From: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 19 May 2026 08:43:57 +0000 (+0200) Subject: [3.14] gh-146581: Update docs for dangerous filenames in ZIP files (GH-149994) (GH... X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=8e13025747e1ca72e86d1f35637123f9c306f0cb;p=thirdparty%2FPython%2Fcpython.git [3.14] gh-146581: Update docs for dangerous filenames in ZIP files (GH-149994) (GH-150065) (cherry picked from commit ba0aca3bffce431fe2fbd53ca4cd6a717a2e2c19) Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka Co-authored-by: Sebastian Gassner --- diff --git a/Doc/library/shutil.rst b/Doc/library/shutil.rst index 8564a5b72d97..e65b96f2e8f0 100644 --- a/Doc/library/shutil.rst +++ b/Doc/library/shutil.rst @@ -745,8 +745,8 @@ provided. They rely on the :mod:`zipfile` and :mod:`tarfile` modules. Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection. It is possible that files are created outside of the path specified in - the *extract_dir* argument, e.g. members that have absolute filenames - starting with "/" or filenames with two dots "..". + the *extract_dir* argument, for example, members that have absolute filenames + or filenames with ".." components. Since Python 3.14, the defaults for both built-in formats (zip and tar files) will prevent the most dangerous of such security issues, diff --git a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst index b1a2c820bea1..36043c355818 100644 --- a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst +++ b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst @@ -414,9 +414,9 @@ ZipFile objects .. warning:: Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection. - It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, e.g. members - that have absolute filenames starting with ``"/"`` or filenames with two - dots ``".."``. This module attempts to prevent that. + It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, for example, members + that have absolute filenames or filenames with ".." components. + This module attempts to prevent that. See :meth:`extract` note. .. versionchanged:: 3.6 @@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ Path objects The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal - vulnerabilities (e.g., filenames containing ".." or absolute paths). When handling + vulnerabilities (for example, absolute paths or paths with ".." components). When handling untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath` and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.