From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2018 16:37:52 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 4.4-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v3.18.119~8 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=008d32f91de173ec1b28d694bc68bb8d35356373;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 4.4-stable patches added patches: asoc-intel-cht_bsw_max98090_ti-fix-jack-initialization.patch crypto-ablkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch crypto-blkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch crypto-vmac-require-a-block-cipher-with-128-bit-block-size.patch crypto-vmac-separate-tfm-and-request-context.patch kbuild-verify-that-depmod-is-installed.patch --- diff --git a/queue-4.4/asoc-intel-cht_bsw_max98090_ti-fix-jack-initialization.patch b/queue-4.4/asoc-intel-cht_bsw_max98090_ti-fix-jack-initialization.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6bacb240064 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.4/asoc-intel-cht_bsw_max98090_ti-fix-jack-initialization.patch @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +From 3bbda5a38601f7675a214be2044e41d7749e6c7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Thierry Escande +Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 00:13:08 -0500 +Subject: ASoC: Intel: cht_bsw_max98090_ti: Fix jack initialization + +From: Thierry Escande + +commit 3bbda5a38601f7675a214be2044e41d7749e6c7b upstream. + +If the ts3a227e audio accessory detection hardware is present and its +driver probed, the jack needs to be created before enabling jack +detection in the ts3a227e driver. With this patch, the jack is +instantiated in the max98090 headset init function if the ts3a227e is +present. This fixes a null pointer dereference as the jack detection +enabling function in the ts3a driver was called before the jack is +created. + +[minor correction to keep error handling on jack creation the same +as before by Pierre Bossart] + +Signed-off-by: Thierry Escande +Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart +Acked-By: Vinod Koul +Signed-off-by: Mark Brown +Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +--- a/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c ++++ b/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c +@@ -131,23 +131,19 @@ static int cht_codec_init(struct snd_soc + struct cht_mc_private *ctx = snd_soc_card_get_drvdata(runtime->card); + struct snd_soc_jack *jack = &ctx->jack; + +- /** +- * TI supports 4 butons headset detection +- * KEY_MEDIA +- * KEY_VOICECOMMAND +- * KEY_VOLUMEUP +- * KEY_VOLUMEDOWN +- */ +- if (ctx->ts3a227e_present) +- jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE | +- SND_JACK_BTN_0 | SND_JACK_BTN_1 | +- SND_JACK_BTN_2 | SND_JACK_BTN_3; +- else +- jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE; ++ if (ctx->ts3a227e_present) { ++ /* ++ * The jack has already been created in the ++ * cht_max98090_headset_init() function. ++ */ ++ snd_soc_jack_notifier_register(jack, &cht_jack_nb); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE; + + ret = snd_soc_card_jack_new(runtime->card, "Headset Jack", + jack_type, jack, NULL, 0); +- + if (ret) { + dev_err(runtime->dev, "Headset Jack creation failed %d\n", ret); + return ret; +@@ -203,6 +199,27 @@ static int cht_max98090_headset_init(str + { + struct snd_soc_card *card = component->card; + struct cht_mc_private *ctx = snd_soc_card_get_drvdata(card); ++ struct snd_soc_jack *jack = &ctx->jack; ++ int jack_type; ++ int ret; ++ ++ /* ++ * TI supports 4 butons headset detection ++ * KEY_MEDIA ++ * KEY_VOICECOMMAND ++ * KEY_VOLUMEUP ++ * KEY_VOLUMEDOWN ++ */ ++ jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE | ++ SND_JACK_BTN_0 | SND_JACK_BTN_1 | ++ SND_JACK_BTN_2 | SND_JACK_BTN_3; ++ ++ ret = snd_soc_card_jack_new(card, "Headset Jack", jack_type, ++ jack, NULL, 0); ++ if (ret) { ++ dev_err(card->dev, "Headset Jack creation failed %d\n", ret); ++ return ret; ++ } + + return ts3a227e_enable_jack_detect(component, &ctx->jack); + } diff --git a/queue-4.4/crypto-ablkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch b/queue-4.4/crypto-ablkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7500075c00d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.4/crypto-ablkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +From 318abdfbe708aaaa652c79fb500e9bd60521f9dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Biggers +Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 10:54:58 -0700 +Subject: crypto: ablkcipher - fix crash flushing dcache in error path + +From: Eric Biggers + +commit 318abdfbe708aaaa652c79fb500e9bd60521f9dc upstream. + +Like the skcipher_walk and blkcipher_walk cases: + +scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of +bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the +dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of +ablkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of +blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes. +This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request") +during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define +ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was +page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0. + +Fix it by reorganizing ablkcipher_walk_done() to skip the +scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred. + +Reported-by: Liu Chao +Fixes: bf06099db18a ("crypto: skcipher - Add ablkcipher_walk interfaces") +Cc: # v2.6.35+ +Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers +Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + crypto/ablkcipher.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) + +--- a/crypto/ablkcipher.c ++++ b/crypto/ablkcipher.c +@@ -73,11 +73,9 @@ static inline u8 *ablkcipher_get_spot(u8 + return max(start, end_page); + } + +-static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk, +- unsigned int bsize) ++static inline void ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk, ++ unsigned int n) + { +- unsigned int n = bsize; +- + for (;;) { + unsigned int len_this_page = scatterwalk_pagelen(&walk->out); + +@@ -89,17 +87,13 @@ static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_do + n -= len_this_page; + scatterwalk_start(&walk->out, sg_next(walk->out.sg)); + } +- +- return bsize; + } + +-static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_fast(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk, +- unsigned int n) ++static inline void ablkcipher_done_fast(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk, ++ unsigned int n) + { + scatterwalk_advance(&walk->in, n); + scatterwalk_advance(&walk->out, n); +- +- return n; + } + + static int ablkcipher_walk_next(struct ablkcipher_request *req, +@@ -109,39 +103,40 @@ int ablkcipher_walk_done(struct ablkciph + struct ablkcipher_walk *walk, int err) + { + struct crypto_tfm *tfm = req->base.tfm; +- unsigned int nbytes = 0; ++ unsigned int n; /* bytes processed */ ++ bool more; + +- if (likely(err >= 0)) { +- unsigned int n = walk->nbytes - err; ++ if (unlikely(err < 0)) ++ goto finish; + +- if (likely(!(walk->flags & ABLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) +- n = ablkcipher_done_fast(walk, n); +- else if (WARN_ON(err)) { ++ n = walk->nbytes - err; ++ walk->total -= n; ++ more = (walk->total != 0); ++ ++ if (likely(!(walk->flags & ABLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) { ++ ablkcipher_done_fast(walk, n); ++ } else { ++ if (WARN_ON(err)) { ++ /* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */ + err = -EINVAL; +- goto err; +- } else +- n = ablkcipher_done_slow(walk, n); +- +- nbytes = walk->total - n; +- err = 0; ++ goto finish; ++ } ++ ablkcipher_done_slow(walk, n); + } + +- scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes); +- scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes); ++ scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, more); ++ scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, more); + +-err: +- walk->total = nbytes; +- walk->nbytes = nbytes; +- +- if (nbytes) { ++ if (more) { + crypto_yield(req->base.flags); + return ablkcipher_walk_next(req, walk); + } +- ++ err = 0; ++finish: ++ walk->nbytes = 0; + if (walk->iv != req->info) + memcpy(req->info, walk->iv, tfm->crt_ablkcipher.ivsize); + kfree(walk->iv_buffer); +- + return err; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ablkcipher_walk_done); diff --git a/queue-4.4/crypto-blkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch b/queue-4.4/crypto-blkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f2b3ac4a703 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.4/crypto-blkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +From 0868def3e4100591e7a1fdbf3eed1439cc8f7ca3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Biggers +Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 10:54:57 -0700 +Subject: crypto: blkcipher - fix crash flushing dcache in error path + +From: Eric Biggers + +commit 0868def3e4100591e7a1fdbf3eed1439cc8f7ca3 upstream. + +Like the skcipher_walk case: + +scatterwalk_done() is only meant to be called after a nonzero number of +bytes have been processed, since scatterwalk_pagedone() will flush the +dcache of the *previous* page. But in the error case of +blkcipher_walk_done(), e.g. if the input wasn't an integer number of +blocks, scatterwalk_done() was actually called after advancing 0 bytes. +This caused a crash ("BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request") +during '!PageSlab(page)' on architectures like arm and arm64 that define +ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE, provided that the input was +page-aligned as in that case walk->offset == 0. + +Fix it by reorganizing blkcipher_walk_done() to skip the +scatterwalk_advance() and scatterwalk_done() if an error has occurred. + +This bug was found by syzkaller fuzzing. + +Reproducer, assuming ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE: + + #include + #include + #include + + int main() + { + struct sockaddr_alg addr = { + .salg_type = "skcipher", + .salg_name = "ecb(aes-generic)", + }; + char buffer[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096))) = { 0 }; + int fd; + + fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); + bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); + setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, 16); + fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL); + write(fd, buffer, 15); + read(fd, buffer, 15); + } + +Reported-by: Liu Chao +Fixes: 5cde0af2a982 ("[CRYPTO] cipher: Added block cipher type") +Cc: # v2.6.19+ +Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers +Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + crypto/blkcipher.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) + +--- a/crypto/blkcipher.c ++++ b/crypto/blkcipher.c +@@ -71,19 +71,18 @@ static inline u8 *blkcipher_get_spot(u8 + return max(start, end_page); + } + +-static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_slow(struct blkcipher_walk *walk, +- unsigned int bsize) ++static inline void blkcipher_done_slow(struct blkcipher_walk *walk, ++ unsigned int bsize) + { + u8 *addr; + + addr = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)walk->buffer, walk->alignmask + 1); + addr = blkcipher_get_spot(addr, bsize); + scatterwalk_copychunks(addr, &walk->out, bsize, 1); +- return bsize; + } + +-static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk, +- unsigned int n) ++static inline void blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk, ++ unsigned int n) + { + if (walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY) { + blkcipher_map_dst(walk); +@@ -97,49 +96,48 @@ static inline unsigned int blkcipher_don + + scatterwalk_advance(&walk->in, n); + scatterwalk_advance(&walk->out, n); +- +- return n; + } + + int blkcipher_walk_done(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, + struct blkcipher_walk *walk, int err) + { +- unsigned int nbytes = 0; ++ unsigned int n; /* bytes processed */ ++ bool more; + +- if (likely(err >= 0)) { +- unsigned int n = walk->nbytes - err; ++ if (unlikely(err < 0)) ++ goto finish; + +- if (likely(!(walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) +- n = blkcipher_done_fast(walk, n); +- else if (WARN_ON(err)) { ++ n = walk->nbytes - err; ++ walk->total -= n; ++ more = (walk->total != 0); ++ ++ if (likely(!(walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) { ++ blkcipher_done_fast(walk, n); ++ } else { ++ if (WARN_ON(err)) { ++ /* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */ + err = -EINVAL; +- goto err; +- } else +- n = blkcipher_done_slow(walk, n); +- +- nbytes = walk->total - n; +- err = 0; ++ goto finish; ++ } ++ blkcipher_done_slow(walk, n); + } + +- scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes); +- scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes); +- +-err: +- walk->total = nbytes; +- walk->nbytes = nbytes; ++ scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, more); ++ scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, more); + +- if (nbytes) { ++ if (more) { + crypto_yield(desc->flags); + return blkcipher_walk_next(desc, walk); + } +- ++ err = 0; ++finish: ++ walk->nbytes = 0; + if (walk->iv != desc->info) + memcpy(desc->info, walk->iv, walk->ivsize); + if (walk->buffer != walk->page) + kfree(walk->buffer); + if (walk->page) + free_page((unsigned long)walk->page); +- + return err; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blkcipher_walk_done); diff --git a/queue-4.4/crypto-vmac-require-a-block-cipher-with-128-bit-block-size.patch b/queue-4.4/crypto-vmac-require-a-block-cipher-with-128-bit-block-size.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9d82287a34c --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.4/crypto-vmac-require-a-block-cipher-with-128-bit-block-size.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 73bf20ef3df262026c3470241ae4ac8196943ffa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Biggers +Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 10:22:37 -0700 +Subject: crypto: vmac - require a block cipher with 128-bit block size + +From: Eric Biggers + +commit 73bf20ef3df262026c3470241ae4ac8196943ffa upstream. + +The VMAC template assumes the block cipher has a 128-bit block size, but +it failed to check for that. Thus it was possible to instantiate it +using a 64-bit block size cipher, e.g. "vmac(cast5)", causing +uninitialized memory to be used. + +Add the needed check when instantiating the template. + +Fixes: f1939f7c5645 ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support") +Cc: # v2.6.32+ +Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers +Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + crypto/vmac.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +--- a/crypto/vmac.c ++++ b/crypto/vmac.c +@@ -655,6 +655,10 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_tem + if (IS_ERR(alg)) + return PTR_ERR(alg); + ++ err = -EINVAL; ++ if (alg->cra_blocksize != 16) ++ goto out_put_alg; ++ + inst = shash_alloc_instance("vmac", alg); + err = PTR_ERR(inst); + if (IS_ERR(inst)) diff --git a/queue-4.4/crypto-vmac-separate-tfm-and-request-context.patch b/queue-4.4/crypto-vmac-separate-tfm-and-request-context.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f45e976e3e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.4/crypto-vmac-separate-tfm-and-request-context.patch @@ -0,0 +1,653 @@ +From bb29648102335586e9a66289a1d98a0cb392b6e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Biggers +Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 10:22:38 -0700 +Subject: crypto: vmac - separate tfm and request context + +From: Eric Biggers + +commit bb29648102335586e9a66289a1d98a0cb392b6e5 upstream. + +syzbot reported a crash in vmac_final() when multiple threads +concurrently use the same "vmac(aes)" transform through AF_ALG. The bug +is pretty fundamental: the VMAC template doesn't separate per-request +state from per-tfm (per-key) state like the other hash algorithms do, +but rather stores it all in the tfm context. That's wrong. + +Also, vmac_final() incorrectly zeroes most of the state including the +derived keys and cached pseudorandom pad. Therefore, only the first +VMAC invocation with a given key calculates the correct digest. + +Fix these bugs by splitting the per-tfm state from the per-request state +and using the proper init/update/final sequencing for requests. + +Reproducer for the crash: + + #include + #include + #include + + int main() + { + int fd; + struct sockaddr_alg addr = { + .salg_type = "hash", + .salg_name = "vmac(aes)", + }; + char buf[256] = { 0 }; + + fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); + bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); + setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buf, 16); + fork(); + fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL); + for (;;) + write(fd, buf, 256); + } + +The immediate cause of the crash is that vmac_ctx_t.partial_size exceeds +VMAC_NHBYTES, causing vmac_final() to memset() a negative length. + +Reported-by: syzbot+264bca3a6e8d645550d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Fixes: f1939f7c5645 ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support") +Cc: # v2.6.32+ +Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers +Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + crypto/vmac.c | 414 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- + include/crypto/vmac.h | 63 ------- + 2 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 293 deletions(-) + +--- a/crypto/vmac.c ++++ b/crypto/vmac.c +@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ + /* +- * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel ++ * VMAC: Message Authentication Code using Universal Hashing ++ * ++ * Reference: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krovetz-vmac-01 ++ * + * Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation. ++ * Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, +@@ -16,14 +20,15 @@ + * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA. + */ + +-/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +- * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) and Wei Dai. +- * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain. +- * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk. +- * Please send bug reports to the authors. +- * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT +- * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ ++/* ++ * Derived from: ++ * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) and Wei Dai. ++ * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain. ++ * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk. ++ * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT ++ */ + ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -31,10 +36,36 @@ + #include + #include + #include +-#include + #include + + /* ++ * User definable settings. ++ */ ++#define VMAC_TAG_LEN 64 ++#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE 128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256 */ ++#define VMAC_KEY_LEN (VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8) ++#define VMAC_NHBYTES 128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/ ++ ++/* per-transform (per-key) context */ ++struct vmac_tfm_ctx { ++ struct crypto_cipher *cipher; ++ u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)]; ++ u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; ++ u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; ++}; ++ ++/* per-request context */ ++struct vmac_desc_ctx { ++ union { ++ u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES]; /* partial block */ ++ __le64 partial_words[VMAC_NHBYTES / 8]; ++ }; ++ unsigned int partial_size; /* size of the partial block */ ++ bool first_block_processed; ++ u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; /* running total of L2-hash */ ++}; ++ ++/* + * Constants and masks + */ + #define UINT64_C(x) x##ULL +@@ -318,13 +349,6 @@ static void poly_step_func(u64 *ahi, u64 + } while (0) + #endif + +-static void vhash_abort(struct vmac_ctx *ctx) +-{ +- ctx->polytmp[0] = ctx->polykey[0] ; +- ctx->polytmp[1] = ctx->polykey[1] ; +- ctx->first_block_processed = 0; +-} +- + static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len) + { + u64 rh, rl, t, z = 0; +@@ -364,280 +388,209 @@ static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1 + return rl; + } + +-static void vhash_update(const unsigned char *m, +- unsigned int mbytes, /* Pos multiple of VMAC_NHBYTES */ +- struct vmac_ctx *ctx) +-{ +- u64 rh, rl, *mptr; +- const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey; +- int i; +- u64 ch, cl; +- u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0]; +- u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1]; +- +- if (!mbytes) +- return; +- +- BUG_ON(mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES); ++/* L1 and L2-hash one or more VMAC_NHBYTES-byte blocks */ ++static void vhash_blocks(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx, ++ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx, ++ const __le64 *mptr, unsigned int blocks) ++{ ++ const u64 *kptr = tctx->nhkey; ++ const u64 pkh = tctx->polykey[0]; ++ const u64 pkl = tctx->polykey[1]; ++ u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0]; ++ u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1]; ++ u64 rh, rl; + +- mptr = (u64 *)m; +- i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES; /* Must be non-zero */ +- +- ch = ctx->polytmp[0]; +- cl = ctx->polytmp[1]; +- +- if (!ctx->first_block_processed) { +- ctx->first_block_processed = 1; ++ if (!dctx->first_block_processed) { ++ dctx->first_block_processed = true; + nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl); + rh &= m62; + ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl); + mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64)); +- i--; ++ blocks--; + } + +- while (i--) { ++ while (blocks--) { + nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl); + rh &= m62; + poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl); + mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64)); + } + +- ctx->polytmp[0] = ch; +- ctx->polytmp[1] = cl; ++ dctx->polytmp[0] = ch; ++ dctx->polytmp[1] = cl; + } + +-static u64 vhash(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes, +- u64 *tagl, struct vmac_ctx *ctx) ++static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, ++ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) + { +- u64 rh, rl, *mptr; +- const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey; +- int i, remaining; +- u64 ch, cl; +- u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0]; +- u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1]; +- +- mptr = (u64 *)m; +- i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES; +- remaining = mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES; +- +- if (ctx->first_block_processed) { +- ch = ctx->polytmp[0]; +- cl = ctx->polytmp[1]; +- } else if (i) { +- nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, ch, cl); +- ch &= m62; +- ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl); +- mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64)); +- i--; +- } else if (remaining) { +- nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), ch, cl); +- ch &= m62; +- ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl); +- mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64)); +- goto do_l3; +- } else {/* Empty String */ +- ch = pkh; cl = pkl; +- goto do_l3; +- } +- +- while (i--) { +- nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl); +- rh &= m62; +- poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl); +- mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64)); +- } +- if (remaining) { +- nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), rh, rl); +- rh &= m62; +- poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl); +- } +- +-do_l3: +- vhash_abort(ctx); +- remaining *= 8; +- return l3hash(ch, cl, ctx->l3key[0], ctx->l3key[1], remaining); +-} +- +-static u64 vmac(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes, +- const unsigned char n[16], u64 *tagl, +- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx) +-{ +- u64 *in_n, *out_p; +- u64 p, h; +- int i; +- +- in_n = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce; +- out_p = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_aes; +- +- i = n[15] & 1; +- if ((*(u64 *)(n+8) != in_n[1]) || (*(u64 *)(n) != in_n[0])) { +- in_n[0] = *(u64 *)(n); +- in_n[1] = *(u64 *)(n+8); +- ((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] &= 0xFE; +- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, +- (unsigned char *)out_p, (unsigned char *)in_n); ++ struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); ++ __be64 out[2]; ++ u8 in[16] = { 0 }; ++ unsigned int i; ++ int err; + +- ((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] |= (unsigned char)(1-i); ++ if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) { ++ crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); ++ return -EINVAL; + } +- p = be64_to_cpup(out_p + i); +- h = vhash(m, mbytes, (u64 *)0, &ctx->__vmac_ctx); +- return le64_to_cpu(p + h); +-} +- +-static int vmac_set_key(unsigned char user_key[], struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx) +-{ +- u64 in[2] = {0}, out[2]; +- unsigned i; +- int err = 0; + +- err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, user_key, VMAC_KEY_LEN); ++ err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->cipher, key, keylen); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Fill nh key */ +- ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0x80; +- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey)/8; i += 2) { +- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, +- (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in); +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpup(out); +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1); +- ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1; ++ in[0] = 0x80; ++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->nhkey); i += 2) { ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in); ++ tctx->nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]); ++ tctx->nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]); ++ in[15]++; + } + + /* Fill poly key */ +- ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xC0; +- in[1] = 0; +- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey)/8; i += 2) { +- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, +- (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in); +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i] = +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i] = +- be64_to_cpup(out) & mpoly; +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i+1] = +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i+1] = +- be64_to_cpup(out+1) & mpoly; +- ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1; ++ in[0] = 0xC0; ++ in[15] = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->polykey); i += 2) { ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in); ++ tctx->polykey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]) & mpoly; ++ tctx->polykey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]) & mpoly; ++ in[15]++; + } + + /* Fill ip key */ +- ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xE0; +- in[1] = 0; +- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key)/8; i += 2) { ++ in[0] = 0xE0; ++ in[15] = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->l3key); i += 2) { + do { +- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child, +- (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in); +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] = be64_to_cpup(out); +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1); +- ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1; +- } while (ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] >= p64 +- || ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] >= p64); ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in); ++ tctx->l3key[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]); ++ tctx->l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]); ++ in[15]++; ++ } while (tctx->l3key[i] >= p64 || tctx->l3key[i+1] >= p64); + } + +- /* Invalidate nonce/aes cache and reset other elements */ +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[0] = (u64)-1; /* Ensure illegal nonce */ +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[1] = (u64)0; /* Ensure illegal nonce */ +- ctx->__vmac_ctx.first_block_processed = 0; +- +- return err; ++ return 0; + } + +-static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent, +- const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) ++static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc) + { +- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent); ++ const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); ++ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + +- if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) { +- crypto_shash_set_flags(parent, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); +- return -EINVAL; +- } +- +- return vmac_set_key((u8 *)key, ctx); +-} +- +-static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *pdesc) +-{ ++ dctx->partial_size = 0; ++ dctx->first_block_processed = false; ++ memcpy(dctx->polytmp, tctx->polykey, sizeof(dctx->polytmp)); + return 0; + } + +-static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p, +- unsigned int len) ++static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *p, unsigned int len) + { +- struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm; +- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent); +- int expand; +- int min; +- +- expand = VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size > 0 ? +- VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size : 0; +- +- min = len < expand ? len : expand; +- +- memcpy(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, p, min); +- ctx->partial_size += min; +- +- if (len < expand) +- return 0; +- +- vhash_update(ctx->partial, VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx); +- ctx->partial_size = 0; +- +- len -= expand; +- p += expand; +- +- if (len % VMAC_NHBYTES) { +- memcpy(ctx->partial, p + len - (len % VMAC_NHBYTES), +- len % VMAC_NHBYTES); +- ctx->partial_size = len % VMAC_NHBYTES; ++ const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); ++ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); ++ unsigned int n; ++ ++ if (dctx->partial_size) { ++ n = min(len, VMAC_NHBYTES - dctx->partial_size); ++ memcpy(&dctx->partial[dctx->partial_size], p, n); ++ dctx->partial_size += n; ++ p += n; ++ len -= n; ++ if (dctx->partial_size == VMAC_NHBYTES) { ++ vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, dctx->partial_words, 1); ++ dctx->partial_size = 0; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (len >= VMAC_NHBYTES) { ++ n = round_down(len, VMAC_NHBYTES); ++ /* TODO: 'p' may be misaligned here */ ++ vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, (const __le64 *)p, n / VMAC_NHBYTES); ++ p += n; ++ len -= n; ++ } ++ ++ if (len) { ++ memcpy(dctx->partial, p, len); ++ dctx->partial_size = len; + } + +- vhash_update(p, len - len % VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx); +- + return 0; + } + +-static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *pdesc, u8 *out) ++static u64 vhash_final(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx, ++ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx) + { +- struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm; +- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent); +- vmac_t mac; +- u8 nonce[16] = {}; +- +- /* vmac() ends up accessing outside the array bounds that +- * we specify. In appears to access up to the next 2-word +- * boundary. We'll just be uber cautious and zero the +- * unwritten bytes in the buffer. +- */ +- if (ctx->partial_size) { +- memset(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, 0, +- VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size); +- } +- mac = vmac(ctx->partial, ctx->partial_size, nonce, NULL, ctx); +- memcpy(out, &mac, sizeof(vmac_t)); +- memzero_explicit(&mac, sizeof(vmac_t)); +- memset(&ctx->__vmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct vmac_ctx)); +- ctx->partial_size = 0; ++ unsigned int partial = dctx->partial_size; ++ u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0]; ++ u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1]; ++ ++ /* L1 and L2-hash the final block if needed */ ++ if (partial) { ++ /* Zero-pad to next 128-bit boundary */ ++ unsigned int n = round_up(partial, 16); ++ u64 rh, rl; ++ ++ memset(&dctx->partial[partial], 0, n - partial); ++ nh_16(dctx->partial_words, tctx->nhkey, n / 8, rh, rl); ++ rh &= m62; ++ if (dctx->first_block_processed) ++ poly_step(ch, cl, tctx->polykey[0], tctx->polykey[1], ++ rh, rl); ++ else ++ ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl); ++ } ++ ++ /* L3-hash the 128-bit output of L2-hash */ ++ return l3hash(ch, cl, tctx->l3key[0], tctx->l3key[1], partial * 8); ++} ++ ++static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out) ++{ ++ const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); ++ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); ++ static const u8 nonce[16] = {}; /* TODO: this is insecure */ ++ union { ++ u8 bytes[16]; ++ __be64 pads[2]; ++ } block; ++ int index; ++ u64 hash, pad; ++ ++ /* Finish calculating the VHASH of the message */ ++ hash = vhash_final(tctx, dctx); ++ ++ /* Generate pseudorandom pad by encrypting the nonce */ ++ memcpy(&block, nonce, 16); ++ index = block.bytes[15] & 1; ++ block.bytes[15] &= ~1; ++ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, block.bytes, block.bytes); ++ pad = be64_to_cpu(block.pads[index]); ++ ++ /* The VMAC is the sum of VHASH and the pseudorandom pad */ ++ put_unaligned_le64(hash + pad, out); + return 0; + } + + static int vmac_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) + { +- struct crypto_cipher *cipher; +- struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg; ++ struct crypto_instance *inst = crypto_tfm_alg_instance(tfm); + struct crypto_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst); +- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); ++ struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); ++ struct crypto_cipher *cipher; + + cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn); + if (IS_ERR(cipher)) + return PTR_ERR(cipher); + +- ctx->child = cipher; ++ tctx->cipher = cipher; + return 0; + } + + static void vmac_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) + { +- struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); +- crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child); ++ struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); ++ ++ crypto_free_cipher(tctx->cipher); + } + + static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) +@@ -674,11 +627,12 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_tem + inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize; + inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask; + +- inst->alg.digestsize = sizeof(vmac_t); +- inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_ctx_t); ++ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_tfm_ctx); + inst->alg.base.cra_init = vmac_init_tfm; + inst->alg.base.cra_exit = vmac_exit_tfm; + ++ inst->alg.descsize = sizeof(struct vmac_desc_ctx); ++ inst->alg.digestsize = VMAC_TAG_LEN / 8; + inst->alg.init = vmac_init; + inst->alg.update = vmac_update; + inst->alg.final = vmac_final; +--- a/include/crypto/vmac.h ++++ /dev/null +@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ +-/* +- * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel +- * Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation. +- * +- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +- * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, +- * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation. +- * +- * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT +- * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or +- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for +- * more details. +- * +- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with +- * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple +- * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA. +- */ +- +-#ifndef __CRYPTO_VMAC_H +-#define __CRYPTO_VMAC_H +- +-/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +- * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) and Wei Dai. +- * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain. +- * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk. +- * Please send bug reports to the authors. +- * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT +- * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +- +-/* +- * User definable settings. +- */ +-#define VMAC_TAG_LEN 64 +-#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE 128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256 */ +-#define VMAC_KEY_LEN (VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8) +-#define VMAC_NHBYTES 128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/ +- +-/* +- * This implementation uses u32 and u64 as names for unsigned 32- +- * and 64-bit integer types. These are defined in C99 stdint.h. The +- * following may need adaptation if you are not running a C99 or +- * Microsoft C environment. +- */ +-struct vmac_ctx { +- u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)]; +- u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; +- u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; +- u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; +- u64 cached_nonce[2]; +- u64 cached_aes[2]; +- int first_block_processed; +-}; +- +-typedef u64 vmac_t; +- +-struct vmac_ctx_t { +- struct crypto_cipher *child; +- struct vmac_ctx __vmac_ctx; +- u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES]; /* partial block */ +- int partial_size; /* size of the partial block */ +-}; +- +-#endif /* __CRYPTO_VMAC_H */ diff --git a/queue-4.4/kbuild-verify-that-depmod-is-installed.patch b/queue-4.4/kbuild-verify-that-depmod-is-installed.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..93c02080e45 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.4/kbuild-verify-that-depmod-is-installed.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 934193a654c1f4d0643ddbf4b2529b508cae926e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Randy Dunlap +Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2018 19:46:06 -0700 +Subject: kbuild: verify that $DEPMOD is installed + +From: Randy Dunlap + +commit 934193a654c1f4d0643ddbf4b2529b508cae926e upstream. + +Verify that 'depmod' ($DEPMOD) is installed. +This is a partial revert of commit 620c231c7a7f +("kbuild: do not check for ancient modutils tools"). + +Also update Documentation/process/changes.rst to refer to +kmod instead of module-init-tools. + +Fixes kernel bugzilla #198965: +https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198965 + +Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap +Cc: Lucas De Marchi +Cc: Lucas De Marchi +Cc: Michal Marek +Cc: Jessica Yu +Cc: Chih-Wei Huang +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # any kernel since 2012 +Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + Documentation/Changes | 17 ++++++----------- + scripts/depmod.sh | 8 +++++++- + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +--- a/Documentation/Changes ++++ b/Documentation/Changes +@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ o GNU C 3.2 + o GNU make 3.80 # make --version + o binutils 2.12 # ld -v + o util-linux 2.10o # fdformat --version +-o module-init-tools 0.9.10 # depmod -V ++o kmod 13 # depmod -V + o e2fsprogs 1.41.4 # e2fsck -V + o jfsutils 1.1.3 # fsck.jfs -V + o reiserfsprogs 3.6.3 # reiserfsck -V +@@ -132,12 +132,6 @@ is not build with CONFIG_KALLSYMS and yo + reproduce the Oops with that option, then you can still decode that Oops + with ksymoops. + +-Module-Init-Tools +------------------ +- +-A new module loader is now in the kernel that requires module-init-tools +-to use. It is backward compatible with the 2.4.x series kernels. +- + Mkinitrd + -------- + +@@ -319,14 +313,15 @@ Util-linux + ---------- + o + ++Kmod ++---- ++o ++o ++ + Ksymoops + -------- + o + +-Module-Init-Tools +------------------ +-o +- + Mkinitrd + -------- + o +--- a/scripts/depmod.sh ++++ b/scripts/depmod.sh +@@ -10,10 +10,16 @@ DEPMOD=$1 + KERNELRELEASE=$2 + SYMBOL_PREFIX=$3 + +-if ! test -r System.map -a -x "$DEPMOD"; then ++if ! test -r System.map ; then + exit 0 + fi + ++if [ -z $(command -v $DEPMOD) ]; then ++ echo "'make modules_install' requires $DEPMOD. Please install it." >&2 ++ echo "This is probably in the kmod package." >&2 ++ exit 1 ++fi ++ + # older versions of depmod don't support -P + # support was added in module-init-tools 3.13 + if test -n "$SYMBOL_PREFIX"; then diff --git a/queue-4.4/series b/queue-4.4/series index 0fd27064e34..29aa211e03c 100644 --- a/queue-4.4/series +++ b/queue-4.4/series @@ -2,3 +2,9 @@ x86-mm-disable-ioremap-free-page-handling-on-x86-pae.patch tcp-fix-missing-range_truesize-enlargement-in-the-backport.patch kasan-don-t-emit-builtin-calls-when-sanitization-is-off.patch i2c-ismt-fix-wrong-device-address-when-unmap-the-data-buffer.patch +kbuild-verify-that-depmod-is-installed.patch +crypto-vmac-require-a-block-cipher-with-128-bit-block-size.patch +crypto-vmac-separate-tfm-and-request-context.patch +crypto-blkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch +crypto-ablkcipher-fix-crash-flushing-dcache-in-error-path.patch +asoc-intel-cht_bsw_max98090_ti-fix-jack-initialization.patch