From: Sasha Levin Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 11:58:10 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Fixes for 5.10 X-Git-Tag: v5.13.7~15^2~5 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=9a28360544e5bda62d66d9d4284bdad0e05f4361;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git Fixes for 5.10 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- diff --git a/queue-5.10/arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch b/queue-5.10/arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fdccc2b9088 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 4c3ccf0346288a7204250981df15b64837cbf463 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 14:21:18 +0100 +Subject: ARM: dts: versatile: Fix up interrupt controller node names + +From: Sudeep Holla + +[ Upstream commit 82a1c67554dff610d6be4e1982c425717b3c6a23 ] + +Once the new schema interrupt-controller/arm,vic.yaml is added, we get +the below warnings: + + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml: + intc@10140000: $nodename:0: 'intc@10140000' does not match + '^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$' + + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml: + intc@10140000: 'clear-mask' does not match any of the regexes + +Fix the node names for the interrupt controller to conform +to the standard node name interrupt-controller@.. Also drop invalid +clear-mask property. + +Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla +Acked-by: Linus Walleij +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210701132118.759454-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com' +Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts | 5 ++--- + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts +index 37bd41ff8dff..151c0220047d 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts ++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts +@@ -195,16 +195,15 @@ + #size-cells = <1>; + ranges; + +- vic: intc@10140000 { ++ vic: interrupt-controller@10140000 { + compatible = "arm,versatile-vic"; + interrupt-controller; + #interrupt-cells = <1>; + reg = <0x10140000 0x1000>; +- clear-mask = <0xffffffff>; + valid-mask = <0xffffffff>; + }; + +- sic: intc@10003000 { ++ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 { + compatible = "arm,versatile-sic"; + interrupt-controller; + #interrupt-cells = <1>; +diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts +index 06a0fdf24026..e7e751a858d8 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts ++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts +@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ + + amba { + /* The Versatile PB is using more SIC IRQ lines than the AB */ +- sic: intc@10003000 { ++ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 { + clear-mask = <0xffffffff>; + /* + * Valid interrupt lines mask according to +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch b/queue-5.10/cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0ce794f298d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 92e101a89725baafe2fee776f20189c846b9de2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 19:34:02 +0900 +Subject: cifs: fix the out of range assignment to bit fields in + parse_server_interfaces + +From: Hyunchul Lee + +[ Upstream commit c9c9c6815f9004ee1ec87401ed0796853bd70f1b ] + +Because the out of range assignment to bit fields +are compiler-dependant, the fields could have wrong +value. + +Signed-off-by: Hyunchul Lee +Signed-off-by: Steve French +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +index b0b06eb86edf..81e087723777 100644 +--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c ++++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +@@ -497,8 +497,8 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp *buf, + p = buf; + while (bytes_left >= sizeof(*p)) { + info->speed = le64_to_cpu(p->LinkSpeed); +- info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE); +- info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE); ++ info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0; ++ info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: adding iface %zu\n", __func__, *iface_count); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: speed %zu bps\n", __func__, info->speed); +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/drm-ttm-add-a-check-against-null-pointer-dereference.patch b/queue-5.10/drm-ttm-add-a-check-against-null-pointer-dereference.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..013107ab516 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/drm-ttm-add-a-check-against-null-pointer-dereference.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From ed62c2db438b73fcfa1ca325f1cd7d69be9a6f88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 14:54:19 +0000 +Subject: drm/ttm: add a check against null pointer dereference +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Zheyu Ma + +[ Upstream commit 9e5c772954406829e928dbe59891d08938ead04b ] + +When calling ttm_range_man_fini(), 'man' may be uninitialized, which may +cause a null pointer dereference bug. + +Fix this by checking if it is a null pointer. + +This log reveals it: + +[ 7.902580 ] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 +[ 7.905721 ] RIP: 0010:ttm_range_man_fini+0x40/0x160 +[ 7.911826 ] Call Trace: +[ 7.911826 ] radeon_ttm_fini+0x167/0x210 +[ 7.911826 ] radeon_bo_fini+0x15/0x40 +[ 7.913767 ] rs400_fini+0x55/0x80 +[ 7.914358 ] radeon_device_fini+0x3c/0x140 +[ 7.914358 ] radeon_driver_unload_kms+0x5c/0xe0 +[ 7.914358 ] radeon_driver_load_kms+0x13a/0x200 +[ 7.914358 ] ? radeon_driver_unload_kms+0xe0/0xe0 +[ 7.914358 ] drm_dev_register+0x1db/0x290 +[ 7.914358 ] radeon_pci_probe+0x16a/0x230 +[ 7.914358 ] local_pci_probe+0x4a/0xb0 + +Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma +Reviewed-by: Christian König +Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1626274459-8148-1-git-send-email-zheyuma97@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Christian König +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.c +index 1da0e277c511..ce9d127edbb5 100644 +--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.c ++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_range_manager.c +@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ int ttm_range_man_fini(struct ttm_bo_device *bdev, + struct drm_mm *mm = &rman->mm; + int ret; + ++ if (!man) ++ return 0; ++ + ttm_resource_manager_set_used(man, false); + + ret = ttm_resource_manager_force_list_clean(bdev, man); +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch b/queue-5.10/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0efb4246822 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 36018a10080d8741d07b889e58c9ec71cde95e5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 14:50:28 +0100 +Subject: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix possible scmi_linux_errmap buffer overflow + +From: Sudeep Holla + +[ Upstream commit 7a691f16ccad05d770f813d9c4b4337a30c6d63f ] + +The scmi_linux_errmap buffer access index is supposed to depend on the +array size to prevent element out of bounds access. It uses SCMI_ERR_MAX +to check bounds but that can mismatch with the array size. It also +changes the success into -EIO though scmi_linux_errmap is never used in +case of success, it is expected to work for success case too. + +It is slightly confusing code as the negative of the error code +is used as index to the buffer. Fix it by negating it at the start and +make it more readable. + +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210707135028.1869642-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com +Reported-by: kernel test robot +Reported-by: Dan Carpenter +Reviewed-by: Cristian Marussi +Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 7 ++++--- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +index af4560dab6b4..6fa024d1dd99 100644 +--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c ++++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ enum scmi_error_codes { + SCMI_ERR_GENERIC = -8, /* Generic Error */ + SCMI_ERR_HARDWARE = -9, /* Hardware Error */ + SCMI_ERR_PROTOCOL = -10,/* Protocol Error */ +- SCMI_ERR_MAX + }; + + /* List of all SCMI devices active in system */ +@@ -118,8 +117,10 @@ static const int scmi_linux_errmap[] = { + + static inline int scmi_to_linux_errno(int errno) + { +- if (errno < SCMI_SUCCESS && errno > SCMI_ERR_MAX) +- return scmi_linux_errmap[-errno]; ++ int err_idx = -errno; ++ ++ if (err_idx >= SCMI_SUCCESS && err_idx < ARRAY_SIZE(scmi_linux_errmap)) ++ return scmi_linux_errmap[err_idx]; + return -EIO; + } + +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch b/queue-5.10/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e14bec5a8e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From f62175dd44e19d316776c6525c4f5bb01aab7571 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 15:18:18 +0100 +Subject: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix range check for the maximum number of pending + messages + +From: Cristian Marussi + +[ Upstream commit bdb8742dc6f7c599c3d61959234fe4c23638727b ] + +SCMI message headers carry a sequence number and such field is sized to +allow for MSG_TOKEN_MAX distinct numbers; moreover zero is not really an +acceptable maximum number of pending in-flight messages. + +Fix accordingly the checks performed on the value exported by transports +in scmi_desc.max_msg + +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712141833.6628-3-cristian.marussi@arm.com +Reported-by: Vincent Guittot +Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi +[sudeep.holla: updated the patch title and error message] +Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +index 6fa024d1dd99..8c9663258d5d 100644 +--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c ++++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +@@ -615,8 +615,9 @@ static int __scmi_xfer_info_init(struct scmi_info *sinfo, + const struct scmi_desc *desc = sinfo->desc; + + /* Pre-allocated messages, no more than what hdr.seq can support */ +- if (WARN_ON(desc->max_msg >= MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) { +- dev_err(dev, "Maximum message of %d exceeds supported %ld\n", ++ if (WARN_ON(!desc->max_msg || desc->max_msg > MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) { ++ dev_err(dev, ++ "Invalid maximum messages %d, not in range [1 - %lu]\n", + desc->max_msg, MSG_TOKEN_MAX); + return -EINVAL; + } +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch b/queue-5.10/hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..67ad1908d76 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From c2de2725ebd6cce5a05aed3fbbc7cc351505313b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:08 -0700 +Subject: hfs: add lock nesting notation to hfs_find_init + +From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi + +[ Upstream commit b3b2177a2d795e35dc11597b2609eb1e7e57e570 ] + +Syzbot reports a possible recursive lock in [1]. + +This happens due to missing lock nesting information. From the logs, we +see that a call to hfs_fill_super is made to mount the hfs filesystem. +While searching for the root inode, the lock on the catalog btree is +grabbed. Then, when the parent of the root isn't found, a call to +__hfs_bnode_create is made to create the parent of the root. This +eventually leads to a call to hfs_ext_read_extent which grabs a lock on +the extents btree. + +Since the order of locking is catalog btree -> extents btree, this lock +hierarchy does not lead to a deadlock. + +To tell lockdep that this locking is safe, we add nesting notation to +distinguish between catalog btrees, extents btrees, and attributes +btrees (for HFS+). This has already been done in hfsplus. + +Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1] +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-4-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi +Reported-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Tested-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko +Cc: Al Viro +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva +Cc: Shuah Khan +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton +Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/hfs/bfind.c | 14 +++++++++++++- + fs/hfs/btree.h | 7 +++++++ + 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c +index 4af318fbda77..ef9498a6e88a 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c ++++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c +@@ -25,7 +25,19 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd) + fd->key = ptr + tree->max_key_len + 2; + hfs_dbg(BNODE_REFS, "find_init: %d (%p)\n", + tree->cnid, __builtin_return_address(0)); +- mutex_lock(&tree->tree_lock); ++ switch (tree->cnid) { ++ case HFS_CAT_CNID: ++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX); ++ break; ++ case HFS_EXT_CNID: ++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX); ++ break; ++ case HFS_ATTR_CNID: ++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX); ++ break; ++ default: ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/btree.h b/fs/hfs/btree.h +index 4ba45caf5939..0e6baee93245 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/btree.h ++++ b/fs/hfs/btree.h +@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ typedef int (*btree_keycmp)(const btree_key *, const btree_key *); + + #define NODE_HASH_SIZE 256 + ++/* B-tree mutex nested subclasses */ ++enum hfs_btree_mutex_classes { ++ CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX, ++ EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX, ++ ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX, ++}; ++ + /* A HFS BTree held in memory */ + struct hfs_btree { + struct super_block *sb; +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch b/queue-5.10/hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7822e6278b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 4feb4af2598e0d069f2465be9bb7d9aa88696b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:01 -0700 +Subject: hfs: add missing clean-up in hfs_fill_super + +From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi + +[ Upstream commit 16ee572eaf0d09daa4c8a755fdb71e40dbf8562d ] + +Patch series "hfs: fix various errors", v2. + +This series ultimately aims to address a lockdep warning in +hfs_find_init reported by Syzbot [1]. + +The work done for this led to the discovery of another bug, and the +Syzkaller repro test also reveals an invalid memory access error after +clearing the lockdep warning. Hence, this series is broken up into +three patches: + +1. Add a missing call to hfs_find_exit for an error path in + hfs_fill_super + +2. Fix memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read by fixing calls to kmap + +3. Add lock nesting notation to tell lockdep that the observed locking + hierarchy is safe + +This patch (of 3): + +Before exiting hfs_fill_super, the struct hfs_find_data used in +hfs_find_init should be passed to hfs_find_exit to be cleaned up, and to +release the lock held on the btree. + +The call to hfs_find_exit is missing from an error path. We add it back +in by consolidating calls to hfs_find_exit for error paths. + +Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1] +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-2-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi +Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko +Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva +Cc: Al Viro +Cc: Shuah Khan +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton +Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/super.c b/fs/hfs/super.c +index 44d07c9e3a7f..12d9bae39363 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/super.c ++++ b/fs/hfs/super.c +@@ -420,14 +420,12 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) + if (!res) { + if (fd.entrylength > sizeof(rec) || fd.entrylength < 0) { + res = -EIO; +- goto bail; ++ goto bail_hfs_find; + } + hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset, fd.entrylength); + } +- if (res) { +- hfs_find_exit(&fd); +- goto bail_no_root; +- } ++ if (res) ++ goto bail_hfs_find; + res = -EINVAL; + root_inode = hfs_iget(sb, &fd.search_key->cat, &rec); + hfs_find_exit(&fd); +@@ -443,6 +441,8 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) + /* everything's okay */ + return 0; + ++bail_hfs_find: ++ hfs_find_exit(&fd); + bail_no_root: + pr_err("get root inode failed\n"); + bail: +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch b/queue-5.10/hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d3825349c0b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From c9c62258ca762ed198fc19a79f167efba06c1b6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:05 -0700 +Subject: hfs: fix high memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read + +From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi + +[ Upstream commit 54a5ead6f5e2b47131a7385d0c0af18e7b89cb02 ] + +Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel +address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the +given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid +memory access. + +To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant +portions of data. + +An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen +in the following crash report: + + ================================================================== + BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] + BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26 + Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634 + + CPU: 0 PID: 4634 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0 + Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 + Call Trace: + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] + dump_stack+0x195/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:120 + print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:233 + __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline] + kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0xd4 mm/kasan/report.c:436 + check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline] + kasan_check_range+0x154/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:186 + memcpy+0x24/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65 + memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] + hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26 + hfs_bnode_read_u16 fs/hfs/bnode.c:34 [inline] + hfs_bnode_find+0x880/0xcc0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:365 + hfs_brec_find+0x2d8/0x540 fs/hfs/bfind.c:126 + hfs_brec_read+0x27/0x120 fs/hfs/bfind.c:165 + hfs_cat_find_brec+0x19a/0x3b0 fs/hfs/catalog.c:194 + hfs_fill_super+0xc13/0x1460 fs/hfs/super.c:419 + mount_bdev+0x331/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1368 + hfs_mount+0x35/0x40 fs/hfs/super.c:457 + legacy_get_tree+0x10c/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592 + vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 fs/super.c:1498 + do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline] + path_mount+0x13f5/0x20e0 fs/namespace.c:3235 + do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline] + __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline] + __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3433 [inline] + __x64_sys_mount+0x2b8/0x340 fs/namespace.c:3433 + do_syscall_64+0x37/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae + RIP: 0033:0x45e63a + Code: 48 c7 c2 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d2 e8 88 04 00 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 + RSP: 002b:00007f9404d410d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 + RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000248 RCX: 000000000045e63a + RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f9404d41120 + RBP: 00007f9404d41120 R08: 00000000200002c0 R09: 0000000020000000 + R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 + R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000004ad5d8 R15: 0000000000000000 + + The buggy address belongs to the page: + page:00000000dadbcf3e refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x125fdc + flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff) + raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffffea000497f748 ffffea000497f6c8 0000000000000000 + raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 + page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected + + Memory state around the buggy address: + ffff888125fdce80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ffff888125fdcf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + >ffff888125fdcf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ^ + ffff888125fdd000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ffff888125fdd080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ================================================================== + +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-3-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi +Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko +Cc: Al Viro +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva +Cc: Shuah Khan +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton +Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/bnode.c b/fs/hfs/bnode.c +index b63a4df7327b..c0a73a6ffb28 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c ++++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c +@@ -15,16 +15,31 @@ + + #include "btree.h" + +-void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, +- int off, int len) ++void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len) + { + struct page *page; ++ int pagenum; ++ int bytes_read; ++ int bytes_to_read; ++ void *vaddr; + + off += node->page_offset; +- page = node->page[0]; ++ pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */ + +- memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len); +- kunmap(page); ++ for (bytes_read = 0; bytes_read < len; bytes_read += bytes_to_read) { ++ if (pagenum >= node->tree->pages_per_bnode) ++ break; ++ page = node->page[pagenum]; ++ bytes_to_read = min_t(int, len - bytes_read, PAGE_SIZE - off); ++ ++ vaddr = kmap_atomic(page); ++ memcpy(buf + bytes_read, vaddr + off, bytes_to_read); ++ kunmap_atomic(vaddr); ++ ++ pagenum++; ++ off = 0; /* page offset only applies to the first page */ ++ } + } + + u16 hfs_bnode_read_u16(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off) +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_data.patch b/queue-5.10/iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_data.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d3d845a16e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_data.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From f0acdcfdd16b113de5bd9be4c6c7a1c61dd6288c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 09:58:04 -0700 +Subject: iomap: remove the length variable in iomap_seek_data + +From: Christoph Hellwig + +[ Upstream commit 3ac1d426510f97ace05093ae9f2f710d9cbe6215 ] + +The length variable is rather pointless given that it can be trivially +deduced from offset and size. Also the initial calculation can lead +to KASAN warnings. + +Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig +Reported-by: Leizhen (ThunderTown) +Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong +Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong +Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/iomap/seek.c | 16 ++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/iomap/seek.c b/fs/iomap/seek.c +index 107ee80c3568..271edcc84a28 100644 +--- a/fs/iomap/seek.c ++++ b/fs/iomap/seek.c +@@ -186,27 +186,23 @@ loff_t + iomap_seek_data(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, const struct iomap_ops *ops) + { + loff_t size = i_size_read(inode); +- loff_t length = size - offset; + loff_t ret; + + /* Nothing to be found before or beyond the end of the file. */ + if (offset < 0 || offset >= size) + return -ENXIO; + +- while (length > 0) { +- ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, length, IOMAP_REPORT, ops, +- &offset, iomap_seek_data_actor); ++ while (offset < size) { ++ ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, size - offset, IOMAP_REPORT, ++ ops, &offset, iomap_seek_data_actor); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 0) +- break; +- ++ return offset; + offset += ret; +- length -= ret; + } + +- if (length <= 0) +- return -ENXIO; +- return offset; ++ /* We've reached the end of the file without finding data */ ++ return -ENXIO; + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iomap_seek_data); +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_hole.patch b/queue-5.10/iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_hole.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ce4a208a2d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_hole.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 4758afd0c4853bd563f1246f28869da840890843 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 09:58:04 -0700 +Subject: iomap: remove the length variable in iomap_seek_hole + +From: Christoph Hellwig + +[ Upstream commit 49694d14ff68fa4b5f86019dbcfb44a8bd213e58 ] + +The length variable is rather pointless given that it can be trivially +deduced from offset and size. Also the initial calculation can lead +to KASAN warnings. + +Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig +Reported-by: Leizhen (ThunderTown) +Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong +Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong +Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/iomap/seek.c | 9 +++------ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/iomap/seek.c b/fs/iomap/seek.c +index 271edcc84a28..220c306167f7 100644 +--- a/fs/iomap/seek.c ++++ b/fs/iomap/seek.c +@@ -140,23 +140,20 @@ loff_t + iomap_seek_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, const struct iomap_ops *ops) + { + loff_t size = i_size_read(inode); +- loff_t length = size - offset; + loff_t ret; + + /* Nothing to be found before or beyond the end of the file. */ + if (offset < 0 || offset >= size) + return -ENXIO; + +- while (length > 0) { +- ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, length, IOMAP_REPORT, ops, +- &offset, iomap_seek_hole_actor); ++ while (offset < size) { ++ ret = iomap_apply(inode, offset, size - offset, IOMAP_REPORT, ++ ops, &offset, iomap_seek_hole_actor); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 0) + break; +- + offset += ret; +- length -= ret; + } + + return offset; +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/ipv6-allocate-enough-headroom-in-ip6_finish_output2.patch b/queue-5.10/ipv6-allocate-enough-headroom-in-ip6_finish_output2.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..029eb59bd7a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/ipv6-allocate-enough-headroom-in-ip6_finish_output2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From e84c451b36446d7a4717ef6a3094c9aadd6779d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 09:45:06 +0300 +Subject: ipv6: allocate enough headroom in ip6_finish_output2() + +From: Vasily Averin + +[ Upstream commit 5796015fa968a3349027a27dcd04c71d95c53ba5 ] + +When TEE target mirrors traffic to another interface, sk_buff may +not have enough headroom to be processed correctly. +ip_finish_output2() detect this situation for ipv4 and allocates +new skb with enogh headroom. However ipv6 lacks this logic in +ip_finish_output2 and it leads to skb_under_panic: + + skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffffc0866ad4 len:96 put:24 + head:ffff97be85e31800 data:ffff97be85e317f8 tail:0x58 end:0xc0 dev:gre0 + ------------[ cut here ]------------ + kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110! + invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI + CPU: 2 PID: 393 Comm: kworker/2:2 Tainted: G OE 5.13.0 #13 + Hardware name: Virtuozzo KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.vz7.4 04/01/2014 + Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work + RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x48/0x4a + Call Trace: + skb_push.cold.111+0x10/0x10 + ipgre_header+0x24/0xf0 [ip_gre] + neigh_connected_output+0xae/0xf0 + ip6_finish_output2+0x1a8/0x5a0 + ip6_output+0x5c/0x110 + nf_dup_ipv6+0x158/0x1000 [nf_dup_ipv6] + tee_tg6+0x2e/0x40 [xt_TEE] + ip6t_do_table+0x294/0x470 [ip6_tables] + nf_hook_slow+0x44/0xc0 + nf_hook.constprop.34+0x72/0xe0 + ndisc_send_skb+0x20d/0x2e0 + ndisc_send_ns+0xd1/0x210 + addrconf_dad_work+0x3c8/0x540 + process_one_work+0x1d1/0x370 + worker_thread+0x30/0x390 + kthread+0x116/0x130 + ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 + +Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +index 341d0c7acc8b..781d3bc64b71 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +@@ -60,10 +60,38 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff * + { + struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); + struct net_device *dev = dst->dev; ++ unsigned int hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); ++ int delta = hh_len - skb_headroom(skb); + const struct in6_addr *nexthop; + struct neighbour *neigh; + int ret; + ++ /* Be paranoid, rather than too clever. */ ++ if (unlikely(delta > 0) && dev->header_ops) { ++ /* pskb_expand_head() might crash, if skb is shared */ ++ if (skb_shared(skb)) { ++ struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); ++ ++ if (likely(nskb)) { ++ if (skb->sk) ++ skb_set_owner_w(skb, skb->sk); ++ consume_skb(skb); ++ } else { ++ kfree_skb(skb); ++ } ++ skb = nskb; ++ } ++ if (skb && ++ pskb_expand_head(skb, SKB_DATA_ALIGN(delta), 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) { ++ kfree_skb(skb); ++ skb = NULL; ++ } ++ if (!skb) { ++ IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS); ++ return -ENOMEM; ++ } ++ } ++ + if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) { + struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)); + +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/ipv6-ip6_finish_output2-set-sk-into-newly-allocated-.patch b/queue-5.10/ipv6-ip6_finish_output2-set-sk-into-newly-allocated-.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4267e9c106f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/ipv6-ip6_finish_output2-set-sk-into-newly-allocated-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 41eff5208c7657a89caec5f3fe91c3ceef64a90b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2021 10:55:14 +0300 +Subject: ipv6: ip6_finish_output2: set sk into newly allocated nskb + +From: Vasily Averin + +[ Upstream commit 2d85a1b31dde84038ea07ad825c3d8d3e71f4344 ] + +skb_set_owner_w() should set sk not to old skb but to new nskb. + +Fixes: 5796015fa968 ("ipv6: allocate enough headroom in ip6_finish_output2()") +Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/70c0744f-89ae-1869-7e3e-4fa292158f4b@virtuozzo.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +index 781d3bc64b71..72a673a43a75 100644 +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int ip6_finish_output2(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff * + + if (likely(nskb)) { + if (skb->sk) +- skb_set_owner_w(skb, skb->sk); ++ skb_set_owner_w(nskb, skb->sk); + consume_skb(skb); + } else { + kfree_skb(skb); +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch b/queue-5.10/net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4d7027da405 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From f0b97fc3e6939342f48149b0fd99d591b0de36a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:53:28 +0800 +Subject: net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join() + +From: Yang Yingliang + +[ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ] + +I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test: + +BUG: memory leak +unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64): + comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s) + hex dump (first 32 bytes): + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ + backtrace: + [<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0 + [<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190 + [<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980 + [<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460 + [<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650 + [<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280 + [<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550 + [<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 + [<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0 + [<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420 + [<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750 + [<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0 + [<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 + [<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820 + [<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0 + [<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0 + +Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state +is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last +transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be +leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before +rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant(). + +Reported-by: Hulk Robot +Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/802/garp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/802/garp.c b/net/802/garp.c +index 400bd857e5f5..f6012f8e59f0 100644 +--- a/net/802/garp.c ++++ b/net/802/garp.c +@@ -203,6 +203,19 @@ static void garp_attr_destroy(struct garp_applicant *app, struct garp_attr *attr + kfree(attr); + } + ++static void garp_attr_destroy_all(struct garp_applicant *app) ++{ ++ struct rb_node *node, *next; ++ struct garp_attr *attr; ++ ++ for (node = rb_first(&app->gid); ++ next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL; ++ node = next) { ++ attr = rb_entry(node, struct garp_attr, node); ++ garp_attr_destroy(app, attr); ++ } ++} ++ + static int garp_pdu_init(struct garp_applicant *app) + { + struct sk_buff *skb; +@@ -609,6 +622,7 @@ void garp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct garp_application *appl + + spin_lock_bh(&app->lock); + garp_gid_event(app, GARP_EVENT_TRANSMIT_PDU); ++ garp_attr_destroy_all(app); + garp_pdu_queue(app); + spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock); + +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch b/queue-5.10/net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..16d646eb578 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From 96ba69b1e555a2107d952993483bed1e7b142c5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 15:22:37 +0800 +Subject: net/802/mrp: fix memleak in mrp_request_join() + +From: Yang Yingliang + +[ Upstream commit 996af62167d0e0ec69b938a3561e96f84ffff1aa ] + +I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test: + +BUG: memory leak +unreferenced object 0xffff88810c239500 (size 64): +comm "syz-executor940", pid 882, jiffies 4294712870 (age 14.631s) +hex dump (first 32 bytes): +01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ +backtrace: +[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2972 [inline] +[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2980 [inline] +[<00000000a323afa4>] __kmalloc+0x167/0x340 mm/slub.c:4130 +[<000000005034ca11>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:595 [inline] +[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_attr_create net/802/mrp.c:276 [inline] +[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_request_join+0x265/0x550 net/802/mrp.c:530 +[<00000000fcfd81f3>] vlan_mvrp_request_join+0x145/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_mvrp.c:40 +[<000000009258546e>] vlan_dev_open+0x477/0x890 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:292 +[<0000000059acd82b>] __dev_open+0x281/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1609 +[<000000004e6dc695>] __dev_change_flags+0x424/0x560 net/core/dev.c:8767 +[<00000000471a09af>] rtnl_configure_link+0xd9/0x210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3122 +[<0000000037a4672b>] __rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3448 +[<000000008d5d0fda>] rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3488 +[<000000004882fe39>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x369/0xa10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5552 +[<00000000907e6c54>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 +[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] +[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 +[<00000000e0645d50>] netlink_sendmsg+0x78e/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 +[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] +[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674 +[<00000000fc210bc2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350 +[<00000000be4577b5>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 + +Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state +is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last +TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. +To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning +from mrp_uninit_applicant(). + +Reported-by: Hulk Robot +Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/802/mrp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/802/mrp.c b/net/802/mrp.c +index bea6e43d45a0..35e04cc5390c 100644 +--- a/net/802/mrp.c ++++ b/net/802/mrp.c +@@ -292,6 +292,19 @@ static void mrp_attr_destroy(struct mrp_applicant *app, struct mrp_attr *attr) + kfree(attr); + } + ++static void mrp_attr_destroy_all(struct mrp_applicant *app) ++{ ++ struct rb_node *node, *next; ++ struct mrp_attr *attr; ++ ++ for (node = rb_first(&app->mad); ++ next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL; ++ node = next) { ++ attr = rb_entry(node, struct mrp_attr, node); ++ mrp_attr_destroy(app, attr); ++ } ++} ++ + static int mrp_pdu_init(struct mrp_applicant *app) + { + struct sk_buff *skb; +@@ -895,6 +908,7 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl) + + spin_lock_bh(&app->lock); + mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_TX); ++ mrp_attr_destroy_all(app); + mrp_pdu_queue(app); + spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock); + +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch b/queue-5.10/net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2d147d15bfe --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From 3a36b8de0e2ebc6e376f7cf9426d97ad17b31790 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 07:12:45 -0700 +Subject: net: annotate data race around sk_ll_usec + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 0dbffbb5335a1e3aa6855e4ee317e25e669dd302 ] + +sk_ll_usec is read locklessly from sk_can_busy_loop() +while another thread can change its value in sock_setsockopt() + +This is correct but needs annotations. + +BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_datagram / sock_setsockopt + +write to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14011 on cpu 0: + sock_setsockopt+0x1287/0x2090 net/core/sock.c:1175 + __sys_setsockopt+0x14f/0x200 net/socket.c:2100 + __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline] + __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline] + __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112 + do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae + +read to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14001 on cpu 1: + sk_can_busy_loop include/net/busy_poll.h:41 [inline] + __skb_try_recv_datagram+0x14f/0x320 net/core/datagram.c:273 + unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x14c/0x870 net/unix/af_unix.c:2101 + unix_seqpacket_recvmsg+0x5a/0x70 net/unix/af_unix.c:2067 + ____sys_recvmsg+0x15d/0x310 include/linux/uio.h:244 + ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2598 [inline] + do_recvmmsg+0x35c/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2692 + __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline] + __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2794 [inline] + __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline] + __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xcf/0x150 net/socket.c:2787 + do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae + +value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000101 + +Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: +CPU: 1 PID: 14001 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 + +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +- + net/core/sock.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/net/busy_poll.h b/include/net/busy_poll.h +index b001fa91c14e..716b7c5f6fdd 100644 +--- a/include/net/busy_poll.h ++++ b/include/net/busy_poll.h +@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void) + + static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk) + { +- return sk->sk_ll_usec && !signal_pending(current); ++ return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current); + } + + bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time); +diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c +index 7de51ea15cdf..d638c5361ed2 100644 +--- a/net/core/sock.c ++++ b/net/core/sock.c +@@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ set_sndbuf: + if (val < 0) + ret = -EINVAL; + else +- sk->sk_ll_usec = val; ++ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec, val); + } + break; + #endif +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_inspect_r.patch b/queue-5.10/rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_inspect_r.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..28ea289cfd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_inspect_r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From d87510da0f7d9b8ad77b329a3f2f5932952fa898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 10:12:45 -0700 +Subject: rcu-tasks: Don't delete holdouts within trc_inspect_reader() + +From: Paul E. McKenney + +[ Upstream commit 1d10bf55d85d34eb73dd8263635f43fd72135d2d ] + +As Yanfei pointed out, although invoking trc_del_holdout() is safe +from the viewpoint of the integrity of the holdout list itself, +the put_task_struct() invoked by trc_del_holdout() can result in +use-after-free errors due to later accesses to this task_struct structure +by the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread. + +This commit therefore removes this call to trc_del_holdout() from +trc_inspect_reader() in favor of the grace-period thread's existing call +to trc_del_holdout(), thus eliminating that particular class of +use-after-free errors. + +Reported-by: "Xu, Yanfei" +Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + kernel/rcu/tasks.h | 5 ++--- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tasks.h b/kernel/rcu/tasks.h +index 73bbe792fe1e..208acb286ec2 100644 +--- a/kernel/rcu/tasks.h ++++ b/kernel/rcu/tasks.h +@@ -879,10 +879,9 @@ static bool trc_inspect_reader(struct task_struct *t, void *arg) + in_qs = likely(!t->trc_reader_nesting); + } + +- // Mark as checked. Because this is called from the grace-period +- // kthread, also remove the task from the holdout list. ++ // Mark as checked so that the grace-period kthread will ++ // remove it from the holdout list. + t->trc_reader_checked = true; +- trc_del_holdout(t); + + if (in_qs) + return true; // Already in quiescent state, done!!! +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_wait_for_.patch b/queue-5.10/rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_wait_for_.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8fff9464ace --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_wait_for_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 6bd294c18ca98ce0b2edb5218e9a3921b2e96ea2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 11:28:40 -0700 +Subject: rcu-tasks: Don't delete holdouts within trc_wait_for_one_reader() + +From: Paul E. McKenney + +[ Upstream commit a9ab9cce9367a2cc02a3c7eb57a004dc0b8f380d ] + +Invoking trc_del_holdout() from within trc_wait_for_one_reader() is +only a performance optimization because the RCU Tasks Trace grace-period +kthread will eventually do this within check_all_holdout_tasks_trace(). +But it is not a particularly important performance optimization because +it only applies to the grace-period kthread, of which there is but one. +This commit therefore removes this invocation of trc_del_holdout() in +favor of the one in check_all_holdout_tasks_trace() in the grace-period +kthread. + +Reported-by: "Xu, Yanfei" +Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + kernel/rcu/tasks.h | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tasks.h b/kernel/rcu/tasks.h +index 208acb286ec2..b338f514ee5a 100644 +--- a/kernel/rcu/tasks.h ++++ b/kernel/rcu/tasks.h +@@ -908,7 +908,6 @@ static void trc_wait_for_one_reader(struct task_struct *t, + // The current task had better be in a quiescent state. + if (t == current) { + t->trc_reader_checked = true; +- trc_del_holdout(t); + WARN_ON_ONCE(t->trc_reader_nesting); + return; + } +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch b/queue-5.10/sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..43e2b30d32a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.10/sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From ad86045738b3273584f5b94c5ca6f25b44bae726 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 23:34:08 -0400 +Subject: sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Xin Long + +[ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ] + +The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses +was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be +allowed to use in SCTP. + +As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from +unusable to private scope. + +Reported-by: Sérgio +Signed-off-by: Xin Long +Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/net/sctp/constants.h | 4 +--- + net/sctp/protocol.c | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/net/sctp/constants.h b/include/net/sctp/constants.h +index 122d9e2d8dfd..1ad049ac2add 100644 +--- a/include/net/sctp/constants.h ++++ b/include/net/sctp/constants.h +@@ -340,8 +340,7 @@ enum { + #define SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_MAX SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_LINK + + /* Based on IPv4 scoping , +- * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.18.0.0/24, +- * 192.88.99.0/24. ++ * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 192.88.99.0/24. + * Also, RFC 8.4, non-unicast addresses are not considered valid SCTP + * addresses. + */ +@@ -349,7 +348,6 @@ enum { + ((htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST) == a) || \ + ipv4_is_multicast(a) || \ + ipv4_is_zeronet(a) || \ +- ipv4_is_test_198(a) || \ + ipv4_is_anycast_6to4(a)) + + /* Flags used for the bind address copy functions. */ +diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c +index 47fb87ce489f..940f1e257a90 100644 +--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c ++++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c +@@ -397,7 +397,8 @@ static enum sctp_scope sctp_v4_scope(union sctp_addr *addr) + retval = SCTP_SCOPE_LINK; + } else if (ipv4_is_private_10(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || + ipv4_is_private_172(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || +- ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) { ++ ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || ++ ipv4_is_test_198(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) { + retval = SCTP_SCOPE_PRIVATE; + } else { + retval = SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL; +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.10/series b/queue-5.10/series index 36f3a6e6632..b44d3958a80 100644 --- a/queue-5.10/series +++ b/queue-5.10/series @@ -4,3 +4,21 @@ kvm-x86-determine-if-an-exception-has-an-error-code-only-when-injecting-it.patch af_unix-fix-garbage-collect-vs-msg_peek.patch workqueue-fix-uaf-in-pwq_unbound_release_workfn.patch cgroup1-fix-leaked-context-root-causing-sporadic-null-deref-in-ltp.patch +net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch +net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch +net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch +sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch +rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_inspect_r.patch +rcu-tasks-don-t-delete-holdouts-within-trc_wait_for_.patch +ipv6-allocate-enough-headroom-in-ip6_finish_output2.patch +drm-ttm-add-a-check-against-null-pointer-dereference.patch +hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch +hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch +hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch +firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch +firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch +cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch +iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_data.patch +iomap-remove-the-length-variable-in-iomap_seek_hole.patch +arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch +ipv6-ip6_finish_output2-set-sk-into-newly-allocated-.patch