From: Peter Marko Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 21:04:15 +0000 (+0100) Subject: wpa-supplicant: patch CVE-2025-24912 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2eed0deab456df4ef8876afe0710c9c89b41d45f;p=thirdparty%2Fopenembedded%2Fopenembedded-core-contrib.git wpa-supplicant: patch CVE-2025-24912 Pick patches as listed in NVD CVE report. Note that Debian lists one of the patches as introducing the vulnerability. This is against what the original report [1] says. Also the commit messages provide hints that the first patch fixes this issue and second is fixing problem with the first patch. [1] https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN19358384/ Signed-off-by: Peter Marko Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..36660b5880c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 11:21:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response + +The case of an invalid authenticator in a RADIUS response could imply +that the response is not from the correct RADIUS server and as such, +such a response should be discarded without changing internal state for +the pending request. The case of an unknown response (RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN) +is somewhat more complex since it could have been indicated before +validating the authenticator. In any case, it seems better to change the +state for the pending request only when we have fully accepted the +response. + +Allowing the internal state of pending RADIUS request to change based on +responses that are not fully validation could have allow at least a +theoretical DoS attack if an attacker were to have means for injecting +RADIUS messages to the network using the IP address of the real RADIUS +server and being able to do so more quickly than the real server and +with the matching identifier from the request header (i.e., either by +flooding 256 responses quickly or by having means to capture the RADIUS +request). These should not really be realistic options in a properly +protected deployment, but nevertheless it is good to be more careful in +processing RADIUS responses. + +Remove a pending RADIUS request from the internal list only when having +fully accepted a matching RADIUS response, i.e., after one of the +registered handlers has confirmed that the authenticator is valid and +processing of the response has succeeded. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +CVE: CVE-2025-24912 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko +--- + src/radius/radius_client.c | 15 +++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c +index 2a7f36170..7909b29a7 100644 +--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c ++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c +@@ -1259,13 +1259,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + roundtrip / 100, roundtrip % 100); + rconf->round_trip_time = roundtrip; + +- /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */ +- if (prev_req) +- prev_req->next = req->next; +- else +- radius->msgs = req->next; +- radius->num_msgs--; +- + for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) { + RadiusRxResult res; + res = handlers[i].handler(msg, req->msg, req->shared_secret, +@@ -1276,6 +1269,13 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + radius_msg_free(msg); + /* fall through */ + case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED: ++ /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */ ++ if (prev_req) ++ prev_req->next = req->next; ++ else ++ radius->msgs = req->next; ++ radius->num_msgs--; ++ + radius_client_msg_free(req); + return; + case RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR: +@@ -1297,7 +1297,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + msg_type, hdr->code, hdr->identifier, + invalid_authenticator ? " [INVALID AUTHENTICATOR]" : + ""); +- radius_client_msg_free(req); + + fail: + radius_msg_free(msg); diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..add2e470488 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 19:23:39 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Fix pending request dropping + +A recent change to this moved the place where the processed RADIUS +request was removed from the pending list to happen after the message +handler had been called. This did not take into account possibility of +the handler adding a new pending request in the list and the prev_req +pointer not necessarily pointing to the correct entry anymore. As such, +some of the pending requests could have been lost and that would result +in not being able to process responses to those requests and also, to a +memory leak. + +Fix this by determining prev_req at the point when the pending request +is being removed, i.e., after the handler function has already added a +new entry. + +Fixes: 726432d7622c ("RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response") +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +CVE: CVE-2025-24912 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko +--- + src/radius/radius_client.c | 10 +++++++--- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c +index 7909b29a7..d4faa7936 100644 +--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c ++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c +@@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + struct radius_hdr *hdr; + struct radius_rx_handler *handlers; + size_t num_handlers, i; +- struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req; ++ struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req, *r; + struct os_reltime now; + struct hostapd_radius_server *rconf; + int invalid_authenticator = 0; +@@ -1224,7 +1224,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + break; + } + +- prev_req = NULL; + req = radius->msgs; + while (req) { + /* TODO: also match by src addr:port of the packet when using +@@ -1236,7 +1235,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + hdr->identifier) + break; + +- prev_req = req; + req = req->next; + } + +@@ -1270,6 +1268,12 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + /* fall through */ + case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED: + /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */ ++ prev_req = NULL; ++ for (r = radius->msgs; r; r = r->next) { ++ if (r == req) ++ break; ++ prev_req = r; ++ } + if (prev_req) + prev_req->next = req->next; + else diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb index 6dc76494f7c..ffb1cf617dc 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ file://0001-macsec_linux-Hardware-offload-requires-Linux-headers.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-24912-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-24912-02.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a"