From d697b0f383a23a94d7415b0e02b025eda46ad534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Blake Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 10:30:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] storage: avoid short reads while chasing backing chain Our backing file chain code was not very robust to an ill-timed EINTR, which could lead to a short read causing us to randomly treat metadata differently than usual. But the existing virFileReadLimFD forces an error if we don't read the entire file, even though we only care about the header of the file. So add a new virFile function that does what we want. * src/util/virfile.h (virFileReadHeaderFD): New prototype. * src/util/virfile.c (virFileReadHeaderFD): New function. * src/libvirt_private.syms (virfile.h): Export it. * src/util/virstoragefile.c (virStorageFileGetMetadataInternal) (virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD): Use it. Signed-off-by: Eric Blake (cherry picked from commit 5327fad4f292e4f3f84884ffe158c492bf00519c) Conflicts: src/util/virstoragefile.c: buffer signedness --- src/libvirt_private.syms | 1 + src/util/virfile.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/util/virfile.h | 9 ++++++--- src/util/virstoragefile.c | 10 ++-------- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms index d25397ce82..e5fca898fb 100644 --- a/src/libvirt_private.syms +++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms @@ -1388,6 +1388,7 @@ virFileOpenAs; virFileOpenTty; virFilePrintf; virFileReadAll; +virFileReadHeaderFD; virFileReadLimFD; virFileResolveAllLinks; virFileResolveLink; diff --git a/src/util/virfile.c b/src/util/virfile.c index 33a8a6d3f5..6ed8db0c67 100644 --- a/src/util/virfile.c +++ b/src/util/virfile.c @@ -1153,6 +1153,27 @@ saferead_lim(int fd, size_t max_len, size_t *length) return NULL; } + +/* A wrapper around saferead_lim that merely stops reading at the + * specified maximum size. */ +int +virFileReadHeaderFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf) +{ + size_t len; + char *s; + + if (maxlen <= 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + s = saferead_lim(fd, maxlen, &len); + if (s == NULL) + return -1; + *buf = s; + return len; +} + + /* A wrapper around saferead_lim that maps a failure due to exceeding the maximum size limitation to EOVERFLOW. */ int diff --git a/src/util/virfile.h b/src/util/virfile.h index 72d35ce4eb..e2e708acca 100644 --- a/src/util/virfile.h +++ b/src/util/virfile.h @@ -122,9 +122,12 @@ int virFileNBDDeviceAssociate(const char *file, int virFileDeleteTree(const char *dir); -int virFileReadLimFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf) ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK; - -int virFileReadAll(const char *path, int maxlen, char **buf) ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK; +int virFileReadHeaderFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf) + ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3); +int virFileReadLimFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf) + ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3); +int virFileReadAll(const char *path, int maxlen, char **buf) + ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(1) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3); int virFileWriteStr(const char *path, const char *str, mode_t mode) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(1) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(2) ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK; diff --git a/src/util/virstoragefile.c b/src/util/virstoragefile.c index 945359931d..fc8aa90b25 100644 --- a/src/util/virstoragefile.c +++ b/src/util/virstoragefile.c @@ -788,10 +788,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataInternal(const char *path, goto cleanup; } - if (VIR_ALLOC_N(buf, len) < 0) - goto cleanup; - - if ((len = read(fd, buf, len)) < 0) { + if ((len = virFileReadHeaderFD(fd, len, (char **)&buf)) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path); goto cleanup; } @@ -934,15 +931,12 @@ virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path, int fd) return VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR; } - if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) - return -1; - if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path); goto cleanup; } - if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) { + if ((len = virFileReadHeaderFD(fd, len, (char **)&head)) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path); goto cleanup; } -- 2.47.3