Matt Caswell [Mon, 2 Dec 2019 17:29:21 +0000 (17:29 +0000)]
Don't acknowledge a servername following warning alert in servername cb
If the servername cb decides to send back a warning alert then the
handshake continues, but we should not signal to the client that the
servername has been accepted.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 28 Nov 2019 12:03:00 +0000 (12:03 +0000)]
Provide better documentation for SSL_get_servername()
The behaviour of SSL_get_servername() is quite complicated and depends on
numerous factors such as whether it is called on the client or the server,
whether it is called before or after the handshake, what protocol version
was negotiated, and whether a resumption was attempted or was successful.
We attempt to document the behavior more clearly.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 26 Sep 2019 15:16:06 +0000 (16:16 +0100)]
Test that SSL_get_servername returns what we expect
Test this on both the client and the server after a normal handshake,
and after a resumption handshake. We also test what happens if an
inconsistent SNI is set between the original handshake and the resumption
handshake. Finally all of this is also tested in TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 25 Sep 2019 16:06:06 +0000 (17:06 +0100)]
Fix SSL_get_servername() and SNI behaviour
The SNI behaviour for TLSv1.3 and the behaviour of SSL_get_servername()
was not quite right, and not entirely consistent with the RFC.
The TLSv1.3 RFC explicitly says that SNI is negotiated on each handshake
and the server is not required to associate it with the session. This was
not quite reflected in the code so we fix that.
Additionally there were some additional checks around early_data checking
that the SNI between the original session and this session were
consistent. In fact the RFC does not require any such checks, so they are
removed.
Finally the behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right. The
behaviour was not consistent between resumption and normal handshakes,
and also not quite consistent with historical behaviour. We clarify the
behaviour in various scenarios and also attempt to make it match historical
behaviour as closely as possible.
Fixes #8822
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018)
Richard Levitte [Tue, 21 Jan 2020 06:53:40 +0000 (07:53 +0100)]
OpenSSL::Test: bring back the relative paths
Because there was a bug in File::Spec::Unix' abs2rel when it was given
relative paths as both PATH and BASE arguments, the directories we
deal with were made to be all absolute. Unfortunately, this meant
getting paths in our verbose test output which are difficult to use
anywhere else (such as a separate test build made for comparison), due
to the constant need to edit all the paths all the time.
We're therefore getting back the relative paths, by doing an extra
abs2rel() in __srctop_file, __srctop_dir, __bldtop_file and
__bldtop_dir, with a 'Cwd::getcwd' call as BASE argument.
Fixes #10628
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10913)
Kurt Roeckx [Thu, 2 Jan 2020 21:53:32 +0000 (22:53 +0100)]
Check that the default signature type is allowed
TLS < 1.2 has fixed signature algorithms: MD5+SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for the
others. TLS 1.2 sends a list of supported ciphers, but allows not sending
it in which case SHA1 is used. TLS 1.3 makes sending the list mandatory.
When we didn't receive a list from the client, we always used the
defaults without checking that they are allowed by the configuration.
Kurt Roeckx [Sun, 12 Jan 2020 15:44:01 +0000 (16:44 +0100)]
Replace apps/server.pem with certificate with a sha256 signature.
It replaces apps/server.pem that used a sha1 signature with a copy of
test/certs/servercert.pem that is uses sha256.
This caused the dtlstest to start failing. It's testing connection
sbetween a dtls client and server. In particular it was checking that if
we drop a record that the handshake recovers and still completes
successfully. The test iterates a number of times. The first time
through it drops the first record. The second time it drops the second
one, and so on. In order to do this it has a hard-coded value for the
expected number of records it should see in a handshake. That's ok
because we completely control both sides of the handshake and know what
records we expect to see. Small changes in message size would be
tolerated because that is unlikely to have an impact on the number of
records. Larger changes in message size however could increase or
decrease the number of records and hence cause the test to fail.
This particular test uses a mem bio which doesn't have all the CTRLs
that the dgram BIO has. When we are using a dgram BIO we query that BIO
to determine the MTU size. The smaller the MTU the more fragmented
handshakes become. Since the mem BIO doesn't report an MTU we use a
rather small default value and get quite a lot of records in our
handshake. This has the tendency to increase the likelihood of the
number of records changing in the test if the message size changes.
It so happens that the new server certificate is smaller than the old
one. AFAICT this is probably because the DNs for the Subject and Issuer
are significantly shorter than previously. The result is that the number
of records used to transmit the Certificate message is one less than it
was before. This actually has a knock on impact for subsequent messages
and how we fragment them resulting in one less ServerKeyExchange record
too (the actual size of the ServerKeyExchange message hasn't changed,
but where in that message it gets fragmented has). In total the number
of records used in the handshake has decreased by 2 with the new
server.pem file.
Benjamin Kaduk [Fri, 24 Jan 2020 01:08:34 +0000 (17:08 -0800)]
openssl-config: add example libssl system-defaults
Provide a "simple" example for affecting the systemwide default behavior
of libssl. The large number of mandatory nested sections makes this
less simple than the main description might suggest.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10937)
Bernd Edlinger [Sun, 19 Jan 2020 12:16:05 +0000 (13:16 +0100)]
Remove remaining references to crypto/include
Configure creates an empty crypto/include which
gets not cleaned up with make distclean.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10893)
Benjamin Kaduk [Wed, 15 Jan 2020 00:22:52 +0000 (16:22 -0800)]
Update SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(3) docs for refcounts
The existing documentation for the new-session callback was unclear
about the requirements on the callback with respect to reference-handling
of the session object being created. Be more explicit about the
(non-)requirements on the callback code for "success" (1) and "ignore"
(0) return values.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10848)
kinichiro [Thu, 9 Jan 2020 14:22:25 +0000 (23:22 +0900)]
Avoid leak in error path of asn1_parse2
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10794)
fix a glitch in the documentation of OCSP_sendreq_bio()
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10713)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 29 Aug 2019 16:15:16 +0000 (17:15 +0100)]
Fix pkeyutl -verifyrecover
When performing a pkeyutl -verifyrecover operation the input file is not
a hash - it is the signature itself. Therefore don't do the check to make
sure it looks like a hash.
Fixes #9658
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9731)
Revert "Move random-related defines from e_os.h to rand_unix.c"
This reverts commit 7b18d1a53f932391bbc599a4717d6f98a597849c, which moved the
DEVRANDOM and DEVRANDOM_EGD defines into rand_unix.c. That change introduced
the regression that the compiler complains about missing declarations in
apps/version.c when OpenSSL is configured using `--with-rand-seed=devrandom`
(resp. `--with-rand-seed=egd`):
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10764)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 3 Jan 2020 09:37:19 +0000 (09:37 +0000)]
Don't store an HMAC key for longer than we need
The HMAC_CTX structure stores the original key in case the ctx is reused
without changing the key.
However, HMAC_Init_ex() checks its parameters such that the only code path
where the stored key is ever used is in the case where HMAC_Init_ex is
called with a NULL key and an explicit md is provided which is the same as
the md that was provided previously. But in that case we can actually reuse
the pre-digested key that we calculated last time, so we can refactor the
code not to use the stored key at all.
With that refactor done it is no longer necessary to store the key in the
ctx at all. This means that long running ctx's will not keep the key in
memory for any longer than required. Note though that the digested key
*is* still kept in memory for the duration of the life of the ctx.
Fixes #10743
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10763)
Andrew Hoang [Tue, 24 Dec 2019 04:19:24 +0000 (20:19 -0800)]
Fix incorrect return code on ECDSA key verification
ECDSA_do_verify() is a function that verifies a ECDSA signature given a hash and a public EC key. The function is supposed to return 1 on valid signature, 0 on invalid signature and -1 on error. Previously, we returned 0 if the key did not have a verify_sig method. This is actually an error case and not an invalid signature. Consequently, this patch updates the return code to -1.
Fixes #8766
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10693)
Nicola Tuveri [Sat, 8 Jun 2019 09:48:47 +0000 (12:48 +0300)]
Fix potential SCA vulnerability in some EC_METHODs
This commit addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in the
internals of some elliptic curve low level operations.
The side-channel leakage appears to be tiny, so the severity of this
issue is rather low.
The issue was reported by David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
dcruette [Tue, 24 Dec 2019 21:48:19 +0000 (22:48 +0100)]
Update tls13_enc.c
Fix double + in hkdflabel declaration (FIXES #10675)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10700)
Benjamin Kaduk [Mon, 23 Dec 2019 18:35:48 +0000 (10:35 -0800)]
Update the krb5 submodule
Bring us up to date with upstream's 1.17.1 release. Among other
things, it includes commit c2497d46b4bad473e164943d67b58cd1ae261c3a
which fixes several issues that affect running the test suite under
Travis CI. Hopefully those will work transitively for us as well.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10690)
Bernd Edlinger [Sun, 22 Dec 2019 18:40:03 +0000 (19:40 +0100)]
Fix a race condition in the speed command
The timer alarm sets run = 0, while the benchmark
does run = 1 in the initialization code. That is
a race condition, if the timer goes off too early
the benchmark runs forever.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10680)
Bernd Edlinger [Sun, 22 Dec 2019 10:48:54 +0000 (11:48 +0100)]
Add some missing cfi frame info in x25519-x86_64.pl
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10676)
Bernd Edlinger [Wed, 18 Dec 2019 09:12:26 +0000 (10:12 +0100)]
Add some missing cfi frame info in camellia-x86_64.pl
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10642)
Jussi Keranen [Wed, 11 Dec 2019 13:08:04 +0000 (15:08 +0200)]
Fix regression on x509 keyform argument
In OpenSSL pre 1.1.0, 'openssl x509 -keyform engine' was possible
and supported. In 1.1.0, type of keyform argument is OPT_FMT_PEMDER
which doesn't support engine. This changes type of keyform argument
to OPT_FMT_PDE which means PEM, DER or engine and updates the manpage
including keyform and CAkeyform.
This restores the pre 1.1.0 behavior.
This issue is very similar than https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/4366
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10609)
Bernd Edlinger [Tue, 17 Dec 2019 08:05:32 +0000 (09:05 +0100)]
Fix unwind info for some trivial functions
While stack unwinding works with gdb here, the
function _Unwind_Backtrace gives up when something outside
.cfi_startproc/.cfi_endproc is found in the call stack, like
OPENSSL_cleanse, OPENSSL_atomic_add, OPENSSL_rdtsc, CRYPTO_memcmp
and other trivial functions which don't save anything in the stack.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10635)
Saritha [Tue, 29 Oct 2019 06:40:55 +0000 (12:10 +0530)]
apps/speed.c: Fix eddsa sign and verify output with -multi option
Fixes #10261
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10285)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 4 Dec 2019 10:21:52 +0000 (10:21 +0000)]
Update the HISTORY entry for RSA_get0_pss_params()
Make a note of when this function was first introduced
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10568)
Matt Caswell [Wed, 4 Dec 2019 10:21:06 +0000 (10:21 +0000)]
Backport the RSA_get0_pss_params() function from master
This is a missing accessor in order to obtain PSS parameters from an
RSA key, which should also be available in 1.1.1.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10568)
Matt Caswell [Mon, 9 Dec 2019 11:51:48 +0000 (11:51 +0000)]
Ensure EVP_PKEY_set1_DH detects X9.42 keys
OpenSSL supports both PKCS#3 and X9.42 DH keys. By default we use PKCS#3
keys. The function `EVP_PKEY_set1_DH` was assuming that the supplied DH
key was a PKCS#3 key. It should detect what type of key it is and assign
the correct type as appropriate.
Fixes #10592
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10593)
kinichiro [Thu, 5 Dec 2019 11:00:50 +0000 (20:00 +0900)]
Return 1 when openssl req -addext kv is duplicated
CLA: trivial
Fixes #10273
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10578)
Large GOST ClientKeyExchange messages are sent by VipNet CSP, one of
Russian certified products implementing GOST TLS, when a server
certificate contains 512-bit keys.
This behaviour was present in 1.0.2 branch and needs to be restored.
Backport of #10376
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10376)
kinichiro [Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:12:53 +0000 (21:12 +0900)]
Check return value after loading config file
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10607)
Fangming.Fang [Fri, 15 Nov 2019 07:47:22 +0000 (07:47 +0000)]
Enrich arm64 tests in Travis matrix
1, Remove simple test just with --strict-warnings enabled.
2, Share the three common envs with amd64.
3, Add matrix item running test in bionic(default xenial) for arm64.
4, Enable MSan test on arm64 for extended test.
5, Enable UBSan test on arm64 for extended test.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10519)
Rich Salz [Tue, 26 Nov 2019 14:16:41 +0000 (09:16 -0500)]
Fix docs for CRYPTO_secure_allocated
Fixes #9300
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10523)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10544)
Difference between EVP_CipherInit and EVP_CipherInit_ex
Fixes #10455
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10550)
Bernd Edlinger [Wed, 4 Dec 2019 11:57:41 +0000 (12:57 +0100)]
Improve the overflow handling in rsaz_512_sqr
We have always a carry in %rcx or %rbx in range 0..2
from the previous stage, that is added to the result
of the 64-bit square, but the low nibble of any square
can only be 0, 1, 4, 9.
Therefore one "adcq $0, %rdx" can be removed.
Likewise in the ADX code we can remove one
"adcx %rbp, $out" since %rbp is always 0, and carry is
also zero, therefore that is a no-op.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10575)
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 4 Dec 2019 11:48:21 +0000 (12:48 +0100)]
Fix an overflow bug in rsaz_512_sqr
There is an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in
exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis
suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a
result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed
likely. Attacks against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an
attack the target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not
recommended anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API
BN_mod_exp may be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
CVE-2019-1551
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10575)
Fangming.Fang [Mon, 2 Dec 2019 02:44:21 +0000 (02:44 +0000)]
Fix exit issue in travisci
Ungraceful 'exit' probably causes unexpeced error on background activity.
So replace 'exit' with recommended 'travis_terminate'. Also see
https://travis-ci.community/t/exit-0-cannot-exit-successfully-on-arm/5731/4
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10561)
zero [Tue, 3 Dec 2019 09:50:52 +0000 (19:50 +1000)]
Update NOTES.ANDROID for newer NDK versions + small fixes.
Fixes #8941
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10478)
Matt Caswell [Fri, 31 May 2019 13:32:55 +0000 (14:32 +0100)]
Add a test for NULL chunks in encrypt/decrypt
Issue #8675 describes a problem where calling EVP_DecryptUpdate() with an
empty chunk causes the result to be different compared to if you do not
use an empty chunk. This adds a test for that case.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9057)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 4 Apr 2019 23:22:14 +0000 (01:22 +0200)]
EVP_*Update: ensure that input NULL with length 0 isn't passed
Even with custom ciphers, the combination in == NULL && inl == 0
should not be passed down to the backend cipher function. The reason
is that these are the values passed by EVP_*Final, and some of the
backend cipher functions do check for these to see if a "final" call
is made.
An exception is made for CCM mode which has special handling for the case
where inl == 0: this may mean the total plaintext or ciphertext length is 0.
This is based on an original commit by Richard Levitte.
Fixes #8675
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9057)
moehuster [Tue, 12 Nov 2019 11:28:51 +0000 (19:28 +0800)]
Fix L<EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx> links
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10420)
Richard Levitte [Tue, 26 Nov 2019 11:40:16 +0000 (12:40 +0100)]
i2b_PVK(): Use Encrypt, not Decrypt
We used EVP_EncryptInit_ex() to initialise, but EVP_DecryptUpdate()
and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() to actually perform encryption. This worked
long ago, when the Encrypt and Decrypt variants were the same, but
doesn't now (actually haven't for a very long time).
This shows how seldom PVK is actually used.
Fixes #9338
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10521)
Benjamin Kaduk [Wed, 13 Nov 2019 17:42:19 +0000 (09:42 -0800)]
Fix a race condition in SNI handling
As was done for ciphers, supported groups, and EC point formats in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9162, only write the negotiated
SNI hostname value to the session object when not resuming, even for
TLS 1.3 resumptions. Otherwise, when using a stateful session cache
(as is done by default when 0-RTT data is enabled), we can have multiple
SSLs active using the same in-memory session object, which leads to
double-frees and similar race conditions in the SNI handler prior
to this commit.
Fortunately, since draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22, there is no requirement
that the SNI hostname be preserved across TLS 1.3 resumption, and thus
not a need to continually update the session object with the "current"
value (to be used when producing session tickets, so that the subsequent
resumption can be checked against the current value). So we can just
relax the logic and only write to the session object for initial handshakes.
This still leaves us in a somewhat inconsistent state, since if the SNI value
does change across handshakes, the session object will continue to record
the initial handshake's value, even if that bears no relation to the
current handshake. The current SSL_get_servername() implementation
prefers the value from the session if s->hit, but a more complete fix
for that and related issues is underway in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018; there is no need to wait
for the complete fix for SNI name handling in order to close the
race condition and avoid runtime crashes.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10441)
Patrick Steuer [Fri, 1 Nov 2019 23:02:47 +0000 (00:02 +0100)]
Allow specifying the tag after AAD in CCM mode (2)
In addition to 67c81ec3 which introduced this behavior in CCM mode
docs but only implemented it for AES-CCM.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10331)
Patrick Steuer [Fri, 15 Nov 2019 09:52:03 +0000 (10:52 +0100)]
s390x assembly pack: fix bn_mul_comba4
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10454)
Anthony Hu [Fri, 8 Nov 2019 02:47:53 +0000 (21:47 -0500)]
Add missing EVP_PKEY_METHOD accessors for digestsign and digestverify
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10388)
Patrick Steuer [Thu, 14 Nov 2019 09:34:02 +0000 (10:34 +0100)]
travis.yml: add arch s390x target
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10446)
Patrick Steuer [Wed, 13 Nov 2019 17:39:51 +0000 (18:39 +0100)]
testutil/init.c rename to testutil/testutil_init.c
Avoid conflicts with some linkers.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10439)
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10417)
Nicola Tuveri [Mon, 11 Nov 2019 22:52:00 +0000 (00:52 +0200)]
Extend docs for EC_POINT conversion functions
Add more explicit documentation about the relation between
EC_POINT_point2oct(), EC_POINT_point2hex(), EC_POINT_point2bn() and
their reverse.
In particular highlight that EC_POINT_point2oct() and
EC_POINT_oct2point() conform to, respectively, Sec. 2.3.3 and Sec. 2.3.4
of the SECG SEC 1 standard (which is the normative reference for the
already mentioned RFC 5480), highlighting with a note how this affect
the encoding/decoding of the point at infinity (which in contrast with
any other valid generic point of a curve is assigned an exceptional
fixed octet string encoding, i.e., 0x00).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10329)
Nicola Tuveri [Fri, 1 Nov 2019 20:09:40 +0000 (22:09 +0200)]
Add self-test for EC_POINT_hex2point
Adds tests for each curve to ensure that encodings obtained through
EC_POINT_hex2point() can be fed to EC_POINT_point2hex() yielding a point
identical to the one from which the encoding is generated.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10329)
Nicola Tuveri [Fri, 1 Nov 2019 20:38:21 +0000 (22:38 +0200)]
Fix EC_POINT_bn2point() for BN_zero()
EC_POINT_bn2point() rejected BIGNUMs with a zero value.
This behavior indirectly caused failures when converting a point
at infinity through EC_POINT_point2hex() and then back to a point with
EC_POINT_hex2point().
With this change such BIGNUMs are treated like any other and exported to
an octet buffer filled with zero.
It is then EC_POINT_oct2point() (either the default implementation or
the custom one in group->meth->oct2point) to determine if such encoding
maps to a valid point (generally the point at infinity is encoded as
0x00).
Fixes #10258
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10329)
Nicola Tuveri [Thu, 31 Oct 2019 15:17:31 +0000 (17:17 +0200)]
Add more tests for apps/req
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/10224#issuecomment-546593113
highlighted that existing testing infrastructure is not covering common
usage patterns of the `req` app.
This commit explicitly adds request generations thorugh the CLI using
RSA, DSA and ECDSA (P-256) keys.
Ido Ben-Natan [Sat, 9 Nov 2019 13:04:39 +0000 (15:04 +0200)]
Fix misspelled resumption_label for CHARSET_EBCDIC
The resumption_label variable when CHARSET_EBCDIC was enabled, was misspelled.
Instead of evaluating to 'res binder' as expected, it evaluated to 'red binder'.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10396)