From: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 17:27:00 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: openssl: update to 1.1.1i
X-Git-Tag: v2.25-core155~381
X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?p=ipfire-2.x.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=591738dc5c867cac63a6301a6c1292c471fb617a

openssl: update to 1.1.1i

fix: EDIPARTYNAME NULL pointer de-reference (CVE-2020-1971)

Severity: High

The X.509 GeneralName type is a generic type for representing different types
of names. One of those name types is known as EDIPartyName. OpenSSL provides a
function GENERAL_NAME_cmp which compares different instances of a GENERAL_NAME
to see if they are equal or not. This function behaves incorrectly when both
GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME. A NULL pointer dereference and a crash
may occur leading to a possible denial of service attack.

OpenSSL itself uses the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes:
1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a CRL
   distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate
2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the timestamp
   authority name (exposed via the API functions TS_RESP_verify_response and
   TS_RESP_verify_token)

If an attacker can control both items being compared then that attacker could
trigger a crash. For example if the attacker can trick a client or server into
checking a malicious certificate against a malicious CRL then this may occur.
Note that some applications automatically download CRLs based on a URL embedded
in a certificate. This checking happens prior to the signatures on the
certificate and CRL being verified. OpenSSL's s_server, s_client and verify
tools have support for the "-crl_download" option which implements automatic
CRL downloading and this attack has been demonstrated to work against those
tools.

Note that an unrelated bug means that affected versions of OpenSSL cannot parse
or construct correct encodings of EDIPARTYNAME. However it is possible to
construct a malformed EDIPARTYNAME that OpenSSL's parser will accept and hence
trigger this attack.

Signed-off-by: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne_f@ipfire.org>
---

diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl
index 84f1d0fa57..16e20b4391 100644
--- a/lfs/openssl
+++ b/lfs/openssl
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 
 include Config
 
-VER        = 1.1.1h
+VER        = 1.1.1i
 
 THISAPP    = openssl-$(VER)
 DL_FILE    = $(THISAPP).tar.gz
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
 
 $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
 
-$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 53840c70434793127a3574433494e8d3
+$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 08987c3cf125202e2b0840035efb392c
 
 install : $(TARGET)