From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2015 16:48:39 +0000 (-0800) Subject: 4.1-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v4.1.15~18 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=cf77fceac203b9b47d95d556ac03d8bd53b07ca2;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 4.1-stable patches added patches: bpf-array-fix-heap-out-of-bounds-access-when-updating-elements.patch broadcom-fix-phy_id_bcm5481-entry-in-the-id-table.patch ip_tunnel-disable-preemption-when-updating-per-cpu-tstats.patch ipv6-add-complete-rcu-protection-around-np-opt.patch ipv6-distinguish-frag-queues-by-device-for-multicast-and-link-local-packets.patch ipv6-sctp-implement-sctp_v6_destroy_sock.patch net-ip6mr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch net-ipmr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch net-neighbour-fix-crash-at-dumping-device-agnostic-proxy-entries.patch net-qmi_wwan-add-xs-stick-w100-2-from-4g-systems.patch net-scm-fix-pax-detected-msg_controllen-overflow-in-scm_detach_fds.patch net_sched-fix-qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen-races.patch packet-always-probe-for-transport-header.patch packet-do-skb_probe_transport_header-when-we-actually-have-data.patch packet-fix-tpacket_snd-max-frame-len.patch packet-infer-protocol-from-ethernet-header-if-unset.patch packet-only-allow-extra-vlan-len-on-ethernet-devices.patch rds-fix-race-condition-when-sending-a-message-on-unbound-socket.patch sctp-translate-host-order-to-network-order-when-setting-a-hmacid.patch snmp-remove-duplicate-outmcast-stat-increment.patch tcp-disable-fast-open-on-timeouts-after-handshake.patch tcp-fix-potential-huge-kmalloc-calls-in-tcp_repair.patch tcp-initialize-tp-copied_seq-in-case-of-cross-syn-connection.patch tcp-md5-fix-lockdep-annotation.patch tools-net-use-include-uapi-with-__exported_headers__.patch unix-avoid-use-after-free-in-ep_remove_wait_queue.patch --- diff --git a/queue-4.1/bpf-array-fix-heap-out-of-bounds-access-when-updating-elements.patch b/queue-4.1/bpf-array-fix-heap-out-of-bounds-access-when-updating-elements.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1d37c9cf291 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/bpf-array-fix-heap-out-of-bounds-access-when-updating-elements.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 13:02:56 +0100 +Subject: bpf, array: fix heap out-of-bounds access when updating elements + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit fbca9d2d35c6ef1b323fae75cc9545005ba25097 ] + +During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been +noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps +when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size +(specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes. + +In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and +used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function +array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ... + +memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size); + +... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from +map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER) +and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size). +Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds. + +Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we +access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack. + +Since 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an +official release yet, it only affects priviledged users. + +In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs +from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also +from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to +user, so nothing could leak. + + [1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller + +Fixes: 28fbcfa08d8e ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps") +Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c ++++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct + /* all elements already exist */ + return -EEXIST; + +- memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size); ++ memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, map->value_size); + return 0; + } + diff --git a/queue-4.1/broadcom-fix-phy_id_bcm5481-entry-in-the-id-table.patch b/queue-4.1/broadcom-fix-phy_id_bcm5481-entry-in-the-id-table.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b9164faea24 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/broadcom-fix-phy_id_bcm5481-entry-in-the-id-table.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Aaro Koskinen +Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2015 01:08:54 +0200 +Subject: broadcom: fix PHY_ID_BCM5481 entry in the id table + +From: Aaro Koskinen + +[ Upstream commit 3c25a860d17b7378822f35d8c9141db9507e3beb ] + +Commit fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header") +updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0 +with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting +the original). Fix that. + +Fixes: fcb26ec5b18d ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header") +Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c ++++ b/drivers/net/phy/broadcom.c +@@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ static struct mdio_device_id __maybe_unu + { PHY_ID_BCM5461, 0xfffffff0 }, + { PHY_ID_BCM54616S, 0xfffffff0 }, + { PHY_ID_BCM5464, 0xfffffff0 }, +- { PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 }, ++ { PHY_ID_BCM5481, 0xfffffff0 }, + { PHY_ID_BCM5482, 0xfffffff0 }, + { PHY_ID_BCM50610, 0xfffffff0 }, + { PHY_ID_BCM50610M, 0xfffffff0 }, diff --git a/queue-4.1/ip_tunnel-disable-preemption-when-updating-per-cpu-tstats.patch b/queue-4.1/ip_tunnel-disable-preemption-when-updating-per-cpu-tstats.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ae71f2921c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/ip_tunnel-disable-preemption-when-updating-per-cpu-tstats.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 17:35:58 +0100 +Subject: ip_tunnel: disable preemption when updating per-cpu tstats + +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" + +[ Upstream commit b4fe85f9c9146f60457e9512fb6055e69e6a7a65 ] + +Drivers like vxlan use the recently introduced +udp_tunnel_xmit_skb/udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb APIs. udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb +makes use of ip6tunnel_xmit, and ip6tunnel_xmit, after sending the +packet, updates the struct stats using the usual +u64_stats_update_begin/end calls on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats). +udp_tunnel_xmit_skb makes use of iptunnel_xmit, which doesn't touch +tstats, so drivers like vxlan, immediately after, call +iptunnel_xmit_stats, which does the same thing - calls +u64_stats_update_begin/end on this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats). + +While vxlan is probably fine (I don't know?), calling a similar function +from, say, an unbound workqueue, on a fully preemptable kernel causes +real issues: + +[ 188.434537] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u8:0/6 +[ 188.435579] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 +[ 188.435583] CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 4.2.6 #2 +[ 188.435607] Call Trace: +[ 188.435611] [] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b +[ 188.435615] [] check_preemption_disabled+0x19d/0x1c0 +[ 188.435619] [] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 + +The solution would be to protect the whole +this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats)/u64_stats_update_begin/end blocks with +disabling preemption and then reenabling it. + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/net/ip6_tunnel.h | 3 ++- + include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h ++++ b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h +@@ -83,11 +83,12 @@ static inline void ip6tunnel_xmit(struct + err = ip6_local_out_sk(sk, skb); + + if (net_xmit_eval(err) == 0) { +- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats); ++ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats); + u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp); + tstats->tx_bytes += pkt_len; + tstats->tx_packets++; + u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp); ++ put_cpu_ptr(tstats); + } else { + stats->tx_errors++; + stats->tx_aborted_errors++; +--- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h ++++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h +@@ -207,12 +207,13 @@ static inline void iptunnel_xmit_stats(i + struct pcpu_sw_netstats __percpu *stats) + { + if (err > 0) { +- struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = this_cpu_ptr(stats); ++ struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(stats); + + u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp); + tstats->tx_bytes += err; + tstats->tx_packets++; + u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp); ++ put_cpu_ptr(tstats); + } else if (err < 0) { + err_stats->tx_errors++; + err_stats->tx_aborted_errors++; diff --git a/queue-4.1/ipv6-add-complete-rcu-protection-around-np-opt.patch b/queue-4.1/ipv6-add-complete-rcu-protection-around-np-opt.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d82a8fc87d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/ipv6-add-complete-rcu-protection-around-np-opt.patch @@ -0,0 +1,543 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 19:37:57 -0800 +Subject: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 ] + +This patch addresses multiple problems : + +UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions +while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt +concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller +(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating +use-after-free. + +Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() +and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection +to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options()) + +This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt + +Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/linux/ipv6.h | 2 +- + include/net/ipv6.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- + net/dccp/ipv6.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------ + net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 13 +++++++++---- + net/ipv6/datagram.c | 4 +++- + net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 3 ++- + net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c | 11 ++++++++--- + net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + net/ipv6/raw.c | 8 ++++++-- + net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 2 +- + net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- + net/ipv6/udp.c | 8 ++++++-- + net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 8 ++++++-- + 13 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/linux/ipv6.h ++++ b/include/linux/ipv6.h +@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ struct ipv6_pinfo { + struct ipv6_ac_socklist *ipv6_ac_list; + struct ipv6_fl_socklist __rcu *ipv6_fl_list; + +- struct ipv6_txoptions *opt; ++ struct ipv6_txoptions __rcu *opt; + struct sk_buff *pktoptions; + struct sk_buff *rxpmtu; + struct inet6_cork cork; +--- a/include/net/ipv6.h ++++ b/include/net/ipv6.h +@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ extern rwlock_t ip6_ra_lock; + */ + + struct ipv6_txoptions { ++ atomic_t refcnt; + /* Length of this structure */ + int tot_len; + +@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions { + struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst0opt; + struct ipv6_rt_hdr *srcrt; /* Routing Header */ + struct ipv6_opt_hdr *dst1opt; +- ++ struct rcu_head rcu; + /* Option buffer, as read by IPV6_PKTOPTIONS, starts here. */ + }; + +@@ -250,6 +251,24 @@ struct ipv6_fl_socklist { + struct rcu_head rcu; + }; + ++static inline struct ipv6_txoptions *txopt_get(const struct ipv6_pinfo *np) ++{ ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt); ++ if (opt && !atomic_inc_not_zero(&opt->refcnt)) ++ opt = NULL; ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ return opt; ++} ++ ++static inline void txopt_put(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt) ++{ ++ if (opt && atomic_dec_and_test(&opt->refcnt)) ++ kfree_rcu(opt, rcu); ++} ++ + struct ip6_flowlabel *fl6_sock_lookup(struct sock *sk, __be32 label); + struct ipv6_txoptions *fl6_merge_options(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_space, + struct ip6_flowlabel *fl, +--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c ++++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c +@@ -202,7 +202,9 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct + security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6)); + + +- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final); ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + + dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p); + if (IS_ERR(dst)) { +@@ -219,7 +221,10 @@ static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct + &ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr, + &ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr); + fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr; +- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass); ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), ++ np->tclass); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + err = net_xmit_eval(err); + } + +@@ -415,6 +420,7 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv + { + struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); + struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk); ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt; + struct inet_sock *newinet; + struct dccp6_sock *newdp6; + struct sock *newsk; +@@ -534,13 +540,15 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv + * Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make + * one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk. + */ +- if (np->opt != NULL) +- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt); +- ++ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt); ++ if (opt) { ++ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt); ++ } + inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0; +- if (newnp->opt != NULL) +- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen + +- newnp->opt->opt_flen); ++ if (opt) ++ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen + ++ opt->opt_flen; + + dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst)); + +@@ -793,6 +801,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock * + struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); + struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk); + struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final; ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt; + struct flowi6 fl6; + struct dst_entry *dst; + int addr_type; +@@ -892,7 +901,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock * + fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport; + security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6)); + +- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final); ++ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk)); ++ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final); + + dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p); + if (IS_ERR(dst)) { +@@ -912,9 +922,8 @@ static int dccp_v6_connect(struct sock * + __ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL); + + icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0; +- if (np->opt != NULL) +- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen + +- np->opt->opt_nflen); ++ if (opt) ++ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen; + + inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port; + +--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +@@ -425,9 +425,11 @@ void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk) + + /* Free tx options */ + +- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL); +- if (opt) +- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len); ++ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL); ++ if (opt) { ++ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc); ++ txopt_put(opt); ++ } + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_destroy_sock); + +@@ -656,7 +658,10 @@ int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock + fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport; + security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6)); + +- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final); ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), ++ &final); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + + dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p); + if (IS_ERR(dst)) { +--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c +@@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ ipv4_connected: + + security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6)); + +- opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : np->opt; ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ opt = flowlabel ? flowlabel->opt : rcu_dereference(np->opt); + final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + + dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p); + err = 0; +--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c +@@ -727,6 +727,7 @@ ipv6_dup_options(struct sock *sk, struct + *((char **)&opt2->dst1opt) += dif; + if (opt2->srcrt) + *((char **)&opt2->srcrt) += dif; ++ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1); + } + return opt2; + } +@@ -790,7 +791,7 @@ ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, stru + return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS); + + memset(opt2, 0, tot_len); +- ++ atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1); + opt2->tot_len = tot_len; + p = (char *)(opt2 + 1); + +--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c +@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route_req(st + memset(fl6, 0, sizeof(*fl6)); + fl6->flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP; + fl6->daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr; +- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final); ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + fl6->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr; + fl6->flowi6_oif = ireq->ir_iif; + fl6->flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark; +@@ -207,7 +209,9 @@ static struct dst_entry *inet6_csk_route + fl6->fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport; + security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6)); + +- final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final); ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + + dst = __inet6_csk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie); + if (!dst) { +@@ -240,7 +244,8 @@ int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, stru + /* Restore final destination back after routing done */ + fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr; + +- res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass); ++ res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), ++ np->tclass); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return res; + } +--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c +@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_optio + icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie); + } + } +- opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt); ++ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, ++ opt); + sk_dst_reset(sk); + + return opt; +@@ -231,9 +232,12 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct soc + sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops; + sk->sk_family = PF_INET; + } +- opt = xchg(&np->opt, NULL); +- if (opt) +- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len); ++ opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, ++ NULL); ++ if (opt) { ++ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc); ++ txopt_put(opt); ++ } + pktopt = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL); + kfree_skb(pktopt); + +@@ -403,7 +407,8 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct soc + if (optname != IPV6_RTHDR && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)) + break; + +- opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, np->opt, optname, ++ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk)); ++ opt = ipv6_renew_options(sk, opt, optname, + (struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *)optval, + optlen); + if (IS_ERR(opt)) { +@@ -432,8 +437,10 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct soc + retv = 0; + opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt); + sticky_done: +- if (opt) +- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len); ++ if (opt) { ++ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc); ++ txopt_put(opt); ++ } + break; + } + +@@ -486,6 +493,7 @@ sticky_done: + break; + + memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); ++ atomic_set(&opt->refcnt, 1); + opt->tot_len = sizeof(*opt) + optlen; + retv = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(opt+1, optval, optlen)) +@@ -502,8 +510,10 @@ update: + retv = 0; + opt = ipv6_update_options(sk, opt); + done: +- if (opt) +- sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len); ++ if (opt) { ++ atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc); ++ txopt_put(opt); ++ } + break; + } + case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS: +@@ -1110,10 +1120,11 @@ static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct soc + case IPV6_RTHDR: + case IPV6_DSTOPTS: + { ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt; + + lock_sock(sk); +- len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, np->opt, +- optname, optval, len); ++ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk)); ++ len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, opt, optname, optval, len); + release_sock(sk); + /* check if ipv6_getsockopt_sticky() returns err code */ + if (len < 0) +--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c +@@ -731,6 +731,7 @@ static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char + + static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) + { ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL; + struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space; + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name); + struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final; +@@ -837,8 +838,10 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk + if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen)) + opt = NULL; + } +- if (!opt) +- opt = np->opt; ++ if (!opt) { ++ opt = txopt_get(np); ++ opt_to_free = opt; ++ } + if (flowlabel) + opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt); + opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt); +@@ -901,6 +904,7 @@ done: + dst_release(dst); + out: + fl6_sock_release(flowlabel); ++ txopt_put(opt_to_free); + return err < 0 ? err : len; + do_confirm: + dst_confirm(dst); +--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c +@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock + memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6)); + fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP; + fl6.daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr; +- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final); ++ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), &final); + fl6.saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr; + fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if; + fl6.flowi6_mark = ireq->ir_mark; +--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *s + struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); + struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final; ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt; + struct rt6_info *rt; + struct flowi6 fl6; + struct dst_entry *dst; +@@ -237,7 +238,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *s + fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port; + fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport; + +- final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final); ++ opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk)); ++ final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final); + + security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6)); + +@@ -266,9 +268,9 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *s + tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst); + + icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0; +- if (np->opt) +- icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen + +- np->opt->opt_nflen); ++ if (opt) ++ icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + ++ opt->opt_nflen; + + tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); + +@@ -464,7 +466,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct soc + fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts)); + + skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_mapping); +- err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass); ++ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt), ++ np->tclass); + err = net_xmit_eval(err); + } + +@@ -994,6 +997,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock + struct inet_request_sock *ireq; + struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk); + struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk; ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt; + struct inet_sock *newinet; + struct tcp_sock *newtp; + struct sock *newsk; +@@ -1129,13 +1133,15 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock + but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem + to newsk. + */ +- if (np->opt) +- newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, np->opt); +- ++ opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt); ++ if (opt) { ++ opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt); ++ RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt); ++ } + inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0; +- if (newnp->opt) +- inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen + +- newnp->opt->opt_flen); ++ if (opt) ++ inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen + ++ opt->opt_flen; + + tcp_ca_openreq_child(newsk, dst); + +--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c +@@ -1107,6 +1107,7 @@ int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struc + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name); + struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final; + struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL; ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL; + struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL; + struct flowi6 fl6; + struct dst_entry *dst; +@@ -1260,8 +1261,10 @@ do_udp_sendmsg: + opt = NULL; + connected = 0; + } +- if (!opt) +- opt = np->opt; ++ if (!opt) { ++ opt = txopt_get(np); ++ opt_to_free = opt; ++ } + if (flowlabel) + opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt); + opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt); +@@ -1370,6 +1373,7 @@ release_dst: + out: + dst_release(dst); + fl6_sock_release(flowlabel); ++ txopt_put(opt_to_free); + if (!err) + return len; + /* +--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c ++++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c +@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name); + struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final; + struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); ++ struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL; + struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL; + struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL; + struct dst_entry *dst = NULL; +@@ -575,8 +576,10 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock + opt = NULL; + } + +- if (opt == NULL) +- opt = np->opt; ++ if (!opt) { ++ opt = txopt_get(np); ++ opt_to_free = opt; ++ } + if (flowlabel) + opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt); + opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt); +@@ -631,6 +634,7 @@ done: + dst_release(dst); + out: + fl6_sock_release(flowlabel); ++ txopt_put(opt_to_free); + + return err < 0 ? err : len; + diff --git a/queue-4.1/ipv6-distinguish-frag-queues-by-device-for-multicast-and-link-local-packets.patch b/queue-4.1/ipv6-distinguish-frag-queues-by-device-for-multicast-and-link-local-packets.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a3b35f83ec8 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/ipv6-distinguish-frag-queues-by-device-for-multicast-and-link-local-packets.patch @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= +Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 15:07:11 +0100 +Subject: ipv6: distinguish frag queues by device for multicast and link-local packets + +From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= + +[ Upstream commit 264640fc2c5f4f913db5c73fa3eb1ead2c45e9d7 ] + +If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which +has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and +received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some +fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the +underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in +ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue. + +To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to +match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local +addresses. + +Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in + + http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/ + +but got lost and forgotten for some reason. + +Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/net/ipv6.h | 1 + + net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 5 +++-- + net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 10 +++++++--- + 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/net/ipv6.h ++++ b/include/net/ipv6.h +@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ struct ip6_create_arg { + u32 user; + const struct in6_addr *src; + const struct in6_addr *dst; ++ int iif; + u8 ecn; + }; + +--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static void nf_ct_frag6_expire(unsigned + /* Creation primitives. */ + static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, + u32 user, struct in6_addr *src, +- struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn) ++ struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn) + { + struct inet_frag_queue *q; + struct ip6_create_arg arg; +@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline struct frag_queue *fq_find + arg.user = user; + arg.src = src; + arg.dst = dst; ++ arg.iif = iif; + arg.ecn = ecn; + + local_bh_disable(); +@@ -603,7 +604,7 @@ struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struc + fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone); + + fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr, +- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr)); ++ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr)); + if (fq == NULL) { + pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n"); + goto ret_orig; +--- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c +@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ bool ip6_frag_match(const struct inet_fr + return fq->id == arg->id && + fq->user == arg->user && + ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->saddr, arg->src) && +- ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst); ++ ipv6_addr_equal(&fq->daddr, arg->dst) && ++ (arg->iif == fq->iif || ++ !(ipv6_addr_type(arg->dst) & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST | ++ IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL))); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip6_frag_match); + +@@ -180,7 +183,7 @@ static void ip6_frag_expire(unsigned lon + + static struct frag_queue * + fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, const struct in6_addr *src, +- const struct in6_addr *dst, u8 ecn) ++ const struct in6_addr *dst, int iif, u8 ecn) + { + struct inet_frag_queue *q; + struct ip6_create_arg arg; +@@ -190,6 +193,7 @@ fq_find(struct net *net, __be32 id, cons + arg.user = IP6_DEFRAG_LOCAL_DELIVER; + arg.src = src; + arg.dst = dst; ++ arg.iif = iif; + arg.ecn = ecn; + + hash = inet6_hash_frag(id, src, dst); +@@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff + } + + fq = fq_find(net, fhdr->identification, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr, +- ip6_frag_ecn(hdr)); ++ skb->dev ? skb->dev->ifindex : 0, ip6_frag_ecn(hdr)); + if (fq) { + int ret; + diff --git a/queue-4.1/ipv6-sctp-implement-sctp_v6_destroy_sock.patch b/queue-4.1/ipv6-sctp-implement-sctp_v6_destroy_sock.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0f1f1955fd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/ipv6-sctp-implement-sctp_v6_destroy_sock.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 07:20:07 -0800 +Subject: ipv6: sctp: implement sctp_v6_destroy_sock() + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 602dd62dfbda3e63a2d6a3cbde953ebe82bf5087 ] + +Dmitry Vyukov reported a memory leak using IPV6 SCTP sockets. + +We need to call inet6_destroy_sock() to properly release +inet6 specific fields. + +Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/sctp/socket.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/sctp/socket.c ++++ b/net/sctp/socket.c +@@ -7387,6 +7387,13 @@ struct proto sctp_prot = { + + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + ++#include ++static void sctp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk) ++{ ++ sctp_destroy_sock(sk); ++ inet6_destroy_sock(sk); ++} ++ + struct proto sctpv6_prot = { + .name = "SCTPv6", + .owner = THIS_MODULE, +@@ -7396,7 +7403,7 @@ struct proto sctpv6_prot = { + .accept = sctp_accept, + .ioctl = sctp_ioctl, + .init = sctp_init_sock, +- .destroy = sctp_destroy_sock, ++ .destroy = sctp_v6_destroy_sock, + .shutdown = sctp_shutdown, + .setsockopt = sctp_setsockopt, + .getsockopt = sctp_getsockopt, diff --git a/queue-4.1/net-ip6mr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch b/queue-4.1/net-ip6mr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..443f126e528 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/net-ip6mr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Nikolay Aleksandrov +Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:20 +0100 +Subject: net: ip6mr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destruction + +From: Nikolay Aleksandrov + +[ Upstream commit 4c6980462f32b4f282c5d8e5f7ea8070e2937725 ] + +Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and +the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be +destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that +everything is cleaned up on netns destruction. + +Fixes: 8229efdaef1e ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code") +CC: Benjamin Thery +Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov +Reviewed-by: Cong Wang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 15 ++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void mr6_netlink_event(struct mr6 + int cmd); + static int ip6mr_rtm_dumproute(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct netlink_callback *cb); +-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt); ++static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all); + static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg); + + #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES +@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static struct mr6_table *ip6mr_new_table + static void ip6mr_free_table(struct mr6_table *mrt) + { + del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer); +- mroute_clean_tables(mrt); ++ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true); + kfree(mrt); + } + +@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ static int ip6mr_mfc_add(struct net *net + * Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc + */ + +-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt) ++static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr6_table *mrt, bool all) + { + int i; + LIST_HEAD(list); +@@ -1553,8 +1553,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct m + * Shut down all active vif entries + */ + for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) { +- if (!(mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC)) +- mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list); ++ if (!all && (mrt->vif6_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC)) ++ continue; ++ mif6_delete(mrt, i, &list); + } + unregister_netdevice_many(&list); + +@@ -1563,7 +1564,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct m + */ + for (i = 0; i < MFC6_LINES; i++) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[i], list) { +- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC) ++ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)) + continue; + write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock); + list_del(&c->list); +@@ -1626,7 +1627,7 @@ int ip6mr_sk_done(struct sock *sk) + net->ipv6.devconf_all); + write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock); + +- mroute_clean_tables(mrt); ++ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false); + err = 0; + break; + } diff --git a/queue-4.1/net-ipmr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch b/queue-4.1/net-ipmr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..97b6aadabfa --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/net-ipmr-fix-static-mfc-dev-leaks-on-table-destruction.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Nikolay Aleksandrov +Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 13:54:19 +0100 +Subject: net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destruction + +From: Nikolay Aleksandrov + +[ Upstream commit 0e615e9601a15efeeb8942cf7cd4dadba0c8c5a7 ] + +When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static +devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed +(because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example: +unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192): + comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s) + hex dump (first 32 bytes): + 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff .S.4.....S.4.... + ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ + backtrace: + [] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0 + [] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300 + [] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910 + [] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0 + [] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 + [] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90 + [] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20 + [] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0 + [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a + [] 0xffffffffffffffff + +Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction. + +Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov +Reviewed-by: Cong Wang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 15 ++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_ + struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm); + static void mroute_netlink_event(struct mr_table *mrt, struct mfc_cache *mfc, + int cmd); +-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt); ++static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all); + static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg); + + #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES +@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(s + static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt) + { + del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer); +- mroute_clean_tables(mrt); ++ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, true); + kfree(mrt); + } + +@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static int ipmr_mfc_add(struct net *net, + * Close the multicast socket, and clear the vif tables etc + */ + +-static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt) ++static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt, bool all) + { + int i; + LIST_HEAD(list); +@@ -1218,8 +1218,9 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct m + /* Shut down all active vif entries */ + + for (i = 0; i < mrt->maxvif; i++) { +- if (!(mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC)) +- vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list); ++ if (!all && (mrt->vif_table[i].flags & VIFF_STATIC)) ++ continue; ++ vif_delete(mrt, i, 0, &list); + } + unregister_netdevice_many(&list); + +@@ -1227,7 +1228,7 @@ static void mroute_clean_tables(struct m + + for (i = 0; i < MFC_LINES; i++) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc_cache_array[i], list) { +- if (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC) ++ if (!all && (c->mfc_flags & MFC_STATIC)) + continue; + list_del_rcu(&c->list); + mroute_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE); +@@ -1262,7 +1263,7 @@ static void mrtsock_destruct(struct sock + NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL, + net->ipv4.devconf_all); + RCU_INIT_POINTER(mrt->mroute_sk, NULL); +- mroute_clean_tables(mrt); ++ mroute_clean_tables(mrt, false); + } + } + rtnl_unlock(); diff --git a/queue-4.1/net-neighbour-fix-crash-at-dumping-device-agnostic-proxy-entries.patch b/queue-4.1/net-neighbour-fix-crash-at-dumping-device-agnostic-proxy-entries.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..07f2488b959 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/net-neighbour-fix-crash-at-dumping-device-agnostic-proxy-entries.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Konstantin Khlebnikov +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 01:14:48 +0300 +Subject: net/neighbour: fix crash at dumping device-agnostic proxy entries + +From: Konstantin Khlebnikov + +[ Upstream commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e ] + +Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device. + +Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov +Fixes: 84920c1420e2 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2") +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/core/neighbour.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/core/neighbour.c ++++ b/net/core/neighbour.c +@@ -2207,7 +2207,7 @@ static int pneigh_fill_info(struct sk_bu + ndm->ndm_pad2 = 0; + ndm->ndm_flags = pn->flags | NTF_PROXY; + ndm->ndm_type = RTN_UNICAST; +- ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev->ifindex; ++ ndm->ndm_ifindex = pn->dev ? pn->dev->ifindex : 0; + ndm->ndm_state = NUD_NONE; + + if (nla_put(skb, NDA_DST, tbl->key_len, pn->key)) +@@ -2282,7 +2282,7 @@ static int pneigh_dump_table(struct neig + if (h > s_h) + s_idx = 0; + for (n = tbl->phash_buckets[h], idx = 0; n; n = n->next) { +- if (dev_net(n->dev) != net) ++ if (pneigh_net(n) != net) + continue; + if (idx < s_idx) + goto next; diff --git a/queue-4.1/net-qmi_wwan-add-xs-stick-w100-2-from-4g-systems.patch b/queue-4.1/net-qmi_wwan-add-xs-stick-w100-2-from-4g-systems.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..758c41b101e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/net-qmi_wwan-add-xs-stick-w100-2-from-4g-systems.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= +Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:13:07 +0100 +Subject: net: qmi_wwan: add XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: =?UTF-8?q?Bj=C3=B8rn=20Mork?= + +[ Upstream commit 68242a5a1e2edce39b069385cbafb82304eac0f1 ] + +Thomas reports +" +4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name. +.. +The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega" +.. +Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for +network and MI01\6 for modem. +.. +echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id +echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id + +T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 +D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 +P: Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32 +S: Manufacturer=USB Modem +S: Product=USB Modem +S: SerialNumber= +C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA +I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option +I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option +I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option +I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan +I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage + +Now all important things are there: + +wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at) + +There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at. + +The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager. +" + +Reported-by: Thomas Schäfer +Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c ++++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +@@ -774,6 +774,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)}, /* TP-LINK MA260 */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1201, 2)}, /* Telit LE920 */ ++ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1c9e, 0x9b01, 3)}, /* XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc000, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 100 */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc001, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 120 */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x0b3c, 0xc002, 4)}, /* Olivetti Olicard 140 */ diff --git a/queue-4.1/net-scm-fix-pax-detected-msg_controllen-overflow-in-scm_detach_fds.patch b/queue-4.1/net-scm-fix-pax-detected-msg_controllen-overflow-in-scm_detach_fds.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dc4fb276619 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/net-scm-fix-pax-detected-msg_controllen-overflow-in-scm_detach_fds.patch @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 00:11:56 +0100 +Subject: net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in scm_detach_fds + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit 6900317f5eff0a7070c5936e5383f589e0de7a09 ] + +David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered +in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin: + +(Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.) + +[ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314 + cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr; +[ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7 +[ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...] +[ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8 +[ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8 +[ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60 +[ 1002.296176] Call Trace: +[ 1002.296190] [] dump_stack+0x45/0x57 +[ 1002.296200] [] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60 +[ 1002.296209] [] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300 +[ 1002.296220] [] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930 +[ 1002.296228] [] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60 +[ 1002.296236] [] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50 +[ 1002.296243] [] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60 +[ 1002.296248] [] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0 +[ 1002.296257] [] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80 +[ 1002.296263] [] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40 +[ 1002.296271] [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85 + +Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of +fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets. + +In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)), +where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due +to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary +on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the +control buffer. + +When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4 +bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will +overflow in scm_detach_fds(): + + int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding + err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level); + if (!err) + err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type); + if (!err) + err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); + if (!err) { + cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding + msg->msg_control += cmlen; + msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ... + } ... wrap-around + +F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the +receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender +properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results +in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes. + +In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an +issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same +should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries +as well. + +In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving +a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is +being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input +buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later +on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen +elsewhere. + +Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253). + +Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read +after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good! + +Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg()) +and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller, +and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control - +old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen +in the example). + +Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7ad24a +("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory +overflow"). + +RFC3542, section 20.2. says: + + The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr + structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr + structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an + application may or may not include padding at the end of last + ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both + as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for + padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may + copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and + include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called + if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items + including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation + may set MSG_CTRUNC. + +Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do +the same as in 1ac70e7ad24a to avoid an overflow. + +Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix +error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?), +thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by +David and HacKurx). + +No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree). + +Reported-by: David Sterba +Reported-by: HacKurx +Cc: PaX Team +Cc: Emese Revfy +Cc: Brad Spengler +Cc: Wei Yongjun +Cc: Eric Dumazet +Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/core/scm.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +--- a/net/core/scm.c ++++ b/net/core/scm.c +@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, + err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); + if (!err) { + cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int)); ++ if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen) ++ cmlen = msg->msg_controllen; + msg->msg_control += cmlen; + msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; + } diff --git a/queue-4.1/net_sched-fix-qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen-races.patch b/queue-4.1/net_sched-fix-qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen-races.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e3664f19723 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/net_sched-fix-qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen-races.patch @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 20:08:51 -0800 +Subject: net_sched: fix qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() races + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 4eaf3b84f2881c9c028f1d5e76c52ab575fe3a66 ] + +qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() suffers from two problems on multiqueue +devices. + +One problem is that it updates sch->q.qlen and sch->qstats.drops +on the mq/mqprio root qdisc, while it should not : Daniele +reported underflows errors : +[ 681.774821] PAX: sch->q.qlen: 0 n: 1 +[ 681.774825] PAX: size overflow detected in function qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen net/sched/sch_api.c:769 cicus.693_49 min, count: 72, decl: qlen; num: 0; context: sk_buff_head; +[ 681.774954] CPU: 2 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Tainted: G O 4.2.6.201511282239-1-grsec #1 +[ 681.774955] Hardware name: ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC. X302LJ/X302LJ, BIOS X302LJ.202 03/05/2015 +[ 681.774956] ffffffffa9a04863 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffa990ff7c +[ 681.774959] ffffc90000d3bc38 ffffffffa95d2810 0000000000000007 ffffffffa991002b +[ 681.774960] ffffc90000d3bc68 ffffffffa91a44f4 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 +[ 681.774962] Call Trace: +[ 681.774967] [] dump_stack+0x4c/0x7f +[ 681.774970] [] report_size_overflow+0x34/0x50 +[ 681.774972] [] qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen+0x152/0x160 +[ 681.774976] [] fq_codel_dequeue+0x7b1/0x820 [sch_fq_codel] +[ 681.774978] [] ? qdisc_peek_dequeued+0xa0/0xa0 [sch_fq_codel] +[ 681.774980] [] __qdisc_run+0x4d/0x1d0 +[ 681.774983] [] net_tx_action+0xc2/0x160 +[ 681.774985] [] __do_softirq+0xf1/0x200 +[ 681.774987] [] run_ksoftirqd+0x1e/0x30 +[ 681.774989] [] smpboot_thread_fn+0x150/0x260 +[ 681.774991] [] ? sort_range+0x40/0x40 +[ 681.774992] [] kthread+0xe4/0x100 +[ 681.774994] [] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x170/0x170 +[ 681.774995] [] ret_from_fork+0x3e/0x70 + +mq/mqprio have their own ways to report qlen/drops by folding stats on +all their queues, with appropriate locking. + +A second problem is that qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() calls qdisc_lookup() +without proper locking : concurrent qdisc updates could corrupt the list +that qdisc_match_from_root() parses to find a qdisc given its handle. + +Fix first problem adding a TCQ_F_NOPARENT qdisc flag that +qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can use to abort its tree traversal, +as soon as it meets a mq/mqprio qdisc children. + +Second problem can be fixed by RCU protection. +Qdisc are already freed after RCU grace period, so qdisc_list_add() and +qdisc_list_del() simply have to use appropriate rcu list variants. + +A future patch will add a per struct netdev_queue list anchor, so that +qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() can have more efficient lookups. + +Reported-by: Daniele Fucini +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Cc: Cong Wang +Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/net/sch_generic.h | 3 +++ + net/sched/sch_api.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- + net/sched/sch_generic.c | 2 +- + net/sched/sch_mq.c | 4 ++-- + net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 4 ++-- + 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/net/sch_generic.h ++++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h +@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ struct Qdisc { + */ + #define TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC (1 << 16) + #define TCQ_F_CPUSTATS 0x20 /* run using percpu statistics */ ++#define TCQ_F_NOPARENT 0x40 /* root of its hierarchy : ++ * qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() should stop. ++ */ + u32 limit; + const struct Qdisc_ops *ops; + struct qdisc_size_table __rcu *stab; +--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c ++++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c +@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ int qdisc_set_default(const char *name) + } + + /* We know handle. Find qdisc among all qdisc's attached to device +- (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.) ++ * (root qdisc, all its children, children of children etc.) ++ * Note: caller either uses rtnl or rcu_read_lock() + */ + + static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_root(struct Qdisc *root, u32 handle) +@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ static struct Qdisc *qdisc_match_from_ro + root->handle == handle) + return root; + +- list_for_each_entry(q, &root->list, list) { ++ list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &root->list, list) { + if (q->handle == handle) + return q; + } +@@ -277,15 +278,18 @@ void qdisc_list_add(struct Qdisc *q) + struct Qdisc *root = qdisc_dev(q)->qdisc; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(root == &noop_qdisc); +- list_add_tail(&q->list, &root->list); ++ ASSERT_RTNL(); ++ list_add_tail_rcu(&q->list, &root->list); + } + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_add); + + void qdisc_list_del(struct Qdisc *q) + { +- if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS)) +- list_del(&q->list); ++ if ((q->parent != TC_H_ROOT) && !(q->flags & TCQ_F_INGRESS)) { ++ ASSERT_RTNL(); ++ list_del_rcu(&q->list); ++ } + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_list_del); + +@@ -750,14 +754,18 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdi + if (n == 0) + return; + drops = max_t(int, n, 0); ++ rcu_read_lock(); + while ((parentid = sch->parent)) { + if (TC_H_MAJ(parentid) == TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_INGRESS)) +- return; ++ break; + ++ if (sch->flags & TCQ_F_NOPARENT) ++ break; ++ /* TODO: perform the search on a per txq basis */ + sch = qdisc_lookup(qdisc_dev(sch), TC_H_MAJ(parentid)); + if (sch == NULL) { +- WARN_ON(parentid != TC_H_ROOT); +- return; ++ WARN_ON_ONCE(parentid != TC_H_ROOT); ++ break; + } + cops = sch->ops->cl_ops; + if (cops->qlen_notify) { +@@ -768,6 +776,7 @@ void qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen(struct Qdi + sch->q.qlen -= n; + __qdisc_qstats_drop(sch, drops); + } ++ rcu_read_unlock(); + } + EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen); + +@@ -941,7 +950,7 @@ qdisc_create(struct net_device *dev, str + } + lockdep_set_class(qdisc_lock(sch), &qdisc_tx_lock); + if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev)) +- sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE; ++ sch->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT; + } + + sch->handle = handle; +--- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c ++++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c +@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ static void attach_one_default_qdisc(str + return; + } + if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev)) +- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE; ++ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT; + } + dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping = qdisc; + } +--- a/net/sched/sch_mq.c ++++ b/net/sched/sch_mq.c +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int mq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, st + if (qdisc == NULL) + goto err; + priv->qdiscs[ntx] = qdisc; +- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE; ++ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT; + } + + sch->flags |= TCQ_F_MQROOT; +@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int mq_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, u + + *old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new); + if (new) +- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE; ++ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT; + if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) + dev_activate(dev); + return 0; +--- a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c ++++ b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c +@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch + goto err; + } + priv->qdiscs[i] = qdisc; +- qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE; ++ qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT; + } + + /* If the mqprio options indicate that hardware should own +@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int mqprio_graft(struct Qdisc *sc + *old = dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new); + + if (new) +- new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE; ++ new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT; + + if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) + dev_activate(dev); diff --git a/queue-4.1/packet-always-probe-for-transport-header.patch b/queue-4.1/packet-always-probe-for-transport-header.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..aebf2c4760a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/packet-always-probe-for-transport-header.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:41 +0100 +Subject: packet: always probe for transport header + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit 8fd6c80d9dd938ca338c70698533a7e304752846 ] + +We concluded that the skb_probe_transport_header() should better be +called unconditionally. Avoiding the call into the flow dissector has +also not really much to do with the direct xmit mode. + +While it seems that only virtio_net code makes use of GSO from non +RX/TX ring packet socket paths, we should probe for a transport header +nevertheless before they hit devices. + +Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/386173/ +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Jason Wang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c ++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c +@@ -2230,8 +2230,7 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packe + len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write); + } + +- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po)) +- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0); ++ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0); + + return tp_len; + } +@@ -2583,8 +2582,8 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc + len += vnet_hdr_len; + } + +- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po)) +- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve); ++ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve); ++ + if (unlikely(extra_len == 4)) + skb->no_fcs = 1; + diff --git a/queue-4.1/packet-do-skb_probe_transport_header-when-we-actually-have-data.patch b/queue-4.1/packet-do-skb_probe_transport_header-when-we-actually-have-data.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..50598527630 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/packet-do-skb_probe_transport_header-when-we-actually-have-data.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:40 +0100 +Subject: packet: do skb_probe_transport_header when we actually have data + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit efdfa2f7848f64517008136fb41f53c4a1faf93a ] + +In tpacket_fill_skb() commit c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport +header before doing xmit") and later on 40893fd0fd4e ("net: switch +to use skb_probe_transport_header()") was probing for a transport +header on the skb from a ring buffer slot, but at a time, where +the skb has _not even_ been filled with data yet. So that call into +the flow dissector is pretty useless. Lets do it after we've set +up the skb frags. + +Fixes: c1aad275b029 ("packet: set transport header before doing xmit") +Reported-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Jason Wang +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/packet/af_packet.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c ++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c +@@ -2151,8 +2151,6 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packe + skb_reserve(skb, hlen); + skb_reset_network_header(skb); + +- if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po)) +- skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0); + if (unlikely(po->tp_tx_has_off)) { + int off_min, off_max, off; + off_min = po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll); +@@ -2232,6 +2230,9 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packe + len = ((to_write > len_max) ? len_max : to_write); + } + ++ if (!packet_use_direct_xmit(po)) ++ skb_probe_transport_header(skb, 0); ++ + return tp_len; + } + diff --git a/queue-4.1/packet-fix-tpacket_snd-max-frame-len.patch b/queue-4.1/packet-fix-tpacket_snd-max-frame-len.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4386557fa08 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/packet-fix-tpacket_snd-max-frame-len.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:44 +0100 +Subject: packet: fix tpacket_snd max frame len + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit 5cfb4c8d05b4409c4044cb9c05b19705c1d9818b ] + +Since it's introduction in commit 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and +packet mmap"), TX_RING could be used from SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_RAW +side. When used with SOCK_DGRAM only, the size_max > dev->mtu + +reserve check should have reserve as 0, but currently, this is +unconditionally set (in it's original form as dev->hard_header_len). + +I think this is not correct since tpacket_fill_skb() would then +take dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len into account for SOCK_DGRAM, +the extra VLAN_HLEN could be possible in both cases. Presumably, the +reserve code was copied from packet_snd(), but later on missed the +check. Make it similar as we have it in packet_snd(). + +Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/packet/af_packet.c | 9 +++++---- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c ++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c +@@ -2293,12 +2293,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc + if (unlikely(!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))) + goto out_put; + +- reserve = dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN; ++ if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW) ++ reserve = dev->hard_header_len; + size_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size + - (po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll)); + +- if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve) +- size_max = dev->mtu + reserve; ++ if (size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN) ++ size_max = dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN; + + do { + ph = packet_current_frame(po, &po->tx_ring, +@@ -2325,7 +2326,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc + tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto, + addr, hlen); + if (likely(tp_len >= 0) && +- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len && ++ tp_len > dev->mtu + reserve && + !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) + tp_len = -EMSGSIZE; + diff --git a/queue-4.1/packet-infer-protocol-from-ethernet-header-if-unset.patch b/queue-4.1/packet-infer-protocol-from-ethernet-header-if-unset.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d80caff7b9a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/packet-infer-protocol-from-ethernet-header-if-unset.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:43 +0100 +Subject: packet: infer protocol from ethernet header if unset + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit c72219b75fde768efccf7666342282fab7f9e4e7 ] + +In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet +socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then +skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol +passed via socket(2)/bind(2). + +Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the +socket as socket(PF_PACKET, , 0) and do a bind(2) on the +TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook() +is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves +cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway. + +That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore +the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric +reported that this leads to problems when using tools like +trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function +could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on +skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all +the traffic is then directed to a single slave. + +Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header +when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only +done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len +length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to +cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after +the skb_store_bits(). + +Reported-by: Eric Dumazet +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c ++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c +@@ -2121,6 +2121,15 @@ static bool ll_header_truncated(const st + return false; + } + ++static void tpacket_set_protocol(const struct net_device *dev, ++ struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER) { ++ skb_reset_mac_header(skb); ++ skb->protocol = eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto; ++ } ++} ++ + static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb, + void *frame, struct net_device *dev, int size_max, + __be16 proto, unsigned char *addr, int hlen) +@@ -2202,6 +2211,8 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packe + dev->hard_header_len); + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; ++ if (!skb->protocol) ++ tpacket_set_protocol(dev, skb); + + data += dev->hard_header_len; + to_write -= dev->hard_header_len; diff --git a/queue-4.1/packet-only-allow-extra-vlan-len-on-ethernet-devices.patch b/queue-4.1/packet-only-allow-extra-vlan-len-on-ethernet-devices.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f404465a523 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/packet-only-allow-extra-vlan-len-on-ethernet-devices.patch @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Daniel Borkmann +Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 23:25:42 +0100 +Subject: packet: only allow extra vlan len on ethernet devices + +From: Daniel Borkmann + +[ Upstream commit 3c70c132488794e2489ab045559b0ce0afcf17de ] + +Packet sockets can be used by various net devices and are not +really restricted to ARPHRD_ETHER device types. However, when +currently checking for the extra 4 bytes that can be transmitted +in VLAN case, our assumption is that we generally probe on +ARPHRD_ETHER devices. Therefore, before looking into Ethernet +header, check the device type first. + +This also fixes the issue where non-ARPHRD_ETHER devices could +have no dev->hard_header_len in TX_RING SOCK_RAW case, and thus +the check would test unfilled linear part of the skb (instead +of non-linear). + +Fixes: 57f89bfa2140 ("network: Allow af_packet to transmit +4 bytes for VLAN packets.") +Fixes: 52f1454f629f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case") +Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann +Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/packet/af_packet.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- + 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c ++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c +@@ -1524,6 +1524,20 @@ static void fanout_release(struct sock * + mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex); + } + ++static bool packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(const struct net_device *dev, ++ struct sk_buff *skb) ++{ ++ /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, double-check ++ * this now that we have the actual packet in hand. We can only ++ * do this check on Ethernet devices. ++ */ ++ if (unlikely(dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER)) ++ return false; ++ ++ skb_reset_mac_header(skb); ++ return likely(eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto == htons(ETH_P_8021Q)); ++} ++ + static const struct proto_ops packet_ops; + + static const struct proto_ops packet_ops_spkt; +@@ -1685,18 +1699,10 @@ retry: + goto retry; + } + +- if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len)) { +- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, +- * double-check this now that we have the actual +- * packet in hand. +- */ +- struct ethhdr *ehdr; +- skb_reset_mac_header(skb); +- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb); +- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) { +- err = -EMSGSIZE; +- goto out_unlock; +- } ++ if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) && ++ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) { ++ err = -EMSGSIZE; ++ goto out_unlock; + } + + skb->protocol = proto; +@@ -2308,18 +2314,10 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc + tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, size_max, proto, + addr, hlen); + if (likely(tp_len >= 0) && +- tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len) { +- struct ethhdr *ehdr; +- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, +- * double-check this now that we have the actual +- * packet in hand. +- */ ++ tp_len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len && ++ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) ++ tp_len = -EMSGSIZE; + +- skb_reset_mac_header(skb); +- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb); +- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) +- tp_len = -EMSGSIZE; +- } + if (unlikely(tp_len < 0)) { + if (po->tp_loss) { + __packet_set_status(po, ph, +@@ -2540,18 +2538,10 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc + + sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags); + +- if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len)) { +- /* Earlier code assumed this would be a VLAN pkt, +- * double-check this now that we have the actual +- * packet in hand. +- */ +- struct ethhdr *ehdr; +- skb_reset_mac_header(skb); +- ehdr = eth_hdr(skb); +- if (ehdr->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) { +- err = -EMSGSIZE; +- goto out_free; +- } ++ if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) && ++ !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) { ++ err = -EMSGSIZE; ++ goto out_free; + } + + skb->protocol = proto; diff --git a/queue-4.1/rds-fix-race-condition-when-sending-a-message-on-unbound-socket.patch b/queue-4.1/rds-fix-race-condition-when-sending-a-message-on-unbound-socket.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..57eb940699e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/rds-fix-race-condition-when-sending-a-message-on-unbound-socket.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Quentin Casasnovas +Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 17:13:21 -0500 +Subject: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket + +From: Quentin Casasnovas + +[ Upstream commit 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a ] + +Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when +sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused +by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks +the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a +race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not +in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to +dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create(). + +Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if +you're interested. + +I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer +with this patch, whereas I could without. + +Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937: + + 74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection") + +Cc: David S. Miller +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org + +Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum +Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin +Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar +Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/rds/connection.c | 6 ------ + net/rds/send.c | 4 +++- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/rds/connection.c ++++ b/net/rds/connection.c +@@ -187,12 +187,6 @@ new_conn: + } + } + +- if (trans == NULL) { +- kmem_cache_free(rds_conn_slab, conn); +- conn = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); +- goto out; +- } +- + conn->c_trans = trans; + + ret = trans->conn_alloc(conn, gfp); +--- a/net/rds/send.c ++++ b/net/rds/send.c +@@ -986,11 +986,13 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, str + release_sock(sk); + } + +- /* racing with another thread binding seems ok here */ ++ lock_sock(sk); + if (daddr == 0 || rs->rs_bound_addr == 0) { ++ release_sock(sk); + ret = -ENOTCONN; /* XXX not a great errno */ + goto out; + } ++ release_sock(sk); + + /* size of rm including all sgs */ + ret = rds_rm_size(msg, payload_len); diff --git a/queue-4.1/sctp-translate-host-order-to-network-order-when-setting-a-hmacid.patch b/queue-4.1/sctp-translate-host-order-to-network-order-when-setting-a-hmacid.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..745105e8847 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/sctp-translate-host-order-to-network-order-when-setting-a-hmacid.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: lucien +Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 13:07:07 +0800 +Subject: sctp: translate host order to network order when setting a hmacid + +From: lucien + +[ Upstream commit ed5a377d87dc4c87fb3e1f7f698cba38cd893103 ] + +now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which +is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix +it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs. + +even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still +can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(): + + if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + +so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility. + +Fixes: 65b07e5d0d09 ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") +Signed-off-by: Xin Long +Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner +Acked-by: Neil Horman +Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/sctp/auth.c ++++ b/net/sctp/auth.c +@@ -809,8 +809,8 @@ int sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(struct sctp_e + if (!has_sha1) + return -EINVAL; + +- memcpy(ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids, &hmacs->shmac_idents[0], +- hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16)); ++ for (i = 0; i < hmacs->shmac_num_idents; i++) ++ ep->auth_hmacs_list->hmac_ids[i] = htons(hmacs->shmac_idents[i]); + ep->auth_hmacs_list->param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t) + + hmacs->shmac_num_idents * sizeof(__u16)); + return 0; diff --git a/queue-4.1/snmp-remove-duplicate-outmcast-stat-increment.patch b/queue-4.1/snmp-remove-duplicate-outmcast-stat-increment.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..661c2dd8103 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/snmp-remove-duplicate-outmcast-stat-increment.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Neil Horman +Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 13:09:10 -0500 +Subject: snmp: Remove duplicate OUTMCAST stat increment + +From: Neil Horman + +[ Upstream commit 41033f029e393a64e81966cbe34d66c6cf8a2e7e ] + +the OUTMCAST stat is double incremented, getting bumped once in the mcast code +itself, and again in the common ip output path. Remove the mcast bump, as its +not needed + +Validated by the reporter, with good results + +Signed-off-by: Neil Horman +Reported-by: Claus Jensen +CC: Claus Jensen +CC: David Miller +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv6/mcast.c | 2 -- + 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv6/mcast.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/mcast.c +@@ -1651,7 +1651,6 @@ out: + if (!err) { + ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMPV6_MLD2_REPORT); + ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS); +- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, payload_len); + } else { + IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS); + } +@@ -2014,7 +2013,6 @@ out: + if (!err) { + ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS(net, idev, type); + ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS); +- IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST, full_len); + } else + IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS); + diff --git a/queue-4.1/tcp-disable-fast-open-on-timeouts-after-handshake.patch b/queue-4.1/tcp-disable-fast-open-on-timeouts-after-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bbc23aad39a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/tcp-disable-fast-open-on-timeouts-after-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Yuchung Cheng +Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 18:17:30 -0800 +Subject: tcp: disable Fast Open on timeouts after handshake + +From: Yuchung Cheng + +[ Upstream commit 0e45f4da5981895e885dd72fe912a3f8e32bae73 ] + +Some middle-boxes black-hole the data after the Fast Open handshake +(https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf). +The exact reason is unknown. The work-around is to disable Fast Open +temporarily after multiple recurring timeouts with few or no data +delivered in the established state. + +Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: Christoph Paasch +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock + syn_set = true; + } else { + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1, 0, 0)) { ++ /* Some middle-boxes may black-hole Fast Open _after_ ++ * the handshake. Therefore we conservatively disable ++ * Fast Open on this path on recurring timeouts with ++ * few or zero bytes acked after Fast Open. ++ */ ++ if (tp->syn_data_acked && ++ tp->bytes_acked <= tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp) { ++ tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, 0, NULL, true, 0); ++ if (icsk->icsk_retransmits == sysctl_tcp_retries1) ++ NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), ++ LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENACTIVEFAIL); ++ } + /* Black hole detection */ + tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk); + diff --git a/queue-4.1/tcp-fix-potential-huge-kmalloc-calls-in-tcp_repair.patch b/queue-4.1/tcp-fix-potential-huge-kmalloc-calls-in-tcp_repair.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e68782d6898 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/tcp-fix-potential-huge-kmalloc-calls-in-tcp_repair.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 21:03:33 -0800 +Subject: tcp: fix potential huge kmalloc() calls in TCP_REPAIR + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 5d4c9bfbabdb1d497f21afd81501e5c54b0c85d9 ] + +tcp_send_rcvq() is used for re-injecting data into tcp receive queue. + +Problems : + +- No check against size is performed, allowed user to fool kernel in + attempting very large memory allocations, eventually triggering + OOM when memory is fragmented. + +- In case of fault during the copy we do not return correct errno. + +Lets use alloc_skb_with_frags() to cook optimal skbs. + +Fixes: 292e8d8c8538 ("tcp: Move rcvq sending to tcp_input.c") +Fixes: c0e88ff0f256 ("tcp: Repair socket queues") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Cc: Pavel Emelyanov +Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +@@ -4438,19 +4438,34 @@ static int __must_check tcp_queue_rcv(st + int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) + { + struct sk_buff *skb; ++ int err = -ENOMEM; ++ int data_len = 0; + bool fragstolen; + + if (size == 0) + return 0; + +- skb = alloc_skb(size, sk->sk_allocation); ++ if (size > PAGE_SIZE) { ++ int npages = min_t(size_t, size >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAX_SKB_FRAGS); ++ ++ data_len = npages << PAGE_SHIFT; ++ size = data_len + (size & ~PAGE_MASK); ++ } ++ skb = alloc_skb_with_frags(size - data_len, data_len, ++ PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER, ++ &err, sk->sk_allocation); + if (!skb) + goto err; + ++ skb_put(skb, size - data_len); ++ skb->data_len = data_len; ++ skb->len = size; ++ + if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize)) + goto err_free; + +- if (memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, size), msg, size)) ++ err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, size); ++ if (err) + goto err_free; + + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = tcp_sk(sk)->rcv_nxt; +@@ -4466,7 +4481,8 @@ int tcp_send_rcvq(struct sock *sk, struc + err_free: + kfree_skb(skb); + err: +- return -ENOMEM; ++ return err; ++ + } + + static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) diff --git a/queue-4.1/tcp-initialize-tp-copied_seq-in-case-of-cross-syn-connection.patch b/queue-4.1/tcp-initialize-tp-copied_seq-in-case-of-cross-syn-connection.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..384ddb87bf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/tcp-initialize-tp-copied_seq-in-case-of-cross-syn-connection.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 08:18:14 -0800 +Subject: tcp: initialize tp->copied_seq in case of cross SYN connection + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 142a2e7ece8d8ac0e818eb2c91f99ca894730e2a ] + +Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller) +generated program that triggers the WARNING at +net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() : + +WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt && + !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC))); + +His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange, +that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we +lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization. + +Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings. + +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +@@ -5638,6 +5638,7 @@ discard: + } + + tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1; ++ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; + tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1; + + /* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is diff --git a/queue-4.1/tcp-md5-fix-lockdep-annotation.patch b/queue-4.1/tcp-md5-fix-lockdep-annotation.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d3e9286fe3f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/tcp-md5-fix-lockdep-annotation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Eric Dumazet +Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 12:40:13 -0800 +Subject: tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation + +From: Eric Dumazet + +[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a01e19f001e9f93b39c32387961c91ed3cc ] + +When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add() +with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we +will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway) + +But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid +following splat : + +[ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! +[ 8451.090932] +[ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this: +[ 8451.090932] +[ 8451.090934] +[ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 +[ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795: +[ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90 +[ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 +[ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500 +[ 8451.090958] +[ 8451.090958] stack backtrace: +[ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_ + +[ 8451.091215] Call Trace: +[ 8451.091216] [] dump_stack+0x55/0x76 +[ 8451.091229] [] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110 +[ 8451.091235] [] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0 +[ 8451.091239] [] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0 +[ 8451.091242] [] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190 +[ 8451.091246] [] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500 +[ 8451.091249] [] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190 +[ 8451.091253] [] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0 +[ 8451.091256] [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 +[ 8451.091260] [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0 +[ 8451.091263] [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 +[ 8451.091267] [] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80 +[ 8451.091270] [] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700 +[ 8451.091273] [] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0 +[ 8451.091277] [] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90 + +Fixes: a8afca0329988 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet +Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c ++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +@@ -922,7 +922,8 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, cons + } + + md5sig = rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info, +- sock_owned_by_user(sk)); ++ sock_owned_by_user(sk) || ++ lockdep_is_held(&sk->sk_lock.slock)); + if (!md5sig) { + md5sig = kmalloc(sizeof(*md5sig), gfp); + if (!md5sig) diff --git a/queue-4.1/tools-net-use-include-uapi-with-__exported_headers__.patch b/queue-4.1/tools-net-use-include-uapi-with-__exported_headers__.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e6981f10259 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/tools-net-use-include-uapi-with-__exported_headers__.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Kamal Mostafa +Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2015 14:24:27 -0800 +Subject: tools/net: Use include/uapi with __EXPORTED_HEADERS__ + +From: Kamal Mostafa + +[ Upstream commit d7475de58575c904818efa369c82e88c6648ce2e ] + +Use the local uapi headers to keep in sync with "recently" added #define's +(e.g. SKF_AD_VLAN_TPID). Refactored CFLAGS, and bpf_asm doesn't need -I. + +Fixes: 3f356385e8a4 ("filter: bpf_asm: add minimal bpf asm tool") +Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa +Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + tools/net/Makefile | 7 ++++--- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/tools/net/Makefile ++++ b/tools/net/Makefile +@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ CC = gcc + LEX = flex + YACC = bison + ++CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 ++CFLAGS += -D__EXPORTED_HEADERS__ -I../../include/uapi -I../../include ++ + %.yacc.c: %.y + $(YACC) -o $@ -d $< + +@@ -12,15 +15,13 @@ YACC = bison + + all : bpf_jit_disasm bpf_dbg bpf_asm + +-bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm' ++bpf_jit_disasm : CFLAGS += -DPACKAGE='bpf_jit_disasm' + bpf_jit_disasm : LDLIBS = -lopcodes -lbfd -ldl + bpf_jit_disasm : bpf_jit_disasm.o + +-bpf_dbg : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 + bpf_dbg : LDLIBS = -lreadline + bpf_dbg : bpf_dbg.o + +-bpf_asm : CFLAGS = -Wall -O2 -I. + bpf_asm : LDLIBS = + bpf_asm : bpf_asm.o bpf_exp.yacc.o bpf_exp.lex.o + bpf_exp.lex.o : bpf_exp.yacc.c diff --git a/queue-4.1/unix-avoid-use-after-free-in-ep_remove_wait_queue.patch b/queue-4.1/unix-avoid-use-after-free-in-ep_remove_wait_queue.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2136132e811 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.1/unix-avoid-use-after-free-in-ep_remove_wait_queue.patch @@ -0,0 +1,329 @@ +From foo@baz Fri Dec 11 11:39:13 EST 2015 +From: Rainer Weikusat +Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 22:07:23 +0000 +Subject: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue + +From: Rainer Weikusat + +[ Upstream commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c ] + +Rainer Weikusat writes: +An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with +some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the +receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog +datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go +to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server +receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be +woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll +routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue +of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake +up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently +problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive +for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the +connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic +in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the +polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the +corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a +wait queue with epoll. + +Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such +that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the +peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full +condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the +peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client +socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again +dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client +socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is +itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from +unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring +that no blocked writer sleeps forever. + +Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat +Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets") +Reviewed-by: Jason Baron +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + include/net/af_unix.h | 1 + net/unix/af_unix.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 2 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +--- a/include/net/af_unix.h ++++ b/include/net/af_unix.h +@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct unix_sock { + #define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0 + #define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1 + struct socket_wq peer_wq; ++ wait_queue_t peer_wake; + }; + + static inline struct unix_sock *unix_sk(struct sock *sk) +--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c ++++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c +@@ -316,6 +316,118 @@ found: + return s; + } + ++/* Support code for asymmetrically connected dgram sockets ++ * ++ * If a datagram socket is connected to a socket not itself connected ++ * to the first socket (eg, /dev/log), clients may only enqueue more ++ * messages if the present receive queue of the server socket is not ++ * "too large". This means there's a second writeability condition ++ * poll and sendmsg need to test. The dgram recv code will do a wake ++ * up on the peer_wait wait queue of a socket upon reception of a ++ * datagram which needs to be propagated to sleeping would-be writers ++ * since these might not have sent anything so far. This can't be ++ * accomplished via poll_wait because the lifetime of the server ++ * socket might be less than that of its clients if these break their ++ * association with it or if the server socket is closed while clients ++ * are still connected to it and there's no way to inform "a polling ++ * implementation" that it should let go of a certain wait queue ++ * ++ * In order to propagate a wake up, a wait_queue_t of the client ++ * socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server socket ++ * whose wake function does a wake_up on the ordinary client socket ++ * wait queue. This connection is established whenever a write (or ++ * poll for write) hit the flow control condition and broken when the ++ * association to the server socket is dissolved or after a wake up ++ * was relayed. ++ */ ++ ++static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay(wait_queue_t *q, unsigned mode, int flags, ++ void *key) ++{ ++ struct unix_sock *u; ++ wait_queue_head_t *u_sleep; ++ ++ u = container_of(q, struct unix_sock, peer_wake); ++ ++ __remove_wait_queue(&unix_sk(u->peer_wake.private)->peer_wait, ++ q); ++ u->peer_wake.private = NULL; ++ ++ /* relaying can only happen while the wq still exists */ ++ u_sleep = sk_sleep(&u->sk); ++ if (u_sleep) ++ wake_up_interruptible_poll(u_sleep, key); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other) ++{ ++ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other; ++ int rc; ++ ++ u = unix_sk(sk); ++ u_other = unix_sk(other); ++ rc = 0; ++ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock); ++ ++ if (!u->peer_wake.private) { ++ u->peer_wake.private = other; ++ __add_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake); ++ ++ rc = 1; ++ } ++ ++ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock); ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(struct sock *sk, ++ struct sock *other) ++{ ++ struct unix_sock *u, *u_other; ++ ++ u = unix_sk(sk); ++ u_other = unix_sk(other); ++ spin_lock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock); ++ ++ if (u->peer_wake.private == other) { ++ __remove_wait_queue(&u_other->peer_wait, &u->peer_wake); ++ u->peer_wake.private = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ spin_unlock(&u_other->peer_wait.lock); ++} ++ ++static void unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(struct sock *sk, ++ struct sock *other) ++{ ++ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other); ++ wake_up_interruptible_poll(sk_sleep(sk), ++ POLLOUT | ++ POLLWRNORM | ++ POLLWRBAND); ++} ++ ++/* preconditions: ++ * - unix_peer(sk) == other ++ * - association is stable ++ */ ++static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other) ++{ ++ int connected; ++ ++ connected = unix_dgram_peer_wake_connect(sk, other); ++ ++ if (unix_recvq_full(other)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ if (connected) ++ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, other); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk) + { + return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf; +@@ -420,6 +532,8 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct soc + skpair->sk_state_change(skpair); + sk_wake_async(skpair, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP); + } ++ ++ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect(sk, skpair); + sock_put(skpair); /* It may now die */ + unix_peer(sk) = NULL; + } +@@ -648,6 +762,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&u->link); + mutex_init(&u->readlock); /* single task reading lock */ + init_waitqueue_head(&u->peer_wait); ++ init_waitqueue_func_entry(&u->peer_wake, unix_dgram_peer_wake_relay); + unix_insert_socket(unix_sockets_unbound(sk), sk); + out: + if (sk == NULL) +@@ -1015,6 +1130,8 @@ restart: + if (unix_peer(sk)) { + struct sock *old_peer = unix_peer(sk); + unix_peer(sk) = other; ++ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, old_peer); ++ + unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other); + + if (other != old_peer) +@@ -1453,6 +1570,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct soc + struct scm_cookie scm; + int max_level; + int data_len = 0; ++ int sk_locked; + + wait_for_unix_gc(); + err = scm_send(sock, msg, &scm, false); +@@ -1532,12 +1650,14 @@ restart: + goto out_free; + } + ++ sk_locked = 0; + unix_state_lock(other); ++restart_locked: + err = -EPERM; + if (!unix_may_send(sk, other)) + goto out_unlock; + +- if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) { ++ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD))) { + /* + * Check with 1003.1g - what should + * datagram error +@@ -1545,10 +1665,14 @@ restart: + unix_state_unlock(other); + sock_put(other); + ++ if (!sk_locked) ++ unix_state_lock(sk); ++ + err = 0; +- unix_state_lock(sk); + if (unix_peer(sk) == other) { + unix_peer(sk) = NULL; ++ unix_dgram_peer_wake_disconnect_wakeup(sk, other); ++ + unix_state_unlock(sk); + + unix_dgram_disconnected(sk, other); +@@ -1574,21 +1698,38 @@ restart: + goto out_unlock; + } + +- if (unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other)) { +- if (!timeo) { +- err = -EAGAIN; +- goto out_unlock; ++ if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) { ++ if (timeo) { ++ timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo); ++ ++ err = sock_intr_errno(timeo); ++ if (signal_pending(current)) ++ goto out_free; ++ ++ goto restart; + } + +- timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo); ++ if (!sk_locked) { ++ unix_state_unlock(other); ++ unix_state_double_lock(sk, other); ++ } + +- err = sock_intr_errno(timeo); +- if (signal_pending(current)) +- goto out_free; ++ if (unix_peer(sk) != other || ++ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) { ++ err = -EAGAIN; ++ sk_locked = 1; ++ goto out_unlock; ++ } + +- goto restart; ++ if (!sk_locked) { ++ sk_locked = 1; ++ goto restart_locked; ++ } + } + ++ if (unlikely(sk_locked)) ++ unix_state_unlock(sk); ++ + if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP)) + __net_timestamp(skb); + maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other); +@@ -1602,6 +1743,8 @@ restart: + return len; + + out_unlock: ++ if (sk_locked) ++ unix_state_unlock(sk); + unix_state_unlock(other); + out_free: + kfree_skb(skb); +@@ -2245,14 +2388,16 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(stru + return mask; + + writable = unix_writable(sk); +- other = unix_peer_get(sk); +- if (other) { +- if (unix_peer(other) != sk) { +- sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait); +- if (unix_recvq_full(other)) +- writable = 0; +- } +- sock_put(other); ++ if (writable) { ++ unix_state_lock(sk); ++ ++ other = unix_peer(sk); ++ if (other && unix_peer(other) != sk && ++ unix_recvq_full(other) && ++ unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) ++ writable = 0; ++ ++ unix_state_unlock(sk); + } + + if (writable)