Start preparing for 1.7.4.4

[thirdparty/git.git] / path.c

diff --git a/path.c b/path.c
index 79aa104712364a8c18964feecd4c8079449a78cf..8951333cb88a6e28ef29538183ebf71e3b0913fa 100644 (file)
--- a/path.c
+++ b/path.c
@@ -122,39 +122,43 @@ char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
        return cleanup_path(pathname);
 }
 
-
-/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
-int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
+char *git_path_submodule(const char *path, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
-       const char *tmp;
-       size_t n;
-
-       tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
-       if (!tmp)
-               tmp = "/tmp";
-       n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
-       if (len <= n) {
-               errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-               return -1;
-       }
-       return mkstemp(path);
-}
+       char *pathname = get_pathname();
+       struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
+       const char *git_dir;
+       va_list args;
+       unsigned len;
 
-/* git_mkstemps() - create tmp file with suffix honoring TMPDIR variable. */
-int git_mkstemps(char *path, size_t len, const char *template, int suffix_len)
-{
-       const char *tmp;
-       size_t n;
-
-       tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
-       if (!tmp)
-               tmp = "/tmp";
-       n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
-       if (len <= n) {
-               errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-               return -1;
+       len = strlen(path);
+       if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
+               return bad_path;
+
+       strbuf_addstr(&buf, path);
+       if (len && path[len-1] != '/')
+               strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
+       strbuf_addstr(&buf, ".git");
+
+       git_dir = read_gitfile_gently(buf.buf);
+       if (git_dir) {
+               strbuf_reset(&buf);
+               strbuf_addstr(&buf, git_dir);
        }
-       return mkstemps(path, suffix_len);
+       strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
+
+       if (buf.len >= PATH_MAX)
+               return bad_path;
+       memcpy(pathname, buf.buf, buf.len + 1);
+
+       strbuf_release(&buf);
+       len = strlen(pathname);
+
+       va_start(args, fmt);
+       len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
+       va_end(args);
+       if (len >= PATH_MAX)
+               return bad_path;
+       return cleanup_path(pathname);
 }
 
 int validate_headref(const char *path)
@@ -237,6 +241,8 @@ char *expand_user_path(const char *path)
                size_t username_len = first_slash - username;
                if (username_len == 0) {
                        const char *home = getenv("HOME");
+                       if (!home)
+                               goto return_null;
                        strbuf_add(&user_path, home, strlen(home));
                } else {
                        struct passwd *pw = getpw_str(username, username_len);
@@ -336,7 +342,7 @@ char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
 
        if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
            validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) {
-               setenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, ".", 1);
+               set_git_dir(".");
                check_repository_format();
                return path;
        }
@@ -610,7 +616,7 @@ int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p)
        /*
         * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
         * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
-        * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations.
+        * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalization.
         *
         * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
         * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
@@ -649,3 +655,10 @@ int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p)
                }
        }
 }
+
+int offset_1st_component(const char *path)
+{
+       if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))
+               return 2 + is_dir_sep(path[2]);
+       return is_dir_sep(path[0]);
+}