FT: Do not add bogus PMKID in msg 1/4 for FT protocol PTK rekeying

Do not try to derive a PMKID for EAPOL-key msg 1/4 when going through
4-way handshake to rekey PTK during an association that was started
through FT protocol.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>

diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
index ff6bf7cdbc70cbb69d1b36d45a2543843f979fe2..54ad2a4b892461d6c449fa3f16c4b7a5ef54a2e3 100644 (file)
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -2161,6 +2161,14 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
                                pmkid = NULL;
                        }
 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
+               } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
+                          sm->ft_completed) {
+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+                                  "FT: No PMKID in message 1/4 when using FT protocol");
+                       pmkid = NULL;
+                       pmkid_len = 0;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SAE
                } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
                        if (sm->pmkid_set) {