BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13553 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Aug 8 23:10:22 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Autobuild-User(v4-9-test): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-9-test): Tue Aug 14 20:49:09 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Volker Lendecke [Wed, 8 Aug 2018 08:08:38 +0000 (10:08 +0200)]
libsmb: Fix CID 1438244 Unsigned compared against 0
ndr_size_dom_sid returns a size_t, so that can't be <0. Also, the only
case that ndr_size_dom_sid returns 0 is a NULL sid
pointer. ndr_size_dom_sid can reasonably be assumed to not overflow, the
number of sub-auths is a uint8. That times 4 plus 8 always fits into a
size_t.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13553 Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
David Disseldorp [Fri, 20 Jul 2018 15:20:08 +0000 (17:20 +0200)]
ctdb: add expiry test for ctdb_mutex_ceph_rados_helper
Kill the ctdb_mutex_ceph_rados_helper with SIGKILL and then confirm
that the lock is automatically released following expiry.
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@gmail.com>
Autobuild-User(master): David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Aug 9 16:26:36 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
David Disseldorp [Thu, 19 Jul 2018 09:55:23 +0000 (11:55 +0200)]
ctdb_mutex_ceph_rados_helper: fix deadlock via lock renewals
RADOS locks without expiry persist indefinitely. This results in CTDB
deadlock during failover if the recovery master dies unexpectedly, as
subsequently elected recovery master nodes can't obtain the recovery
lock.
Avoid deadlock by using a lock expiration time (10s by default), and
renewing it periodically.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Aug 10 21:08:14 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Signed-off-by: Anoop C S <anoopcs@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6a7f11746c9cc3cdc5307e540bdd1f3f10fed05b)
Anoop C S [Thu, 9 Aug 2018 06:58:41 +0000 (12:28 +0530)]
s3/libsmb: Explicitly set delete_on_close token for rmdir
The current implementation of `rmdir` hopes to get the directory deleted
on closing last open handle when FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE is set on it. But
for non-empty directories Windows doesn't error out during an open call.
Following that we internally refuse to set initial delete_on_close while
opening a non-empty directory. This prevents us from trying to delete
the directory when last open handle is closed.
Instead of relying on FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE during an open we explicitly
set delete_on_close token on directory handle once it is available. This
ensures that NT_STATUS_DIRECTORY_NOT_EMPTY is returned for `rmdir` on
non-empty directories while closing open directory handle.
Signed-off-by: Anoop C S <anoopcs@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6b68e3eca631c04d6d57c489daf60f64732fc86d)
Tim Beale [Wed, 1 Aug 2018 01:51:42 +0000 (13:51 +1200)]
CVE-2018-10919 tests: Add extra test for dirsync deleted object corner-case
The acl_read.c code contains a special case to allow dirsync to
work-around having insufficient access rights. We had a concern that
the dirsync module could leak sensitive information for deleted objects.
This patch adds a test-case to prove whether or not this is happening.
The new test case is similar to the existing dirsync test except:
- We make the confidential attribute also preserve-on-delete, so it
hangs around for deleted objcts. Because the attributes now persist
across test case runs, I've used a different attribute to normal.
(Technically, the dirsync search expressions are now specific enough
that the regular attribute could be used, but it would make things
quite fragile if someone tried to add a new test case).
- To handle searching for deleted objects, the search expressions are
now more complicated. Currently dirsync adds an extra-filter to the
'!' searches to exclude deleted objects, i.e. samaccountname matches
the test-objects AND the object is not deleted. We now extend this to
include deleted objects with lastKnownParent equal to the test OU.
The search expression matches either case so that we can use the same
expression throughout the test (regardless of whether the object is
deleted yet or not).
This test proves that the dirsync corner-case does not actually leak
sensitive information on Samba. This is due to a bug in the dirsync
code - when the buggy line is removed, this new test promptly fails.
Test also passes against Windows.
Tim Beale [Fri, 20 Jul 2018 03:42:36 +0000 (15:42 +1200)]
CVE-2018-10919 acl_read: Fix unauthorized attribute access via searches
A user that doesn't have access to view an attribute can still guess the
attribute's value via repeated LDAP searches. This affects confidential
attributes, as well as ACLs applied to an object/attribute to deny
access.
Currently the code will hide objects if the attribute filter contains an
attribute they are not authorized to see. However, the code still
returns objects as results if confidential attribute is in the search
expression itself, but not in the attribute filter.
To fix this problem we have to check the access rights on the attributes
in the search-tree, as well as the attributes returned in the message.
Points of note:
- I've preserved the existing dirsync logic (the dirsync module code
suppresses the result as long as the replPropertyMetaData attribute is
removed). However, there doesn't appear to be any test that highlights
that this functionality is required for dirsync.
- To avoid this fix breaking the acl.py tests, we need to still permit
searches like 'objectClass=*', even though we don't have Read Property
access rights for the objectClass attribute. The logic that Windows
uses does not appear to be clearly documented, so I've made a best
guess that seems to mirror Windows behaviour.
Tim Beale [Fri, 20 Jul 2018 01:01:00 +0000 (13:01 +1200)]
CVE-2018-10919 security: Fix checking of object-specific CONTROL_ACCESS rights
An 'Object Access Allowed' ACE that assigned 'Control Access' (CR)
rights to a specific attribute would not actually grant access.
What was happening was the remaining_access mask for the object_tree
nodes would be Read Property (RP) + Control Access (CR). The ACE mapped
to the schemaIDGUID for a given attribute, which would end up being a
child node in the tree. So the CR bit was cleared for a child node, but
not the rest of the tree. We would then check the user had the RP access
right, which it did. However, the RP right was cleared for another node
in the tree, which still had the CR bit set in its remaining_access
bitmap, so Samba would not grant access.
Generally, the remaining_access only ever has one bit set, which means
this isn't a problem normally. However, in the Control Access case there
are 2 separate bits being checked, i.e. RP + CR.
One option to fix this problem would be to clear the remaining_access
for the tree instead of just the node. However, the Windows spec is
actually pretty clear on this: if the ACE has a CR right present, then
you can stop any further access checks.
Tim Beale [Tue, 24 Jul 2018 22:08:34 +0000 (10:08 +1200)]
CVE-2018-10919 tests: Add test case for object visibility with limited rights
Currently Samba is a bit disclosive with LDB_OP_PRESENT (i.e.
attribute=*) searches compared to Windows.
All the acl.py tests are based on objectClass=* searches, where Windows
will happily tell a user about objects they have List Contents rights,
but not Read Property rights for. However, if you change the attribute
being searched for, suddenly the objects are no longer visible on
Windows (whereas they are on Samba).
This is a problem, because Samba can tell you about which objects have
confidential attributes, which in itself could be disclosive.
This patch adds a acl.py test-case that highlights this behaviour. The
test passes against Windows but fails against Samba.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Tim Beale [Mon, 9 Jul 2018 03:57:59 +0000 (15:57 +1200)]
CVE-2018-10919 tests: Add tests for guessing confidential attributes
Adds tests that assert that a confidential attribute cannot be guessed
by an unprivileged user through wildcard DB searches.
The tests basically consist of a set of DB searches/assertions that
get run for:
- basic searches against a confidential attribute
- confidential attributes that get overridden by giving access to the
user via an ACE (run against a variety of ACEs)
- protecting a non-confidential attribute via an ACL that denies read-
access (run against a variety of ACEs)
- querying confidential attributes via the dirsync controls
These tests all pass when run against a Windows Dc and all fail against
a Samba DC.
Tim Beale [Thu, 19 Jul 2018 04:03:36 +0000 (16:03 +1200)]
CVE-2018-10919 security: Move object-specific access checks into separate function
Object-specific access checks refer to a specific section of the
MS-ADTS, and the code closely matches the spec. We need to extend this
logic to properly handle the Control-Access Right (CR), so it makes
sense to split the logic out into its own function.
This patch just moves the code, and should not alter the logic (apart
from ading in the boolean grant_access return variable.
Andrew Bartlett [Mon, 21 May 2018 03:25:58 +0000 (15:25 +1200)]
CVE-2018-1140 ldb: Add tests for search add and rename with a bad dn= DN
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
Andrew Bartlett [Mon, 21 May 2018 03:23:53 +0000 (15:23 +1200)]
CVE-2018-1140 ldb_tdb: Check for DN validity in add, rename and search
This ensures we fail with a good error code before an eventual ldb_dn_get_casefold() which
would otherwise fail.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
Andrew Bartlett [Mon, 21 May 2018 03:20:26 +0000 (15:20 +1200)]
CVE-2018-1140 ldb_tdb: Ensure the dn in distinguishedName= is valid before use
ldb_dn_from_ldb_val() does not validate this untrusted input, so a later
call to ldb_dn_get_casefold() can fail if the input is not valid.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
Andrew Bartlett [Mon, 21 May 2018 02:50:50 +0000 (14:50 +1200)]
CVE-2018-1140 ldb: Check for ldb_dn_get_casefold() failure in ldb_sqlite
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
Andrej Gessel [Fri, 6 Apr 2018 16:18:33 +0000 (18:18 +0200)]
CVE-2018-1140 Add NULL check for ldb_dn_get_casefold() in ltdb_index_dn_attr()
Signed-off-by: Andrej Gessel <Andrej.Gessel@janztec.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Noel Power [Tue, 7 Aug 2018 10:06:34 +0000 (11:06 +0100)]
s3/smbd: Ensure quota code is only called when quota support detected
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13563 Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Autobuild-User(v4-9-test): Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-9-test): Mon Aug 13 15:53:27 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
this fixes a lexgrog parse error, the NAME subheader description
of the vfs_linux_xfs_sgid(8) manual was too long, this will shorten
the description and allow it to be correctly detected by mandb.
The eventlogadm binary needs write access to the registry which, by
default, is only possible as root.
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13561
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0530cccc41f683cb35d065ddcb3968cf4ef759f4)
systemd: Only start smb when network interfaces are up
For smb, if the smb.conf contains explicit bindings to the network
interfaces, the service must wait till network interfaces are up,
otherwise the service won't be operational.
The 0e571054a61e commit and the BZ 13184 have fixed this for nmb and
samba, so do exactly the same here, for smb.
Noel Power [Thu, 28 Jun 2018 15:04:24 +0000 (16:04 +0100)]
s3/utils: fix regression where specifying -Unetbios/root works
Usually you need to be root on a linux server to modify quotas. Even
with a linux server joined to a windows AD you could always log in as
local root with smbcquotas. However in recent builds this has changed.
This patch fixes this
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Noel Power <npower@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jul 31 19:45:59 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Noel Power [Tue, 28 Feb 2017 11:36:47 +0000 (11:36 +0000)]
s3/smbd: Don't stat when doing a quota operation (as it's a fake file)
calling SMB_VFS_STAT on the quota fake file fails and caused
FS_INFO/FileFsControlInfo request to error out early, in turn stopped a
Win8.1 client from proceeding with quota queries.
Calling parse_user_quota_list with a NULL buffer can cause a panic, while
this shouldn't happen, I managed to trigger this with an early implementation
of SMB2 quota support in smbd which didn't pass back NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES
when handling a SMB2_0_INFO_QUOTA GETINFO message.
OTHOH the Windows client handled the same situation gracefully.
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jul 14 03:09:00 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net> Reviewed-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@gmail.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Martin Schwenke <martins@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jul 28 07:26:24 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
Martin Schwenke [Thu, 26 Jul 2018 01:01:30 +0000 (11:01 +1000)]
ctdb-protocol: Fix compilation issue with strncpy()
When configured with --picky-developer and using -O3 with gcc 8.1:
../protocol/protocol_util.c: In function ‘ctdb_sock_addr_from_string’:
../protocol/protocol_util.c:282:2: error: ‘strncpy’ specified bound depends on the length of the source argument [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
strncpy(s, str, len+1);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../protocol/protocol_util.c:277:8: note: length computed here
len = strlen(str);
^~~~~~~~~~~
Martin Schwenke [Thu, 26 Jul 2018 01:00:28 +0000 (11:00 +1000)]
ctdb-common: Fix compilation issue with strncpy()
When configured with --picky-developer and using -O3 with gcc 8.1:
../common/system_socket.c: In function ‘parse_ip_mask’:
../common/system_socket.c:229:2: error: ‘strncpy’ specified bound depends on the length of the source argument [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
strncpy(s, str, len+1);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../common/system_socket.c:223:8: note: length computed here
len = strlen(str);
^~~~~~~~~~~
projects / thirdparty / samba.git / log
