From: Sasha Levin Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 11:58:11 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Fixes for 4.19 X-Git-Tag: v5.13.7~15^2~3 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=bc53fcf32c15ecb103d91792de0324902a588d52;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git Fixes for 4.19 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- diff --git a/queue-4.19/arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch b/queue-4.19/arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5273dbc0681 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 563a70222b82b6067e82d3a283355b5fb1cb2255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 14:21:18 +0100 +Subject: ARM: dts: versatile: Fix up interrupt controller node names + +From: Sudeep Holla + +[ Upstream commit 82a1c67554dff610d6be4e1982c425717b3c6a23 ] + +Once the new schema interrupt-controller/arm,vic.yaml is added, we get +the below warnings: + + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml: + intc@10140000: $nodename:0: 'intc@10140000' does not match + '^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$' + + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml: + intc@10140000: 'clear-mask' does not match any of the regexes + +Fix the node names for the interrupt controller to conform +to the standard node name interrupt-controller@.. Also drop invalid +clear-mask property. + +Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla +Acked-by: Linus Walleij +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210701132118.759454-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com' +Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts | 5 ++--- + arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts +index 6f4f60ba5429..990b7ef1800e 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts ++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts +@@ -192,16 +192,15 @@ + #size-cells = <1>; + ranges; + +- vic: intc@10140000 { ++ vic: interrupt-controller@10140000 { + compatible = "arm,versatile-vic"; + interrupt-controller; + #interrupt-cells = <1>; + reg = <0x10140000 0x1000>; +- clear-mask = <0xffffffff>; + valid-mask = <0xffffffff>; + }; + +- sic: intc@10003000 { ++ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 { + compatible = "arm,versatile-sic"; + interrupt-controller; + #interrupt-cells = <1>; +diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts +index 06a0fdf24026..e7e751a858d8 100644 +--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts ++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts +@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ + + amba { + /* The Versatile PB is using more SIC IRQ lines than the AB */ +- sic: intc@10003000 { ++ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 { + clear-mask = <0xffffffff>; + /* + * Valid interrupt lines mask according to +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch b/queue-4.19/cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9f5432de67e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From d4b406121729dd8dd20c27c63f2a878992f097c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 19:34:02 +0900 +Subject: cifs: fix the out of range assignment to bit fields in + parse_server_interfaces + +From: Hyunchul Lee + +[ Upstream commit c9c9c6815f9004ee1ec87401ed0796853bd70f1b ] + +Because the out of range assignment to bit fields +are compiler-dependant, the fields could have wrong +value. + +Signed-off-by: Hyunchul Lee +Signed-off-by: Steve French +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +index 5a14f518cd97..61955a7c838b 100644 +--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c ++++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp *buf, + p = buf; + while (bytes_left >= sizeof(*p)) { + info->speed = le64_to_cpu(p->LinkSpeed); +- info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE); +- info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE); ++ info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0; ++ info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0; + + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: adding iface %zu\n", __func__, *iface_count); + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: speed %zu bps\n", __func__, info->speed); +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch b/queue-4.19/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c8fb238f984 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 1c601ba3c5bdbc9591e9abd81c92d38d9c9cc3b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 14:50:28 +0100 +Subject: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix possible scmi_linux_errmap buffer overflow + +From: Sudeep Holla + +[ Upstream commit 7a691f16ccad05d770f813d9c4b4337a30c6d63f ] + +The scmi_linux_errmap buffer access index is supposed to depend on the +array size to prevent element out of bounds access. It uses SCMI_ERR_MAX +to check bounds but that can mismatch with the array size. It also +changes the success into -EIO though scmi_linux_errmap is never used in +case of success, it is expected to work for success case too. + +It is slightly confusing code as the negative of the error code +is used as index to the buffer. Fix it by negating it at the start and +make it more readable. + +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210707135028.1869642-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com +Reported-by: kernel test robot +Reported-by: Dan Carpenter +Reviewed-by: Cristian Marussi +Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 7 ++++--- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +index effc4c17e0fb..081fbe28da4b 100644 +--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c ++++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ enum scmi_error_codes { + SCMI_ERR_GENERIC = -8, /* Generic Error */ + SCMI_ERR_HARDWARE = -9, /* Hardware Error */ + SCMI_ERR_PROTOCOL = -10,/* Protocol Error */ +- SCMI_ERR_MAX + }; + + /* List of all SCMI devices active in system */ +@@ -168,8 +167,10 @@ static const int scmi_linux_errmap[] = { + + static inline int scmi_to_linux_errno(int errno) + { +- if (errno < SCMI_SUCCESS && errno > SCMI_ERR_MAX) +- return scmi_linux_errmap[-errno]; ++ int err_idx = -errno; ++ ++ if (err_idx >= SCMI_SUCCESS && err_idx < ARRAY_SIZE(scmi_linux_errmap)) ++ return scmi_linux_errmap[err_idx]; + return -EIO; + } + +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch b/queue-4.19/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3e5f4e4d82b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 05d5c57a25833d551903ca84d2b7e310e0d6ff87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 15:18:18 +0100 +Subject: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix range check for the maximum number of pending + messages + +From: Cristian Marussi + +[ Upstream commit bdb8742dc6f7c599c3d61959234fe4c23638727b ] + +SCMI message headers carry a sequence number and such field is sized to +allow for MSG_TOKEN_MAX distinct numbers; moreover zero is not really an +acceptable maximum number of pending in-flight messages. + +Fix accordingly the checks performed on the value exported by transports +in scmi_desc.max_msg + +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712141833.6628-3-cristian.marussi@arm.com +Reported-by: Vincent Guittot +Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi +[sudeep.holla: updated the patch title and error message] +Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +index 081fbe28da4b..af5139eb96b5 100644 +--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c ++++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c +@@ -629,8 +629,9 @@ static int scmi_xfer_info_init(struct scmi_info *sinfo) + struct scmi_xfers_info *info = &sinfo->minfo; + + /* Pre-allocated messages, no more than what hdr.seq can support */ +- if (WARN_ON(desc->max_msg >= MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) { +- dev_err(dev, "Maximum message of %d exceeds supported %ld\n", ++ if (WARN_ON(!desc->max_msg || desc->max_msg > MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) { ++ dev_err(dev, ++ "Invalid maximum messages %d, not in range [1 - %lu]\n", + desc->max_msg, MSG_TOKEN_MAX); + return -EINVAL; + } +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch b/queue-4.19/hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a0426c3e6e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From d8cdce4f13509fb1cc2defb001207c9a50bf6e51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:08 -0700 +Subject: hfs: add lock nesting notation to hfs_find_init + +From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi + +[ Upstream commit b3b2177a2d795e35dc11597b2609eb1e7e57e570 ] + +Syzbot reports a possible recursive lock in [1]. + +This happens due to missing lock nesting information. From the logs, we +see that a call to hfs_fill_super is made to mount the hfs filesystem. +While searching for the root inode, the lock on the catalog btree is +grabbed. Then, when the parent of the root isn't found, a call to +__hfs_bnode_create is made to create the parent of the root. This +eventually leads to a call to hfs_ext_read_extent which grabs a lock on +the extents btree. + +Since the order of locking is catalog btree -> extents btree, this lock +hierarchy does not lead to a deadlock. + +To tell lockdep that this locking is safe, we add nesting notation to +distinguish between catalog btrees, extents btrees, and attributes +btrees (for HFS+). This has already been done in hfsplus. + +Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1] +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-4-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi +Reported-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Tested-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko +Cc: Al Viro +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva +Cc: Shuah Khan +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton +Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/hfs/bfind.c | 14 +++++++++++++- + fs/hfs/btree.h | 7 +++++++ + 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c +index 4af318fbda77..ef9498a6e88a 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c ++++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c +@@ -25,7 +25,19 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd) + fd->key = ptr + tree->max_key_len + 2; + hfs_dbg(BNODE_REFS, "find_init: %d (%p)\n", + tree->cnid, __builtin_return_address(0)); +- mutex_lock(&tree->tree_lock); ++ switch (tree->cnid) { ++ case HFS_CAT_CNID: ++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX); ++ break; ++ case HFS_EXT_CNID: ++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX); ++ break; ++ case HFS_ATTR_CNID: ++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX); ++ break; ++ default: ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/btree.h b/fs/hfs/btree.h +index dcc2aab1b2c4..25ac9a8bb57a 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/btree.h ++++ b/fs/hfs/btree.h +@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ typedef int (*btree_keycmp)(const btree_key *, const btree_key *); + + #define NODE_HASH_SIZE 256 + ++/* B-tree mutex nested subclasses */ ++enum hfs_btree_mutex_classes { ++ CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX, ++ EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX, ++ ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX, ++}; ++ + /* A HFS BTree held in memory */ + struct hfs_btree { + struct super_block *sb; +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch b/queue-4.19/hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..486f3f16bc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 6baef1d4c55ff5dabecd8cd290ff478e0484ab42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:01 -0700 +Subject: hfs: add missing clean-up in hfs_fill_super + +From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi + +[ Upstream commit 16ee572eaf0d09daa4c8a755fdb71e40dbf8562d ] + +Patch series "hfs: fix various errors", v2. + +This series ultimately aims to address a lockdep warning in +hfs_find_init reported by Syzbot [1]. + +The work done for this led to the discovery of another bug, and the +Syzkaller repro test also reveals an invalid memory access error after +clearing the lockdep warning. Hence, this series is broken up into +three patches: + +1. Add a missing call to hfs_find_exit for an error path in + hfs_fill_super + +2. Fix memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read by fixing calls to kmap + +3. Add lock nesting notation to tell lockdep that the observed locking + hierarchy is safe + +This patch (of 3): + +Before exiting hfs_fill_super, the struct hfs_find_data used in +hfs_find_init should be passed to hfs_find_exit to be cleaned up, and to +release the lock held on the btree. + +The call to hfs_find_exit is missing from an error path. We add it back +in by consolidating calls to hfs_find_exit for error paths. + +Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1] +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-2-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi +Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko +Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva +Cc: Al Viro +Cc: Shuah Khan +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton +Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/super.c b/fs/hfs/super.c +index 173876782f73..77b6f35a4aa9 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/super.c ++++ b/fs/hfs/super.c +@@ -427,14 +427,12 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) + if (!res) { + if (fd.entrylength > sizeof(rec) || fd.entrylength < 0) { + res = -EIO; +- goto bail; ++ goto bail_hfs_find; + } + hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset, fd.entrylength); + } +- if (res) { +- hfs_find_exit(&fd); +- goto bail_no_root; +- } ++ if (res) ++ goto bail_hfs_find; + res = -EINVAL; + root_inode = hfs_iget(sb, &fd.search_key->cat, &rec); + hfs_find_exit(&fd); +@@ -450,6 +448,8 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) + /* everything's okay */ + return 0; + ++bail_hfs_find: ++ hfs_find_exit(&fd); + bail_no_root: + pr_err("get root inode failed\n"); + bail: +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch b/queue-4.19/hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2f992583ffc --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From dee2c35e5a14f16aa6231b3a8b349dd42941cc8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:05 -0700 +Subject: hfs: fix high memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read + +From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi + +[ Upstream commit 54a5ead6f5e2b47131a7385d0c0af18e7b89cb02 ] + +Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel +address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the +given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid +memory access. + +To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant +portions of data. + +An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen +in the following crash report: + + ================================================================== + BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] + BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26 + Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634 + + CPU: 0 PID: 4634 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0 + Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 + Call Trace: + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] + dump_stack+0x195/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:120 + print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:233 + __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline] + kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0xd4 mm/kasan/report.c:436 + check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline] + kasan_check_range+0x154/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:186 + memcpy+0x24/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65 + memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline] + hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26 + hfs_bnode_read_u16 fs/hfs/bnode.c:34 [inline] + hfs_bnode_find+0x880/0xcc0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:365 + hfs_brec_find+0x2d8/0x540 fs/hfs/bfind.c:126 + hfs_brec_read+0x27/0x120 fs/hfs/bfind.c:165 + hfs_cat_find_brec+0x19a/0x3b0 fs/hfs/catalog.c:194 + hfs_fill_super+0xc13/0x1460 fs/hfs/super.c:419 + mount_bdev+0x331/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1368 + hfs_mount+0x35/0x40 fs/hfs/super.c:457 + legacy_get_tree+0x10c/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592 + vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 fs/super.c:1498 + do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline] + path_mount+0x13f5/0x20e0 fs/namespace.c:3235 + do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline] + __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline] + __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3433 [inline] + __x64_sys_mount+0x2b8/0x340 fs/namespace.c:3433 + do_syscall_64+0x37/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae + RIP: 0033:0x45e63a + Code: 48 c7 c2 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d2 e8 88 04 00 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 + RSP: 002b:00007f9404d410d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 + RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000248 RCX: 000000000045e63a + RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f9404d41120 + RBP: 00007f9404d41120 R08: 00000000200002c0 R09: 0000000020000000 + R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 + R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000004ad5d8 R15: 0000000000000000 + + The buggy address belongs to the page: + page:00000000dadbcf3e refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x125fdc + flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff) + raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffffea000497f748 ffffea000497f6c8 0000000000000000 + raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 + page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected + + Memory state around the buggy address: + ffff888125fdce80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ffff888125fdcf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + >ffff888125fdcf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ^ + ffff888125fdd000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ffff888125fdd080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff + ================================================================== + +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-3-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi +Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko +Cc: Al Viro +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman +Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva +Cc: Shuah Khan +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton +Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/fs/hfs/bnode.c b/fs/hfs/bnode.c +index b63a4df7327b..c0a73a6ffb28 100644 +--- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c ++++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c +@@ -15,16 +15,31 @@ + + #include "btree.h" + +-void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, +- int off, int len) ++void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len) + { + struct page *page; ++ int pagenum; ++ int bytes_read; ++ int bytes_to_read; ++ void *vaddr; + + off += node->page_offset; +- page = node->page[0]; ++ pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT; ++ off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */ + +- memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len); +- kunmap(page); ++ for (bytes_read = 0; bytes_read < len; bytes_read += bytes_to_read) { ++ if (pagenum >= node->tree->pages_per_bnode) ++ break; ++ page = node->page[pagenum]; ++ bytes_to_read = min_t(int, len - bytes_read, PAGE_SIZE - off); ++ ++ vaddr = kmap_atomic(page); ++ memcpy(buf + bytes_read, vaddr + off, bytes_to_read); ++ kunmap_atomic(vaddr); ++ ++ pagenum++; ++ off = 0; /* page offset only applies to the first page */ ++ } + } + + u16 hfs_bnode_read_u16(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off) +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch b/queue-4.19/net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7ea20aa7a7a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From 273bb2f6423f1662fd5a5f8bd1ad71a6b499e2b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:53:28 +0800 +Subject: net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join() + +From: Yang Yingliang + +[ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ] + +I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test: + +BUG: memory leak +unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64): + comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s) + hex dump (first 32 bytes): + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ + backtrace: + [<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0 + [<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190 + [<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980 + [<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460 + [<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650 + [<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280 + [<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550 + [<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 + [<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0 + [<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420 + [<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750 + [<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0 + [<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 + [<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820 + [<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0 + [<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0 + +Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state +is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last +transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be +leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before +rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant(). + +Reported-by: Hulk Robot +Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/802/garp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/802/garp.c b/net/802/garp.c +index 7f50d47470bd..8e19f51833d6 100644 +--- a/net/802/garp.c ++++ b/net/802/garp.c +@@ -206,6 +206,19 @@ static void garp_attr_destroy(struct garp_applicant *app, struct garp_attr *attr + kfree(attr); + } + ++static void garp_attr_destroy_all(struct garp_applicant *app) ++{ ++ struct rb_node *node, *next; ++ struct garp_attr *attr; ++ ++ for (node = rb_first(&app->gid); ++ next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL; ++ node = next) { ++ attr = rb_entry(node, struct garp_attr, node); ++ garp_attr_destroy(app, attr); ++ } ++} ++ + static int garp_pdu_init(struct garp_applicant *app) + { + struct sk_buff *skb; +@@ -612,6 +625,7 @@ void garp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct garp_application *appl + + spin_lock_bh(&app->lock); + garp_gid_event(app, GARP_EVENT_TRANSMIT_PDU); ++ garp_attr_destroy_all(app); + garp_pdu_queue(app); + spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock); + +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch b/queue-4.19/net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bb4c6616db2 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From b845c13e07f4d1053c8273a099a353d6277e0dbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 15:22:37 +0800 +Subject: net/802/mrp: fix memleak in mrp_request_join() + +From: Yang Yingliang + +[ Upstream commit 996af62167d0e0ec69b938a3561e96f84ffff1aa ] + +I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test: + +BUG: memory leak +unreferenced object 0xffff88810c239500 (size 64): +comm "syz-executor940", pid 882, jiffies 4294712870 (age 14.631s) +hex dump (first 32 bytes): +01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ +00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ +backtrace: +[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2972 [inline] +[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2980 [inline] +[<00000000a323afa4>] __kmalloc+0x167/0x340 mm/slub.c:4130 +[<000000005034ca11>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:595 [inline] +[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_attr_create net/802/mrp.c:276 [inline] +[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_request_join+0x265/0x550 net/802/mrp.c:530 +[<00000000fcfd81f3>] vlan_mvrp_request_join+0x145/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_mvrp.c:40 +[<000000009258546e>] vlan_dev_open+0x477/0x890 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:292 +[<0000000059acd82b>] __dev_open+0x281/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1609 +[<000000004e6dc695>] __dev_change_flags+0x424/0x560 net/core/dev.c:8767 +[<00000000471a09af>] rtnl_configure_link+0xd9/0x210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3122 +[<0000000037a4672b>] __rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3448 +[<000000008d5d0fda>] rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3488 +[<000000004882fe39>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x369/0xa10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5552 +[<00000000907e6c54>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 +[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] +[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 +[<00000000e0645d50>] netlink_sendmsg+0x78e/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 +[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] +[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674 +[<00000000fc210bc2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350 +[<00000000be4577b5>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 + +Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state +is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last +TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. +To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning +from mrp_uninit_applicant(). + +Reported-by: Hulk Robot +Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + net/802/mrp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/net/802/mrp.c b/net/802/mrp.c +index a808dd5bbb27..32f87d458f05 100644 +--- a/net/802/mrp.c ++++ b/net/802/mrp.c +@@ -295,6 +295,19 @@ static void mrp_attr_destroy(struct mrp_applicant *app, struct mrp_attr *attr) + kfree(attr); + } + ++static void mrp_attr_destroy_all(struct mrp_applicant *app) ++{ ++ struct rb_node *node, *next; ++ struct mrp_attr *attr; ++ ++ for (node = rb_first(&app->mad); ++ next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL; ++ node = next) { ++ attr = rb_entry(node, struct mrp_attr, node); ++ mrp_attr_destroy(app, attr); ++ } ++} ++ + static int mrp_pdu_init(struct mrp_applicant *app) + { + struct sk_buff *skb; +@@ -898,6 +911,7 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl) + + spin_lock_bh(&app->lock); + mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_TX); ++ mrp_attr_destroy_all(app); + mrp_pdu_queue(app); + spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock); + +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch b/queue-4.19/net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b66e85a6237 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From d46f9b31028cbe758227b2f572fd0ff2cca084e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 07:12:45 -0700 +Subject: net: annotate data race around sk_ll_usec + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 0dbffbb5335a1e3aa6855e4ee317e25e669dd302 ] + +sk_ll_usec is read locklessly from sk_can_busy_loop() +while another thread can change its value in sock_setsockopt() + +This is correct but needs annotations. + +BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_datagram / sock_setsockopt + +write to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14011 on cpu 0: + sock_setsockopt+0x1287/0x2090 net/core/sock.c:1175 + __sys_setsockopt+0x14f/0x200 net/socket.c:2100 + __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline] + __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline] + __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112 + do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae + +read to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14001 on cpu 1: + sk_can_busy_loop include/net/busy_poll.h:41 [inline] + __skb_try_recv_datagram+0x14f/0x320 net/core/datagram.c:273 + unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x14c/0x870 net/unix/af_unix.c:2101 + unix_seqpacket_recvmsg+0x5a/0x70 net/unix/af_unix.c:2067 + ____sys_recvmsg+0x15d/0x310 include/linux/uio.h:244 + ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2598 [inline] + do_recvmmsg+0x35c/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2692 + __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline] + __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2794 [inline] + __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline] + __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xcf/0x150 net/socket.c:2787 + do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae + +value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000101 + +Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: +CPU: 1 PID: 14001 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 + +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: syzbot +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +- + net/core/sock.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/net/busy_poll.h b/include/net/busy_poll.h +index cf8f792743ec..c76a5e9894da 100644 +--- a/include/net/busy_poll.h ++++ b/include/net/busy_poll.h +@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void) + + static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk) + { +- return sk->sk_ll_usec && !signal_pending(current); ++ return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current); + } + + bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time); +diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c +index e6cbe137cb6f..956af38aa0d6 100644 +--- a/net/core/sock.c ++++ b/net/core/sock.c +@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ set_rcvbuf: + if (val < 0) + ret = -EINVAL; + else +- sk->sk_ll_usec = val; ++ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec, val); + } + break; + #endif +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch b/queue-4.19/sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f66d85a2fbe --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.19/sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From 99634ffa3428242d18bf0a1a521de04da5d8e47d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sasha Levin +Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 23:34:08 -0400 +Subject: sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Xin Long + +[ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ] + +The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses +was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be +allowed to use in SCTP. + +As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from +unusable to private scope. + +Reported-by: Sérgio +Signed-off-by: Xin Long +Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin +--- + include/net/sctp/constants.h | 4 +--- + net/sctp/protocol.c | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/net/sctp/constants.h b/include/net/sctp/constants.h +index 48d74674d5e9..bc22e44ffcdf 100644 +--- a/include/net/sctp/constants.h ++++ b/include/net/sctp/constants.h +@@ -348,8 +348,7 @@ enum { + #define SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_MAX SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_LINK + + /* Based on IPv4 scoping , +- * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.18.0.0/24, +- * 192.88.99.0/24. ++ * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 192.88.99.0/24. + * Also, RFC 8.4, non-unicast addresses are not considered valid SCTP + * addresses. + */ +@@ -357,7 +356,6 @@ enum { + ((htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST) == a) || \ + ipv4_is_multicast(a) || \ + ipv4_is_zeronet(a) || \ +- ipv4_is_test_198(a) || \ + ipv4_is_anycast_6to4(a)) + + /* Flags used for the bind address copy functions. */ +diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c +index dd5125658255..7207a9769f1a 100644 +--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c ++++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c +@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ static enum sctp_scope sctp_v4_scope(union sctp_addr *addr) + retval = SCTP_SCOPE_LINK; + } else if (ipv4_is_private_10(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || + ipv4_is_private_172(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || +- ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) { ++ ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) || ++ ipv4_is_test_198(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) { + retval = SCTP_SCOPE_PRIVATE; + } else { + retval = SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL; +-- +2.30.2 + diff --git a/queue-4.19/series b/queue-4.19/series index 265fc417792..4b4d67d7e43 100644 --- a/queue-4.19/series +++ b/queue-4.19/series @@ -4,3 +4,14 @@ kvm-x86-determine-if-an-exception-has-an-error-code-only-when-injecting-it.patch net-split-out-functions-related-to-registering-inflight-socket-files.patch af_unix-fix-garbage-collect-vs-msg_peek.patch workqueue-fix-uaf-in-pwq_unbound_release_workfn.patch +net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch +net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch +net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch +sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch +hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch +hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch +hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch +firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch +firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch +cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch +arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch