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1 /* This file is part of the IPCop Firewall.
2 *
3 * IPCop is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
4 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
5 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
6 * (at your option) any later version.
7 *
8 * IPCop is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
9 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
10 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
11 * GNU General Public License for more details.
12 *
13 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
14 * along with IPCop; if not, write to the Free Software
15 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
16 *
17 * Copyright (C) 2003-04-22 Robert Kerr <rkerr@go.to>
18 *
19 * $Id: setuid.c,v 1.2.2.1 2005/11/18 14:51:43 franck78 Exp $
20 *
21 */
22
23 #include <ctype.h>
24 #include <stdio.h>
25 #include <string.h>
26 #include <errno.h>
27 #include <unistd.h>
28 #include <stdlib.h>
29 #include <sys/types.h>
30 #include <limits.h>
31 #include <sys/time.h>
32 #include <sys/resource.h>
33 #include <sys/stat.h>
34 #include <fcntl.h>
35 #include <grp.h>
36 #include <signal.h>
37 #include <sys/wait.h>
38 #include <glob.h>
39 #include "setuid.h"
40
41 #ifndef OPEN_MAX
42 #define OPEN_MAX 256
43 #endif
44
45 #define MAX_ARGUMENTS 128
46
47 /* Trusted environment for executing commands */
48 char * trusted_env[4] = {
49 "PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/bin",
50 "SHELL=/bin/sh",
51 "TERM=dumb",
52 NULL
53 };
54
55 static int system_core(char* command, char** args, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error) {
56 int pid, status;
57
58 char* argv[MAX_ARGUMENTS + 1];
59 unsigned int argc = 0;
60
61 if(!command)
62 return 1;
63
64 #if 0
65 // Add command as first element to argv
66 argv[argc++] = command;
67 #endif
68
69 // Add all other arguments
70 if (args) {
71 while (*args) {
72 argv[argc++] = *args++;
73
74 // Break when argv is full
75 if (argc >= MAX_ARGUMENTS) {
76 return 2;
77 }
78 }
79 }
80
81 // Make sure that argv is NULL-terminated
82 argv[argc] = NULL;
83
84 switch(pid = fork()) {
85 case -1:
86 return -1;
87
88 case 0: /* child */ {
89 if (gid && setgid(gid)) {
90 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
91 perror("Couldn't setgid");
92 exit(127);
93 }
94
95 if (uid && setuid(uid)) {
96 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
97 perror("Couldn't setuid");
98 exit(127);
99 }
100
101 execve(command, argv, trusted_env);
102
103 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
104 perror("execve failed");
105 exit(127);
106 }
107
108 default: /* parent */
109 do {
110 if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
111 if (errno != EINTR)
112 return -1;
113 } else {
114 return status;
115 }
116 } while (1);
117 }
118
119 }
120
121 int run(char* command, char** argv) {
122 return system_core(command, argv, 0, 0, "run");
123 }
124
125 /* Spawns a child process that uses /bin/sh to interpret a command.
126 * This is much the same in use and purpose as system(), yet as it uses execve
127 * to pass a trusted environment it's immune to attacks based upon changing
128 * IFS, ENV, BASH_ENV and other such variables.
129 * Note this does NOT guard against any other attacks, inparticular you MUST
130 * validate the command you are passing. If the command is formed from user
131 * input be sure to check this input is what you expect. Nasty things can
132 * happen if a user can inject ; or `` into your command for example */
133 int safe_system(char* command) {
134 char* argv[4] = {
135 "/bin/sh",
136 "-c",
137 command,
138 NULL,
139 };
140
141 return system_core(argv[0], argv, 0, 0, "safe_system");
142 }
143
144 /* Much like safe_system but lets you specify a non-root uid and gid to run
145 * the command as */
146 int unpriv_system(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
147 return system_core(command, NULL, uid, gid, "unpriv_system");
148 }
149
150 /* General routine to initialise a setuid root program, and put the
151 * environment in a known state. Returns 1 on success, if initsetuid() returns
152 * 0 then you should exit(1) immediately, DON'T attempt to recover from the
153 * error */
154 int initsetuid(void) {
155 int fds, i;
156 struct stat st;
157 struct rlimit rlim;
158
159 /* Prevent signal tricks by ignoring all except SIGKILL and SIGCHILD */
160 for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) {
161 if (i != SIGKILL && i != SIGCHLD)
162 signal(i, SIG_IGN);
163 }
164
165 /* dump all non-standard file descriptors (a full descriptor table could
166 * lead to DoS by preventing us opening files) */
167 if ((fds = getdtablesize()) == -1)
168 fds = OPEN_MAX;
169 for (i = 3; i < fds; i++)
170 close(i);
171
172 /* check stdin, stdout & stderr are open before going any further */
173 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
174 if( fstat(i, &st) == -1 && ((errno != EBADF) || (close(i), open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != i))
175 return 0;
176
177 /* disable core dumps in case we're processing sensitive information */
178 rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
179 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim)) {
180 perror("Couldn't disable core dumps");
181 return 0;
182 }
183
184 /* drop any supplementary groups, set uid & gid to root */
185 if (setgroups(0, NULL)) {
186 perror("Couldn't clear group list");
187 return 0;
188 }
189
190 if (setgid(0)) {
191 perror("Couldn't setgid(0)");
192 return 0;
193 }
194
195 if (setuid(0)) {
196 perror("Couldn't setuid(0)");
197 return 0;
198 }
199
200 return 1;
201 }