From: Joe Orton
SSLCryptoDevice
SSLEngine
SSLHonorCipherOrder
SSLInsecureRenegotiation
SSLOCSPDefaultResponder
SSLOCSPEnable
SSLOCSPOverrideResponderSSL_PROTOCOLSSL_SESSION_IDSSL_SESSION_RESUMEDSSL_SECURE_RENEGtrue if secure renegotiation is supported, else falseSSL_CIPHERSSL_CIPHER_EXPORTtrue if cipher is an export cipherSSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE| Description: | Option to enable support for insecure renegotiation |
|---|---|
| Syntax: | SSLInsecureRenegotiation flag |
| Context: | server config, virtual host |
| Status: | Extension |
| Module: | mod_ssl |
| Compatibility: | Available in httpd 2.3 and later, if using OpenSSL 1.0.0 Beta 5 or later |
As originally specified, all versions of the SSL and TLS protocols +(up to and including TLS/1.2) were vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle +attack +(CVE-2009-3555) +during a renegotiation. This vulnerability allowed an attacker to +"prefix" a chosen plaintext to the HTTP request as seen by the web +server. A protocol extension was developed which fixed this +vulnerability if supported by both client and server.
+ +If mod_ssl is linked against OpenSSL version 1.0.0
+Beta 5 or later, by default renegotiation is only supported with
+clients supporting the new protocol extension. If this directive is
+enabled, renegotiation will be allowed with old (unpatched) clients.
+SSL connections will be vulnerable to the prefix attack as described
+above if this directive is enabled. The SSL_SECURE_RENEG
+variable can be used to determine whether secure renegotiation is
+supported for a given SSL connection.
+SSLInsecureRenegotiation on
+
TRACE
+TRACE
requestsmime.types filemime.types file