From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 13:44:20 +0000 (+0200)
Subject: 4.19-stable patches
X-Git-Tag: v4.19.150~8
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=f9ba8b9611517d05176a0a1199b1c3adf2dff482;p=thirdparty%2Fkernel%2Fstable-queue.git

4.19-stable patches

added patches:
	net-packet-fix-overflow-in-tpacket_rcv.patch
---

diff --git a/queue-4.19/net-packet-fix-overflow-in-tpacket_rcv.patch b/queue-4.19/net-packet-fix-overflow-in-tpacket_rcv.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ea553424da2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-4.19/net-packet-fix-overflow-in-tpacket_rcv.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From acf69c946233259ab4d64f8869d4037a198c7f06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2020 21:05:28 -0700
+Subject: net/packet: fix overflow in tpacket_rcv
+
+From: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
+
+commit acf69c946233259ab4d64f8869d4037a198c7f06 upstream.
+
+Using tp_reserve to calculate netoff can overflow as
+tp_reserve is unsigned int and netoff is unsigned short.
+
+This may lead to macoff receving a smaller value then
+sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), and if po->has_vnet_hdr
+is set, an out-of-bounds write will occur when
+calling virtio_net_hdr_from_skb.
+
+The bug is fixed by converting netoff to unsigned int
+and checking if it exceeds USHRT_MAX.
+
+This addresses CVE-2020-14386
+
+Fixes: 8913336a7e8d ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
+Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+[ snu: backported to pre-5.3, changed tp_drops counting/locking ]
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Nuernberger <snu@amazon.com>
+CC: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+CC: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.com>
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/packet/af_packet.c |    9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
+@@ -2162,7 +2162,8 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
+ 	int skb_len = skb->len;
+ 	unsigned int snaplen, res;
+ 	unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_USER;
+-	unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
++	unsigned short macoff, hdrlen;
++	unsigned int netoff;
+ 	struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
+ 	struct timespec ts;
+ 	__u32 ts_status;
+@@ -2225,6 +2226,12 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *s
+ 		}
+ 		macoff = netoff - maclen;
+ 	}
++	if (netoff > USHRT_MAX) {
++		spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
++		po->stats.stats1.tp_drops++;
++		spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
++		goto drop_n_restore;
++	}
+ 	if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
+ 		if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
+ 			if (po->copy_thresh &&
diff --git a/queue-4.19/series b/queue-4.19/series
index 95136170c8f..457c472ccd3 100644
--- a/queue-4.19/series
+++ b/queue-4.19/series
@@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ input-trackpoint-enable-synaptics-trackpoints.patch
 random32-restore-__latent_entropy-attribute-on-net_r.patch
 mm-replace-memmap_context-by-meminit_context.patch
 mm-don-t-rely-on-system-state-to-detect-hot-plug-operations.patch
+net-packet-fix-overflow-in-tpacket_rcv.patch