
+ initrd);
+
err = pe_kernel_check_no_relocation(kernel->iov_base);
if (err != EFI_SUCCESS)
return err;