From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2019 12:39:47 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 4.9-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v5.2.8~2 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d0d43eada33c021a3ec28ead299e4dbb14f0213a;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 4.9-stable patches added patches: x86-cpufeatures-sort-feature-word-7.patch x86-entry-64-use-jmp-instead-of-jmpq.patch x86-speculation-enable-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch x86-speculation-prepare-entry-code-for-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch x86-speculation-swapgs-exclude-atoms-from-speculation-through-swapgs.patch --- diff --git a/queue-4.9/series b/queue-4.9/series index bc5dfba9e21..3acdff56946 100644 --- a/queue-4.9/series +++ b/queue-4.9/series @@ -25,3 +25,8 @@ ife-error-out-when-nla-attributes-are-empty.patch bnx2x-disable-multi-cos-feature.patch block-blk_init_allocated_queue-set-q-fq-as-null-in-the-fail-case.patch spi-bcm2835-fix-3-wire-mode-if-dma-is-enabled.patch +x86-cpufeatures-sort-feature-word-7.patch +x86-speculation-prepare-entry-code-for-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch +x86-speculation-enable-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch +x86-entry-64-use-jmp-instead-of-jmpq.patch +x86-speculation-swapgs-exclude-atoms-from-speculation-through-swapgs.patch diff --git a/queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-sort-feature-word-7.patch b/queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-sort-feature-word-7.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7a51d36b494 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-sort-feature-word-7.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 09 Aug 2019 02:39:27 PM CEST +From: Ben Hutchings +Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 20:03:32 +0100 +Subject: x86: cpufeatures: Sort feature word 7 + +From: Ben Hutchings + +This will make it clearer which bits are allocated, in case we need to +assign more feature bits for later backports. + +Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 4 +--- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -201,9 +201,6 @@ + + #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ + +-/* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */ +-#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ +- + #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ + #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ + #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ +@@ -214,6 +211,7 @@ + #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */ + #define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */ + #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */ ++#define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ + + /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ diff --git a/queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-use-jmp-instead-of-jmpq.patch b/queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-use-jmp-instead-of-jmpq.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..07fa757fd8d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/x86-entry-64-use-jmp-instead-of-jmpq.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 09 Aug 2019 02:39:27 PM CEST +From: Josh Poimboeuf +Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 11:51:39 -0500 +Subject: x86/entry/64: Use JMP instead of JMPQ + +From: Josh Poimboeuf + +commit 64dbc122b20f75183d8822618c24f85144a5a94d upstream. + +Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ +instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed. Some +assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP +when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation. For +some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot. + +Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended. + +Fixes: 18ec54fdd6d1 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations") +Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context] +Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S ++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start) + TRACE_IRQS_OFF + + CALL_enter_from_user_mode +- jmpq 2f ++ jmp 2f + 1: + FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY + 2: diff --git a/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-enable-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-enable-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0f697b5a66f --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-enable-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 09 Aug 2019 02:39:27 PM CEST +From: Josh Poimboeuf +Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2019 11:52:26 -0500 +Subject: x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations + +From: Josh Poimboeuf + +commit a2059825986a1c8143fd6698774fa9d83733bb11 upstream. + +The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the +Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are +enabled. Enable those features where applicable. + +The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off". + +There are different features which can affect the risk of attack: + +- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any + value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can + write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can + be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI + handler: + + if (coming from user space) + swapgs + mov %gs:, %reg1 + // dependent load or store based on the value of %reg + // for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2 + + If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code + speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it + may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent + load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak. + + Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when + coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to + switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible + because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based + accesses. + + NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case + doesn't exist quite yet. + +- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because + unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which + restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the + gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address + needs to be read from user space first. Something like: + + if (coming from user space) + swapgs + mov %gs:, %reg1 + mov (%reg1), %reg2 + // dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2 + // for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3 + + It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while + there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it + exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without + tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable. + + Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case: + + - If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not + susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively + reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively + disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector. + + - If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP + still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space + memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the + user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably + only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome. + +Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function. + +Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs +is serializing on AMD. + +[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested + by Dave Hansen ] + +Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen +[bwh: Backported to 4.9: + - Check for X86_FEATURE_KAISER instead of X86_FEATURE_PTI + - mitigations= parameter is x86-only here + - Adjust filename, context] +Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +- + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -2484,6 +2484,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes + improves system performance, but it may also + expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. + Equivalent to: nopti [X86] ++ nospectre_v1 [X86] + nospectre_v2 [X86] + spectre_v2_user=off [X86] + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86] +@@ -2819,10 +2820,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes + + nohugeiomap [KNL,x86] Disable kernel huge I/O mappings. + +- nospectre_v1 [PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds +- check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible +- in the system. +- + nosmt [KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT). + Equivalent to smt=1. + +@@ -2830,6 +2827,10 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes + nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone + via the sysfs control file. + ++ nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 ++ (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are ++ possible in the system. ++ + nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may + allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include + #include + ++static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); +@@ -95,17 +96,11 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + +- /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */ ++ /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ ++ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); +- +- /* +- * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store +- * Bypass vulnerability. +- */ + ssb_select_mitigation(); +- + l1tf_select_mitigation(); +- + mds_select_mitigation(); + + arch_smt_update(); +@@ -271,6 +266,108 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str) + early_param("mds", mds_cmdline); + + #undef pr_fmt ++#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt ++ ++enum spectre_v1_mitigation { ++ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE, ++ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO, ++}; ++ ++static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init = ++ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO; ++ ++static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = { ++ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers", ++ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization", ++}; ++ ++static bool is_swapgs_serializing(void) ++{ ++ /* ++ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously ++ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is ++ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory ++ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is ++ * good enough for our purposes. ++ */ ++ return boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to ++ * userspace? ++ */ ++static bool smap_works_speculatively(void) ++{ ++ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP)) ++ return false; ++ ++ /* ++ * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not ++ * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache. ++ * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these ++ * CPUs. ++ */ ++ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) ++ return false; ++ ++ return true; ++} ++ ++static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void) ++{ ++ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) { ++ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE; ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) { ++ /* ++ * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either ++ * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS ++ * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths. ++ * ++ * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in ++ * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection. ++ * ++ * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the ++ * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ] ++ * ++ * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space ++ * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still ++ * possible if there's no SMAP protection. ++ */ ++ if (!smap_works_speculatively()) { ++ /* ++ * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or ++ * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation ++ * is serializing. ++ * ++ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE. ++ */ ++ if (!is_swapgs_serializing() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER)) ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER); ++ ++ /* ++ * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs) ++ * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively ++ * skipping swapgs. ++ */ ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]); ++} ++ ++static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) ++{ ++ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE; ++ return 0; ++} ++early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); ++ ++#undef pr_fmt + #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt + + static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = +@@ -1265,7 +1362,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de + break; + + case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1: +- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); ++ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]); + + case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], diff --git a/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-prepare-entry-code-for-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-prepare-entry-code-for-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9f47e01ba6e --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-prepare-entry-code-for-spectre-v1-swapgs-mitigations.patch @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 09 Aug 2019 02:39:27 PM CEST +From: Josh Poimboeuf +Date: Mon, 8 Jul 2019 11:52:25 -0500 +Subject: x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations + +From: Josh Poimboeuf + +commit 18ec54fdd6d18d92025af097cd042a75cf0ea24c upstream. + +Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any +conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI +handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in +the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user +GS. + +For example: + + if (coming from user space) + swapgs + mov %gs:, %reg + mov (%reg), %reg1 + +When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and +then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can +speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which +uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the +contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel +attack. + +A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can +speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest +of the speculative window. + +The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except: + + a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset) + isn't user-controlled; and + + b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the + "from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described + above). + +The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a +CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the +lfences can be skipped in those cases. + +On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI. + +To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate +features for alternative patching: + + X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER + X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL + +Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed. + +The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen +[bwh: Backported to 4.9: + - Assign the CPU feature bits from word 7 + - Add FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY to NMI entry, since it does not + use paranoid_entry + - Include in calling.h + - Adjust context] +Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++- + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h ++++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ + #include ++#include + + /* + +@@ -201,6 +202,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent + .byte 0xf1 + .endm + ++/* ++ * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths. ++ * ++ * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to ++ * prevent a speculative swapgs when coming from kernel space. ++ * ++ * FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY is used in the kernel entry non-swapgs code path, ++ * to prevent the swapgs from getting speculatively skipped when coming from ++ * user space. ++ */ ++.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY ++ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER ++.endm ++.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY ++ ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL ++.endm ++ + #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + + /* +--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S ++++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ END(irq_entries_start) + * tracking that we're in kernel mode. + */ + SWAPGS ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY + SWITCH_KERNEL_CR3 + + /* +@@ -433,8 +434,10 @@ END(irq_entries_start) + TRACE_IRQS_OFF + + CALL_enter_from_user_mode +- ++ jmpq 2f + 1: ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY ++2: + /* + * Save previous stack pointer, optionally switch to interrupt stack. + * irq_count is used to check if a CPU is already on an interrupt stack +@@ -1004,6 +1007,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry) + movq %rax, %cr3 + 2: + #endif ++ /* ++ * The above doesn't do an unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI ++ * case. So do an lfence to prevent GS speculation, regardless of ++ * whether PTI is enabled. ++ */ ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY ++ + ret + END(paranoid_entry) + +@@ -1065,6 +1075,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) + * from user mode due to an IRET fault. + */ + SWAPGS ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY + + .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: + /* +@@ -1076,6 +1087,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) + CALL_enter_from_user_mode + ret + ++.Lerror_entry_done_lfence: ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY + .Lerror_entry_done: + TRACE_IRQS_OFF + ret +@@ -1094,7 +1107,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) + cmpq %rax, RIP+8(%rsp) + je .Lbstep_iret + cmpq $.Lgs_change, RIP+8(%rsp) +- jne .Lerror_entry_done ++ jne .Lerror_entry_done_lfence + + /* + * hack: .Lgs_change can fail with user gsbase. If this happens, fix up +@@ -1102,6 +1115,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) + * .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase. + */ + SWAPGS ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY + jmp .Lerror_entry_done + + .Lbstep_iret: +@@ -1115,6 +1129,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry) + * Switch to kernel gsbase: + */ + SWAPGS ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY + + /* + * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs +@@ -1211,6 +1226,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi) + * to switch CR3 here. + */ + cld ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY + movq %rsp, %rdx + movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp + pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */ +@@ -1499,6 +1515,7 @@ end_repeat_nmi: + movq %rax, %cr3 + 2: + #endif ++ FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY + + /* paranoidentry do_nmi, 0; without TRACE_IRQS_OFF */ + call do_nmi +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ + + #define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */ + #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ +- ++#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER ( 7*32+10) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */ ++#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL ( 7*32+11) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */ + #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ + #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ + diff --git a/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-swapgs-exclude-atoms-from-speculation-through-swapgs.patch b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-swapgs-exclude-atoms-from-speculation-through-swapgs.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bdac088a7ad --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.9/x86-speculation-swapgs-exclude-atoms-from-speculation-through-swapgs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +From foo@baz Fri 09 Aug 2019 02:39:27 PM CEST +From: Thomas Gleixner +Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2019 21:18:59 +0200 +Subject: x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS + +From: Thomas Gleixner + +commit f36cf386e3fec258a341d446915862eded3e13d8 upstream. + +Intel provided the following information: + + On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register + value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the + last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a + speculatively written segment value. + +That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS +entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled. + +Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all +out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs +are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway. + +Reported-by: Andrew Cooper +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner +Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks +Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf +[bwh: Backported to 4.4: + - There's no whitelist entry (or any support) for Hygon CPUs + - Adjust context, indentation] +Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 +++------------ + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) + +--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +@@ -356,5 +356,6 @@ + #define X86_BUG_L1TF X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */ + #define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */ + #define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */ ++#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */ + + #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +@@ -281,18 +281,6 @@ static const char * const spectre_v1_str + [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization", + }; + +-static bool is_swapgs_serializing(void) +-{ +- /* +- * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously +- * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is +- * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory +- * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is +- * good enough for our purposes. +- */ +- return boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD; +-} +- + /* + * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to + * userspace? +@@ -343,9 +331,11 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_select_mit + * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation + * is serializing. + * +- * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE. ++ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to ++ * stop speculation through swapgs. + */ +- if (!is_swapgs_serializing() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER)) ++ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) && ++ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER)) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER); + + /* +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s + #define NO_L1TF BIT(3) + #define NO_MDS BIT(4) + #define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5) ++#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6) + + #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \ + { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist } +@@ -920,29 +921,37 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION), + +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), +- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), +- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), + + VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB), + +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), + +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF), +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF), +- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS), ++ ++ /* ++ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously ++ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is ++ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory ++ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is ++ * good enough for our purposes. ++ */ + + /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ +- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), +- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), +- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), +- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), ++ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), ++ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), + + /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ +- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), ++ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), + {} + }; + +@@ -979,6 +988,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY); + } + ++ if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS)) ++ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS); ++ + if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN)) + return; +