Erik Kapfer [Sat, 27 Apr 2019 14:05:49 +0000 (16:05 +0200)]
ovpn_reorganize_encryption: Integrate HMAC selection to global section
Fixes: #12009 and #11824
- Since HMACs will be used in any configuration it is better placed in the global menu.
- Adapted global section to advanced and marked sections with a headline for better overview.
- Deleted old headline in advanced section cause it is not needed anymore.
- Added check if settings do not includes 'DAUTH', if possible SHA512 will be used and written to settings file.
Old configurations with SHA1 will be untouched.
Signed-off-by: Erik Kapfer <ummeegge@ipfire.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Peter Müller [Wed, 15 May 2019 17:01:00 +0000 (17:01 +0000)]
httpd: prefer AES-GCM ciphers over AES-CBC
CBC ciphers are vulnerable to a bunch of attacks (being
rather academic so far) such as MAC-then-encrypt or
padding oracle.
These seem to be more serious (see
https://blog.qualys.com/technology/2019/04/22/zombie-poodle-and-goldendoodle-vulnerabilities
for further readings) which is why they should be used
for interoperability purposes only.
I plan to remove AES-CBC ciphers for the WebUI at the
end of the year, provided overall security landscape
has not changed until that.
(AES-CBC + ECDSA will be preferred over RSA for performance
reasons. As this cipher order cannot be trivially rebuilt with
OpenSSL cipher stings, it has to be hard-coded.)
All working clients will stay compatible.
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Michael Tremer [Sat, 11 May 2019 03:19:37 +0000 (04:19 +0100)]
unbound: Add Safe Search
This is a feature that will filter adult content from search
engine's results.
The old method of rewriting the HTTP request no longer works.
This method changes the DNS response for supported search engines
which violates our belief in DNSSEC and won't allow these search
engines to ever enable DNSSEC.
However, there is no better solution available to this and this
an optional feature, too.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller@ipfire.org>
Michael Tremer [Tue, 30 Apr 2019 16:06:08 +0000 (17:06 +0100)]
URL Filter: Drop Safe Search feature
This is not working for quite some time now because all search
engines have moved over to HTTPS. Therefore we no longer can
manipulate the URL query string.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Michael Tremer [Fri, 10 May 2019 02:36:58 +0000 (03:36 +0100)]
Config: Disable XZ parallelism by default
Exporting XZ_OPT caused that every time xz was called, it automatically
enabled parallelism. The make systemm also launches multiple processes
at the same time to use more processor cores at the same time.
The combination of this causes memory exhaustion even on large systems
and has no performance gain. Therefore this is disabled by default
and only enabled where we need it which is already the case.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Michael Tremer [Thu, 9 May 2019 13:51:40 +0000 (14:51 +0100)]
routing: Fix potential authenticated XSS in input processing
An authenticated Stored XSS (Cross-site Scripting) exists in the
(https://192.168.0.241:444/cgi-bin/routing.cgi) Routing Table Entries
via the "Remark" text box or "remark" parameter. This is due to a
lack of user input validation in "Remark" text box or "remark"
parameter. It allows an authenticated WebGUI user with privileges
for the affected page to execute Stored Cross-site Scripting in
the Routing Table Entries (/cgi-bin/routing.cgi), which helps
attacker to redirect the victim to a attacker's phishing page.
The Stored XSS get prompted on the victims page whenever victim
tries to access the Routing Table Entries configuraiton page.
An attacker get access to the victim's session by performing
the CSRF and gather the cookie and session id's or possibly can
change the victims configuration using this Stored XSS.
This attack can possibly spoof the victim's informations.
Fixes: #12072 Reported-by: Dharmesh Baskaran <dharmesh201093@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Michael Tremer [Tue, 7 May 2019 20:36:21 +0000 (21:36 +0100)]
captive: Fix potential authenticated XSS in title processing
An authenticated Stored XSS (Cross-site Scripting) exists in the
(https://localhost:444/cgi-bin/captive.cgi) Captive Portal via the
"Title of Login Page" text box or "TITLE" parameter. This is due to
a lack of user input validation in "Title of Login Page" text box
or "TITLE" parameter. It allows an authenticated WebGUI user with
privileges for the affected page to execute Stored Cross-site
Scripting in the Captive Portal page (/cgi-bin/captive.cgi), which
helps attacker to redirect the victim to a attacker's page.
The Stored XSS get prompted on the victims page whenever victim
tries to access the Captive Portal page.
An attacker get access to the victim's session by performing the
CSRF and gather the cookie and session id's or possibly can
change the victims configuration using this Stored XSS.
This attack can possibly spoof the victim's informations.
Fixes: #12071 Reported-by: Dharmesh Baskaran <dharmesh201093@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Alexander Koch [Sat, 27 Apr 2019 19:26:45 +0000 (21:26 +0200)]
Pakfire: Add new command line argument "status"
This enables Pakfire to return a Status-Summary for the Current Core-Update-Level, time since last updates, the availability of a core-/packet-update and if a reboot is required to complete an update. This can be used by monitoring agents (e.g. zabbix_agentd) to monitor the update status of the IPFire device.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Koch <ipfire@starkstromkonsument.de> Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
For details see:
http://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/9.11.6-P1/RELEASE-NOTES-bind-9.11.6-P1.html
"Security Fixes
The TCP client quota set using the tcp-clients option could be exceeded in some cases.
This could lead to exhaustion of file descriptors. This flaw is disclosed in CVE-2018-5743.
[GL #615]"
Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer@ipfire.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
When a forwarding rule is being created, we sometimes create
INPUT/OUTPUT rules, too. Those were slightly invalid because
the source and destination interfaces where passed, too.
This could render some rules in certain circumstances useless.
This patch fixes this and only adds -i for INPUT and -o for
OUTPUT rules.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Michael Tremer [Tue, 30 Apr 2019 09:45:34 +0000 (10:45 +0100)]
firewall: Add more rules to input/output when adding rules to forward
The special_input/output_targets array assumed that firewall access
will always be denied. However, rules also need to be created when
access is granted. Therefore the ACCEPT target needs to be included
in this list and rules must be created in INPUTFW/OUTGOINGFW too
when ACCEPT rules are created in FORWARDFW.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Stefan Schantl [Thu, 25 Apr 2019 17:31:46 +0000 (19:31 +0200)]
firewall: Use seperate firewall chains for passing traffic to the IPS
Create and use seperate iptables chain called IPS_INPUT, IPS_FORWARD and IPS_OUTPUT
to be more flexible which kind of traffic should be passed to suricata.
Reference #12062
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl@ipfire.org> Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>