From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 15:38:47 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 4.9-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v5.1.16~26 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=82628ef0393a265c7d6f25504250bd0fec00f03d;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 4.9-stable patches added patches: cpu-speculation-warn-on-unsupported-mitigations-parameter.patch nfs-flexfiles-use-the-correct-tcp-timeout-for-flexfiles-i-o.patch x86-speculation-allow-guests-to-use-ssbd-even-if-host-does-not.patch --- diff --git a/queue-4.9/cpu-speculation-warn-on-unsupported-mitigations-parameter.patch b/queue-4.9/cpu-speculation-warn-on-unsupported-mitigations-parameter.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8cb6e5bc0af --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/cpu-speculation-warn-on-unsupported-mitigations-parameter.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 1bf72720281770162c87990697eae1ba2f1d917a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Geert Uytterhoeven +Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 09:09:35 +0200 +Subject: cpu/speculation: Warn on unsupported mitigations= parameter + +From: Geert Uytterhoeven + +commit 1bf72720281770162c87990697eae1ba2f1d917a upstream. + +Currently, if the user specifies an unsupported mitigation strategy on the +kernel command line, it will be ignored silently. The code will fall back +to the default strategy, possibly leaving the system more vulnerable than +expected. + +This may happen due to e.g. a simple typo, or, for a stable kernel release, +because not all mitigation strategies have been backported. + +Inform the user by printing a message. + +Fixes: 98af8452945c5565 ("cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option") +Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Cc: Peter Zijlstra +Cc: Jiri Kosina +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Cc: Ben Hutchings +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190516070935.22546-1-geert@linux-m68k.org +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + kernel/cpu.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +--- a/kernel/cpu.c ++++ b/kernel/cpu.c +@@ -2245,6 +2245,9 @@ static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdl + cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO; + else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt")) + cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT; ++ else ++ pr_crit("Unsupported mitigations=%s, system may still be vulnerable\n", ++ arg); + + return 0; + } diff --git a/queue-4.9/nfs-flexfiles-use-the-correct-tcp-timeout-for-flexfiles-i-o.patch b/queue-4.9/nfs-flexfiles-use-the-correct-tcp-timeout-for-flexfiles-i-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..039f910b035 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/nfs-flexfiles-use-the-correct-tcp-timeout-for-flexfiles-i-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 68f461593f76bd5f17e87cdd0bea28f4278c7268 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Trond Myklebust +Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 16:41:16 -0400 +Subject: NFS/flexfiles: Use the correct TCP timeout for flexfiles I/O + +From: Trond Myklebust + +commit 68f461593f76bd5f17e87cdd0bea28f4278c7268 upstream. + +Fix a typo where we're confusing the default TCP retrans value +(NFS_DEF_TCP_RETRANS) for the default TCP timeout value. + +Fixes: 15d03055cf39f ("pNFS/flexfiles: Set reasonable default ...") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.8+ +Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust +Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c ++++ b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c +@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ + + #define NFSDBG_FACILITY NFSDBG_PNFS_LD + +-static unsigned int dataserver_timeo = NFS_DEF_TCP_RETRANS; ++static unsigned int dataserver_timeo = NFS_DEF_TCP_TIMEO; + static unsigned int dataserver_retrans; + + void nfs4_ff_layout_put_deviceid(struct nfs4_ff_layout_ds *mirror_ds) diff --git a/queue-4.9/series b/queue-4.9/series index cac588185a3..00297604da6 100644 --- a/queue-4.9/series +++ b/queue-4.9/series @@ -46,3 +46,6 @@ fs-proc-array.c-allow-reporting-eip-esp-for-all-coredumping-threads.patch fs-binfmt_flat.c-make-load_flat_shared_library-work.patch mm-page_idle.c-fix-oops-because-end_pfn-is-larger-than-max_pfn.patch scsi-vmw_pscsi-fix-use-after-free-in-pvscsi_queue_lck.patch +x86-speculation-allow-guests-to-use-ssbd-even-if-host-does-not.patch +nfs-flexfiles-use-the-correct-tcp-timeout-for-flexfiles-i-o.patch +cpu-speculation-warn-on-unsupported-mitigations-parameter.patch diff --git a/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-allow-guests-to-use-ssbd-even-if-host-does-not.patch b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-allow-guests-to-use-ssbd-even-if-host-does-not.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..806c3a769ef --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-allow-guests-to-use-ssbd-even-if-host-does-not.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alejandro Jimenez +Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 13:20:10 -0400 +Subject: x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does not + +From: Alejandro Jimenez + +commit c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88 upstream. + +The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value +of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which +mitigations the guest can enable. In the case of SSBD, unless the host has +enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in +the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest +can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode. + +This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD +always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter +"spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable +unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest +OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated. + +Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports +it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to +enable the mitigation in any of its modes. + +Fixes: be6fcb5478e9 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic") +Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick +Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda +Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini +Cc: bp@alien8.de +Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com +Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -829,6 +829,16 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_ + } + + /* ++ * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper ++ * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the ++ * case where the host does not enable it. ++ */ ++ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || ++ static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { ++ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; ++ } ++ ++ /* + * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: + * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. + * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass +@@ -845,7 +855,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_ + x86_amd_ssb_disable(); + } else { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; +- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + } + }