From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2025 06:16:18 +0000 (+0200) Subject: 6.1-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v6.16.3~68 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=f295f40ad62886baf7e5a9d8bcfa62b6bb130a63;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 6.1-stable patches added patches: acpi-pfr_update-fix-the-driver-update-version-check.patch ipv6-sr-fix-mac-comparison-to-be-constant-time.patch mptcp-drop-skb-if-mptcp-skb-extension-allocation-fails.patch mptcp-pm-kernel-flush-do-not-reset-add_addr-limit.patch net-hsr-reject-hsr-frame-if-skb-can-t-hold-tag.patch --- diff --git a/queue-6.1/acpi-pfr_update-fix-the-driver-update-version-check.patch b/queue-6.1/acpi-pfr_update-fix-the-driver-update-version-check.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9e69eb0518 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/acpi-pfr_update-fix-the-driver-update-version-check.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 8151320c747efb22d30b035af989fed0d502176e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chen Yu +Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 22:32:33 +0800 +Subject: ACPI: pfr_update: Fix the driver update version check + +From: Chen Yu + +commit 8151320c747efb22d30b035af989fed0d502176e upstream. + +The security-version-number check should be used rather +than the runtime version check for driver updates. + +Otherwise, the firmware update would fail when the update binary had +a lower runtime version number than the current one. + +Fixes: 0db89fa243e5 ("ACPI: Introduce Platform Firmware Runtime Update device driver") +Cc: 5.17+ # 5.17+ +Reported-by: "Govindarajulu, Hariganesh" +Signed-off-by: Chen Yu +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250722143233.3970607-1-yu.c.chen@intel.com +[ rjw: Changelog edits ] +Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + drivers/acpi/pfr_update.c | 2 +- + include/uapi/linux/pfrut.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/drivers/acpi/pfr_update.c ++++ b/drivers/acpi/pfr_update.c +@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ static bool applicable_image(const void + if (type == PFRU_CODE_INJECT_TYPE) + return payload_hdr->rt_ver >= cap->code_rt_version; + +- return payload_hdr->rt_ver >= cap->drv_rt_version; ++ return payload_hdr->svn_ver >= cap->drv_svn; + } + + static void print_update_debug_info(struct pfru_updated_result *result, +--- a/include/uapi/linux/pfrut.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/pfrut.h +@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct pfru_payload_hdr { + __u32 hw_ver; + __u32 rt_ver; + __u8 platform_id[16]; ++ __u32 svn_ver; + }; + + enum pfru_dsm_status { diff --git a/queue-6.1/ipv6-sr-fix-mac-comparison-to-be-constant-time.patch b/queue-6.1/ipv6-sr-fix-mac-comparison-to-be-constant-time.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7cc21f14a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/ipv6-sr-fix-mac-comparison-to-be-constant-time.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Biggers +Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 13:27:24 -0700 +Subject: ipv6: sr: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time + +From: Eric Biggers + +commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa upstream. + +To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. +Use the appropriate helper function for this. + +Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers +Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818202724.15713-1-ebiggers@kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c ++++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_bu + if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output)) + return false; + +- if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0) ++ if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN)) + return false; + + return true; diff --git a/queue-6.1/mptcp-drop-skb-if-mptcp-skb-extension-allocation-fails.patch b/queue-6.1/mptcp-drop-skb-if-mptcp-skb-extension-allocation-fails.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45bbdf713d --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/mptcp-drop-skb-if-mptcp-skb-extension-allocation-fails.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From ccab044697980c6c01ab51f43f48f13b8a3e5c33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christoph Paasch +Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 19:28:19 +0200 +Subject: mptcp: drop skb if MPTCP skb extension allocation fails + +From: Christoph Paasch + +commit ccab044697980c6c01ab51f43f48f13b8a3e5c33 upstream. + +When skb_ext_add(skb, SKB_EXT_MPTCP) fails in mptcp_incoming_options(), +we used to return true, letting the segment proceed through the TCP +receive path without a DSS mapping. Such segments can leave inconsistent +mapping state and trigger a mid-stream fallback to TCP, which in testing +collapsed (by artificially forcing failures in skb_ext_add) throughput +to zero. + +Return false instead so the TCP input path drops the skb (see +tcp_data_queue() and step-7 processing). This is the safer choice +under memory pressure: it preserves MPTCP correctness and provides +backpressure to the sender. + +Control packets remain unaffected: ACK updates and DATA_FIN handling +happen before attempting the extension allocation, and tcp_reset() +continues to ignore the return value. + +With this change, MPTCP continues to work at high throughput if we +artificially inject failures into skb_ext_add. + +Fixes: 6787b7e350d3 ("mptcp: avoid processing packet if a subflow reset") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch +Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) +Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc2-v1-1-521fe9957892@kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/mptcp/options.c | 6 ++++-- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/net/mptcp/options.c ++++ b/net/mptcp/options.c +@@ -1100,7 +1100,9 @@ static bool add_addr_hmac_valid(struct m + return hmac == mp_opt->ahmac; + } + +-/* Return false if a subflow has been reset, else return true */ ++/* Return false in case of error (or subflow has been reset), ++ * else return true. ++ */ + bool mptcp_incoming_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) + { + struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow = mptcp_subflow_ctx(sk); +@@ -1198,7 +1200,7 @@ bool mptcp_incoming_options(struct sock + + mpext = skb_ext_add(skb, SKB_EXT_MPTCP); + if (!mpext) +- return true; ++ return false; + + memset(mpext, 0, sizeof(*mpext)); + diff --git a/queue-6.1/mptcp-pm-kernel-flush-do-not-reset-add_addr-limit.patch b/queue-6.1/mptcp-pm-kernel-flush-do-not-reset-add_addr-limit.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..069a0f0d6b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/mptcp-pm-kernel-flush-do-not-reset-add_addr-limit.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 68fc0f4b0d25692940cdc85c68e366cae63e1757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" +Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 19:28:20 +0200 +Subject: mptcp: pm: kernel: flush: do not reset ADD_ADDR limit + +From: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) + +commit 68fc0f4b0d25692940cdc85c68e366cae63e1757 upstream. + +A flush of the MPTCP endpoints should not affect the MPTCP limits. In +other words, 'ip mptcp endpoint flush' should not change 'ip mptcp +limits'. + +But it was the case: the MPTCP_PM_ATTR_RCV_ADD_ADDRS (add_addr_accepted) +limit was reset by accident. Removing the reset of this counter during a +flush fixes this issue. + +Fixes: 01cacb00b35c ("mptcp: add netlink-based PM") +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Reported-by: Thomas Dreibholz +Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/579 +Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau +Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250815-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-17-rc2-v1-2-521fe9957892@kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 1 - + 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c ++++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +@@ -1778,7 +1778,6 @@ static void __flush_addrs(struct list_he + static void __reset_counters(struct pm_nl_pernet *pernet) + { + WRITE_ONCE(pernet->add_addr_signal_max, 0); +- WRITE_ONCE(pernet->add_addr_accept_max, 0); + WRITE_ONCE(pernet->local_addr_max, 0); + pernet->addrs = 0; + } diff --git a/queue-6.1/net-hsr-reject-hsr-frame-if-skb-can-t-hold-tag.patch b/queue-6.1/net-hsr-reject-hsr-frame-if-skb-can-t-hold-tag.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..70a7ae8214 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-6.1/net-hsr-reject-hsr-frame-if-skb-can-t-hold-tag.patch @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +From 7af76e9d18a9fd6f8611b3313c86c190f9b6a5a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Acs +Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2025 08:28:42 +0000 +Subject: net, hsr: reject HSR frame if skb can't hold tag +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +From: Jakub Acs + +commit 7af76e9d18a9fd6f8611b3313c86c190f9b6a5a7 upstream. + +Receiving HSR frame with insufficient space to hold HSR tag in the skb +can result in a crash (kernel BUG): + +[ 45.390915] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff86f32cac len:26 put:14 head:ffff888042418000 data:ffff888042417ff4 tail:0xe end:0x180 dev:bridge_slave_1 +[ 45.392559] ------------[ cut here ]------------ +[ 45.392912] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:211! +[ 45.393276] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI +[ 45.393809] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2496 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.15.0 #12 PREEMPT(undef) +[ 45.394433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 +[ 45.395273] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15b/0x1d0 + + + +[ 45.402911] Call Trace: +[ 45.403105] +[ 45.404470] skb_push+0xcd/0xf0 +[ 45.404726] br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x7c/0x6c0 +[ 45.406513] br_forward_finish+0x128/0x260 +[ 45.408483] __br_forward+0x42d/0x590 +[ 45.409464] maybe_deliver+0x2eb/0x420 +[ 45.409763] br_flood+0x174/0x4a0 +[ 45.410030] br_handle_frame_finish+0xc7c/0x1bc0 +[ 45.411618] br_handle_frame+0xac3/0x1230 +[ 45.413674] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x808/0x3df0 +[ 45.422966] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb4/0x1f0 +[ 45.424478] __netif_receive_skb+0x22/0x170 +[ 45.424806] process_backlog+0x242/0x6d0 +[ 45.425116] __napi_poll+0xbb/0x630 +[ 45.425394] net_rx_action+0x4d1/0xcc0 +[ 45.427613] handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x580 +[ 45.427926] do_softirq+0x74/0x90 +[ 45.428196] + +This issue was found by syzkaller. + +The panic happens in br_dev_queue_push_xmit() once it receives a +corrupted skb with ETH header already pushed in linear data. When it +attempts the skb_push() call, there's not enough headroom and +skb_push() panics. + +The corrupted skb is put on the queue by HSR layer, which makes a +sequence of unintended transformations when it receives a specific +corrupted HSR frame (with incomplete TAG). + +Fix it by dropping and consuming frames that are not long enough to +contain both ethernet and hsr headers. + +Alternative fix would be to check for enough headroom before skb_push() +in br_dev_queue_push_xmit(). + +In the reproducer, this is injected via AF_PACKET, but I don't easily +see why it couldn't be sent over the wire from adjacent network. + +Further Details: + +In the reproducer, the following network interface chain is set up: + +┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ +│ veth0_to_hsr ├───┤ hsr_slave0 ┼───┐ +└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ │ + │ ┌──────┐ + ├─┤ hsr0 ├───┐ + │ └──────┘ │ +┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ │ │┌────────┐ +│ veth1_to_hsr ┼───┤ hsr_slave1 ├───┘ └┤ │ +└────────────────┘ └────────────────┘ ┌┼ bridge │ + ││ │ + │└────────┘ + │ + ┌───────┐ │ + │ ... ├──────┘ + └───────┘ + +To trigger the events leading up to crash, reproducer sends a corrupted +HSR frame with incomplete TAG, via AF_PACKET socket on 'veth0_to_hsr'. + +The first HSR-layer function to process this frame is +hsr_handle_frame(). It and then checks if the +protocol is ETH_P_PRP or ETH_P_HSR. If it is, it calls +skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN), without checking that +the skb is long enough. For the crashing frame it is not, and hence the +skb->network_header and skb->mac_len fields are set incorrectly, +pointing after the end of the linear buffer. + +I will call this a BUG#1 and it is what is addressed by this patch. In +the crashing scenario before the fix, the skb continues to go down the +hsr path as follows. + +hsr_handle_frame() then calls this sequence +hsr_forward_skb() + fill_frame_info() + hsr->proto_ops->fill_frame_info() + hsr_fill_frame_info() + +hsr_fill_frame_info() contains a check that intends to check whether the +skb actually contains the HSR header. But the check relies on the +skb->mac_len field which was erroneously setup due to BUG#1, so the +check passes and the execution continues back in the hsr_forward_skb(): + +hsr_forward_skb() + hsr_forward_do() + hsr->proto_ops->get_untagged_frame() + hsr_get_untagged_frame() + create_stripped_skb_hsr() + +In create_stripped_skb_hsr(), a copy of the skb is created and is +further corrupted by operation that attempts to strip the HSR tag in a +call to __pskb_copy(). + +The skb enters create_stripped_skb_hsr() with ethernet header pushed in +linear buffer. The skb_pull(skb_in, HSR_HLEN) thus pulls 6 bytes of +ethernet header into the headroom, creating skb_in with a headroom of +size 8. The subsequent __pskb_copy() then creates an skb with headroom +of just 2 and skb->len of just 12, this is how it looks after the copy: + +gdb) p skb->len +$10 = 12 +(gdb) p skb->data +$11 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45382 "\252\252\252\252\252!\210\373", +(gdb) p skb->head +$12 = (unsigned char *) 0xffff888041e45380 "" + +It seems create_stripped_skb_hsr() assumes that ETH header is pulled +in the headroom when it's entered, because it just pulls HSR header on +top. But that is not the case in our code-path and we end up with the +corrupted skb instead. I will call this BUG#2 + +*I got confused here because it seems that under no conditions can +create_stripped_skb_hsr() work well, the assumption it makes is not true +during the processing of hsr frames - since the skb_push() in +hsr_handle_frame to skb_pull in hsr_deliver_master(). I wonder whether I +missed something here.* + +Next, the execution arrives in hsr_deliver_master(). It calls +skb_pull(ETH_HLEN), which just returns NULL - the SKB does not have +enough space for the pull (as it only has 12 bytes in total at this +point). + +*The skb_pull() here further suggests that ethernet header is meant +to be pushed through the whole hsr processing and +create_stripped_skb_hsr() should pull it before doing the HSR header +pull.* + +hsr_deliver_master() then puts the corrupted skb on the queue, it is +then picked up from there by bridge frame handling layer and finally +lands in br_dev_queue_push_xmit where it panics. + +Cc: stable@kernel.org +Fixes: 48b491a5cc74 ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks") +Reported-by: syzbot+a81f2759d022496b40ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs +Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet +Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250819082842.94378-1-acsjakub@amazon.de +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman +--- + net/hsr/hsr_slave.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/net/hsr/hsr_slave.c ++++ b/net/hsr/hsr_slave.c +@@ -62,8 +62,14 @@ static rx_handler_result_t hsr_handle_fr + skb_push(skb, ETH_HLEN); + skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + if ((!hsr->prot_version && protocol == htons(ETH_P_PRP)) || +- protocol == htons(ETH_P_HSR)) ++ protocol == htons(ETH_P_HSR)) { ++ if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN)) { ++ kfree_skb(skb); ++ goto finish_consume; ++ } ++ + skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN + HSR_HLEN); ++ } + skb_reset_mac_len(skb); + + hsr_forward_skb(skb, port); diff --git a/queue-6.1/series b/queue-6.1/series index 98d4a46388..1bfce78ef0 100644 --- a/queue-6.1/series +++ b/queue-6.1/series @@ -336,3 +336,8 @@ drm-amdgpu-avoid-extra-evict-restore-process.patch drm-amdgpu-update-mmhub-3.0.1-client-id-mappings.patch drm-amdkfd-destroy-kfd-debugfs-after-destroy-kfd-wq.patch drm-amd-display-don-t-overwrite-dce60_clk_mgr.patch +net-hsr-reject-hsr-frame-if-skb-can-t-hold-tag.patch +ipv6-sr-fix-mac-comparison-to-be-constant-time.patch +acpi-pfr_update-fix-the-driver-update-version-check.patch +mptcp-drop-skb-if-mptcp-skb-extension-allocation-fails.patch +mptcp-pm-kernel-flush-do-not-reset-add_addr-limit.patch