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1 /* This file is part of the IPCop Firewall.
2 *
3 * IPCop is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
4 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
5 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
6 * (at your option) any later version.
7 *
8 * IPCop is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
9 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
10 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
11 * GNU General Public License for more details.
12 *
13 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
14 * along with IPCop; if not, write to the Free Software
15 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
16 *
17 * Copyright (C) 2003-04-22 Robert Kerr <rkerr@go.to>
18 *
19 * $Id: setuid.c,v 1.2.2.1 2005/11/18 14:51:43 franck78 Exp $
20 *
21 */
22
23 #include <stdio.h>
24 #include <string.h>
25 #include <errno.h>
26 #include <unistd.h>
27 #include <stdlib.h>
28 #include <sys/types.h>
29 #include <limits.h>
30 #include <sys/time.h>
31 #include <sys/resource.h>
32 #include <sys/stat.h>
33 #include <fcntl.h>
34 #include <grp.h>
35 #include <signal.h>
36 #include <sys/wait.h>
37 #include <glob.h>
38 #include "setuid.h"
39
40 #ifndef OPEN_MAX
41 #define OPEN_MAX 256
42 #endif
43
44 /* Trusted environment for executing commands */
45 char * trusted_env[4] = {
46 "PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/bin",
47 "SHELL=/bin/sh",
48 "TERM=dumb",
49 NULL
50 };
51
52 /* Spawns a child process that uses /bin/sh to interpret a command.
53 * This is much the same in use and purpose as system(), yet as it uses execve
54 * to pass a trusted environment it's immune to attacks based upon changing
55 * IFS, ENV, BASH_ENV and other such variables.
56 * Note this does NOT guard against any other attacks, inparticular you MUST
57 * validate the command you are passing. If the command is formed from user
58 * input be sure to check this input is what you expect. Nasty things can
59 * happen if a user can inject ; or `` into your command for example */
60 int safe_system(char* command) {
61 return system_core(command, 0, 0, "safe_system");
62 }
63
64 /* Much like safe_system but lets you specify a non-root uid and gid to run
65 * the command as */
66 int unpriv_system(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
67 return system_core(command, uid, gid, "unpriv_system");
68 }
69
70 int system_core(char* command, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char *error) {
71 int pid, status;
72
73 if(!command)
74 return 1;
75
76 switch(pid = fork()) {
77 case -1:
78 return -1;
79
80 case 0: /* child */ {
81 char *argv[4];
82
83 if (gid && setgid(gid)) {
84 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
85 perror("Couldn't setgid");
86 exit(127);
87 }
88
89 if (uid && setuid(uid)) {
90 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
91 perror("Couldn't setuid");
92 exit(127);
93 }
94
95 argv[0] = "sh";
96 argv[1] = "-c";
97 argv[2] = command;
98 argv[3] = NULL;
99 execve("/bin/sh", argv, trusted_env);
100 fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", error);
101 perror("execve failed");
102 exit(127);
103 }
104
105 default: /* parent */
106 do {
107 if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
108 if (errno != EINTR)
109 return -1;
110 } else {
111 return status;
112 }
113 } while (1);
114 }
115
116 }
117
118 /* General routine to initialise a setuid root program, and put the
119 * environment in a known state. Returns 1 on success, if initsetuid() returns
120 * 0 then you should exit(1) immediately, DON'T attempt to recover from the
121 * error */
122 int initsetuid(void) {
123 int fds, i;
124 struct stat st;
125 struct rlimit rlim;
126
127 /* Prevent signal tricks by ignoring all except SIGKILL and SIGCHILD */
128 for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) {
129 if (i != SIGKILL && i != SIGCHLD)
130 signal(i, SIG_IGN);
131 }
132
133 /* dump all non-standard file descriptors (a full descriptor table could
134 * lead to DoS by preventing us opening files) */
135 if ((fds = getdtablesize()) == -1)
136 fds = OPEN_MAX;
137 for (i = 3; i < fds; i++)
138 close(i);
139
140 /* check stdin, stdout & stderr are open before going any further */
141 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
142 if( fstat(i, &st) == -1 && ((errno != EBADF) || (close(i), open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != i))
143 return 0;
144
145 /* disable core dumps in case we're processing sensitive information */
146 rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
147 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim)) {
148 perror("Couldn't disable core dumps");
149 return 0;
150 }
151
152 /* drop any supplementary groups, set uid & gid to root */
153 if (setgroups(0, NULL)) {
154 perror("Couldn't clear group list");
155 return 0;
156 }
157
158 if (setgid(0)) {
159 perror("Couldn't setgid(0)");
160 return 0;
161 }
162
163 if (setuid(0)) {
164 perror("Couldn't setuid(0)");
165 return 0;
166 }
167
168 return 1;
169 }