From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 10:18:27 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: More correctly handle a selected_len of 0 when processing NPN
X-Git-Tag: openssl-3.4.0-alpha1~442
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=c6e1ea223510bb7104bf0c41c0c45eda5a16b718;p=thirdparty%2Fopenssl.git

More correctly handle a selected_len of 0 when processing NPN

In the case where the NPN callback returns with SSL_TLEXT_ERR_OK, but
the selected_len is 0 we should fail. Previously this would fail with an
internal_error alert because calling OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len) will
return NULL when selected_len is 0. We make this error detection more
explicit and return a handshake failure alert.

Follow on from CVE-2024-5535

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24716)
---

diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index ef51c61ef3c..f24db5f570d 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1598,8 +1598,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
                                 &selected, &selected_len,
                                 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
-                                sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
-             SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+                                sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+            || selected_len == 0) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
         return 0;
     }