From: Gregory P. Smith Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 20:39:21 +0000 (-0400) Subject: bpo-30458: Use InvalidURL instead of ValueError. (GH-13044) X-Git-Tag: v3.8.0a4~41 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b7378d77289c911ca6a0c0afaf513879002df7d5;p=thirdparty%2FPython%2Fcpython.git bpo-30458: Use InvalidURL instead of ValueError. (GH-13044) Use http.client.InvalidURL instead of ValueError as the new error case's exception. --- diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py index 99d6a68cf428..f71a062d2b57 100644 --- a/Lib/http/client.py +++ b/Lib/http/client.py @@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ class HTTPConnection: url = '/' # Prevent CVE-2019-9740. if match := _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(url): - raise ValueError(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} " + raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} " f"(found at least {match.group()!r})") request = '%s %s %s' % (method, url, self._http_vsn_str) diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py index c5b23f935b27..7214492eca9d 100644 --- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py @@ -343,11 +343,12 @@ class urlopen_HttpTests(unittest.TestCase, FakeHTTPMixin, FakeFTPMixin): # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe. escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\') + InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL with self.assertRaisesRegex( - ValueError, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"): + InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"): urllib.request.urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}") with self.assertRaisesRegex( - ValueError, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"): + InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"): urllib.request.urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}") # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection. resp = urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}") @@ -367,10 +368,11 @@ class urlopen_HttpTests(unittest.TestCase, FakeHTTPMixin, FakeFTPMixin): # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe. + InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL with self.assertRaisesRegex( - ValueError, r"contain control.*\\r.*(found at least . .)"): + InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r.*(found at least . .)"): urllib.request.urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}") - with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, r"contain control.*\\n"): + with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"): urllib.request.urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}") # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection. resp = urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}") diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst similarity index 75% rename from Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst rename to Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst index 4fed4d545040..ed8027fb4d64 100644 --- a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst +++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst @@ -1 +1 @@ -Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a ValueError to be raised. \ No newline at end of file +Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request. Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause an http.client.InvalidURL exception to be raised.