If mtu probing is enabled tcp_mtu_probing() could very well end up
with a too small MSS.
Use the new sysctl tcp_min_snd_mss to make sure MSS search
is performed in an acceptable range.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for context changes in 4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: The sysctl is global] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.
This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.
Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.
In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.
We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.
Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.
We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for context changes in 4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Make the sysctl global, consistent with
net.ipv4.tcp_base_mss] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.
TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.
A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.
Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.
CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
socket is already using more than half the allowed space
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Adjust context for backport to 4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
Backport notes, provided by Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
v4.15 or since commit 737ff314563 ("tcp: use sequence distance to
detect reordering") had switched from the packet-based FACK tracking and
switched to sequence-based.
v4.14 and older still have the old logic and hence on
tcp_skb_shift_data() needs to retain its original logic and have
@fack_count in sync. In other words, we keep the increment of pcount with
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) to later used that to update fack_count. To make it
more explicit we track the new skb that gets incremented to pcount in
@next_pcount, and we get to avoid the constant invocation of
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) all together.
Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Adjust for context changes to backport to
4.9.168]
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The "param.count" value is a u64 thatcomes from the user. The code
later in the function assumes that param.count is at least one and if
it's not then it leads to an Oops when we dereference the ZERO_SIZE_PTR.
Also the addition can have an integer overflow which would lead us to
allocate a smaller "pages" array than required. I can't immediately
tell what the possible run times implications are, but it's safest to
prevent the overflow.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181218082129.GE32567@kadam Fixes: 6db7199407ca ("drivers/virt: introduce Freescale hypervisor management driver") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@freescale.com> Cc: Mihai Caraman <mihai.caraman@freescale.com> Cc: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The semantics of what mincore() considers to be resident is not
completely clear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache".
That's potentially a problem, as that [in]directly exposes
meta-information about pagecache / memory mapping state even about
memory not strictly belonging to the process executing the syscall,
opening possibilities for sidechannel attacks.
Change the semantics of mincore() so that it only reveals pagecache
information for non-anonymous mappings that belog to files that the
calling process could (if it tried to) successfully open for writing;
otherwise we'd be including shared non-exclusive mappings, which
- is the sidechannel
- is not the usecase for mincore(), as that's primarily used for data,
not (shared) text
[jkosina@suse.cz: v2] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190312141708.6652-2-vbabka@suse.cz
[mhocko@suse.com: restructure can_do_mincore() conditions] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1903062342020.19912@cbobk.fhfr.pm Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Josh Snyder <joshs@netflix.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Originally-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Originally-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel@gruss.cc> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
special_mapping_fault() is absolutely broken. It seems it was always
wrong, but this didn't matter until vdso/vvar started to use more than
one page.
And after this change vma_is_anonymous() becomes really trivial, it
simply checks vm_ops == NULL. However, I do think the helper makes
sense. There are a lot of ->vm_ops != NULL checks, the helper makes the
caller's code more understandable (self-documented) and this is more
grep-friendly.
This patch (of 3):
Preparation. Add the new simple helper, vma_is_anonymous(vma), and change
handle_pte_fault() to use it. It will have more users.
The name is not accurate, say a hpet_mmap()'ed vma is not anonymous.
Perhaps it should be named vma_has_fault() instead. But it matches the
logic in mmap.c/memory.c (see next changes). "True" just means that a
page fault will use do_anonymous_page().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of "mm/mincore.c: make mincore() more
conservative"; adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Ben Hutchings [Tue, 14 May 2019 12:46:46 +0000 (13:46 +0100)]
x86/bugs: Change L1TF mitigation string to match upstream
Commit 72c6d2db64fa "x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable" upstream
changed "Page Table Inversion" to "PTE Inversion". That was part of
the implementation of additional mitigations for VMX which haven't
been applied to this branch. Just change this string to be consistent
and match documentation.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Adjust the last two rows in the table that display possible values when
MDS mitigation is enabled. They both were slightly innacurate.
In addition, convert the table of possible values and their descriptions
to a list-table. The simple table format uses the top border of equals
signs to determine cell width which resulted in the first column being
far too wide in comparison to the second column that contained the
majority of the text.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Updated the documentation for a new CVE-2019-11091 Microarchitectural Data
Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) which is a variant of
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is a family of side channel
attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs.
MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS. There are no new code changes expected for MDSUM.
The existing mitigation for MDS applies to MDSUM as well.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop the auto,nosmt option, which we can't support
- Adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop the auto,nosmt option and the l1tf mitigation selection, which we can't
support
- Adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
Most users fall into a few basic categories:
a) they want all mitigations off;
b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
it's vulnerable; or
c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
vulnerable.
Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:
- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
SMT if needed by a mitigation.
Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop the auto,nosmt option which we can't support
- Adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
arch_smt_update() now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS
mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions
have been made.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop the index updates
- Adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
entry. Should have done that right away.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we never added the documentation, so just update
the log message] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.
Introduce an internal mitigation mode VMWERV which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.
That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Test x86_hyper instead of using hypervisor_is_type()
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Ben Hutchings [Sat, 11 May 2019 22:45:54 +0000 (23:45 +0100)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Document l1tf in sysfs
The vulnerabilties/l1tf attribute was added by commit 17dbca119312
"x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf", which has
already been backported to 3.16, but only documented in commit d90a7a0ec83f "x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF
mitigations", which has not and probbaly won't be.
Add just that line of documentation for now.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
mechanism.
This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:
mds=[full|off]
This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
enabled systems.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop " __ro_after_init"
- Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations
because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to
store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems.
Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which
covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on
Intel CPUs.
The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling
after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to
the non idle sibling.
When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be
speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are
flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER.
When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this,
then there is no action required either because before returning to user
space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush
on the return to user path.
Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are
solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other
MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer
clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise.
This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle
driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for
two reasons:
- The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver
almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults
to that new driver.
- The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore
unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates
anymore, so there is no point in adding that.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop change in _mwaitx()
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into
prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning.
Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and
explain why some corner cases are not mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Add an assembly macro equivalent to
mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers() and use this in the system call exit path,
as we don't have prepare_exit_to_usermode()] Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) vulernabilities are mitigated by
clearing the affected CPU buffers. The mechanism for clearing the buffers
uses the unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a
microcode update which triggers a CPU buffer clear when VERW is executed.
Provide a inline function with the assembly magic. The argument of the VERW
instruction must be a memory operand as documented:
"MD_CLEAR enumerates that the memory-operand variant of VERW (for
example, VERW m16) has been extended to also overwrite buffers affected
by MDS. This buffer overwriting functionality is not guaranteed for the
register operand variant of VERW."
Documentation also recommends to use a writable data segment selector:
"The buffer overwriting occurs regardless of the result of the VERW
permission check, as well as when the selector is null or causes a
descriptor load segment violation. However, for lowest latency we
recommend using a selector that indicates a valid writable data
segment."
Add x86 specific documentation about MDS and the internal workings of the
mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: drop changes to doc index and configuration] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode
provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers
by invoking the VERW instruction.
Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations.
This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available
separately.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.
That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category. Also the
Silvermont/Airmont ATOMs, but for them it's not really relevant as they do
not support SMT, but mark them for completeness sake.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Assign the next available bug flag
- Adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks
on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
- Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
- Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
- Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
thread leakage is possible.
All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off),
so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue.
Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by
MDS.
[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use CPU feature word 10 and next available bug flag
- Adjust filename, context, indentation] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
1UL at least.
Clean it up.
[ Josh Poimboeuf: Fix tools build ]
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Since <asm/msr-index.h> is a UAPI header here, open-code BIT() and drop
changes under tools/
- Drop changes to flush MSRs which we haven't defined] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Months ago, we have added code to allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
to the guest, which makes STIBP available to guests. This was implemented
by commits d28b387fb74d ("KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL") and b2ac58f90540 ("KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL").
However, we never updated GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to let userspace know that
STIBP can be enabled in CPUID. Fix that by updating
kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features and kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.
SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.
The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
(or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.
Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.
While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.
IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.
Invocations:
Check indirect branch speculation status with
- prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but
only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the
other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch.
This creates the following situation with Process A and B:
Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2
does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the
speculation control TIF bit set.
CPU0 CPU1
MSR bit is set
ProcB.T1 schedules out
ProcA.T2 schedules in
MSR bit is cleared
ProcA.T1
seccomp_update()
set TIF bit on ProcA.T2
ProcB.T1 schedules in
MSR is not updated <-- FAIL
This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update
if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task
are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks
scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever.
In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which
could be migrated is complex and full of races.
The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF
bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state
is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates
already.
Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the
atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous
update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for
updating the current task.
Reported-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811272247140.1875@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Assign the first available thread_info flag
- Exclude _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE from _TIF_WORK_MASK and _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The upcoming fine grained per task STIBP control needs to be updated on CPU
hotplug as well.
Split out the code which controls the strict mode so the prctl control code
can be added later. Mark the SMP function call argument __unused while at it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.759457117@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The update of the TIF_SSBD flag and the conditional speculation control MSR
update is done in the ssb_prctl_set() function directly. The upcoming prctl
support for controlling indirect branch speculation via STIBP needs the
same mechanism.
Split the code out and make it reusable. Reword the comment about updates
for other tasks.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.652305076@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel
switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task
which ran last on the same CPU.
An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be
ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching
directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to
a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot
be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just
adding overhead.
The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space
tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the
following cases:
1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB not set.
2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB set.
This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when
only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the
same process.
The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the
tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because
it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based
mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code.
When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into
the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was
running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of
the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or
not to cover the two cases above.
As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace
check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the
process changes.
Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one
created a hole.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop changes in initialize_tlbstate_and_flush()
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The TIF_SPEC_IB bit does not need to be evaluated in the decision to invoke
__switch_to_xtra() when:
- CONFIG_SMP is disabled
- The conditional STIPB mode is disabled
The TIF_SPEC_IB bit still controls IBPB in both cases so the TIF work mask
checks might invoke __switch_to_xtra() for nothing if TIF_SPEC_IB is the
only set bit in the work masks.
Optimize it out by masking the bit at compile time for CONFIG_SMP=n and at
run time when the static key controlling the conditional STIBP mode is
disabled.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.374062201@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline
function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit.
Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly
in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the
per_cpu() indirection.
This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch
speculation optimization happens only in one place.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use init_tss instead of cpu_tss_rw
- __switch_to() still uses the tss variable, so don't delete it
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task
control of STIBP.
Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if
SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control
code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the
guest/host switch works properly.
This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key
which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control
code.
[ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation
depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional
update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and
IBPB ]
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Exclude _TIF_SPEC_IB from _TIF_WORK_MASK and _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK
- Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=
The initial options are:
- on: Unconditionally enabled
- off: Unconditionally disabled
-auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)
When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Don't use __ro_after_init or cpu_smt_control
- Adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code:
WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const
Fix up all the string arrays.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.800018931@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: drop the part for KVM mitigation modes] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Reorder the code so it is better grouped. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.707122879@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- We still have the minimal mitigation modes
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is
changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the
system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline.
To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT
state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled.
Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU
hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Ben Hutchings [Thu, 9 May 2019 23:46:25 +0000 (00:46 +0100)]
sched: Add sched_smt_active()
Add the sched_smt_active() function needed for some x86 speculation
mitigations. This was introduced upstream by commits 1b568f0aabf2
"sched/core: Optimize SCHED_SMT", ba2591a5993e "sched/smt: Update
sched_smt_present at runtime", c5511d03ec09 "sched/smt: Make
sched_smt_present track topology", and 321a874a7ef8 "sched/smt: Expose
sched_smt_present static key". The upstream implementation uses the
static_key_{disable,enable}_cpuslocked() functions, which aren't
practical to backport.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to
have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is
minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static
key.
This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the
speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be
made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an
unused static key to every other architecture for nothing.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.337452245@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: CONFIG_SCHED_SMT depended on CONFG_X86_HT, but that
also follows CONFIG_SMP] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next
task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out
across multiple functions.
Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into
the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function.
This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits
in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes.
Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.151077005@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according
to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task.
Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in
SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have
"speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names.
For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be
updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate.
Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No
functional change.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.058866968@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the
various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's
hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to
be made for a particular method.
Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper
functions, so they can be extended later on.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.874479208@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.
Enable this feature if
- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)
After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.
Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Don't add any calls to arch_smt_update() yet. They will be introduced by
"x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change".
- Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_HT) instead of cpu_smt_control for now. This
will be fixed by "x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change".] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.
This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.
In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).
[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
fine-grained ]
Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch") Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we still can't use ctx_id to optimise the check] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Only CPUs which speculate can speculate. Therefore, it seems prudent
to test for cpu_no_speculation first and only then determine whether
a specific speculating CPU is susceptible to store bypass speculation.
This is underlined by all CPUs currently listed in cpu_no_speculation
were present in cpu_no_spec_store_bypass as well.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@suse.de Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522090539.GA24668@light.dominikbrodowski.net Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always
on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never
disabled.
From the specification [1]:
"With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches
executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less
privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a
result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not
use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more
privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes
effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable
enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT."
If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the
preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's
Retpoline white paper [2] states:
"Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre
variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6
(enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for
enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be
used for mitigation instead of retpoline."
The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors
which support it is that these processors also support CET which
provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP
techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense.
If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2,
the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never
cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after
VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already
covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions.
Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation.
[1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
[2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
Both documents are available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533148945-24095-1-git-send-email-sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use the first available bit from word 7
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
We will need to provide declarations of static keys in header
files. Provide DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_{TRUE,FALSE} macros.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/816881cf85bd3cf13385d212882618f38a3b5d33.1472754711.git.tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CPU 1 CPU 2
static_key_slow_inc()
atomic_inc_not_zero()
-> key.enabled == 0, no increment
jump_label_lock()
atomic_inc_return()
-> key.enabled == 1 now
static_key_slow_inc()
atomic_inc_not_zero()
-> key.enabled == 1, inc to 2
return
** static key is wrong!
jump_label_update()
jump_label_unlock()
Testing the static key at the point marked by (**) will follow the
wrong path for jumps that have not been patched yet. This can
actually happen when creating many KVM virtual machines with userspace
LAPIC emulation; just run several copies of the following program:
int main(void)
{
for (;;) {
int kvmfd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDONLY);
int vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0);
close(ioctl(vmfd, KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 1));
close(vmfd);
close(kvmfd);
}
return 0;
}
Every KVM_CREATE_VCPU ioctl will attempt a static_key_slow_inc() call.
The static key's purpose is to skip NULL pointer checks and indeed one
of the processes eventually dereferences NULL.
As explained in the commit that introduced the bug:
jump_label_update() needs key.enabled to be true. The solution adopted
here is to temporarily make key.enabled == -1, and use go down the
slow path when key.enabled <= 0.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 706249c222f6 ("locking/static_keys: Rework update logic") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466527937-69798-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com
[ Small stylistic edits to the changelog and the code. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
This makes it easier to use the header in asm code and not
include the whole cpufeature.h and add guards for asm.
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453842730-28463-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 to avoid a dependency loop:
- Drop some inapplicable changes
- Move all the previously backported feature and bug flags across
- Also change <asm/nospec-branch.h> and lib/retpoline.S to use
<asm/cpufeatures.h>
- Also include <asm/cpufeatures.h> in <asm/barrier.h>, as the vdso fails to
build without that
- Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
asm/atomic.h doesn't really need asm/processor.h anymore. Everything
it uses has moved to other header files. So remove that include.
processor.h is a nasty header that includes lots of
other headers and makes it prone to include loops. Removing the
include here makes asm/atomic.h a "leaf" header that can
be safely included in most other headers.
The only fallout is in the lib/atomic tester which relied on
this implicit include. Give it an explicit include.
(the include is in ifdef because the user is also in ifdef)
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1449018060-1742-1-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 to avoid a dependency loop; adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Unfortunately, we can only do this if HAVE_JUMP_LABEL. In
principle, we could do some serious surgery on the core jump
label infrastructure to keep the patch infrastructure available
on x86 on all builds, but that's probably not worth it.
Implementing the macros using a conditional branch as a fallback
seems like a bad idea: we'd have to clobber flags.
This limitation can't cause silent failures -- trying to include
asm/jump_label.h at all on a non-HAVE_JUMP_LABEL kernel will
error out. The macro's users are responsible for handling this
issue themselves.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/63aa45c4b692e8469e1876d6ccbb5da707972990.1447361906.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
static_key_enabled() can be used on struct static_key but not on its
wrapper types static_key_true and static_key_false. The function is
useful for debugging and management of static keys. Update it so that
it can be used for the wrapper types too.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150907131803.54c027e1@lwn.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Boris reported that gcc version 4.4.4 20100503 (Red Hat
4.4.4-2) fails to build linux-next kernels that have
this fresh commit via the locking tree:
11276d5306b8 ("locking/static_keys: Add a new static_key interface")
The problem appears to be that even though @key and @branch are
compile time constants, it doesn't see the following expression
as an immediate value:
&((char *)key)[branch]
More recent GCCs don't appear to have this problem.
In particular, Red Hat backported the 'asm goto' feature into 4.4,
'normal' 4.4 compilers will not have this feature and thus not
run into this asm.
The workaround is to supply both values to the asm as immediates
and do the addition in asm.
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Which define a key of different types with an initial true/false
value.
Then allow:
static_branch_likely()
static_branch_unlikely()
to take a key of either type and emit the right instruction for the
case.
This means adding a second arch_static_branch_jump() assembly helper
which emits a JMP per default.
In order to determine the right instruction for the right state,
encode the branch type in the LSB of jump_entry::key.
This is the final step in removing the naming confusion that has led to
a stream of avoidable bugs such as:
a833581e372a ("x86, perf: Fix static_key bug in load_mm_cr4()")
... but it also allows new static key combinations that will give us
performance enhancements in the subsequent patches.
Tested-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in> # arm Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> # s390 Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- For s390, use the 31-bit-compatible macros in arch_static_branch_jump()
- Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Instead of spreading the branch_default logic all over the place,
concentrate it into the one jump_label_type() function.
This does mean we need to actually increment/decrement the enabled
count _before_ calling the update path, otherwise jump_label_type()
will not see the right state.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Rename the JUMP_LABEL_TYPE_* macros to be JUMP_TYPE_* and move the
inline helpers into kernel/jump_label.c, since that's the only place
they're ever used.
Also rename the helpers where it's all about static keys.
This is the second step in removing the naming confusion that has led to
a stream of avoidable bugs such as:
a833581e372a ("x86, perf: Fix static_key bug in load_mm_cr4()")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Since we've already stepped away from ENABLE is a JMP and DISABLE is a
NOP with the branch_default bits, and are going to make it even worse,
rename it to make it all clearer.
This way we don't mix multiple levels of logic attributes, but have a
plain 'physical' name for what the current instruction patching status
of a jump label is.
This is a first step in removing the naming confusion that has led to
a stream of avoidable bugs such as:
a833581e372a ("x86, perf: Fix static_key bug in load_mm_cr4()")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
[ Beefed up the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Wrap asm/jump_label.h for all archs with #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__.
Since these are kernel only headers, we don't need #ifdef
__KERNEL__ so can simplify things a bit.
If an architecture wants to use jump labels in assembly, it
will still need to define a macro to create the __jump_table
entries (see ARCH_STATIC_BRANCH in the powerpc asm/jump_label.h
for an example).
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: jbaron@akamai.com Cc: linux@arm.linux.org.uk Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: liuj97@gmail.com Cc: mgorman@suse.de Cc: mmarek@suse.cz Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: paulus@samba.org Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428551492-21977-1-git-send-email-anton@samba.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Use a brcl 0,2 instruction for jump label nops during compile time,
so we don't mix up the different nops during mcount/hotpatch call
site detection.
The initial jump label code instruction replacement will exchange
these instructions with either a branch or a brcl 0,0 instruction.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Add sanity checks to verify that only expected code will be replaced.
If the code patterns do not match print the code patterns and panic,
since something went terribly wrong.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Implement the microMIPS encoding of the J instruction for the purpose of
the static keys feature, fixing a crash early on in bootstrap as the
kernel is unhappy seeing the ISA bit set in jump table entries. Make
sure the ISA bit correctly reflects the instruction encoding chosen for
the kernel, 0 for the standard MIPS and 1 for the microMIPS encoding.
Also make sure the instruction to patch is a 32-bit NOP in the microMIPS
mode as by default the 16-bit short encoding is assumed
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@codesourcery.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8516/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Correct the check for the span of the 256MB segment addressable by the J
instruction according to this instruction's semantics. The calculation
of the jump target is applied to the address of the delay-slot
instruction that immediately follows. Adjust the check accordingly by
adding 4 to `e->code' that holds the address of the J instruction
itself.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@codesourcery.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8515/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Dump the flags which denote we have detected and/or have applied bug
workarounds to the CPU we're executing on, in a similar manner to the
feature flags.
The advantage is that those are not accumulating over time like the CPU
features.
Instead of changing the print to "%px", and leaking kernel addresses,
just remove the print completely, cfr. e.g. commit 071929dbdd865f77
("arm64: Stop printing the virtual memory layout").
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>