Todd Short [Wed, 2 Sep 2020 20:57:46 +0000 (16:57 -0400)]
Fix -static builds
Pull in check from #10878
Move disabling of pic, threads and statics up higher before they
are checked.
Fixes #12772
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12773)
anupamam13 [Mon, 2 Nov 2020 12:20:11 +0000 (17:50 +0530)]
Fix for negative return value from `SSL_CTX_sess_accept()`
Fixes #13183
From the original issue report, before this commit, on master and on
1.1.1, the issue can be detected with the following steps:
- Start with a default SSL_CTX, initiate a TLS 1.3 connection with SNI,
"Accept" count of default context gets incremented
- After servername lookup, "Accept" count of default context gets
decremented and that of SNI context is incremented
- Server sends a "Hello Retry Request"
- Client sends the second "Client Hello", now again "Accept" count of
default context is decremented. Hence giving a negative value.
This commit fixes it by adding a check on `s->hello_retry_request` in
addition to `SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)`, to ensure the counter is moved
only on the first ClientHello.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13297)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 10 Dec 2020 10:36:23 +0000 (10:36 +0000)]
Ensure DTLS free functions can handle NULL
Our free functions should be able to deal with the case where the object
being freed is NULL. This turns out to not be quite the case for DTLS
related objects.
Fixes #13649
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13655)
This fix is identical to one of the changes made in 3405db9, which I
discovered right after taking a quick stab at fixing this.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #7878
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13757)
Ingo Schwarze [Thu, 4 Jun 2020 22:30:00 +0000 (00:30 +0200)]
Fix NULL pointer access caused by X509_ATTRIBUTE_create()
When X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() receives an invalid NID (e.g., -1), return
failure rather than silently constructing a broken X509_ATTRIBUTE object
that might cause NULL pointer accesses later on. This matters because
X509_ATTRIBUTE_create() is used by API functions like PKCS7_add_attribute(3)
and the NID comes straight from the user.
This bug was found while working on LibreSSL documentation.
Reviewed-by: Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12052)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 17 Dec 2020 20:55:07 +0000 (21:55 +0100)]
GitHub CI: Add 'check-update' and 'check-docs'
'check-update' runs a 'make update' to check that it wasn't forgotten.
'check-docs' runs 'make doc-nits'. We have that as a separate job to
make it more prominent.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13701)
Rich Salz [Wed, 16 Dec 2020 15:32:20 +0000 (10:32 -0500)]
Document OCSP_REQ_CTX_i2d.
This is a backport of the documentation from #13620.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13691)
Define B_ENDIAN on PowerPC because it is a big endian architecture. With
this change the BN* related tests pass.
Fixes: #12199 Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12371)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 Nov 2020 15:51:23 +0000 (15:51 +0000)]
Test that we can negotiate TLSv1.3 if we have an SNI callback
If an SNI callback has been set then we may have no certificuates suitable
for TLSv1.3 use configured for the current SSL_CTX. This should not prevent
us from negotiating TLSv1.3, since we may change the SSL_CTX by the time we
need a suitable certificate.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13305)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 3 Nov 2020 14:01:46 +0000 (14:01 +0000)]
Modify is_tls13_capable() to take account of the servername cb
A servername cb may change the available certificates, so if we have one
set then we cannot rely on the configured certificates to determine if we
are capable of negotiating TLSv1.3 or not.
Fixes #13291
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13305)
Nan Xiao [Tue, 8 Dec 2020 04:35:31 +0000 (12:35 +0800)]
Fix typo in OPENSSL_malloc.pod
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13632)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:55:31 +0000 (14:55 +0000)]
Complain if we are attempting to encode with an invalid ASN.1 template
It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to have implicit
tagging. If we have a template that uses the in this way then we
should immediately fail.
Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
Matt Caswell [Thu, 12 Nov 2020 11:58:12 +0000 (11:58 +0000)]
Check that multi-strings/CHOICE types don't use implicit tagging
It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to use implicit
tagging since the content would be ambiguous. It is an error in the
template if this ever happens. If we detect it we should stop parsing.
Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
x509_vfy.c: Restore rejection of expired trusted (root) certificate
The certificate path validation procedure specified in RFC 5280 does not
include checking the validity period of the trusted (root) certificate.
Still it is common good practice to perform this check.
Also OpenSSL did this until version 1.1.1h, yet
commit e2590c3a162eb118c36b09c2168164283aa099b4 accidentally killed it.
The current commit restores the previous behavior.
It also removes the cause of that bug, namely counter-intuitive design
of the internal function check_issued(), which was complicated by checks
that actually belong to some other internal function, namely find_issuer().
Moreover, this commit adds a regression check and proper documentation of
the root cert validity period check feature, which had been missing so far.
Fixes #13471
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13585)
Stuart Carnie [Sat, 4 Jul 2020 18:41:43 +0000 (11:41 -0700)]
Configuration: darwin64-arm64-cc for Apple silicon
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12369)
Ard Biesheuvel [Tue, 24 Nov 2020 16:33:31 +0000 (17:33 +0100)]
aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: avoid 32-bit lane assignment in CTR mode
ARM Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72 cores running in 32-bit mode are affected
by silicon errata #1742098 [0] and #1655431 [1], respectively, where the
second instruction of a AES instruction pair may execute twice if an
interrupt is taken right after the first instruction consumes an input
register of which a single 32-bit lane has been updated the last time it
was modified.
This is not such a rare occurrence as it may seem: in counter mode, only
the least significant 32-bit word is incremented in the absence of a
carry, which makes our counter mode implementation susceptible to these
errata.
So let's shuffle the counter assignments around a bit so that the most
recent updates when the AES instruction pair executes are 128-bit wide.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13571)
ihsinme [Wed, 25 Nov 2020 19:09:33 +0000 (22:09 +0300)]
Update bio_ok.c
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13515)
Return immediately on matched cipher. Without this patch the code only breaks out of the inner for loop, meaning for a matched TLS13 cipher the code will still loop through 160ish SSL3 ciphers.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit d93bded6aa2852e681de2ed76fb43c415687af68)
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13280)
PAC pointer authentication signs the return address against the value
of the stack pointer, to prevent stack overrun exploits from corrupting
the control flow. However, this requires that the AUTIASP is issued with
SP holding the same value as it held when the PAC value was generated.
The Poly1305 armv8 code got this wrong, resulting in crashes on PAC
capable hardware.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13256)
André Klitzing [Wed, 18 Mar 2020 15:04:06 +0000 (16:04 +0100)]
Allow to continue on UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
This unifies the behaviour of a single certificate with
an unknown CA certificate with a self-signed certificate.
The user callback can mask that error to retrieve additional
error information. So the user application can decide to
abort the connection instead to be forced by openssl.
This change in behaviour is backward compatible as user callbacks
who don't want to ignore UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE will
still abort the connection by default.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #11297
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11359)
Romain Geissler [Fri, 2 Oct 2020 00:07:32 +0000 (00:07 +0000)]
Fix aarch64 static linking into shared libraries (see issue #10842 and pull request #11464)
Cherry-pick of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13056 for branch 1.1.1. Tested against
the release 1.1.1h
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13218)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13193)
xuyunjia [Sun, 18 Oct 2020 15:33:54 +0000 (23:33 +0800)]
resolve defects: reverse_inull; row[DB_exp_date] referenced before checking
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13170)
Matt Caswell [Thu, 15 Oct 2020 10:40:18 +0000 (11:40 +0100)]
Add a CHANGES entry for the SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH change
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13136)
In most places this is what is passed. All these places occur server side.
However there is one client side call of this security operation and it
passes a DH object instead. This is incorrect according to the
definition of SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, and is inconsistent with all of the other
locations.
Our own default security callback, and the debug callback in the apps,
never look at this value and therefore this issue was never noticed
previously. In theory a client side application could be relying on this
behaviour and could be broken by this change. This is probably fairly
unlikely but can't be ruled out.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13136)
Yury Is [Mon, 12 Oct 2020 23:28:26 +0000 (02:28 +0300)]
syscall_random(): don't fail if the getentropy() function is a dummy
Several embedded toolchains may provide dummy implemented getentropy()
function which always returns -1 and sets errno to the ENOSYS.
As a result the function SSL_CTX_new() fails to create a new context.
Fixes #13002
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13112)
Benny Baumann [Thu, 1 Oct 2020 23:06:12 +0000 (01:06 +0200)]
Avoid memory leak of parent on allocation failure for child structure
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13055)
Benny Baumann [Thu, 1 Oct 2020 23:04:06 +0000 (01:04 +0200)]
Use size of target buffer for allocation
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13055)
drgler [Thu, 1 Oct 2020 19:20:33 +0000 (21:20 +0200)]
Ensure that _GNU_SOURCE is defined for NI_MAXHOST and NI_MAXSERV
Since glibc 2.8, these defines like `NI_MAXHOST` are exposed only
if suitable feature test macros are defined, namely: _GNU_SOURCE,
_DEFAULT_SOURCE (since glibc 2.19), or _BSD_SOURCE or _SVID_SOURCE
(before glibc 2.19), see GETNAMEINFO(3).
CLA: trivial
Fixes #13049
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13054)
olszomal [Fri, 19 Jun 2020 13:00:32 +0000 (15:00 +0200)]
Add const to 'ppin' function parameter
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #12205
(cherry picked from commit 434343f896a2bb3e5857cc9831c38f8cd1cceec1)
Norman Ashley [Fri, 10 Jul 2020 23:01:32 +0000 (19:01 -0400)]
Support keys with RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK with OCSP sign
OCSP_basic_sign_ctx() in ocsp_srv.c , does not check for RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK.
If a key has RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK set, OCSP sign operations can fail
because the X509_check_private_key() can fail.
The check for the RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK was moved to crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
as a common place to check. Checks in ssl_rsa.c were removed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12419)
Tomas Mraz [Fri, 11 Sep 2020 07:09:29 +0000 (09:09 +0200)]
Disallow certs with explicit curve in verification chain
The check is applied only with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT.
Fixes #12139
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12909)
Tomas Mraz [Fri, 21 Aug 2020 12:50:52 +0000 (14:50 +0200)]
EC_KEY: add EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params()
The function returns 1 when the encoding of a decoded EC key used
explicit encoding of the curve parameters.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12909)
Henry N [Thu, 10 Sep 2020 21:55:28 +0000 (23:55 +0200)]
Fix: ecp_nistz256-armv4.S bad arguments
Fix this error:
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3853: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r10'
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3854: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orr r11,r12'
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256-armv4.S:3855: Error: bad arguments to instruction -- `orrs r11,r14'
CLA: trivial
Fixes #12848
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
GH: #12854
(cherry picked from commit b5f82567afa820bac55b7dd7eb9dd510c32c3ef6)
The original names were more intuitive: the generate_counter counts the
number of generate requests, and the reseed_counter counts the number
of reseedings (of the principal DRBG).
In a nutshell, reseed propagation is a compatibility feature with the sole
purpose to support the traditional way of (re-)seeding manually by calling
'RAND_add()' before 'RAND_bytes(). It ensures that the former has an immediate
effect on the latter *within the same thread*, but it does not care about
immediate reseed propagation to other threads. The implementation is lock-free,
i.e., it works without taking the lock of the primary DRBG.
Pull request #7399 not only fixed the data race issue #7394 but also changed
the original implementation of the seed propagation unnecessarily.
This commit reverts most of the changes of commit 1f98527659b8 and intends to
fix the data race while retaining the original simplicity of the seed propagation.
- use atomics with relaxed semantics to load and store the seed counter
- add a new member drbg->enable_reseed_propagation to simplify the
overflow treatment of the seed propagation counter
- don't handle races between different threads
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12533)
Richard Levitte [Thu, 27 Aug 2020 05:18:55 +0000 (07:18 +0200)]
Fix PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional() to not output PKCS#8
PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional() uses i2d_PrivateKey() to do the
actual encoding to DER. However, i2d_PrivateKey() is a generic
function that will do what it can to produce output according to what
the associated EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD offers. If that method offers a
function 'old_priv_encode', which is expected to produce the
"traditional" encoded form, then i2d_PrivateKey() uses that. If not,
i2d_PrivateKey() will go on and used more modern methods, which are
all expected to produce PKCS#8.
To ensure that PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional() never produces
more modern encoded forms, an extra check that 'old_priv_encode' is
non-NULL is added. If it is NULL, an error is returned.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12729)
This prevented us from properly detecting AVX support, etc.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12725)
Gustaf Neumann [Sat, 4 Jul 2020 19:58:30 +0000 (21:58 +0200)]
Fix typos and repeated words
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12370)
The condition in test_error_checks() was inverted, so the test succeeded
as long as error_check() failed. Incidently, error_check() contained
several bugs that assured it always failed, thus giving overall drbg
test success.
Remove the broken explicit zero check.
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate() cleanses the data via drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(),
but right after that it resets drbg->data.ctr using RAND_DRBG_set(),
so TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(drbg->data)) always failed.
(backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11195)
Signed-off-by: Vitezslav Cizek <vcizek@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12517)
Viktor Dukhovni [Fri, 17 Jul 2020 01:30:43 +0000 (23:30 -0200)]
Avoid errors with a priori inapplicable protocol bounds
The 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' configuration commands now silently
ignore TLS protocol version bounds when configurign DTLS-based contexts,
and conversely, silently ignore DTLS protocol version bounds when
configuring TLS-based contexts. The commands can be repeated to set
bounds of both types. The same applies with the corresponding
"min_protocol" and "max_protocol" command-line switches, in case some
application uses both TLS and DTLS.
SSL_CTX instances that are created for a fixed protocol version (e.g.
TLSv1_server_method()) also silently ignore version bounds. Previously
attempts to apply bounds to these protocol versions would result in an
error. Now only the "version-flexible" SSL_CTX instances are subject to
limits in configuration files in command-line options.
Expected to resolve #12394
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #12507
man3: Drop warning about using security levels higher than 1.
Today, majority of web-browsers reject communication as allowed by the
security level 1. Instead key sizes and algorithms from security level
2 are required. Thus remove the now obsolete warning against using
security levels higher than 1. For example Ubuntu, compiles OpenSSL
with security level set to 2, and further restricts algorithm versions
available at that security level.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12444)
x509_vfy.c: Improve key usage checks in internal_verify() of cert chains
If a presumably self-signed cert is last in chain we verify its signature
only if X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE is set. Upon this request we do the
signature verification, but not in case it is a (non-conforming) self-issued
CA certificate with a key usage extension that does not include keyCertSign.
Make clear when we must verify the signature of a certificate
and when we must adhere to key usage restrictions of the 'issuing' cert.
Add some comments for making internal_verify() easier to understand.
Update the documentation of X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12357)
Fix issue 1418 by moving check of KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN and weakening check_issued()
Move check that cert signing is allowed from x509v3_cache_extensions() to
where it belongs: internal_verify(), generalize it for proxy cert signing.
Correct and simplify check_issued(), now checking self-issued (not: self-signed).
Add test case to 25-test_verify.t that demonstrates successful fix.
As prerequisites, this adds the static function check_sig_alg_match()
and the internal functions x509_likely_issued() and x509_signing_allowed().
This is a backport of the core of PR #10587.
Fixes #1418
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12357)
Disable optimiization of BN_num_bits_word() for VS2005 ARM compiler due to
its miscompilation of the function.
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-users/2018-August/008465.html
Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11526)
Backport of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12096 to 1.1.1 broke
the build as the following functions are missing:
const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_field(const EC_GROUP *group);
int EC_GROUP_get_field_type(const EC_GROUP *group);
Turns out that for the purposes of the test code, we don't really need
to differentiate between prime and binary fields, and we can directly
use the existing `EC_GROUP_get_degree()` in the same fashion as was
being done for binary fields also for prime fields.
Glenn Strauss [Fri, 5 Jun 2020 21:14:08 +0000 (17:14 -0400)]
improve SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb ref impl
improve reference implementation code in
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb man page
change EVP_aes_128_cbc() to EVP_aes_256_cbc(), with the implication
of requiring longer keys. Updating this code brings the reference
implementation in line with implementation in openssl committed in 2016:
commit 05df5c20
Use AES256 for the default encryption algorithm for TLS session tickets
add comments where user-implementation is needed to complete code
(backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12063)
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12391)
Nicola Tuveri [Sun, 28 Jun 2020 17:23:29 +0000 (20:23 +0300)]
[test][15-test_genec] Improve EC tests with genpkey
Test separately EC parameters and EC key generation.
Some curves only support explicit params encoding.
For some curves we have had cases in which generating the parameters
under certain conditions failed, while generating and serializing a key
under the same conditions did not.
See <https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/12306> for more details.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12308)
Nicola Tuveri [Fri, 26 Jun 2020 22:42:49 +0000 (01:42 +0300)]
[apps/genpkey] exit status should not be 0 on output errors
If the key is to be serialized or printed as text and the framework
returns an error, the app should signal the failure to the user using
a non-zero exit status.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12305)
Nicola Tuveri [Sun, 28 Jun 2020 21:53:46 +0000 (00:53 +0300)]
[EC][ASN1] Detect missing OID when serializing EC parameters and keys
The following built-in curves do not have an assigned OID:
- Oakley-EC2N-3
- Oakley-EC2N-4
In general we shouldn't assume that an OID is always available.
This commit detects such cases, raises an error and returns appropriate
return values so that the condition can be detected and correctly
handled by the callers, when serializing EC parameters or EC keys with
the default `ec_param_enc:named_curve`.
Fixes #12306
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12312)
Richard Levitte [Wed, 1 Jul 2020 08:06:59 +0000 (10:06 +0200)]
Configure: Check source and build dir equality a little more thoroughly
'absolutedir' does a thorough job ensuring that we have a "real" path
to both source and build directory, unencumbered by symbolic links.
However, that isn't enough on case insensitive file systems on Unix
flavored platforms, where it's possible to stand in, for example,
/PATH/TO/Work/openssl, and then do this:
perl ../../work/openssl/Configure
... and thereby having it look like the source directory and the build
directory aren't the same.
We solve this by having a closer look at the computed source and build
directories, and making sure they are exactly the same strings if they
are in fact the same directory.
This is especially important when making symbolic links based on this
directories, but may have other ramifications as well.
Fixes #12323
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12337)
Miłosz Kaniewski [Tue, 30 Jun 2020 19:46:38 +0000 (21:46 +0200)]
Free pre_proc_exts in SSL_free()
Usually it will be freed in tls_early_post_process_client_hello().
However if a ClientHello callback will be used and will return
SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY then tls_early_post_process_client_hello()
may never come to the point where pre_proc_exts is freed.
Fixes #12194
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12330)
Matt Caswell [Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:40:40 +0000 (17:40 +0100)]
Don't attempt to duplicate the BIO state in SSL_dup
SSL_dup attempted to duplicate the BIO state if the source SSL had BIOs
configured for it. This did not work.
Firstly the SSL_dup code was passing a BIO ** as the destination
argument for BIO_dup_state. However BIO_dup_state expects a BIO * for that
parameter. Any attempt to use this will either (1) fail silently, (2) crash
or fail in some other strange way.
Secondly many BIOs do not implement the BIO_CTRL_DUP ctrl required to make
this work.
Thirdly, if rbio == wbio in the original SSL object, then an attempt is made
to up-ref the BIO in the new SSL object - even though it hasn't been set
yet and is NULL. This results in a crash.
This appears to have been broken for a very long time with at least some of
the problems described above coming from SSLeay. The simplest approach is
to just remove this capability from the function.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12245)
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