From: Sasha Levin Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2023 01:03:16 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Fixes for 5.4 X-Git-Tag: v4.14.314~80 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b248f1887cc37c54994a5fde933471f271f83616;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git Fixes for 5.4 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- diff --git a/queue-5.4/arm-dts-rockchip-fix-a-typo-error-for-rk3288-spdif-n.patch b/queue-5.4/arm-dts-rockchip-fix-a-typo-error-for-rk3288-spdif-n.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4247e75721c --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/arm-dts-rockchip-fix-a-typo-error-for-rk3288-spdif-n.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 110c4bd7ad90f49ea50c1e0d472ce0793ea94c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 17:14:11 +0800 +Subject: ARM: dts: rockchip: fix a typo error for rk3288 spdif node + +From: Jianqun Xu + +[ Upstream commit 02c84f91adb9a64b75ec97d772675c02a3e65ed7 ] + +Fix the address in the spdif node name. + +Fixes: 874e568e500a ("ARM: dts: rockchip: Add SPDIF transceiver for RK3288") +Signed-off-by: Jianqun Xu +Reviewed-by: Sjoerd Simons +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230208091411.1603142-1-jay.xu@rock-chips.com +Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi +index 3a7d375389d0e..36f943a3f3ad2 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi ++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi +@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ + status = "disabled"; + }; + +- spdif: sound@ff88b0000 { ++ spdif: sound@ff8b0000 { + compatible = "rockchip,rk3288-spdif", "rockchip,rk3066-spdif"; + reg = <0x0 0xff8b0000 0x0 0x10000>; + #sound-dai-cells = <0>; +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/arm64-dts-meson-g12-common-specify-full-dmc-range.patch b/queue-5.4/arm64-dts-meson-g12-common-specify-full-dmc-range.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ea29507aed6 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/arm64-dts-meson-g12-common-specify-full-dmc-range.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 17251d0fa12000a47d8a963e3e4a2a4aacebb5fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2023 14:09:30 +0200 +Subject: arm64: dts: meson-g12-common: specify full DMC range + +From: Marc Gonzalez + +[ Upstream commit aec4353114a408b3a831a22ba34942d05943e462 ] + +According to S905X2 Datasheet - Revision 07: +DRAM Memory Controller (DMC) register area spans ff638000-ff63a000. + +According to DeviceTree Specification - Release v0.4-rc1: +simple-bus nodes do not require reg property. + +Fixes: 1499218c80c99a ("arm64: dts: move common G12A & G12B modes to meson-g12-common.dtsi") +Signed-off-by: Marc Gonzalez +Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230327120932.2158389-2-mgonzalez@freebox.fr +Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-g12-common.dtsi | 3 +-- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-g12-common.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-g12-common.dtsi +index 937b27549d56d..a31b623fedb75 100644 +--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-g12-common.dtsi ++++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-g12-common.dtsi +@@ -1376,10 +1376,9 @@ + + dmc: bus@38000 { + compatible = "simple-bus"; +- reg = <0x0 0x38000 0x0 0x400>; + #address-cells = <2>; + #size-cells = <2>; +- ranges = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x38000 0x0 0x400>; ++ ranges = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x38000 0x0 0x2000>; + + canvas: video-lut@48 { + compatible = "amlogic,canvas"; +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/bpf-fix-incorrect-verifier-pruning-due-to-missing-re.patch b/queue-5.4/bpf-fix-incorrect-verifier-pruning-due-to-missing-re.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8ed57dec0b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/bpf-fix-incorrect-verifier-pruning-due-to-missing-re.patch @@ -0,0 +1,425 @@ +From c952d04c6bdd1893d04087bd4be1ce83ad55f019 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 15:24:13 +0000 +Subject: bpf: Fix incorrect verifier pruning due to missing register precision + taints + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit 71b547f561247897a0a14f3082730156c0533fed ] + +Juan Jose et al reported an issue found via fuzzing where the verifier's +pruning logic prematurely marks a program path as safe. + +Consider the following program: + + 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 + 1: (b7) r7 = 0 + 2: (b7) r8 = 0 + 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 + 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 + 5: (05) goto pc+0 + 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 + 7: (97) r6 %= 1 + 8: (b7) r9 = 0 + 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 + 10: (b7) r6 = 0 + 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff888103693400 // map_ptr(ks=4,vs=48) + 15: (bf) r1 = r4 + 16: (bf) r2 = r10 + 17: (07) r2 += -4 + 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + 19: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 + 20: (95) exit + 21: (77) r6 >>= 10 + 22: (27) r6 *= 8192 + 23: (bf) r1 = r0 + 24: (0f) r0 += r6 + 25: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) + 26: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = r3 + 27: (95) exit + +The verifier treats this as safe, leading to oob read/write access due +to an incorrect verifier conclusion: + + func#0 @0 + 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 + 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 ; R6_w=1024 + 1: (b7) r7 = 0 ; R7_w=0 + 2: (b7) r8 = 0 ; R8_w=0 + 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 ; R9_w=-2147483648 + 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 ; R6_w=scalar() + 5: (05) goto pc+0 + 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 ; R6_w=scalar(umin=18446744071562067969,var_off=(0xffffffff00000000; 0xffffffff)) R9_w=-2147483648 + 7: (97) r6 %= 1 ; R6_w=scalar() + 8: (b7) r9 = 0 ; R9=0 + 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 ; R6=scalar(umin=1) R9=0 + 10: (b7) r6 = 0 ; R6_w=0 + 11: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 + 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + last_idx 12 first_idx 9 + regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + 13: R0_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000???? + 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff8ad3886c2a00 ; R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 15: (bf) r1 = r4 ; R1_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 16: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 + 17: (07) r2 += -4 ; R2_w=fp-4 + 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 ; R0=map_value_or_null(id=1,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 19: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R0=0 + 20: (95) exit + + from 19 to 21: R0=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R6=0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm???? + 21: (77) r6 >>= 10 ; R6_w=0 + 22: (27) r6 *= 8192 ; R6_w=0 + 23: (bf) r1 = r0 ; R0=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R1_w=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 24: (0f) r0 += r6 + last_idx 24 first_idx 19 + regs=40 stack=0 before 23: (bf) r1 = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 22: (27) r6 *= 8192 + regs=40 stack=0 before 21: (77) r6 >>= 10 + regs=40 stack=0 before 19: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 + parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks: R0_rw=map_value_or_null(id=1,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R6_rw=P0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm???? + last_idx 18 first_idx 9 + regs=40 stack=0 before 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 17: (07) r2 += -4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 16: (bf) r2 = r10 + regs=40 stack=0 before 15: (bf) r1 = r4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff8ad3886c2a00 + regs=40 stack=0 before 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 10: (b7) r6 = 0 + 25: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0_w=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R3_w=scalar() + 26: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = r3 ; R1_w=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R3_w=scalar() + 27: (95) exit + + from 9 to 11: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6=0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 + 11: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 + 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + last_idx 12 first_idx 11 + regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + 13: R0_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000???? + 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff8ad3886c2a00 ; R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 15: (bf) r1 = r4 ; R1_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 16: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 + 17: (07) r2 += -4 ; R2_w=fp-4 + 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + frame 0: propagating r6 + last_idx 19 first_idx 11 + regs=40 stack=0 before 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 17: (07) r2 += -4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 16: (bf) r2 = r10 + regs=40 stack=0 before 15: (bf) r1 = r4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff8ad3886c2a00 + regs=40 stack=0 before 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6_r=P0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 + last_idx 9 first_idx 9 + regs=40 stack=0 before 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 + parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6_rw=Pscalar() R7_w=0 R8_w=0 R9_rw=0 R10=fp0 + last_idx 8 first_idx 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 8: (b7) r9 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 7: (97) r6 %= 1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 + regs=40 stack=0 before 5: (05) goto pc+0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 + regs=40 stack=0 before 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 + regs=40 stack=0 before 2: (b7) r8 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 1: (b7) r7 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 + 19: safe + frame 0: propagating r6 + last_idx 9 first_idx 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 + regs=40 stack=0 before 5: (05) goto pc+0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 + regs=40 stack=0 before 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 + regs=40 stack=0 before 2: (b7) r8 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 1: (b7) r7 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 + + from 6 to 9: safe + verification time 110 usec + stack depth 4 + processed 36 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 3 peak_states 3 mark_read 2 + +The verifier considers this program as safe by mistakenly pruning unsafe +code paths. In the above func#0, code lines 0-10 are of interest. In line +0-3 registers r6 to r9 are initialized with known scalar values. In line 4 +the register r6 is reset to an unknown scalar given the verifier does not +track modulo operations. Due to this, the verifier can also not determine +precisely which branches in line 6 and 9 are taken, therefore it needs to +explore them both. + +As can be seen, the verifier starts with exploring the false/fall-through +paths first. The 'from 19 to 21' path has both r6=0 and r9=0 and the pointer +arithmetic on r0 += r6 is therefore considered safe. Given the arithmetic, +r6 is correctly marked for precision tracking where backtracking kicks in +where it walks back the current path all the way where r6 was set to 0 in +the fall-through branch. + +Next, the pruning logics pops the path 'from 9 to 11' from the stack. Also +here, the state of the registers is the same, that is, r6=0 and r9=0, so +that at line 19 the path can be pruned as it is considered safe. It is +interesting to note that the conditional in line 9 turned r6 into a more +precise state, that is, in the fall-through path at the beginning of line +10, it is R6=scalar(umin=1), and in the branch-taken path (which is analyzed +here) at the beginning of line 11, r6 turned into a known const r6=0 as +r9=0 prior to that and therefore (unsigned) r6 <= 0 concludes that r6 must +be 0 (**): + + [...] ; R6_w=scalar() + 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 ; R6=scalar(umin=1) R9=0 + [...] + + from 9 to 11: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6=0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 + [...] + +The next path is 'from 6 to 9'. The verifier considers the old and current +state equivalent, and therefore prunes the search incorrectly. Looking into +the two states which are being compared by the pruning logic at line 9, the +old state consists of R6_rwD=Pscalar() R9_rwD=0 R10=fp0 and the new state +consists of R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6_w=scalar(umax=18446744071562067968) +R7_w=0 R8_w=0 R9_w=-2147483648 R10=fp0. While r6 had the reg->precise flag +correctly set in the old state, r9 did not. Both r6'es are considered as +equivalent given the old one is a superset of the current, more precise one, +however, r9's actual values (0 vs 0x80000000) mismatch. Given the old r9 +did not have reg->precise flag set, the verifier does not consider the +register as contributing to the precision state of r6, and therefore it +considered both r9 states as equivalent. However, for this specific pruned +path (which is also the actual path taken at runtime), register r6 will be +0x400 and r9 0x80000000 when reaching line 21, thus oob-accessing the map. + +The purpose of precision tracking is to initially mark registers (including +spilled ones) as imprecise to help verifier's pruning logic finding equivalent +states it can then prune if they don't contribute to the program's safety +aspects. For example, if registers are used for pointer arithmetic or to pass +constant length to a helper, then the verifier sets reg->precise flag and +backtracks the BPF program instruction sequence and chain of verifier states +to ensure that the given register or stack slot including their dependencies +are marked as precisely tracked scalar. This also includes any other registers +and slots that contribute to a tracked state of given registers/stack slot. +This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to traverse +entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the necessary +registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as precise. + +The backtrack_insn() is called from the current instruction up to the first +instruction, and its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and stack +slots that need precision tracking in the parent's verifier state. For example, +if a current instruction is r6 = r7, then r6 needs precision after this +instruction and r7 needs precision before this instruction, that is, in the +parent state. Hence for the latter r7 is marked and r6 unmarked. + +For the class of jmp/jmp32 instructions, backtrack_insn() today only looks +at call and exit instructions and for all other conditionals the masks +remain as-is. However, in the given situation register r6 has a dependency +on r9 (as described above in **), so also that one needs to be marked for +precision tracking. In other words, if an imprecise register influences a +precise one, then the imprecise register should also be marked precise. +Meaning, in the parent state both dest and src register need to be tracked +for precision and therefore the marking must be more conservative by setting +reg->precise flag for both. The precision propagation needs to cover both +for the conditional: if the src reg was marked but not the dst reg and vice +versa. + +After the fix the program is correctly rejected: + + func#0 @0 + 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 + 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 ; R6_w=1024 + 1: (b7) r7 = 0 ; R7_w=0 + 2: (b7) r8 = 0 ; R8_w=0 + 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 ; R9_w=-2147483648 + 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 ; R6_w=scalar() + 5: (05) goto pc+0 + 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 ; R6_w=scalar(umin=18446744071562067969,var_off=(0xffffffff80000000; 0x7fffffff),u32_min=-2147483648) R9_w=-2147483648 + 7: (97) r6 %= 1 ; R6_w=scalar() + 8: (b7) r9 = 0 ; R9=0 + 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 ; R6=scalar(umin=1) R9=0 + 10: (b7) r6 = 0 ; R6_w=0 + 11: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 + 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + last_idx 12 first_idx 9 + regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + 13: R0_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000???? + 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff9290dc5bfe00 ; R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 15: (bf) r1 = r4 ; R1_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 16: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 + 17: (07) r2 += -4 ; R2_w=fp-4 + 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 ; R0=map_value_or_null(id=1,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 19: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R0=0 + 20: (95) exit + + from 19 to 21: R0=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R6=0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm???? + 21: (77) r6 >>= 10 ; R6_w=0 + 22: (27) r6 *= 8192 ; R6_w=0 + 23: (bf) r1 = r0 ; R0=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R1_w=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 24: (0f) r0 += r6 + last_idx 24 first_idx 19 + regs=40 stack=0 before 23: (bf) r1 = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 22: (27) r6 *= 8192 + regs=40 stack=0 before 21: (77) r6 >>= 10 + regs=40 stack=0 before 19: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 + parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks: R0_rw=map_value_or_null(id=1,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R6_rw=P0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm???? + last_idx 18 first_idx 9 + regs=40 stack=0 before 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 17: (07) r2 += -4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 16: (bf) r2 = r10 + regs=40 stack=0 before 15: (bf) r1 = r4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff9290dc5bfe00 + regs=40 stack=0 before 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 10: (b7) r6 = 0 + 25: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0_w=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R3_w=scalar() + 26: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = r3 ; R1_w=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R3_w=scalar() + 27: (95) exit + + from 9 to 11: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6=0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 + 11: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 + 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + last_idx 12 first_idx 11 + regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + 13: R0_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000???? + 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff9290dc5bfe00 ; R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 15: (bf) r1 = r4 ; R1_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 16: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 + 17: (07) r2 += -4 ; R2_w=fp-4 + 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + frame 0: propagating r6 + last_idx 19 first_idx 11 + regs=40 stack=0 before 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 17: (07) r2 += -4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 16: (bf) r2 = r10 + regs=40 stack=0 before 15: (bf) r1 = r4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff9290dc5bfe00 + regs=40 stack=0 before 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6_r=P0 R7=0 R8=0 R9=0 R10=fp0 + last_idx 9 first_idx 9 + regs=40 stack=0 before 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 + parent didn't have regs=240 stack=0 marks: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6_rw=Pscalar() R7_w=0 R8_w=0 R9_rw=P0 R10=fp0 + last_idx 8 first_idx 0 + regs=240 stack=0 before 8: (b7) r9 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 7: (97) r6 %= 1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 + regs=240 stack=0 before 5: (05) goto pc+0 + regs=240 stack=0 before 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 + regs=240 stack=0 before 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 + regs=40 stack=0 before 2: (b7) r8 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 1: (b7) r7 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 + 19: safe + + from 6 to 9: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6_w=scalar(umax=18446744071562067968) R7_w=0 R8_w=0 R9_w=-2147483648 R10=fp0 + 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 + last_idx 9 first_idx 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 + regs=240 stack=0 before 5: (05) goto pc+0 + regs=240 stack=0 before 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 + regs=240 stack=0 before 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 + regs=40 stack=0 before 2: (b7) r8 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 1: (b7) r7 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 + last_idx 9 first_idx 0 + regs=200 stack=0 before 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 + regs=240 stack=0 before 5: (05) goto pc+0 + regs=240 stack=0 before 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 + regs=240 stack=0 before 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 + regs=40 stack=0 before 2: (b7) r8 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 1: (b7) r7 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 + 11: R6=scalar(umax=18446744071562067968) R9=-2147483648 + 11: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 + 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + last_idx 12 first_idx 11 + regs=1 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + 13: R0_w=0 R10=fp0 fp-8=0000???? + 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff9290dc5bfe00 ; R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 15: (bf) r1 = r4 ; R1_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R4_w=map_ptr(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 16: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 + 17: (07) r2 += -4 ; R2_w=fp-4 + 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 ; R0_w=map_value_or_null(id=3,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 19: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 ; R0_w=0 + 20: (95) exit + + from 19 to 21: R0=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R6=scalar(umax=18446744071562067968) R7=0 R8=0 R9=-2147483648 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm???? + 21: (77) r6 >>= 10 ; R6_w=scalar(umax=18014398507384832,var_off=(0x0; 0x3fffffffffffff)) + 22: (27) r6 *= 8192 ; R6_w=scalar(smax=9223372036854767616,umax=18446744073709543424,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffffffffe000),s32_max=2147475456,u32_max=-8192) + 23: (bf) r1 = r0 ; R0=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R1_w=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) + 24: (0f) r0 += r6 + last_idx 24 first_idx 21 + regs=40 stack=0 before 23: (bf) r1 = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 22: (27) r6 *= 8192 + regs=40 stack=0 before 21: (77) r6 >>= 10 + parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks: R0_rw=map_value(off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R6_r=Pscalar(umax=18446744071562067968) R7=0 R8=0 R9=-2147483648 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmm???? + last_idx 19 first_idx 11 + regs=40 stack=0 before 19: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 18: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 + regs=40 stack=0 before 17: (07) r2 += -4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 16: (bf) r2 = r10 + regs=40 stack=0 before 15: (bf) r1 = r4 + regs=40 stack=0 before 13: (18) r4 = 0xffff9290dc5bfe00 + regs=40 stack=0 before 12: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 11: (b7) r0 = 0 + parent didn't have regs=40 stack=0 marks: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R6_rw=Pscalar(umax=18446744071562067968) R7_w=0 R8_w=0 R9_w=-2147483648 R10=fp0 + last_idx 9 first_idx 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 9: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+1 + regs=240 stack=0 before 6: (bd) if r6 <= r9 goto pc+2 + regs=240 stack=0 before 5: (05) goto pc+0 + regs=240 stack=0 before 4: (97) r6 %= 1025 + regs=240 stack=0 before 3: (b7) r9 = -2147483648 + regs=40 stack=0 before 2: (b7) r8 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 1: (b7) r7 = 0 + regs=40 stack=0 before 0: (b7) r6 = 1024 + math between map_value pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed + verification time 886 usec + stack depth 4 + processed 49 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 1 total_states 5 peak_states 5 mark_read 2 + +Fixes: b5dc0163d8fd ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking") +Reported-by: Juan Jose Lopez Jaimez +Reported-by: Meador Inge +Reported-by: Simon Scannell +Reported-by: Nenad Stojanovski +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Co-developed-by: Andrii Nakryiko +Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko +Reviewed-by: John Fastabend +Reviewed-by: Juan Jose Lopez Jaimez +Reviewed-by: Meador Inge +Reviewed-by: Simon Scannell +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +index ca7e05ddbb46e..5476f61bad232 100644 +--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c ++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +@@ -1563,6 +1563,21 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, + } + } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { + return -ENOTSUPP; ++ } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { ++ if (!(*reg_mask & (dreg | sreg))) ++ return 0; ++ /* dreg sreg ++ * Both dreg and sreg need precision before ++ * this insn. If only sreg was marked precise ++ * before it would be equally necessary to ++ * propagate it to dreg. ++ */ ++ *reg_mask |= (sreg | dreg); ++ /* else dreg K ++ * Only dreg still needs precision before ++ * this insn, so for the K-based conditional ++ * there is nothing new to be marked. ++ */ + } + } else if (class == BPF_LD) { + if (!(*reg_mask & dreg)) +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/e1000e-disable-tso-on-i219-lm-card-to-increase-speed.patch b/queue-5.4/e1000e-disable-tso-on-i219-lm-card-to-increase-speed.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e655f228254 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/e1000e-disable-tso-on-i219-lm-card-to-increase-speed.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From f9b6311d894a856e628d8080d5760c3ac8abd1e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2023 13:53:45 -0700 +Subject: e1000e: Disable TSO on i219-LM card to increase speed + +From: Sebastian Basierski + +[ Upstream commit 67d47b95119ad589b0a0b16b88b1dd9a04061ced ] + +While using i219-LM card currently it was only possible to achieve +about 60% of maximum speed due to regression introduced in Linux 5.8. +This was caused by TSO not being disabled by default despite commit +f29801030ac6 ("e1000e: Disable TSO for buffer overrun workaround"). +Fix that by disabling TSO during driver probe. + +Fixes: f29801030ac6 ("e1000e: Disable TSO for buffer overrun workaround") +Signed-off-by: Sebastian Basierski +Signed-off-by: Mateusz Palczewski +Tested-by: Naama Meir +Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen +Reviewed-by: Simon Horman +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230417205345.1030801-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c | 51 +++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c +index b0d43985724d8..2c34d45354fe9 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c +@@ -5270,31 +5270,6 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work) + ew32(TARC(0), tarc0); + } + +- /* disable TSO for pcie and 10/100 speeds, to avoid +- * some hardware issues +- */ +- if (!(adapter->flags & FLAG_TSO_FORCE)) { +- switch (adapter->link_speed) { +- case SPEED_10: +- case SPEED_100: +- e_info("10/100 speed: disabling TSO\n"); +- netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO; +- netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO6; +- break; +- case SPEED_1000: +- netdev->features |= NETIF_F_TSO; +- netdev->features |= NETIF_F_TSO6; +- break; +- default: +- /* oops */ +- break; +- } +- if (hw->mac.type == e1000_pch_spt) { +- netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO; +- netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO6; +- } +- } +- + /* enable transmits in the hardware, need to do this + * after setting TARC(0) + */ +@@ -7223,6 +7198,32 @@ static int e1000_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) + NETIF_F_RXCSUM | + NETIF_F_HW_CSUM); + ++ /* disable TSO for pcie and 10/100 speeds to avoid ++ * some hardware issues and for i219 to fix transfer ++ * speed being capped at 60% ++ */ ++ if (!(adapter->flags & FLAG_TSO_FORCE)) { ++ switch (adapter->link_speed) { ++ case SPEED_10: ++ case SPEED_100: ++ e_info("10/100 speed: disabling TSO\n"); ++ netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO; ++ netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO6; ++ break; ++ case SPEED_1000: ++ netdev->features |= NETIF_F_TSO; ++ netdev->features |= NETIF_F_TSO6; ++ break; ++ default: ++ /* oops */ ++ break; ++ } ++ if (hw->mac.type == e1000_pch_spt) { ++ netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO; ++ netdev->features &= ~NETIF_F_TSO6; ++ } ++ } ++ + /* Set user-changeable features (subset of all device features) */ + netdev->hw_features = netdev->features; + netdev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_RXFCS; +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/f2fs-fix-f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes-ftrace-event.patch b/queue-5.4/f2fs-fix-f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes-ftrace-event.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d9ea2e1c8d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/f2fs-fix-f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes-ftrace-event.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 24c0f85dcb3fcf4f8fc180a3191d1dc8cc9f9e7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:25:49 +0000 +Subject: f2fs: Fix f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes ftrace event + +From: Douglas Raillard + +[ Upstream commit 0b04d4c0542e8573a837b1d81b94209e48723b25 ] + +Fix the nid_t field so that its size is correctly reported in the text +format embedded in trace.dat files. As it stands, it is reported as +being of size 4: + + field:nid_t nid[3]; offset:24; size:4; signed:0; + +Instead of 12: + + field:nid_t nid[3]; offset:24; size:12; signed:0; + +This also fixes the reported offset of subsequent fields so that they +match with the actual struct layout. + +Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard +Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha +Reviewed-by: Chao Yu +Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/trace/events/f2fs.h | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/include/trace/events/f2fs.h b/include/trace/events/f2fs.h +index a7613efc271ab..88266a7fbad26 100644 +--- a/include/trace/events/f2fs.h ++++ b/include/trace/events/f2fs.h +@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes, + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(dev_t, dev) + __field(ino_t, ino) +- __field(nid_t, nid[3]) ++ __array(nid_t, nid, 3) + __field(int, depth) + __field(int, err) + ), +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/i40e-fix-accessing-vsi-active_filters-without-holdin.patch b/queue-5.4/i40e-fix-accessing-vsi-active_filters-without-holdin.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b013ea1ee5e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/i40e-fix-accessing-vsi-active_filters-without-holdin.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 6ce04e27082b67fe0ecd1ecd97bbdfee48c762f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 18:16:38 +0100 +Subject: i40e: fix accessing vsi->active_filters without holding lock + +From: Aleksandr Loktionov + +[ Upstream commit 8485d093b076e59baff424552e8aecfc5bd2d261 ] + +Fix accessing vsi->active_filters without holding the mac_filter_hash_lock. +Move vsi->active_filters = 0 inside critical section and +move clear_bit(__I40E_VSI_OVERFLOW_PROMISC, vsi->state) after the critical +section to ensure the new filters from other threads can be added only after +filters cleaning in the critical section is finished. + +Fixes: 278e7d0b9d68 ("i40e: store MAC/VLAN filters in a hash with the MAC Address as key") +Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov +Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy (A Contingent worker at Intel) +Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +index 05f2f5637d3df..c5edee873ba54 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +@@ -13463,15 +13463,15 @@ static int i40e_add_vsi(struct i40e_vsi *vsi) + vsi->id = ctxt.vsi_number; + } + +- vsi->active_filters = 0; +- clear_bit(__I40E_VSI_OVERFLOW_PROMISC, vsi->state); + spin_lock_bh(&vsi->mac_filter_hash_lock); ++ vsi->active_filters = 0; + /* If macvlan filters already exist, force them to get loaded */ + hash_for_each_safe(vsi->mac_filter_hash, bkt, h, f, hlist) { + f->state = I40E_FILTER_NEW; + f_count++; + } + spin_unlock_bh(&vsi->mac_filter_hash_lock); ++ clear_bit(__I40E_VSI_OVERFLOW_PROMISC, vsi->state); + + if (f_count) { + vsi->flags |= I40E_VSI_FLAG_FILTER_CHANGED; +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/i40e-fix-i40e_setup_misc_vector-error-handling.patch b/queue-5.4/i40e-fix-i40e_setup_misc_vector-error-handling.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d5ca61f6660 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/i40e-fix-i40e_setup_misc_vector-error-handling.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From ca8c14ffab7ce74526a9ef4d62aa0e1d6a465b90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 07:13:18 +0200 +Subject: i40e: fix i40e_setup_misc_vector() error handling + +From: Aleksandr Loktionov + +[ Upstream commit c86c00c6935505929cc9adb29ddb85e48c71f828 ] + +Add error handling of i40e_setup_misc_vector() in i40e_rebuild(). +In case interrupt vectors setup fails do not re-open vsi-s and +do not bring up vf-s, we have no interrupts to serve a traffic +anyway. + +Fixes: 41c445ff0f48 ("i40e: main driver core") +Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov +Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy (A Contingent worker at Intel) +Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +index c5edee873ba54..351d4c53297f5 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +@@ -10336,8 +10336,11 @@ static void i40e_rebuild(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool reinit, bool lock_acquired) + pf->hw.aq.asq_last_status)); + } + /* reinit the misc interrupt */ +- if (pf->flags & I40E_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED) ++ if (pf->flags & I40E_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED) { + ret = i40e_setup_misc_vector(pf); ++ if (ret) ++ goto end_unlock; ++ } + + /* Add a filter to drop all Flow control frames from any VSI from being + * transmitted. By doing so we stop a malicious VF from sending out +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/input-i8042-add-quirk-for-fujitsu-lifebook-a574-h.patch b/queue-5.4/input-i8042-add-quirk-for-fujitsu-lifebook-a574-h.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..691262477de --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/input-i8042-add-quirk-for-fujitsu-lifebook-a574-h.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 617f7252d2a0646d6163b4c05a1aca0df9c4b033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2023 03:19:51 -0700 +Subject: Input: i8042 - add quirk for Fujitsu Lifebook A574/H + +From: Jonathan Denose + +[ Upstream commit f5bad62f9107b701a6def7cac1f5f65862219b83 ] + +Fujitsu Lifebook A574/H requires the nomux option to properly +probe the touchpad, especially when waking from sleep. + +Signed-off-by: Jonathan Denose +Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230303152623.45859-1-jdenose@google.com +Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h b/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h +index 6b2e88da30766..92fb2f72511e8 100644 +--- a/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h ++++ b/drivers/input/serio/i8042-x86ia64io.h +@@ -601,6 +601,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id i8042_dmi_quirk_table[] __initconst = { + }, + .driver_data = (void *)(SERIO_QUIRK_NOMUX) + }, ++ { ++ /* Fujitsu Lifebook A574/H */ ++ .matches = { ++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "FUJITSU"), ++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "FMVA0501PZ"), ++ }, ++ .driver_data = (void *)(SERIO_QUIRK_NOMUX) ++ }, + { + /* Gigabyte M912 */ + .matches = { +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/mlxfw-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_next.patch b/queue-5.4/mlxfw-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_next.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1a9af46dc1a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/mlxfw-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_next.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From 80fe457a0aecfe693b12e35cc5a4fdde05838b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2023 05:07:18 -0700 +Subject: mlxfw: fix null-ptr-deref in mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_next() + +From: Nikita Zhandarovich + +[ Upstream commit c0e73276f0fcbbd3d4736ba975d7dc7a48791b0c ] + +Function mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi_get() returns NULL if 'tlv' in +question does not pass checks in mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_payload_get(). This +behaviour may lead to NULL pointer dereference in 'multi->total_len'. +Fix this issue by testing mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi_get()'s return value +against NULL. + +Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static +analysis tool SVACE. + +Fixes: 410ed13cae39 ("Add the mlxfw module for Mellanox firmware flash process") +Co-developed-by: Natalia Petrova +Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich +Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230417120718.52325-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru +Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c +index 017d68f1e1232..972c571b41587 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c ++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c +@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_next(const struct mlxfw_mfa2_file *mfa2_file, + + if (tlv->type == MLXFW_MFA2_TLV_MULTI_PART) { + multi = mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi_get(mfa2_file, tlv); ++ if (!multi) ++ return NULL; + tlv_len = NLA_ALIGN(tlv_len + be16_to_cpu(multi->total_len)); + } + +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-dsa-b53-mmap-add-phy-ops.patch b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-b53-mmap-add-phy-ops.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8443ef6b3cf --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-dsa-b53-mmap-add-phy-ops.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 2521dc57bdc161cf8a83fb6c0f7c6c83538160dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 20:48:41 +0100 +Subject: net: dsa: b53: mmap: add phy ops +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Álvaro Fernández Rojas + +[ Upstream commit 45977e58ce65ed0459edc9a0466d9dfea09463f5 ] + +Implement phy_read16() and phy_write16() ops for B53 MMAP to avoid accessing +B53_PORT_MII_PAGE registers which hangs the device. +This access should be done through the MDIO Mux bus controller. + +Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas +Acked-by: Florian Fainelli +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c b/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c +index c628d0980c0b1..1d52cb3e46d52 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c ++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c +@@ -215,6 +215,18 @@ static int b53_mmap_write64(struct b53_device *dev, u8 page, u8 reg, + return 0; + } + ++static int b53_mmap_phy_read16(struct b53_device *dev, int addr, int reg, ++ u16 *value) ++{ ++ return -EIO; ++} ++ ++static int b53_mmap_phy_write16(struct b53_device *dev, int addr, int reg, ++ u16 value) ++{ ++ return -EIO; ++} ++ + static const struct b53_io_ops b53_mmap_ops = { + .read8 = b53_mmap_read8, + .read16 = b53_mmap_read16, +@@ -226,6 +238,8 @@ static const struct b53_io_ops b53_mmap_ops = { + .write32 = b53_mmap_write32, + .write48 = b53_mmap_write48, + .write64 = b53_mmap_write64, ++ .phy_read16 = b53_mmap_phy_read16, ++ .phy_write16 = b53_mmap_phy_write16, + }; + + static int b53_mmap_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/net-sched-sch_qfq-prevent-slab-out-of-bounds-in-qfq_.patch b/queue-5.4/net-sched-sch_qfq-prevent-slab-out-of-bounds-in-qfq_.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d1cf6f2b76a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/net-sched-sch_qfq-prevent-slab-out-of-bounds-in-qfq_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +From 11678178d8638facf256b42db975fac48ca9630a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2023 19:35:54 +0900 +Subject: net: sched: sch_qfq: prevent slab-out-of-bounds in qfq_activate_agg + +From: Gwangun Jung + +[ Upstream commit 3037933448f60f9acb705997eae62013ecb81e0d ] + +If the TCA_QFQ_LMAX value is not offered through nlattr, lmax is determined by the MTU value of the network device. +The MTU of the loopback device can be set up to 2^31-1. +As a result, it is possible to have an lmax value that exceeds QFQ_MIN_LMAX. + +Due to the invalid lmax value, an index is generated that exceeds the QFQ_MAX_INDEX(=24) value, causing out-of-bounds read/write errors. + +The following reports a oob access: + +[ 84.582666] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in qfq_activate_agg.constprop.0 (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1027 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1060 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1313) +[ 84.583267] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810f676948 by task ping/301 +[ 84.583686] +[ 84.583797] CPU: 3 PID: 301 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.3.0-rc5 #1 +[ 84.584164] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 +[ 84.584644] Call Trace: +[ 84.584787] +[ 84.584906] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1)) +[ 84.585108] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:320 mm/kasan/report.c:430) +[ 84.585570] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:538) +[ 84.585988] qfq_activate_agg.constprop.0 (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1027 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1060 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1313) +[ 84.586599] qfq_enqueue (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1255) +[ 84.587607] dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:3776) +[ 84.587749] __dev_queue_xmit (./include/net/sch_generic.h:186 net/core/dev.c:3865 net/core/dev.c:4212) +[ 84.588763] ip_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:546 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228) +[ 84.589460] ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:430) +[ 84.590132] ip_push_pending_frames (./include/net/dst.h:444 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:126 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1586 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1606) +[ 84.590285] raw_sendmsg (net/ipv4/raw.c:649) +[ 84.591960] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:724 net/socket.c:747) +[ 84.592084] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2142) +[ 84.593306] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2150) +[ 84.593779] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) +[ 84.593902] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) +[ 84.594070] RIP: 0033:0x7fe568032066 +[ 84.594192] Code: 0e 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c09[ 84.594796] RSP: 002b:00007ffce388b4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c + +Code starting with the faulting instruction +=========================================== +[ 84.595047] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce388cc70 RCX: 00007fe568032066 +[ 84.595281] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00005605fdad6d10 RDI: 0000000000000003 +[ 84.595515] RBP: 00005605fdad6d10 R08: 00007ffce388eeec R09: 0000000000000010 +[ 84.595749] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 +[ 84.595984] R13: 00007ffce388cc30 R14: 00007ffce388b4f0 R15: 0000001d00000001 +[ 84.596218] +[ 84.596295] +[ 84.596351] Allocated by task 291: +[ 84.596467] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:46) +[ 84.596597] kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:52) +[ 84.596725] __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:384) +[ 84.596852] __kmalloc_node (./include/linux/kasan.h:196 mm/slab_common.c:967 mm/slab_common.c:974) +[ 84.596979] qdisc_alloc (./include/linux/slab.h:610 ./include/linux/slab.h:731 net/sched/sch_generic.c:938) +[ 84.597100] qdisc_create (net/sched/sch_api.c:1244) +[ 84.597222] tc_modify_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1680) +[ 84.597357] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6174) +[ 84.597495] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2574) +[ 84.597627] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365) +[ 84.597759] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1942) +[ 84.597891] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:724 net/socket.c:747) +[ 84.598016] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2501) +[ 84.598147] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2557) +[ 84.598275] __sys_sendmsg (./include/linux/file.h:31 net/socket.c:2586) +[ 84.598399] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) +[ 84.598520] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) +[ 84.598688] +[ 84.598744] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810f674000 +[ 84.598744] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 +[ 84.599135] The buggy address is located 2664 bytes to the right of +[ 84.599135] allocated 7904-byte region [ffff88810f674000, ffff88810f675ee0) +[ 84.599544] +[ 84.599598] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: +[ 84.599777] page:00000000e638567f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10f670 +[ 84.600074] head:00000000e638567f order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 +[ 84.600330] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) +[ 84.600517] raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100043180 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 +[ 84.600764] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080020002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 +[ 84.601009] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected +[ 84.601187] +[ 84.601241] Memory state around the buggy address: +[ 84.601396] ffff88810f676800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +[ 84.601620] ffff88810f676880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +[ 84.601845] >ffff88810f676900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +[ 84.602069] ^ +[ 84.602243] ffff88810f676980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +[ 84.602468] ffff88810f676a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc +[ 84.602693] ================================================================== +[ 84.602924] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint + +Fixes: 3015f3d2a3cd ("pkt_sched: enable QFQ to support TSO/GSO") +Reported-by: Gwangun Jung +Signed-off-by: Gwangun Jung +Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 13 +++++++------ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +index 1eb339d224ae5..603bd3097bd84 100644 +--- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c ++++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +@@ -421,15 +421,16 @@ static int qfq_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, u32 parentid, + } else + weight = 1; + +- if (tb[TCA_QFQ_LMAX]) { ++ if (tb[TCA_QFQ_LMAX]) + lmax = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_QFQ_LMAX]); +- if (lmax < QFQ_MIN_LMAX || lmax > (1UL << QFQ_MTU_SHIFT)) { +- pr_notice("qfq: invalid max length %u\n", lmax); +- return -EINVAL; +- } +- } else ++ else + lmax = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)); + ++ if (lmax < QFQ_MIN_LMAX || lmax > (1UL << QFQ_MTU_SHIFT)) { ++ pr_notice("qfq: invalid max length %u\n", lmax); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ + inv_w = ONE_FP / weight; + weight = ONE_FP / inv_w; + +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/netfilter-br_netfilter-fix-recent-physdev-match-brea.patch b/queue-5.4/netfilter-br_netfilter-fix-recent-physdev-match-brea.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0092b56decf --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/netfilter-br_netfilter-fix-recent-physdev-match-brea.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 76c26c54564901557b32841d47af5b91641b16ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 13:54:37 +0200 +Subject: netfilter: br_netfilter: fix recent physdev match breakage + +From: Florian Westphal + +[ Upstream commit 94623f579ce338b5fa61b5acaa5beb8aa657fb9e ] + +Recent attempt to ensure PREROUTING hook is executed again when a +decrypted ipsec packet received on a bridge passes through the network +stack a second time broke the physdev match in INPUT hook. + +We can't discard the nf_bridge info strct from sabotage_in hook, as +this is needed by the physdev match. + +Keep the struct around and handle this with another conditional instead. + +Fixes: 2b272bb558f1 ("netfilter: br_netfilter: disable sabotage_in hook after first suppression") +Reported-and-tested-by: Farid BENAMROUCHE +Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/linux/skbuff.h | 1 + + net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 17 +++++++++++------ + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h +index eab3a4d02f325..c951d16a40a70 100644 +--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h ++++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h +@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ struct nf_bridge_info { + u8 pkt_otherhost:1; + u8 in_prerouting:1; + u8 bridged_dnat:1; ++ u8 sabotage_in_done:1; + __u16 frag_max_size; + struct net_device *physindev; + +diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c +index 43cb7aab4eed6..277b6fb92ac5f 100644 +--- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c ++++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c +@@ -868,12 +868,17 @@ static unsigned int ip_sabotage_in(void *priv, + { + struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = nf_bridge_info_get(skb); + +- if (nf_bridge && !nf_bridge->in_prerouting && +- !netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev) && +- !netif_is_l3_slave(skb->dev)) { +- nf_bridge_info_free(skb); +- state->okfn(state->net, state->sk, skb); +- return NF_STOLEN; ++ if (nf_bridge) { ++ if (nf_bridge->sabotage_in_done) ++ return NF_ACCEPT; ++ ++ if (!nf_bridge->in_prerouting && ++ !netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev) && ++ !netif_is_l3_slave(skb->dev)) { ++ nf_bridge->sabotage_in_done = 1; ++ state->okfn(state->net, state->sk, skb); ++ return NF_STOLEN; ++ } + } + + return NF_ACCEPT; +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/netfilter-nf_tables-fix-ifdef-to-also-consider-nf_ta.patch b/queue-5.4/netfilter-nf_tables-fix-ifdef-to-also-consider-nf_ta.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..246800c0a07 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/netfilter-nf_tables-fix-ifdef-to-also-consider-nf_ta.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 60e9ee86209319a530d6855d22b5cc8d48de659e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2023 10:21:36 +0200 +Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: fix ifdef to also consider nf_tables=m + +From: Florian Westphal + +[ Upstream commit c55c0e91c813589dc55bea6bf9a9fbfaa10ae41d ] + +nftables can be built as a module, so fix the preprocessor conditional +accordingly. + +Fixes: 478b360a47b7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix nf_trace always-on with XT_TRACE=n") +Reported-by: Florian Fainelli +Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal +Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/linux/skbuff.h | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h +index c951d16a40a70..302a2ad679809 100644 +--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h ++++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h +@@ -4227,7 +4227,7 @@ static inline void nf_reset_ct(struct sk_buff *skb) + + static inline void nf_reset_trace(struct sk_buff *skb) + { +-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE) || defined(CONFIG_NF_TABLES) ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_TABLES) + skb->nf_trace = 0; + #endif + } +@@ -4247,7 +4247,7 @@ static inline void __nf_copy(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct sk_buff *src, + dst->_nfct = src->_nfct; + nf_conntrack_get(skb_nfct(src)); + #endif +-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE) || defined(CONFIG_NF_TABLES) ++#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_TABLES) + if (copy) + dst->nf_trace = src->nf_trace; + #endif +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/nvme-tcp-fix-a-possible-uaf-when-failing-to-allocate.patch b/queue-5.4/nvme-tcp-fix-a-possible-uaf-when-failing-to-allocate.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e4850a25a55 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/nvme-tcp-fix-a-possible-uaf-when-failing-to-allocate.patch @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +From d5089237389f7b87cd6e76a084fa6b19c60077a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 15:33:34 +0200 +Subject: nvme-tcp: fix a possible UAF when failing to allocate an io queue + +From: Sagi Grimberg + +[ Upstream commit 88eaba80328b31ef81813a1207b4056efd7006a6 ] + +When we allocate a nvme-tcp queue, we set the data_ready callback before +we actually need to use it. This creates the potential that if a stray +controller sends us data on the socket before we connect, we can trigger +the io_work and start consuming the socket. + +In this case reported: we failed to allocate one of the io queues, and +as we start releasing the queues that we already allocated, we get +a UAF [1] from the io_work which is running before it should really. + +Fix this by setting the socket ops callbacks only before we start the +queue, so that we can't accidentally schedule the io_work in the +initialization phase before the queue started. While we are at it, +rename nvme_tcp_restore_sock_calls to pair with nvme_tcp_setup_sock_ops. + +[1]: +[16802.107284] nvme nvme4: starting error recovery +[16802.109166] nvme nvme4: Reconnecting in 10 seconds... +[16812.173535] nvme nvme4: failed to connect socket: -111 +[16812.173745] nvme nvme4: Failed reconnect attempt 1 +[16812.173747] nvme nvme4: Reconnecting in 10 seconds... +[16822.413555] nvme nvme4: failed to connect socket: -111 +[16822.413762] nvme nvme4: Failed reconnect attempt 2 +[16822.413765] nvme nvme4: Reconnecting in 10 seconds... +[16832.661274] nvme nvme4: creating 32 I/O queues. +[16833.919887] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088 +[16833.920068] nvme nvme4: Failed reconnect attempt 3 +[16833.920094] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode +[16833.920261] nvme nvme4: Reconnecting in 10 seconds... +[16833.920368] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page +[16833.921086] Workqueue: nvme_tcp_wq nvme_tcp_io_work [nvme_tcp] +[16833.921191] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x17/0x30 +... +[16833.923138] Call Trace: +[16833.923271] +[16833.923402] lock_sock_nested+0x1e/0x50 +[16833.923545] nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x40/0xa0 [nvme_tcp] +[16833.923685] nvme_tcp_io_work+0x68/0xa0 [nvme_tcp] +[16833.923824] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x390 +[16833.923969] worker_thread+0x53/0x3d0 +[16833.924104] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 +[16833.924240] kthread+0x124/0x150 +[16833.924376] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 +[16833.924518] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 +[16833.924655] + +Reported-by: Yanjun Zhang +Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg +Tested-by: Yanjun Zhang +Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +index 3169859cd3906..4250081595c14 100644 +--- a/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c ++++ b/drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +@@ -1387,22 +1387,7 @@ static int nvme_tcp_alloc_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, + if (ret) + goto err_init_connect; + +- queue->rd_enabled = true; + set_bit(NVME_TCP_Q_ALLOCATED, &queue->flags); +- nvme_tcp_init_recv_ctx(queue); +- +- write_lock_bh(&queue->sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); +- queue->sock->sk->sk_user_data = queue; +- queue->state_change = queue->sock->sk->sk_state_change; +- queue->data_ready = queue->sock->sk->sk_data_ready; +- queue->write_space = queue->sock->sk->sk_write_space; +- queue->sock->sk->sk_data_ready = nvme_tcp_data_ready; +- queue->sock->sk->sk_state_change = nvme_tcp_state_change; +- queue->sock->sk->sk_write_space = nvme_tcp_write_space; +-#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL +- queue->sock->sk->sk_ll_usec = 1; +-#endif +- write_unlock_bh(&queue->sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); + + return 0; + +@@ -1419,7 +1404,7 @@ static int nvme_tcp_alloc_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, + return ret; + } + +-static void nvme_tcp_restore_sock_calls(struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue) ++static void nvme_tcp_restore_sock_ops(struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue) + { + struct socket *sock = queue->sock; + +@@ -1434,7 +1419,7 @@ static void nvme_tcp_restore_sock_calls(struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue) + static void __nvme_tcp_stop_queue(struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue) + { + kernel_sock_shutdown(queue->sock, SHUT_RDWR); +- nvme_tcp_restore_sock_calls(queue); ++ nvme_tcp_restore_sock_ops(queue); + cancel_work_sync(&queue->io_work); + } + +@@ -1448,21 +1433,42 @@ static void nvme_tcp_stop_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, int qid) + __nvme_tcp_stop_queue(queue); + } + ++static void nvme_tcp_setup_sock_ops(struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue) ++{ ++ write_lock_bh(&queue->sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); ++ queue->sock->sk->sk_user_data = queue; ++ queue->state_change = queue->sock->sk->sk_state_change; ++ queue->data_ready = queue->sock->sk->sk_data_ready; ++ queue->write_space = queue->sock->sk->sk_write_space; ++ queue->sock->sk->sk_data_ready = nvme_tcp_data_ready; ++ queue->sock->sk->sk_state_change = nvme_tcp_state_change; ++ queue->sock->sk->sk_write_space = nvme_tcp_write_space; ++#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL ++ queue->sock->sk->sk_ll_usec = 1; ++#endif ++ write_unlock_bh(&queue->sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); ++} ++ + static int nvme_tcp_start_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, int idx) + { + struct nvme_tcp_ctrl *ctrl = to_tcp_ctrl(nctrl); ++ struct nvme_tcp_queue *queue = &ctrl->queues[idx]; + int ret; + ++ queue->rd_enabled = true; ++ nvme_tcp_init_recv_ctx(queue); ++ nvme_tcp_setup_sock_ops(queue); ++ + if (idx) + ret = nvmf_connect_io_queue(nctrl, idx, false); + else + ret = nvmf_connect_admin_queue(nctrl); + + if (!ret) { +- set_bit(NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE, &ctrl->queues[idx].flags); ++ set_bit(NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE, &queue->flags); + } else { +- if (test_bit(NVME_TCP_Q_ALLOCATED, &ctrl->queues[idx].flags)) +- __nvme_tcp_stop_queue(&ctrl->queues[idx]); ++ if (test_bit(NVME_TCP_Q_ALLOCATED, &queue->flags)) ++ __nvme_tcp_stop_queue(queue); + dev_err(nctrl->device, + "failed to connect queue: %d ret=%d\n", idx, ret); + } +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/regulator-fan53555-explicitly-include-bits-header.patch b/queue-5.4/regulator-fan53555-explicitly-include-bits-header.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ccb76e41cf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/regulator-fan53555-explicitly-include-bits-header.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From aace08627ec56a211341e96b47d98d35440f22c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 20:18:00 +0300 +Subject: regulator: fan53555: Explicitly include bits header + +From: Cristian Ciocaltea + +[ Upstream commit 4fb9a5060f73627303bc531ceaab1b19d0a24aef ] + +Since commit f2a9eb975ab2 ("regulator: fan53555: Add support for +FAN53526") the driver makes use of the BIT() macro, but relies on the +bits header being implicitly included. + +Explicitly pull the header in to avoid potential build failures in some +configurations. + +While here, reorder include directives alphabetically. + +Fixes: f2a9eb975ab2 ("regulator: fan53555: Add support for FAN53526") +Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230406171806.948290-3-cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com +Signed-off-by: Mark Brown +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/regulator/fan53555.c | 11 ++++++----- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/regulator/fan53555.c b/drivers/regulator/fan53555.c +index dbe477da4e559..99a1b2dc30933 100644 +--- a/drivers/regulator/fan53555.c ++++ b/drivers/regulator/fan53555.c +@@ -8,18 +8,19 @@ + // Copyright (c) 2012 Marvell Technology Ltd. + // Yunfan Zhang + ++#include ++#include ++#include + #include ++#include + #include +-#include + #include ++#include + #include ++#include + #include + #include +-#include +-#include + #include +-#include +-#include + + /* Voltage setting */ + #define FAN53555_VSEL0 0x00 +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/s390-ptrace-fix-ptrace_get_last_break-error-handling.patch b/queue-5.4/s390-ptrace-fix-ptrace_get_last_break-error-handling.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f314b39ae5d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/s390-ptrace-fix-ptrace_get_last_break-error-handling.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From b75b5ed04429d86da51db49f49946730a0760e7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:31:30 +0100 +Subject: s390/ptrace: fix PTRACE_GET_LAST_BREAK error handling + +From: Heiko Carstens + +[ Upstream commit f9bbf25e7b2b74b52b2f269216a92657774f239c ] + +Return -EFAULT if put_user() for the PTRACE_GET_LAST_BREAK +request fails, instead of silently ignoring it. + +Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle +Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens +Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c | 8 ++------ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +index ad74472ce967e..34ca344039bbf 100644 +--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c ++++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +@@ -502,9 +502,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, + } + return 0; + case PTRACE_GET_LAST_BREAK: +- put_user(child->thread.last_break, +- (unsigned long __user *) data); +- return 0; ++ return put_user(child->thread.last_break, (unsigned long __user *)data); + case PTRACE_ENABLE_TE: + if (!MACHINE_HAS_TE) + return -EIO; +@@ -856,9 +854,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request, + } + return 0; + case PTRACE_GET_LAST_BREAK: +- put_user(child->thread.last_break, +- (unsigned int __user *) data); +- return 0; ++ return put_user(child->thread.last_break, (unsigned int __user *)data); + } + return compat_ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data); + } +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/scsi-core-improve-scsi_vpd_inquiry-checks.patch b/queue-5.4/scsi-core-improve-scsi_vpd_inquiry-checks.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ad47c9af7fc --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/scsi-core-improve-scsi_vpd_inquiry-checks.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From 61950e78063f61fcad6aa828cdaa4bf7cfc5cbb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2023 11:22:11 +0900 +Subject: scsi: core: Improve scsi_vpd_inquiry() checks + +From: Damien Le Moal + +[ Upstream commit f0aa59a33d2ac2267d260fe21eaf92500df8e7b4 ] + +Some USB-SATA adapters have broken behavior when an unsupported VPD page is +probed: Depending on the VPD page number, a 4-byte header with a valid VPD +page number but with a 0 length is returned. Currently, scsi_vpd_inquiry() +only checks that the page number is valid to determine if the page is +valid, which results in receiving only the 4-byte header for the +non-existent page. This error manifests itself very often with page 0xb9 +for the Concurrent Positioning Ranges detection done by sd_read_cpr(), +resulting in the following error message: + +sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Invalid Concurrent Positioning Ranges VPD page + +Prevent such misleading error message by adding a check in +scsi_vpd_inquiry() to verify that the page length is not 0. + +Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230322022211.116327-1-damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com +Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block +Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/scsi/scsi.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi.c +index 1ce3f90f782fd..2921256b59a0e 100644 +--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi.c ++++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi.c +@@ -331,11 +331,18 @@ static int scsi_vpd_inquiry(struct scsi_device *sdev, unsigned char *buffer, + if (result) + return -EIO; + +- /* Sanity check that we got the page back that we asked for */ ++ /* ++ * Sanity check that we got the page back that we asked for and that ++ * the page size is not 0. ++ */ + if (buffer[1] != page) + return -EIO; + +- return get_unaligned_be16(&buffer[2]) + 4; ++ result = get_unaligned_be16(&buffer[2]); ++ if (!result) ++ return -EIO; ++ ++ return result + 4; + } + + /** +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/scsi-megaraid_sas-fix-fw_crash_buffer_show.patch b/queue-5.4/scsi-megaraid_sas-fix-fw_crash_buffer_show.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cc6585d03b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/scsi-megaraid_sas-fix-fw_crash_buffer_show.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 3effa35bbad4cc683d4d3b6266f884f3c4bb07b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 14:52:49 +0100 +Subject: scsi: megaraid_sas: Fix fw_crash_buffer_show() + +From: Tomas Henzl + +[ Upstream commit 0808ed6ebbc292222ca069d339744870f6d801da ] + +If crash_dump_buf is not allocated then crash dump can't be available. +Replace logical 'and' with 'or'. + +Signed-off-by: Tomas Henzl +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230324135249.9733-1-thenzl@redhat.com +Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +index a261ce511e9ed..617148567d8d7 100644 +--- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c ++++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +@@ -3235,7 +3235,7 @@ fw_crash_buffer_show(struct device *cdev, + + spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags); + buff_offset = instance->fw_crash_buffer_offset; +- if (!instance->crash_dump_buf && ++ if (!instance->crash_dump_buf || + !((instance->fw_crash_state == AVAILABLE) || + (instance->fw_crash_state == COPYING))) { + dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev, +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/selftests-sigaltstack-fix-wuninitialized.patch b/queue-5.4/selftests-sigaltstack-fix-wuninitialized.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..23605507195 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/selftests-sigaltstack-fix-wuninitialized.patch @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +From cd19da69df8445eea5fcff97283b96984d24330c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:59:33 -0800 +Subject: selftests: sigaltstack: fix -Wuninitialized + +From: Nick Desaulniers + +[ Upstream commit 05107edc910135d27fe557267dc45be9630bf3dd ] + +Building sigaltstack with clang via: +$ ARCH=x86 make LLVM=1 -C tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/ + +produces the following warning: + warning: variable 'sp' is uninitialized when used here [-Wuninitialized] + if (sp < (unsigned long)sstack || + ^~ + +Clang expects these to be declared at global scope; we've fixed this in +the kernel proper by using the macro `current_stack_pointer`. This is +defined in different headers for different target architectures, so just +create a new header that defines the arch-specific register names for +the stack pointer register, and define it for more targets (at least the +ones that support current_stack_pointer/ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER). + +Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+G9fYsi3OOu7yCsMutpzKDnBMAzJBCPimBp86LhGBa0eCnEpA@mail.gmail.com/ +Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers +Reviewed-by: Kees Cook +Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing +Tested-by: Anders Roxell +Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + .../sigaltstack/current_stack_pointer.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ + tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/sas.c | 7 +----- + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/current_stack_pointer.h + +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/current_stack_pointer.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/current_stack_pointer.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..ea9bdf3a90b16 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/current_stack_pointer.h +@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ ++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ ++ ++#if __alpha__ ++register unsigned long sp asm("$30"); ++#elif __arm__ || __aarch64__ || __csky__ || __m68k__ || __mips__ || __riscv ++register unsigned long sp asm("sp"); ++#elif __i386__ ++register unsigned long sp asm("esp"); ++#elif __loongarch64 ++register unsigned long sp asm("$sp"); ++#elif __ppc__ ++register unsigned long sp asm("r1"); ++#elif __s390x__ ++register unsigned long sp asm("%15"); ++#elif __sh__ ++register unsigned long sp asm("r15"); ++#elif __x86_64__ ++register unsigned long sp asm("rsp"); ++#elif __XTENSA__ ++register unsigned long sp asm("a1"); ++#else ++#error "implement current_stack_pointer equivalent" ++#endif +diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/sas.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/sas.c +index ad0f8df2ca0af..6e60545994916 100644 +--- a/tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/sas.c ++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sigaltstack/sas.c +@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ + #include + + #include "../kselftest.h" ++#include "current_stack_pointer.h" + + #ifndef SS_AUTODISARM + #define SS_AUTODISARM (1U << 31) +@@ -40,12 +41,6 @@ void my_usr1(int sig, siginfo_t *si, void *u) + stack_t stk; + struct stk_data *p; + +-#if __s390x__ +- register unsigned long sp asm("%15"); +-#else +- register unsigned long sp asm("sp"); +-#endif +- + if (sp < (unsigned long)sstack || + sp >= (unsigned long)sstack + SIGSTKSZ) { + ksft_exit_fail_msg("SP is not on sigaltstack\n"); +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/series b/queue-5.4/series new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1fe1b3bc172 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/series @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +arm-dts-rockchip-fix-a-typo-error-for-rk3288-spdif-n.patch +arm64-dts-meson-g12-common-specify-full-dmc-range.patch +netfilter-br_netfilter-fix-recent-physdev-match-brea.patch +regulator-fan53555-explicitly-include-bits-header.patch +net-sched-sch_qfq-prevent-slab-out-of-bounds-in-qfq_.patch +virtio_net-bugfix-overflow-inside-xdp_linearize_page.patch +netfilter-nf_tables-fix-ifdef-to-also-consider-nf_ta.patch +i40e-fix-accessing-vsi-active_filters-without-holdin.patch +i40e-fix-i40e_setup_misc_vector-error-handling.patch +mlxfw-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_next.patch +bpf-fix-incorrect-verifier-pruning-due-to-missing-re.patch +e1000e-disable-tso-on-i219-lm-card-to-increase-speed.patch +f2fs-fix-f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes-ftrace-event.patch +input-i8042-add-quirk-for-fujitsu-lifebook-a574-h.patch +selftests-sigaltstack-fix-wuninitialized.patch +scsi-megaraid_sas-fix-fw_crash_buffer_show.patch +scsi-core-improve-scsi_vpd_inquiry-checks.patch +net-dsa-b53-mmap-add-phy-ops.patch +s390-ptrace-fix-ptrace_get_last_break-error-handling.patch +nvme-tcp-fix-a-possible-uaf-when-failing-to-allocate.patch +xen-netback-use-same-error-messages-for-same-errors.patch diff --git a/queue-5.4/virtio_net-bugfix-overflow-inside-xdp_linearize_page.patch b/queue-5.4/virtio_net-bugfix-overflow-inside-xdp_linearize_page.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ca3a1340803 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/virtio_net-bugfix-overflow-inside-xdp_linearize_page.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 7b65083cc7ee0b07695fcfef313d9aa9b10a7c4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2023 14:08:35 +0800 +Subject: virtio_net: bugfix overflow inside xdp_linearize_page() + +From: Xuan Zhuo + +[ Upstream commit 853618d5886bf94812f31228091cd37d308230f7 ] + +Here we copy the data from the original buf to the new page. But we +not check that it may be overflow. + +As long as the size received(including vnethdr) is greater than 3840 +(PAGE_SIZE -VIRTIO_XDP_HEADROOM). Then the memcpy will overflow. + +And this is completely possible, as long as the MTU is large, such +as 4096. In our test environment, this will cause crash. Since crash is +caused by the written memory, it is meaningless, so I do not include it. + +Fixes: 72979a6c3590 ("virtio_net: xdp, add slowpath case for non contiguous buffers") +Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo +Acked-by: Jason Wang +Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 8 ++++++-- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +index 5212d9cb03728..59d4449450ee8 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c ++++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +@@ -646,8 +646,13 @@ static struct page *xdp_linearize_page(struct receive_queue *rq, + int page_off, + unsigned int *len) + { +- struct page *page = alloc_page(GFP_ATOMIC); ++ int tailroom = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)); ++ struct page *page; + ++ if (page_off + *len + tailroom > PAGE_SIZE) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ page = alloc_page(GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!page) + return NULL; + +@@ -655,7 +660,6 @@ static struct page *xdp_linearize_page(struct receive_queue *rq, + page_off += *len; + + while (--*num_buf) { +- int tailroom = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)); + unsigned int buflen; + void *buf; + int off; +-- +2.39.2 + diff --git a/queue-5.4/xen-netback-use-same-error-messages-for-same-errors.patch b/queue-5.4/xen-netback-use-same-error-messages-for-same-errors.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a6234791c3b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-5.4/xen-netback-use-same-error-messages-for-same-errors.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 69ac0abfda2029ce7fba1c6a0362978050e979cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2023 10:02:59 +0200 +Subject: xen/netback: use same error messages for same errors + +From: Juergen Gross + +[ Upstream commit 2eca98e5b24d01c02b46c67be05a5f98cc9789b1 ] + +Issue the same error message in case an illegal page boundary crossing +has been detected in both cases where this is tested. + +Suggested-by: Jan Beulich +Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230329080259.14823-1-jgross@suse.com +Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +index 3dfc5c66f1408..a3078755939e3 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c ++++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +@@ -989,10 +989,8 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue, + + /* No crossing a page as the payload mustn't fragment. */ + if (unlikely((txreq.offset + txreq.size) > XEN_PAGE_SIZE)) { +- netdev_err(queue->vif->dev, +- "txreq.offset: %u, size: %u, end: %lu\n", +- txreq.offset, txreq.size, +- (unsigned long)(txreq.offset&~XEN_PAGE_MASK) + txreq.size); ++ netdev_err(queue->vif->dev, "Cross page boundary, txreq.offset: %u, size: %u\n", ++ txreq.offset, txreq.size); + xenvif_fatal_tx_err(queue->vif); + break; + } +-- +2.39.2 +