From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 12:49:08 +0000 (+0100) Subject: 4.14-stable patches X-Git-Tag: v4.19.6~16 X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=f82eccf41eaedeb4871c4c0d23c39941446ac843;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git 4.14-stable patches added patches: lan78xx-read-mac-address-from-dt-if-present.patch namei-allow-restricted-o_creat-of-fifos-and-regular-files.patch rcu-make-need_resched-respond-to-urgent-rcu-qs-needs.patch s390-mm-check-for-valid-vma-before-zapping-in-gmap_discard.patch usb-xhci-fix-uninitialized-completion-when-usb3-port-got-wrong-status.patch --- diff --git a/queue-4.14/lan78xx-read-mac-address-from-dt-if-present.patch b/queue-4.14/lan78xx-read-mac-address-from-dt-if-present.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..31929485a63 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/lan78xx-read-mac-address-from-dt-if-present.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From 760db29bdc97b73ff60b091315ad787b1deb5cf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Phil Elwell +Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 17:59:38 +0100 +Subject: lan78xx: Read MAC address from DT if present + +From: Phil Elwell + +commit 760db29bdc97b73ff60b091315ad787b1deb5cf5 upstream. + +There is a standard mechanism for locating and using a MAC address from +the Device Tree. Use this facility in the lan78xx driver to support +applications without programmed EEPROM or OTP. At the same time, +regularise the handling of the different address sources. + +Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell +Signed-off-by: David S. Miller +Tested-by: Paolo Pisati +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c ++++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include "lan78xx.h" + + #define DRIVER_AUTHOR "WOOJUNG HUH " +@@ -1645,34 +1646,31 @@ static void lan78xx_init_mac_address(str + addr[5] = (addr_hi >> 8) & 0xFF; + + if (!is_valid_ether_addr(addr)) { +- /* reading mac address from EEPROM or OTP */ +- if ((lan78xx_read_eeprom(dev, EEPROM_MAC_OFFSET, ETH_ALEN, +- addr) == 0) || +- (lan78xx_read_otp(dev, EEPROM_MAC_OFFSET, ETH_ALEN, +- addr) == 0)) { +- if (is_valid_ether_addr(addr)) { +- /* eeprom values are valid so use them */ +- netif_dbg(dev, ifup, dev->net, +- "MAC address read from EEPROM"); +- } else { +- /* generate random MAC */ +- random_ether_addr(addr); +- netif_dbg(dev, ifup, dev->net, +- "MAC address set to random addr"); +- } +- +- addr_lo = addr[0] | (addr[1] << 8) | +- (addr[2] << 16) | (addr[3] << 24); +- addr_hi = addr[4] | (addr[5] << 8); +- +- ret = lan78xx_write_reg(dev, RX_ADDRL, addr_lo); +- ret = lan78xx_write_reg(dev, RX_ADDRH, addr_hi); ++ if (!eth_platform_get_mac_address(&dev->udev->dev, addr)) { ++ /* valid address present in Device Tree */ ++ netif_dbg(dev, ifup, dev->net, ++ "MAC address read from Device Tree"); ++ } else if (((lan78xx_read_eeprom(dev, EEPROM_MAC_OFFSET, ++ ETH_ALEN, addr) == 0) || ++ (lan78xx_read_otp(dev, EEPROM_MAC_OFFSET, ++ ETH_ALEN, addr) == 0)) && ++ is_valid_ether_addr(addr)) { ++ /* eeprom values are valid so use them */ ++ netif_dbg(dev, ifup, dev->net, ++ "MAC address read from EEPROM"); + } else { + /* generate random MAC */ + random_ether_addr(addr); + netif_dbg(dev, ifup, dev->net, + "MAC address set to random addr"); + } ++ ++ addr_lo = addr[0] | (addr[1] << 8) | ++ (addr[2] << 16) | (addr[3] << 24); ++ addr_hi = addr[4] | (addr[5] << 8); ++ ++ ret = lan78xx_write_reg(dev, RX_ADDRL, addr_lo); ++ ret = lan78xx_write_reg(dev, RX_ADDRH, addr_hi); + } + + ret = lan78xx_write_reg(dev, MAF_LO(0), addr_lo); diff --git a/queue-4.14/namei-allow-restricted-o_creat-of-fifos-and-regular-files.patch b/queue-4.14/namei-allow-restricted-o_creat-of-fifos-and-regular-files.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..86095faf31b --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/namei-allow-restricted-o_creat-of-fifos-and-regular-files.patch @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +From 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Salvatore Mesoraca +Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 17:00:35 -0700 +Subject: namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files + +From: Salvatore Mesoraca + +commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5 upstream. + +Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world +writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the +directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag. The purpose +is to make data spoofing attacks harder. This protection can be turned +on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like +the symlinks/hardlinks protection. This patch is based on Openwall's +"HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer. + +This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented +by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation: + +CVE-2000-1134 +CVE-2007-3852 +CVE-2008-0525 +CVE-2009-0416 +CVE-2011-4834 +CVE-2015-1838 +CVE-2015-7442 +CVE-2016-7489 + +This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down all +vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any +mention of this particular attack vector. In fact, before +hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite +vehicle to exploit them. + +[s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter] + Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda + Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com +[keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future] +[keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet] +Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast +Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca +Signed-off-by: Kees Cook +Suggested-by: Solar Designer +Suggested-by: Kees Cook +Cc: Al Viro +Cc: Dan Carpenter +Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton +Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds +Cc: Loic +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + fs/namei.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + include/linux/fs.h | 2 + + kernel/sysctl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt ++++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt +@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/ + - overflowgid + - pipe-user-pages-hard + - pipe-user-pages-soft ++- protected_fifos + - protected_hardlinks ++- protected_regular + - protected_symlinks + - suid_dumpable + - super-max +@@ -182,6 +184,24 @@ applied. + + ============================================================== + ++protected_fifos: ++ ++The intent of this protection is to avoid unintentional writes to ++an attacker-controlled FIFO, where a program expected to create a regular ++file. ++ ++When set to "0", writing to FIFOs is unrestricted. ++ ++When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on FIFOs that we don't own ++in world writable sticky directories, unless they are owned by the ++owner of the directory. ++ ++When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. ++ ++This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall. ++ ++============================================================== ++ + protected_hardlinks: + + A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based +@@ -202,6 +222,22 @@ This protection is based on the restrict + + ============================================================== + ++protected_regular: ++ ++This protection is similar to protected_fifos, but it ++avoids writes to an attacker-controlled regular file, where a program ++expected to create one. ++ ++When set to "0", writing to regular files is unrestricted. ++ ++When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on regular files that we ++don't own in world writable sticky directories, unless they are ++owned by the owner of the directory. ++ ++When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. ++ ++============================================================== ++ + protected_symlinks: + + A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based +--- a/fs/namei.c ++++ b/fs/namei.c +@@ -904,6 +904,8 @@ static inline void put_link(struct namei + + int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0; + int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0; ++int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly; ++int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly; + + /** + * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations +@@ -1017,6 +1019,45 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link) + return -EPERM; + } + ++/** ++ * may_create_in_sticky - Check whether an O_CREAT open in a sticky directory ++ * should be allowed, or not, on files that already ++ * exist. ++ * @dir: the sticky parent directory ++ * @inode: the inode of the file to open ++ * ++ * Block an O_CREAT open of a FIFO (or a regular file) when: ++ * - sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is enabled ++ * - the file already exists ++ * - we are in a sticky directory ++ * - we don't own the file ++ * - the owner of the directory doesn't own the file ++ * - the directory is world writable ++ * If the sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is set to 2 ++ * the directory doesn't have to be world writable: being group writable will ++ * be enough. ++ * ++ * Returns 0 if the open is allowed, -ve on error. ++ */ ++static int may_create_in_sticky(struct dentry * const dir, ++ struct inode * const inode) ++{ ++ if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || ++ (!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) || ++ likely(!(dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX)) || ++ uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir->d_inode->i_uid) || ++ uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (likely(dir->d_inode->i_mode & 0002) || ++ (dir->d_inode->i_mode & 0020 && ++ ((sysctl_protected_fifos >= 2 && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || ++ (sysctl_protected_regular >= 2 && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))))) { ++ return -EACCES; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ + static __always_inline + const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd) + { +@@ -3355,9 +3396,15 @@ finish_open: + if (error) + return error; + audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0); +- error = -EISDIR; +- if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) && d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry)) +- goto out; ++ if (open_flag & O_CREAT) { ++ error = -EISDIR; ++ if (d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry)) ++ goto out; ++ error = may_create_in_sticky(dir, ++ d_backing_inode(nd->path.dentry)); ++ if (unlikely(error)) ++ goto out; ++ } + error = -ENOTDIR; + if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) && !d_can_lookup(nd->path.dentry)) + goto out; +--- a/include/linux/fs.h ++++ b/include/linux/fs.h +@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ extern struct inodes_stat_t inodes_stat; + extern int leases_enable, lease_break_time; + extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks; + extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks; ++extern int sysctl_protected_fifos; ++extern int sysctl_protected_regular; + + typedef __kernel_rwf_t rwf_t; + +--- a/kernel/sysctl.c ++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c +@@ -1794,6 +1794,24 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = { + .extra2 = &one, + }, + { ++ .procname = "protected_fifos", ++ .data = &sysctl_protected_fifos, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &two, ++ }, ++ { ++ .procname = "protected_regular", ++ .data = &sysctl_protected_regular, ++ .maxlen = sizeof(int), ++ .mode = 0600, ++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, ++ .extra1 = &zero, ++ .extra2 = &two, ++ }, ++ { + .procname = "suid_dumpable", + .data = &suid_dumpable, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), diff --git a/queue-4.14/rcu-make-need_resched-respond-to-urgent-rcu-qs-needs.patch b/queue-4.14/rcu-make-need_resched-respond-to-urgent-rcu-qs-needs.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d57d3757b6a --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/rcu-make-need_resched-respond-to-urgent-rcu-qs-needs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 92aa39e9dc77481b90cbef25e547d66cab901496 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Paul E. McKenney" +Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 13:47:30 -0700 +Subject: rcu: Make need_resched() respond to urgent RCU-QS needs + +From: Paul E. McKenney + +commit 92aa39e9dc77481b90cbef25e547d66cab901496 upstream. + +The per-CPU rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs variable communicates an urgent +need for an RCU quiescent state from the force-quiescent-state processing +within the grace-period kthread to context switches and to cond_resched(). +Unfortunately, such urgent needs are not communicated to need_resched(), +which is sometimes used to decide when to invoke cond_resched(), for +but one example, within the KVM vcpu_run() function. As of v4.15, this +can result in synchronize_sched() being delayed by up to ten seconds, +which can be problematic, to say nothing of annoying. + +This commit therefore checks rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs from within +rcu_check_callbacks(), which is invoked from the scheduling-clock +interrupt handler. If the current task is not an idle task and is +not executing in usermode, a context switch is forced, and either way, +the rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs variable is set to false. If the current +task is an idle task, then RCU's dyntick-idle code will detect the +quiescent state, so no further action is required. Similarly, if the +task is executing in usermode, other code in rcu_check_callbacks() and +its called functions will report the corresponding quiescent state. + +Reported-by: Marius Hillenbrand +Reported-by: David Woodhouse +Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra +Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney +[ paulmck: Backported to make patch apply cleanly on older versions. ] +Tested-by: Marius Hillenbrand +Cc: # 4.12.x - 4.19.x +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + kernel/rcu/tree.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +--- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c ++++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c +@@ -2772,6 +2772,15 @@ void rcu_check_callbacks(int user) + rcu_bh_qs(); + } + rcu_preempt_check_callbacks(); ++ /* The load-acquire pairs with the store-release setting to true. */ ++ if (smp_load_acquire(this_cpu_ptr(&rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs))) { ++ /* Idle and userspace execution already are quiescent states. */ ++ if (!rcu_is_cpu_rrupt_from_idle() && !user) { ++ set_tsk_need_resched(current); ++ set_preempt_need_resched(); ++ } ++ __this_cpu_write(rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs, false); ++ } + if (rcu_pending()) + invoke_rcu_core(); + if (user) diff --git a/queue-4.14/s390-mm-check-for-valid-vma-before-zapping-in-gmap_discard.patch b/queue-4.14/s390-mm-check-for-valid-vma-before-zapping-in-gmap_discard.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bd0ab151c79 --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/s390-mm-check-for-valid-vma-before-zapping-in-gmap_discard.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 1843abd03250115af6cec0892683e70cf2297c25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Janosch Frank +Date: Thu, 16 Aug 2018 09:02:31 +0100 +Subject: s390/mm: Check for valid vma before zapping in gmap_discard + +From: Janosch Frank + +commit 1843abd03250115af6cec0892683e70cf2297c25 upstream. + +Userspace could have munmapped the area before doing unmapping from +the gmap. This would leave us with a valid vmaddr, but an invalid vma +from which we would try to zap memory. + +Let's check before using the vma. + +Fixes: 1e133ab296f3 ("s390/mm: split arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c") +Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank +Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand +Reported-by: Dan Carpenter +Message-Id: <20180816082432.78828-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com> +Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + + +--- + arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +--- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c ++++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +@@ -689,6 +689,8 @@ void gmap_discard(struct gmap *gmap, uns + vmaddr |= gaddr & ~PMD_MASK; + /* Find vma in the parent mm */ + vma = find_vma(gmap->mm, vmaddr); ++ if (!vma) ++ continue; + size = min(to - gaddr, PMD_SIZE - (gaddr & ~PMD_MASK)); + zap_page_range(vma, vmaddr, size); + } diff --git a/queue-4.14/series b/queue-4.14/series index 29a86cb9db8..a28f6511923 100644 --- a/queue-4.14/series +++ b/queue-4.14/series @@ -88,3 +88,8 @@ driver-core-move-device_links_purge-after-bus_remove_device.patch include-linux-pfn_t.h-force-to-be-parsed-as-an-unary-operator.patch tty-wipe-buffer.patch tty-wipe-buffer-if-not-echoing-data.patch +usb-xhci-fix-uninitialized-completion-when-usb3-port-got-wrong-status.patch +namei-allow-restricted-o_creat-of-fifos-and-regular-files.patch +lan78xx-read-mac-address-from-dt-if-present.patch +s390-mm-check-for-valid-vma-before-zapping-in-gmap_discard.patch +rcu-make-need_resched-respond-to-urgent-rcu-qs-needs.patch diff --git a/queue-4.14/usb-xhci-fix-uninitialized-completion-when-usb3-port-got-wrong-status.patch b/queue-4.14/usb-xhci-fix-uninitialized-completion-when-usb3-port-got-wrong-status.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a391724d2aa --- /dev/null +++ b/queue-4.14/usb-xhci-fix-uninitialized-completion-when-usb3-port-got-wrong-status.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 958c0bd86075d4ef1c936998deefe1947e539240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Aaron Ma +Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 17:21:20 +0200 +Subject: usb: xhci: fix uninitialized completion when USB3 port got wrong status + +From: Aaron Ma + +commit 958c0bd86075d4ef1c936998deefe1947e539240 upstream. + +Realtek USB3.0 Card Reader [0bda:0328] reports wrong port status on +Cannon lake PCH USB3.1 xHCI [8086:a36d] after resume from S3, +after clear port reset it works fine. + +Since this device is registered on USB3 roothub at boot, +when port status reports not superspeed, xhci_get_port_status will call +an uninitialized completion in bus_state[0]. +Kernel will hang because of NULL pointer. + +Restrict the USB2 resume status check in USB2 roothub to fix hang issue. + +Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org +Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma +Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman +Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman + +--- + drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c | 2 +- + drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c +@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static u32 xhci_get_port_status(struct u + status |= USB_PORT_STAT_SUSPEND; + } + if ((raw_port_status & PORT_PLS_MASK) == XDEV_RESUME && +- !DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(raw_port_status)) { ++ !DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(raw_port_status) && hcd->speed < HCD_USB3) { + if ((raw_port_status & PORT_RESET) || + !(raw_port_status & PORT_PE)) + return 0xffffffff; +--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ static void handle_port_status(struct xh + * RExit to a disconnect state). If so, let the the driver know it's + * out of the RExit state. + */ +- if (!DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(portsc) && ++ if (!DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(portsc) && hcd->speed < HCD_USB3 && + test_and_clear_bit(faked_port_index, + &bus_state->rexit_ports)) { + complete(&bus_state->rexit_done[faked_port_index]);