From: Mike Marshall Date: Wed, 1 May 2024 20:20:36 +0000 (-0400) Subject: orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access X-Git-Tag: v6.10-rc1~160^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=53e4efa470d5fc6a96662d2d3322cfc925818517;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Flinux.git orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access Arnd Bergmann sent a patch to fsdevel, he says: "orangefs_statfs() copies two consecutive fields of the superblock into the statfs structure, which triggers a warning from the string fortification helpers" Jan Kara suggested an alternate way to do the patch to make it more readable. I ran both ideas through xfstests and both seem fine. This patch is based on Jan Kara's suggestion. Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall --- diff --git a/fs/orangefs/super.c b/fs/orangefs/super.c index 34849b4a3243c..907765673765c 100644 --- a/fs/orangefs/super.c +++ b/fs/orangefs/super.c @@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ static int orangefs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf) (long)new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.files_avail); buf->f_type = sb->s_magic; - memcpy(&buf->f_fsid, &ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id, sizeof(buf->f_fsid)); + buf->f_fsid.val[0] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->fs_id; + buf->f_fsid.val[1] = ORANGEFS_SB(sb)->id; buf->f_bsize = new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.block_size; buf->f_namelen = ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX;