From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 10:33:57 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 3.18-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v4.19.40~5 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7132a7a4ab3006edf2519075eb4ff006ed284dae;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 3.18-stable patches added patches: ipv4-ip_do_fragment-preserve-skb_iif-during-fragmentation.patch ipv6-flowlabel-wait-rcu-grace-period-before-put_pid.patch ipv6-invert-flowlabel-sharing-check-in-process-and-user-mode.patch packet-validate-msg_namelen-in-send-directly.patch --- diff --git a/queue-3.18/ipv4-ip_do_fragment-preserve-skb_iif-during-fragmentation.patch b/queue-3.18/ipv4-ip_do_fragment-preserve-skb_iif-during-fragmentation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ccc8e0d5989 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/ipv4-ip_do_fragment-preserve-skb_iif-during-fragmentation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From foo@baz Sat 04 May 2019 12:30:05 PM CEST +From: Shmulik Ladkani +Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 16:39:30 +0300 +Subject: ipv4: ip_do_fragment: Preserve skb_iif during fragmentation + +From: Shmulik Ladkani + +[ Upstream commit d2f0c961148f65bc73eda72b9fa3a4e80973cb49 ] + +Previously, during fragmentation after forwarding, skb->skb_iif isn't +preserved, i.e. 'ip_copy_metadata' does not copy skb_iif from given +'from' skb. + +As a result, ip_do_fragment's creates fragments with zero skb_iif, +leading to inconsistent behavior. + +Assume for example an eBPF program attached at tc egress (post +forwarding) that examines __sk_buff->ingress_ifindex: + - the correct iif is observed if forwarding path does not involve + fragmentation/refragmentation + - a bogus iif is observed if forwarding path involves + fragmentation/refragmentatiom + +Fix, by preserving skb_iif during 'ip_copy_metadata'. + +Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c +@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@ static void ip_copy_metadata(struct sk_b + to->pkt_type = from->pkt_type; + to->priority = from->priority; + to->protocol = from->protocol; ++ to->skb_iif = from->skb_iif; + skb_dst_drop(to); + skb_dst_copy(to, from); + to->dev = from->dev; diff --git a/queue-3.18/ipv6-flowlabel-wait-rcu-grace-period-before-put_pid.patch b/queue-3.18/ipv6-flowlabel-wait-rcu-grace-period-before-put_pid.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3e37e75a5ad --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/ipv6-flowlabel-wait-rcu-grace-period-before-put_pid.patch @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +From foo@baz Sat 04 May 2019 12:30:05 PM CEST +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2019 16:49:06 -0700 +Subject: ipv6/flowlabel: wait rcu grace period before put_pid() + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 6c0afef5fb0c27758f4d52b2210c61b6bd8b4470 ] + +syzbot was able to catch a use-after-free read in pid_nr_ns() [1] + +ip6fl_seq_show() seems to use RCU protection, dereferencing fl->owner.pid +but fl_free() releases fl->owner.pid before rcu grace period is started. + +[1] + +BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407 +Read of size 4 at addr ffff888094012a04 by task syz-executor.0/18087 + +CPU: 0 PID: 18087 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6+ #89 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 +Call Trace: + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] + dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 + print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 + kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 + __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:131 + pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407 + ip6fl_seq_show+0x2f8/0x4f0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:794 + seq_read+0xad3/0x1130 fs/seq_file.c:268 + proc_reg_read+0x1fe/0x2c0 fs/proc/inode.c:227 + do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:701 [inline] + do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:688 [inline] + do_iter_read+0x4a9/0x660 fs/read_write.c:922 + vfs_readv+0xf0/0x160 fs/read_write.c:984 + kernel_readv fs/splice.c:358 [inline] + default_file_splice_read+0x475/0x890 fs/splice.c:413 + do_splice_to+0x12a/0x190 fs/splice.c:876 + splice_direct_to_actor+0x2d2/0x970 fs/splice.c:953 + do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1062 + do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1443 + __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1498 [inline] + __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1490 [inline] + __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x15a/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1490 + do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe +RIP: 0033:0x458da9 +Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 +RSP: 002b:00007f300d24bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028 +RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000458da9 +RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000007 +RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 +R10: 000000000000005a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f300d24c6d4 +R13: 00000000004c5fa3 R14: 00000000004da748 R15: 00000000ffffffff + +Allocated by task 17543: + save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 + set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] + __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline] + __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 + kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505 + slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] + slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline] + kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555 + alloc_pid+0x55/0x8f0 kernel/pid.c:168 + copy_process.part.0+0x3b08/0x7980 kernel/fork.c:1932 + copy_process kernel/fork.c:1709 [inline] + _do_fork+0x257/0xfd0 kernel/fork.c:2226 + __do_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2333 [inline] + __se_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2327 [inline] + __x64_sys_clone+0xbf/0x150 kernel/fork.c:2327 + do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe + +Freed by task 7789: + save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 + set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] + __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459 + kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467 + __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline] + kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765 + put_pid.part.0+0x111/0x150 kernel/pid.c:111 + put_pid+0x20/0x30 kernel/pid.c:105 + fl_free+0xbe/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:102 + ip6_fl_gc+0x295/0x3e0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:152 + call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325 + expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline] + __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline] + __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline] + run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694 + __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293 + +The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888094012a00 + which belongs to the cache pid_2 of size 88 +The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of + 88-byte region [ffff888094012a00, ffff888094012a58) +The buggy address belongs to the page: +page:ffffea0002500480 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88809a483080 index:0xffff888094012980 +flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) +raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea00018a3508 ffffea0002524a88 ffff88809a483080 +raw: ffff888094012980 ffff888094012000 000000010000001b 0000000000000000 +page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected + +Memory state around the buggy address: + ffff888094012900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc + ffff888094012980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc +>ffff888094012a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc + ^ + ffff888094012a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc + ffff888094012b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc + +Fixes: 4f82f45730c6 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid * and kuid_t") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Cc: Eric W. Biederman +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +@@ -94,16 +94,21 @@ static struct ip6_flowlabel *fl_lookup(s + return fl; + } + ++static void fl_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) ++{ ++ struct ip6_flowlabel *fl = container_of(head, struct ip6_flowlabel, rcu); ++ ++ if (fl->share == IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS) ++ put_pid(fl->owner.pid); ++ release_net(fl->fl_net); ++ kfree(fl->opt); ++ kfree_rcu(fl, rcu); ++} + + static void fl_free(struct ip6_flowlabel *fl) + { +- if (fl) { +- if (fl->share == IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS) +- put_pid(fl->owner.pid); +- release_net(fl->fl_net); +- kfree(fl->opt); +- kfree_rcu(fl, rcu); +- } ++ if (fl) ++ call_rcu(&fl->rcu, fl_free_rcu); + } + + static void fl_release(struct ip6_flowlabel *fl) diff --git a/queue-3.18/ipv6-invert-flowlabel-sharing-check-in-process-and-user-mode.patch b/queue-3.18/ipv6-invert-flowlabel-sharing-check-in-process-and-user-mode.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4151aab9d36 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/ipv6-invert-flowlabel-sharing-check-in-process-and-user-mode.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From foo@baz Sat 04 May 2019 12:30:05 PM CEST +From: Willem de Bruijn +Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2019 12:06:54 -0400 +Subject: ipv6: invert flowlabel sharing check in process and user mode + +From: Willem de Bruijn + +[ Upstream commit 95c169251bf734aa555a1e8043e4d88ec97a04ec ] + +A request for a flowlabel fails in process or user exclusive mode must +fail if the caller pid or uid does not match. Invert the test. + +Previously, the test was unsafe wrt PID recycling, but indeed tested +for inequality: fl1->owner != fl->owner + +Fixes: 4f82f45730c68 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid* and kuid_t") +Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +@@ -629,9 +629,9 @@ recheck: + if (fl1->share == IPV6_FL_S_EXCL || + fl1->share != fl->share || + ((fl1->share == IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS) && +- (fl1->owner.pid == fl->owner.pid)) || ++ (fl1->owner.pid != fl->owner.pid)) || + ((fl1->share == IPV6_FL_S_USER) && +- uid_eq(fl1->owner.uid, fl->owner.uid))) ++ !uid_eq(fl1->owner.uid, fl->owner.uid))) + goto release; + + err = -ENOMEM; diff --git a/queue-3.18/packet-validate-msg_namelen-in-send-directly.patch b/queue-3.18/packet-validate-msg_namelen-in-send-directly.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7b8bedcf4d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/packet-validate-msg_namelen-in-send-directly.patch @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +From foo@baz Sat 04 May 2019 12:23:27 PM CEST +From: Willem de Bruijn +Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 11:53:18 -0400 +Subject: packet: validate msg_namelen in send directly + +From: Willem de Bruijn + +[ Upstream commit 486efdc8f6ce802b27e15921d2353cc740c55451 ] + +Packet sockets in datagram mode take a destination address. Verify its +length before passing to dev_hard_header. + +Prior to 2.6.14-rc3, the send code ignored sll_halen. This is +established behavior. Directly compare msg_namelen to dev->addr_len. + +Change v1->v2: initialize addr in all paths + +Fixes: 6b8d95f1795c4 ("packet: validate address length if non-zero") +Suggested-by: David Laight +Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/packet/af_packet.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c ++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c +@@ -2252,8 +2252,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc + void *ph; + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, saddr, msg->msg_name); + bool need_wait = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); ++ unsigned char *addr = NULL; + int tp_len, size_max; +- unsigned char *addr; + int len_sum = 0; + int status = TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE; + int hlen, tlen; +@@ -2273,10 +2273,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc + sll_addr))) + goto out; + proto = saddr->sll_protocol; +- addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL; + dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); +- if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) +- goto out_put; ++ if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_DGRAM) { ++ if (dev && msg->msg_namelen < dev->addr_len + ++ offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr)) ++ goto out_put; ++ addr = saddr->sll_addr; ++ } + } + + err = -ENXIO; +@@ -2411,7 +2414,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc + struct sk_buff *skb; + struct net_device *dev; + __be16 proto; +- unsigned char *addr; ++ unsigned char *addr = NULL; + int err, reserve = 0; + struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 }; + int offset = 0; +@@ -2428,7 +2431,6 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc + if (likely(saddr == NULL)) { + dev = packet_cached_dev_get(po); + proto = po->num; +- addr = NULL; + } else { + err = -EINVAL; + if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll)) +@@ -2436,10 +2438,13 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc + if (msg->msg_namelen < (saddr->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr))) + goto out; + proto = saddr->sll_protocol; +- addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL; + dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); +- if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) +- goto out_unlock; ++ if (sock->type == SOCK_DGRAM) { ++ if (dev && msg->msg_namelen < dev->addr_len + ++ offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr)) ++ goto out_unlock; ++ addr = saddr->sll_addr; ++ } + } + + err = -ENXIO; diff --git a/queue-3.18/series b/queue-3.18/series index bc7ffdf2f83..7476d6ea140 100644 --- a/queue-3.18/series +++ b/queue-3.18/series @@ -25,3 +25,7 @@ ceph-fix-use-after-free-on-symlink-traversal.patch scsi-zfcp-reduce-flood-of-fcrscn1-trace-records-on-m.patch libata-fix-using-dma-buffers-on-stack.patch kconfig-mn-conf-handle-backspace-h-key.patch +ipv4-ip_do_fragment-preserve-skb_iif-during-fragmentation.patch +ipv6-invert-flowlabel-sharing-check-in-process-and-user-mode.patch +packet-validate-msg_namelen-in-send-directly.patch +ipv6-flowlabel-wait-rcu-grace-period-before-put_pid.patch