From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2018 15:37:52 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 3.18-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v4.4.160~21 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=ad918a65c69092f3e5569266eb5ca6692152c6b9;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 3.18-stable patches added patches: arch-hexagon-fix-kernel-dma.c-build-warning.patch cifs-read-overflow-in-is_valid_oplock_break.patch dm-thin-metadata-try-to-avoid-ever-aborting-transactions.patch fs-cifs-suppress-a-string-overflow-warning.patch hexagon-modify-ffs-and-fls-to-return-int.patch pinctrl-msm-really-mask-level-interrupts-to-prevent-latching.patch r8169-clear-rtl_flag_task_-_pending-when-clearing-rtl_flag_task_enabled.patch rdma-ucma-check-fd-type-in-ucma_migrate_id.patch s390-qeth-don-t-dump-past-end-of-unknown-hw-header.patch usb-gadget-fotg210-udc-fix-memory-leak-of-fotg210-ep.patch usb-yurex-check-for-truncation-in-yurex_read.patch xen-fix-gcc-warning-and-remove-duplicate-evtchn_row-evtchn_col-usage.patch xen-manage-don-t-complain-about-an-empty-value-in-control-sysrq-node.patch --- diff --git a/queue-3.18/arch-hexagon-fix-kernel-dma.c-build-warning.patch b/queue-3.18/arch-hexagon-fix-kernel-dma.c-build-warning.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4d68ef74691 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/arch-hexagon-fix-kernel-dma.c-build-warning.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Randy Dunlap +Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 20:17:35 -0700 +Subject: arch/hexagon: fix kernel/dma.c build warning + +From: Randy Dunlap + +[ Upstream commit 200f351e27f014fcbf69b544b0b4b72aeaf45fd3 ] + +Fix build warning in arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c by casting a void * +to unsigned long to match the function parameter type. + +../arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c: In function 'arch_dma_alloc': +../arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c:51:5: warning: passing argument 2 of 'gen_pool_add' makes integer from pointer without a cast [enabled by default] +../include/linux/genalloc.h:112:19: note: expected 'long unsigned int' but argument is of type 'void *' + +Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap +Cc: Yoshinori Sato +Cc: Rich Felker +Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org +Patch-mainline: linux-kernel @ 07/20/2018, 20:17 +[rkuo@codeaurora.org: fixed architecture name] +Signed-off-by: Richard Kuo +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c ++++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/dma.c +@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void *hexagon_dma_alloc_coherent( + panic("Can't create %s() memory pool!", __func__); + else + gen_pool_add(coherent_pool, +- pfn_to_virt(max_low_pfn), ++ (unsigned long)pfn_to_virt(max_low_pfn), + hexagon_coherent_pool_size, -1); + } + diff --git a/queue-3.18/cifs-read-overflow-in-is_valid_oplock_break.patch b/queue-3.18/cifs-read-overflow-in-is_valid_oplock_break.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7b7848a91d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/cifs-read-overflow-in-is_valid_oplock_break.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Dan Carpenter +Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:47:01 +0300 +Subject: cifs: read overflow in is_valid_oplock_break() + +From: Dan Carpenter + +[ Upstream commit 097f5863b1a0c9901f180bbd56ae7d630655faaa ] + +We need to verify that the "data_offset" is within bounds. + +Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect +Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter +Signed-off-by: Steve French +Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + fs/cifs/misc.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +--- a/fs/cifs/misc.c ++++ b/fs/cifs/misc.c +@@ -405,9 +405,17 @@ is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer, stru + (struct smb_com_transaction_change_notify_rsp *)buf; + struct file_notify_information *pnotify; + __u32 data_offset = 0; ++ size_t len = srv->total_read - sizeof(pSMBr->hdr.smb_buf_length); ++ + if (get_bcc(buf) > sizeof(struct file_notify_information)) { + data_offset = le32_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset); + ++ if (data_offset > ++ len - sizeof(struct file_notify_information)) { ++ cifs_dbg(FYI, "invalid data_offset %u\n", ++ data_offset); ++ return true; ++ } + pnotify = (struct file_notify_information *) + ((char *)&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol + data_offset); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "dnotify on %s Action: 0x%x\n", diff --git a/queue-3.18/dm-thin-metadata-try-to-avoid-ever-aborting-transactions.patch b/queue-3.18/dm-thin-metadata-try-to-avoid-ever-aborting-transactions.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4ed8eba040e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/dm-thin-metadata-try-to-avoid-ever-aborting-transactions.patch @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Joe Thornber +Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 16:50:09 +0100 +Subject: dm thin metadata: try to avoid ever aborting transactions + +From: Joe Thornber + +[ Upstream commit 3ab91828166895600efd9cdc3a0eb32001f7204a ] + +Committing a transaction can consume some metadata of it's own, we now +reserve a small amount of metadata to cover this. Free metadata +reported by the kernel will not include this reserve. + +If any of the reserve has been used after a commit we enter a new +internal state PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE. This is reported as +PM_READ_ONLY, so no userland changes are needed. If the metadata +device is resized the pool will move back to PM_WRITE. + +These changes mean we never need to abort and rollback a transaction due +to running out of metadata space. This is particularly important +because there have been a handful of reports of data corruption against +DM thin-provisioning that can all be attributed to the thin-pool having +ran out of metadata space. + +Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber +Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++ + drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c ++++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +@@ -191,6 +191,12 @@ struct dm_pool_metadata { + bool read_only:1; + + /* ++ * We reserve a section of the metadata for commit overhead. ++ * All reported space does *not* include this. ++ */ ++ dm_block_t metadata_reserve; ++ ++ /* + * Set if a transaction has to be aborted but the attempt to roll back + * to the previous (good) transaction failed. The only pool metadata + * operation possible in this state is the closing of the device. +@@ -824,6 +830,22 @@ static int __commit_transaction(struct d + return dm_tm_commit(pmd->tm, sblock); + } + ++static void __set_metadata_reserve(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd) ++{ ++ int r; ++ dm_block_t total; ++ dm_block_t max_blocks = 4096; /* 16M */ ++ ++ r = dm_sm_get_nr_blocks(pmd->metadata_sm, &total); ++ if (r) { ++ DMERR("could not get size of metadata device"); ++ pmd->metadata_reserve = max_blocks; ++ } else { ++ sector_div(total, 10); ++ pmd->metadata_reserve = min(max_blocks, total); ++ } ++} ++ + struct dm_pool_metadata *dm_pool_metadata_open(struct block_device *bdev, + sector_t data_block_size, + bool format_device) +@@ -858,6 +880,8 @@ struct dm_pool_metadata *dm_pool_metadat + return ERR_PTR(r); + } + ++ __set_metadata_reserve(pmd); ++ + return pmd; + } + +@@ -1625,6 +1649,13 @@ int dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_coun + down_read(&pmd->root_lock); + if (!pmd->fail_io) + r = dm_sm_get_nr_free(pmd->metadata_sm, result); ++ ++ if (!r) { ++ if (*result < pmd->metadata_reserve) ++ *result = 0; ++ else ++ *result -= pmd->metadata_reserve; ++ } + up_read(&pmd->root_lock); + + return r; +@@ -1746,8 +1777,11 @@ int dm_pool_resize_metadata_dev(struct d + int r = -EINVAL; + + down_write(&pmd->root_lock); +- if (!pmd->fail_io) ++ if (!pmd->fail_io) { + r = __resize_space_map(pmd->metadata_sm, new_count); ++ if (!r) ++ __set_metadata_reserve(pmd); ++ } + up_write(&pmd->root_lock); + + return r; +--- a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c ++++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c +@@ -140,7 +140,13 @@ struct dm_thin_new_mapping; + enum pool_mode { + PM_WRITE, /* metadata may be changed */ + PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE, /* metadata may be changed, though data may not be allocated */ ++ ++ /* ++ * Like READ_ONLY, except may switch back to WRITE on metadata resize. Reported as READ_ONLY. ++ */ ++ PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE, + PM_READ_ONLY, /* metadata may not be changed */ ++ + PM_FAIL, /* all I/O fails */ + }; + +@@ -994,7 +1000,35 @@ static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *p + + static void requeue_bios(struct pool *pool); + +-static void check_for_space(struct pool *pool) ++static bool is_read_only_pool_mode(enum pool_mode mode) ++{ ++ return (mode == PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE || mode == PM_READ_ONLY); ++} ++ ++static bool is_read_only(struct pool *pool) ++{ ++ return is_read_only_pool_mode(get_pool_mode(pool)); ++} ++ ++static void check_for_metadata_space(struct pool *pool) ++{ ++ int r; ++ const char *ooms_reason = NULL; ++ dm_block_t nr_free; ++ ++ r = dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_count(pool->pmd, &nr_free); ++ if (r) ++ ooms_reason = "Could not get free metadata blocks"; ++ else if (!nr_free) ++ ooms_reason = "No free metadata blocks"; ++ ++ if (ooms_reason && !is_read_only(pool)) { ++ DMERR("%s", ooms_reason); ++ set_pool_mode(pool, PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE); ++ } ++} ++ ++static void check_for_data_space(struct pool *pool) + { + int r; + dm_block_t nr_free; +@@ -1020,14 +1054,16 @@ static int commit(struct pool *pool) + { + int r; + +- if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_READ_ONLY) ++ if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE) + return -EINVAL; + + r = dm_pool_commit_metadata(pool->pmd); + if (r) + metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_commit_metadata", r); +- else +- check_for_space(pool); ++ else { ++ check_for_metadata_space(pool); ++ check_for_data_space(pool); ++ } + + return r; + } +@@ -1093,6 +1129,19 @@ static int alloc_data_block(struct thin_ + return r; + } + ++ r = dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_count(pool->pmd, &free_blocks); ++ if (r) { ++ metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_get_free_metadata_block_count", r); ++ return r; ++ } ++ ++ if (!free_blocks) { ++ /* Let's commit before we use up the metadata reserve. */ ++ r = commit(pool); ++ if (r) ++ return r; ++ } ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -1124,6 +1173,7 @@ static int should_error_unserviceable_bi + case PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE: + return pool->pf.error_if_no_space ? -ENOSPC : 0; + ++ case PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE: + case PM_READ_ONLY: + case PM_FAIL: + return -EIO; +@@ -1823,8 +1873,9 @@ static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *p + error_retry_list(pool); + break; + ++ case PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE: + case PM_READ_ONLY: +- if (old_mode != new_mode) ++ if (!is_read_only_pool_mode(old_mode)) + notify_of_pool_mode_change(pool, "read-only"); + dm_pool_metadata_read_only(pool->pmd); + pool->process_bio = process_bio_read_only; +@@ -2727,6 +2778,10 @@ static int maybe_resize_metadata_dev(str + DMINFO("%s: growing the metadata device from %llu to %llu blocks", + dm_device_name(pool->pool_md), + sb_metadata_dev_size, metadata_dev_size); ++ ++ if (get_pool_mode(pool) == PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE) ++ set_pool_mode(pool, PM_WRITE); ++ + r = dm_pool_resize_metadata_dev(pool->pmd, metadata_dev_size); + if (r) { + metadata_operation_failed(pool, "dm_pool_resize_metadata_dev", r); +@@ -2974,7 +3029,7 @@ static int pool_message(struct dm_target + struct pool_c *pt = ti->private; + struct pool *pool = pt->pool; + +- if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_READ_ONLY) { ++ if (get_pool_mode(pool) >= PM_OUT_OF_METADATA_SPACE) { + DMERR("%s: unable to service pool target messages in READ_ONLY or FAIL mode", + dm_device_name(pool->pool_md)); + return -EINVAL; +@@ -3047,6 +3102,7 @@ static void pool_status(struct dm_target + dm_block_t nr_blocks_data; + dm_block_t nr_blocks_metadata; + dm_block_t held_root; ++ enum pool_mode mode; + char buf[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; + char buf2[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; + struct pool_c *pt = ti->private; +@@ -3117,9 +3173,10 @@ static void pool_status(struct dm_target + else + DMEMIT("- "); + +- if (pool->pf.mode == PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE) ++ mode = get_pool_mode(pool); ++ if (mode == PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE) + DMEMIT("out_of_data_space "); +- else if (pool->pf.mode == PM_READ_ONLY) ++ else if (is_read_only_pool_mode(mode)) + DMEMIT("ro "); + else + DMEMIT("rw "); diff --git a/queue-3.18/fs-cifs-suppress-a-string-overflow-warning.patch b/queue-3.18/fs-cifs-suppress-a-string-overflow-warning.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cc2612299c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/fs-cifs-suppress-a-string-overflow-warning.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Stephen Rothwell +Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 13:15:58 +1000 +Subject: fs/cifs: suppress a string overflow warning + +From: Stephen Rothwell + +[ Upstream commit bcfb84a996f6fa90b5e6e2954b2accb7a4711097 ] + +A powerpc build of cifs with gcc v8.2.0 produces this warning: + +fs/cifs/cifssmb.c: In function ‘CIFSSMBNegotiate’: +fs/cifs/cifssmb.c:605:3: warning: ‘strncpy’ writing 16 bytes into a region of size 1 overflows the destination [-Wstringop-overflow=] + strncpy(pSMB->DialectsArray+count, protocols[i].name, 16); + ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Since we are already doing a strlen() on the source, change the strncpy +to a memcpy(). + +Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell +Signed-off-by: Steve French +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c ++++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c +@@ -577,10 +577,15 @@ CIFSSMBNegotiate(const unsigned int xid, + } + + count = 0; ++ /* ++ * We know that all the name entries in the protocols array ++ * are short (< 16 bytes anyway) and are NUL terminated. ++ */ + for (i = 0; i < CIFS_NUM_PROT; i++) { +- strncpy(pSMB->DialectsArray+count, protocols[i].name, 16); +- count += strlen(protocols[i].name) + 1; +- /* null at end of source and target buffers anyway */ ++ size_t len = strlen(protocols[i].name) + 1; ++ ++ memcpy(pSMB->DialectsArray+count, protocols[i].name, len); ++ count += len; + } + inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, count); + pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(count); diff --git a/queue-3.18/hexagon-modify-ffs-and-fls-to-return-int.patch b/queue-3.18/hexagon-modify-ffs-and-fls-to-return-int.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..52eecca8da8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/hexagon-modify-ffs-and-fls-to-return-int.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Randy Dunlap +Date: Sun, 22 Jul 2018 16:03:58 -0700 +Subject: hexagon: modify ffs() and fls() to return int + +From: Randy Dunlap + +[ Upstream commit 5c41aaad409c097cf1ef74f2c649fed994744ef5 ] + +Building drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nandsim.c on arch/hexagon/ produces a +printk format build warning. This is due to hexagon's ffs() being +coded as returning long instead of int. + +Fix the printk format warning by changing all of hexagon's ffs() and +fls() functions to return int instead of long. The variables that +they return are already int instead of long. This return type +matches the return type in . + +../drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nandsim.c: In function 'init_nandsim': +../drivers/mtd/nand/raw/nandsim.c:760:2: warning: format '%u' expects argument of type 'unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'long int' [-Wformat] + +There are no ffs() or fls() allmodconfig build errors after making this +change. + +Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap +Cc: Richard Kuo +Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org +Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven +Patch-mainline: linux-kernel @ 07/22/2018, 16:03 +Signed-off-by: Richard Kuo +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h ++++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h +@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline long ffz(int x) + * This is defined the same way as ffs. + * Note fls(0) = 0, fls(1) = 1, fls(0x80000000) = 32. + */ +-static inline long fls(int x) ++static inline int fls(int x) + { + int r; + +@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static inline long fls(int x) + * the libc and compiler builtin ffs routines, therefore + * differs in spirit from the above ffz (man ffs). + */ +-static inline long ffs(int x) ++static inline int ffs(int x) + { + int r; + diff --git a/queue-3.18/pinctrl-msm-really-mask-level-interrupts-to-prevent-latching.patch b/queue-3.18/pinctrl-msm-really-mask-level-interrupts-to-prevent-latching.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..50fd0a221da --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/pinctrl-msm-really-mask-level-interrupts-to-prevent-latching.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Stephen Boyd +Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2018 13:06:46 -0700 +Subject: pinctrl: msm: Really mask level interrupts to prevent latching + +From: Stephen Boyd + +[ Upstream commit b55326dc969ea2d704a008d9a97583b128f54f4f ] + +The interrupt controller hardware in this pin controller has two status +enable bits. The first "normal" status enable bit enables or disables +the summary interrupt line being raised when a gpio interrupt triggers +and the "raw" status enable bit allows or prevents the hardware from +latching an interrupt into the status register for a gpio interrupt. +Currently we just toggle the "normal" status enable bit in the mask and +unmask ops so that the summary irq interrupt going to the CPU's +interrupt controller doesn't trigger for the masked gpio interrupt. + +For a level triggered interrupt, the flow would be as follows: the pin +controller sees the interrupt, latches the status into the status +register, raises the summary irq to the CPU, summary irq handler runs +and calls handle_level_irq(), handle_level_irq() masks and acks the gpio +interrupt, the interrupt handler runs, and finally unmask the interrupt. +When the interrupt handler completes, we expect that the interrupt line +level will go back to the deasserted state so the genirq code can unmask +the interrupt without it triggering again. + +If we only mask the interrupt by clearing the "normal" status enable bit +then we'll ack the interrupt but it will continue to show up as pending +in the status register because the raw status bit is enabled, the +hardware hasn't deasserted the line, and thus the asserted state latches +into the status register again. When the hardware deasserts the +interrupt the pin controller still thinks there is a pending unserviced +level interrupt because it latched it earlier. This behavior causes +software to see an extra interrupt for level type interrupts each time +the interrupt is handled. + +Let's fix this by clearing the raw status enable bit for level type +interrupts so that the hardware stops latching the status of the +interrupt after we ack it. We don't do this for edge type interrupts +because it seems that toggling the raw status enable bit for edge type +interrupts causes spurious edge interrupts. + +Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd +Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson +Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson +Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-msm.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-msm.c ++++ b/drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-msm.c +@@ -596,6 +596,29 @@ static void msm_gpio_irq_mask(struct irq + spin_lock_irqsave(&pctrl->lock, flags); + + val = readl(pctrl->regs + g->intr_cfg_reg); ++ /* ++ * There are two bits that control interrupt forwarding to the CPU. The ++ * RAW_STATUS_EN bit causes the level or edge sensed on the line to be ++ * latched into the interrupt status register when the hardware detects ++ * an irq that it's configured for (either edge for edge type or level ++ * for level type irq). The 'non-raw' status enable bit causes the ++ * hardware to assert the summary interrupt to the CPU if the latched ++ * status bit is set. There's a bug though, the edge detection logic ++ * seems to have a problem where toggling the RAW_STATUS_EN bit may ++ * cause the status bit to latch spuriously when there isn't any edge ++ * so we can't touch that bit for edge type irqs and we have to keep ++ * the bit set anyway so that edges are latched while the line is masked. ++ * ++ * To make matters more complicated, leaving the RAW_STATUS_EN bit ++ * enabled all the time causes level interrupts to re-latch into the ++ * status register because the level is still present on the line after ++ * we ack it. We clear the raw status enable bit during mask here and ++ * set the bit on unmask so the interrupt can't latch into the hardware ++ * while it's masked. ++ */ ++ if (irqd_get_trigger_type(d) & IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_MASK) ++ val &= ~BIT(g->intr_raw_status_bit); ++ + val &= ~BIT(g->intr_enable_bit); + writel(val, pctrl->regs + g->intr_cfg_reg); + +@@ -617,6 +640,7 @@ static void msm_gpio_irq_unmask(struct i + spin_lock_irqsave(&pctrl->lock, flags); + + val = readl(pctrl->regs + g->intr_cfg_reg); ++ val |= BIT(g->intr_raw_status_bit); + val |= BIT(g->intr_enable_bit); + writel(val, pctrl->regs + g->intr_cfg_reg); + diff --git a/queue-3.18/r8169-clear-rtl_flag_task_-_pending-when-clearing-rtl_flag_task_enabled.patch b/queue-3.18/r8169-clear-rtl_flag_task_-_pending-when-clearing-rtl_flag_task_enabled.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4da4d2d408d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/r8169-clear-rtl_flag_task_-_pending-when-clearing-rtl_flag_task_enabled.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Kai-Heng Feng +Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 01:51:43 +0800 +Subject: r8169: Clear RTL_FLAG_TASK_*_PENDING when clearing RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED + +From: Kai-Heng Feng + +[ Upstream commit 6ad569019999300afd8e614d296fdc356550b77f ] + +After system suspend, sometimes the r8169 doesn't work when ethernet +cable gets pluggued. + +This issue happens because rtl_reset_work() doesn't get called from +rtl8169_runtime_resume(), after system suspend. + +In rtl_task(), RTL_FLAG_TASK_* only gets cleared if this condition is +met: +if (!netif_running(dev) || + !test_bit(RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, tp->wk.flags)) + ... + +If RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED was cleared during system suspend while +RTL_FLAG_TASK_RESET_PENDING was set, the next rtl_schedule_task() won't +schedule task as the flag is still there. + +So in addition to clearing RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, also clears other +flags. + +Cc: Heiner Kallweit +Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 9 ++++++--- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ struct rtl8169_counters { + }; + + enum rtl_flag { +- RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, ++ RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED = 0, + RTL_FLAG_TASK_SLOW_PENDING, + RTL_FLAG_TASK_RESET_PENDING, + RTL_FLAG_TASK_PHY_PENDING, +@@ -7523,7 +7523,8 @@ static int rtl8169_close(struct net_devi + rtl8169_update_counters(dev); + + rtl_lock_work(tp); +- clear_bit(RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, tp->wk.flags); ++ /* Clear all task flags */ ++ bitmap_zero(tp->wk.flags, RTL_FLAG_MAX); + + rtl8169_down(dev); + rtl_unlock_work(tp); +@@ -7679,7 +7680,9 @@ static void rtl8169_net_suspend(struct n + + rtl_lock_work(tp); + napi_disable(&tp->napi); +- clear_bit(RTL_FLAG_TASK_ENABLED, tp->wk.flags); ++ /* Clear all task flags */ ++ bitmap_zero(tp->wk.flags, RTL_FLAG_MAX); ++ + rtl_unlock_work(tp); + + rtl_pll_power_down(tp); diff --git a/queue-3.18/rdma-ucma-check-fd-type-in-ucma_migrate_id.patch b/queue-3.18/rdma-ucma-check-fd-type-in-ucma_migrate_id.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9753f6714ac --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/rdma-ucma-check-fd-type-in-ucma_migrate_id.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Jann Horn +Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 18:54:14 +0200 +Subject: RDMA/ucma: check fd type in ucma_migrate_id() + +From: Jann Horn + +[ Upstream commit 0d23ba6034b9cf48b8918404367506da3e4b3ee5 ] + +The current code grabs the private_data of whatever file descriptor +userspace has supplied and implicitly casts it to a `struct ucma_file *`, +potentially causing a type confusion. + +This is probably fine in practice because the pointer is only used for +comparisons, it is never actually dereferenced; and even in the +comparisons, it is unlikely that a file from another filesystem would have +a ->private_data pointer that happens to also be valid in this context. +But ->private_data is not always guaranteed to be a valid pointer to an +object owned by the file's filesystem; for example, some filesystems just +cram numbers in there. + +Check the type of the supplied file descriptor to be safe, analogous to how +other places in the kernel do it. + +Fixes: 88314e4dda1e ("RDMA/cma: add support for rdma_migrate_id()") +Signed-off-by: Jann Horn +Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c ++++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mut); + static DEFINE_IDR(ctx_idr); + static DEFINE_IDR(multicast_idr); + ++static const struct file_operations ucma_fops; ++ + static inline struct ucma_context *_ucma_find_context(int id, + struct ucma_file *file) + { +@@ -1416,6 +1418,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_migrate_id(struct uc + f = fdget(cmd.fd); + if (!f.file) + return -ENOENT; ++ if (f.file->f_op != &ucma_fops) { ++ ret = -EINVAL; ++ goto file_put; ++ } + + /* Validate current fd and prevent destruction of id. */ + ctx = ucma_get_ctx(f.file->private_data, cmd.id); diff --git a/queue-3.18/s390-qeth-don-t-dump-past-end-of-unknown-hw-header.patch b/queue-3.18/s390-qeth-don-t-dump-past-end-of-unknown-hw-header.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..96100dfbbd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/s390-qeth-don-t-dump-past-end-of-unknown-hw-header.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Julian Wiedmann +Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:31:35 +0200 +Subject: s390/qeth: don't dump past end of unknown HW header + +From: Julian Wiedmann + +[ Upstream commit 0ac1487c4b2de383b91ecad1be561b8f7a2c15f4 ] + +For inbound data with an unsupported HW header format, only dump the +actual HW header. We have no idea how much payload follows it, and what +it contains. Worst case, we dump past the end of the Inbound Buffer and +access whatever is located next in memory. + +Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c | 2 +- + drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c ++++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ static int qeth_l2_process_inbound_buffe + default: + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); + QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "inbunkno"); +- QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, QETH_DBF_CTRL_LEN); ++ QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, sizeof(*hdr)); + continue; + } + work_done++; +--- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c ++++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c +@@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@ static int qeth_l3_process_inbound_buffe + default: + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); + QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "inbunkno"); +- QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, QETH_DBF_CTRL_LEN); ++ QETH_DBF_HEX(CTRL, 3, hdr, sizeof(*hdr)); + continue; + } + work_done++; diff --git a/queue-3.18/series b/queue-3.18/series index d8afb360e00..a80e4483e21 100644 --- a/queue-3.18/series +++ b/queue-3.18/series @@ -81,3 +81,16 @@ mac80211-shorten-the-ibss-debug-messages.patch tools-vm-slabinfo.c-fix-sign-compare-warning.patch tools-vm-page-types.c-fix-defined-but-not-used-warning.patch mm-madvise-madv_dodump-allow-hugetlbfs-pages.patch +usb-gadget-fotg210-udc-fix-memory-leak-of-fotg210-ep.patch +pinctrl-msm-really-mask-level-interrupts-to-prevent-latching.patch +rdma-ucma-check-fd-type-in-ucma_migrate_id.patch +usb-yurex-check-for-truncation-in-yurex_read.patch +fs-cifs-suppress-a-string-overflow-warning.patch +dm-thin-metadata-try-to-avoid-ever-aborting-transactions.patch +arch-hexagon-fix-kernel-dma.c-build-warning.patch +hexagon-modify-ffs-and-fls-to-return-int.patch +r8169-clear-rtl_flag_task_-_pending-when-clearing-rtl_flag_task_enabled.patch +s390-qeth-don-t-dump-past-end-of-unknown-hw-header.patch +cifs-read-overflow-in-is_valid_oplock_break.patch +xen-manage-don-t-complain-about-an-empty-value-in-control-sysrq-node.patch +xen-fix-gcc-warning-and-remove-duplicate-evtchn_row-evtchn_col-usage.patch diff --git a/queue-3.18/usb-gadget-fotg210-udc-fix-memory-leak-of-fotg210-ep.patch b/queue-3.18/usb-gadget-fotg210-udc-fix-memory-leak-of-fotg210-ep.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..23d1429ab70 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/usb-gadget-fotg210-udc-fix-memory-leak-of-fotg210-ep.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Anton Vasilyev +Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 14:44:48 +0300 +Subject: usb: gadget: fotg210-udc: Fix memory leak of fotg210->ep[i] + +From: Anton Vasilyev + +[ Upstream commit c37bd52836296ecc9a0fc8060b819089aebdbcde ] + +There is no deallocation of fotg210->ep[i] elements, allocated at +fotg210_udc_probe. + +The patch adds deallocation of fotg210->ep array elements and simplifies +error path of fotg210_udc_probe(). + +Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). + +Signed-off-by: Anton Vasilyev +Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fotg210-udc.c | 15 ++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fotg210-udc.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fotg210-udc.c +@@ -1077,12 +1077,15 @@ static struct usb_gadget_ops fotg210_gad + static int fotg210_udc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) + { + struct fotg210_udc *fotg210 = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); ++ int i; + + usb_del_gadget_udc(&fotg210->gadget); + iounmap(fotg210->reg); + free_irq(platform_get_irq(pdev, 0), fotg210); + + fotg210_ep_free_request(&fotg210->ep[0]->ep, fotg210->ep0_req); ++ for (i = 0; i < FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP; i++) ++ kfree(fotg210->ep[i]); + kfree(fotg210); + + return 0; +@@ -1113,7 +1116,7 @@ static int fotg210_udc_probe(struct plat + /* initialize udc */ + fotg210 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fotg210_udc), GFP_KERNEL); + if (fotg210 == NULL) +- goto err_alloc; ++ goto err; + + for (i = 0; i < FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP; i++) { + _ep[i] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fotg210_ep), GFP_KERNEL); +@@ -1125,7 +1128,7 @@ static int fotg210_udc_probe(struct plat + fotg210->reg = ioremap(res->start, resource_size(res)); + if (fotg210->reg == NULL) { + pr_err("ioremap error.\n"); +- goto err_map; ++ goto err_alloc; + } + + spin_lock_init(&fotg210->lock); +@@ -1162,7 +1165,7 @@ static int fotg210_udc_probe(struct plat + fotg210->ep0_req = fotg210_ep_alloc_request(&fotg210->ep[0]->ep, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (fotg210->ep0_req == NULL) +- goto err_req; ++ goto err_map; + + fotg210_init(fotg210); + +@@ -1191,12 +1194,14 @@ err_req: + fotg210_ep_free_request(&fotg210->ep[0]->ep, fotg210->ep0_req); + + err_map: +- if (fotg210->reg) +- iounmap(fotg210->reg); ++ iounmap(fotg210->reg); + + err_alloc: ++ for (i = 0; i < FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP; i++) ++ kfree(fotg210->ep[i]); + kfree(fotg210); + ++err: + return ret; + } + diff --git a/queue-3.18/usb-yurex-check-for-truncation-in-yurex_read.patch b/queue-3.18/usb-yurex-check-for-truncation-in-yurex_read.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..96e9f42bfe6 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/usb-yurex-check-for-truncation-in-yurex_read.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Ben Hutchings +Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 21:45:37 +0100 +Subject: USB: yurex: Check for truncation in yurex_read() + +From: Ben Hutchings + +[ Upstream commit 14427b86837a4baf1c121934c6599bdb67dfa9fc ] + +snprintf() always returns the full length of the string it could have +printed, even if it was truncated because the buffer was too small. +So in case the counter value is truncated, we will over-read from +in_buffer and over-write to the caller's buffer. + +I don't think it's actually possible for this to happen, but in case +truncation occurs, WARN and return -EIO. + +Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +--- a/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c +@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ static ssize_t yurex_read(struct file *f + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); + mutex_unlock(&dev->io_mutex); + ++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len >= sizeof(in_buffer))) ++ return -EIO; ++ + return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, count, ppos, in_buffer, len); + } + diff --git a/queue-3.18/xen-fix-gcc-warning-and-remove-duplicate-evtchn_row-evtchn_col-usage.patch b/queue-3.18/xen-fix-gcc-warning-and-remove-duplicate-evtchn_row-evtchn_col-usage.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fa9559c4834 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/xen-fix-gcc-warning-and-remove-duplicate-evtchn_row-evtchn_col-usage.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Josh Abraham +Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:13:54 -1000 +Subject: xen: fix GCC warning and remove duplicate EVTCHN_ROW/EVTCHN_COL usage + +From: Josh Abraham + +[ Upstream commit 4dca864b59dd150a221730775e2f21f49779c135 ] + +This patch removes duplicate macro useage in events_base.c. + +It also fixes gcc warning: +variable ‘col’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] + +Signed-off-by: Joshua Abraham +Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross +Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c ++++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c +@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int set_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned ev + clear_evtchn_to_irq_row(row); + } + +- evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)][EVTCHN_COL(evtchn)] = irq; ++ evtchn_to_irq[row][col] = irq; + return 0; + } + diff --git a/queue-3.18/xen-manage-don-t-complain-about-an-empty-value-in-control-sysrq-node.patch b/queue-3.18/xen-manage-don-t-complain-about-an-empty-value-in-control-sysrq-node.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..38a1dd804c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-3.18/xen-manage-don-t-complain-about-an-empty-value-in-control-sysrq-node.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From foo@baz Mon Oct 8 17:34:37 CEST 2018 +From: Vitaly Kuznetsov +Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 13:26:08 +0200 +Subject: xen/manage: don't complain about an empty value in control/sysrq node + +From: Vitaly Kuznetsov + +[ Upstream commit 87dffe86d406bee8782cac2db035acb9a28620a7 ] + +When guest receives a sysrq request from the host it acknowledges it by +writing '\0' to control/sysrq xenstore node. This, however, make xenstore +watch fire again but xenbus_scanf() fails to parse empty value with "%c" +format string: + + sysrq: SysRq : Emergency Sync + Emergency Sync complete + xen:manage: Error -34 reading sysrq code in control/sysrq + +Ignore -ERANGE the same way we already ignore -ENOENT, empty value in +control/sysrq is totally legal. + +Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov +Reviewed-by: Wei Liu +Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/xen/manage.c | 6 ++++-- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/xen/manage.c ++++ b/drivers/xen/manage.c +@@ -277,9 +277,11 @@ static void sysrq_handler(struct xenbus_ + /* + * The Xenstore watch fires directly after registering it and + * after a suspend/resume cycle. So ENOENT is no error but +- * might happen in those cases. ++ * might happen in those cases. ERANGE is observed when we get ++ * an empty value (''), this happens when we acknowledge the ++ * request by writing '\0' below. + */ +- if (err != -ENOENT) ++ if (err != -ENOENT && err != -ERANGE) + pr_err("Error %d reading sysrq code in control/sysrq\n", + err); + xenbus_transaction_end(xbt, 1);