From: Tobias Stoeckmann Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 15:33:11 +0000 (+0200) Subject: Check return value of buf_move_to_buf for error. X-Git-Tag: tor-0.4.0.4-rc~6^2^2~1 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a628e36024c4db6e5b178abe3a0b2784c0ab00ec;p=thirdparty%2Ftor.git Check return value of buf_move_to_buf for error. If the concatenation of connection buffer and the buffer of linked connection exceeds INT_MAX bytes, then buf_move_to_buf returns -1 as an error value. This value is currently casted to size_t (variable n_read) and will erroneously lead to an increasement of variable "max_to_read". This in turn can be used to call connection_buf_read_from_socket to store more data inside the buffer than expected and clogging the connection buffer. If the linked connection buffer was able to overflow INT_MAX, the call of buf_move_to_buf would have previously internally triggered an integer overflow, corrupting the state of the connection buffer. Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann --- diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 0a2a635096..f18ef74536 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -3561,6 +3561,10 @@ connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, if (conn->linked_conn) { result = buf_move_to_buf(conn->inbuf, conn->linked_conn->outbuf, &conn->linked_conn->outbuf_flushlen); + if (BUG(result<0)) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "reading from linked connection buffer failed."); + return -1; + } } else { result = 0; }