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[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / basic / fs-util.c
CommitLineData
53e1b683 1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
f4f15635 2
11c3a366
TA
3#include <errno.h>
4#include <stddef.h>
11c3a366 5#include <stdlib.h>
1c73b069 6#include <linux/falloc.h>
655f2da0 7#include <linux/magic.h>
11c3a366
TA
8#include <unistd.h>
9
b5efdb8a 10#include "alloc-util.h"
f4f15635
LP
11#include "dirent-util.h"
12#include "fd-util.h"
f4f15635 13#include "fs-util.h"
fd74c6f3 14#include "locale-util.h"
11c3a366
TA
15#include "log.h"
16#include "macro.h"
0499585f 17#include "missing_fcntl.h"
f5947a5e
YW
18#include "missing_fs.h"
19#include "missing_syscall.h"
93cc7779
TA
20#include "mkdir.h"
21#include "parse-util.h"
22#include "path-util.h"
dccca82b 23#include "process-util.h"
34a8f081 24#include "stat-util.h"
430fbf8e 25#include "stdio-util.h"
f4f15635
LP
26#include "string-util.h"
27#include "strv.h"
93cc7779 28#include "time-util.h"
e4de7287 29#include "tmpfile-util.h"
ee104e11 30#include "user-util.h"
f4f15635
LP
31#include "util.h"
32
33int unlink_noerrno(const char *path) {
34 PROTECT_ERRNO;
35 int r;
36
37 r = unlink(path);
38 if (r < 0)
39 return -errno;
40
41 return 0;
42}
43
44int rmdir_parents(const char *path, const char *stop) {
45 size_t l;
46 int r = 0;
47
48 assert(path);
49 assert(stop);
50
51 l = strlen(path);
52
53 /* Skip trailing slashes */
54 while (l > 0 && path[l-1] == '/')
55 l--;
56
57 while (l > 0) {
58 char *t;
59
60 /* Skip last component */
61 while (l > 0 && path[l-1] != '/')
62 l--;
63
64 /* Skip trailing slashes */
65 while (l > 0 && path[l-1] == '/')
66 l--;
67
68 if (l <= 0)
69 break;
70
71 t = strndup(path, l);
72 if (!t)
73 return -ENOMEM;
74
75 if (path_startswith(stop, t)) {
76 free(t);
77 return 0;
78 }
79
80 r = rmdir(t);
81 free(t);
82
83 if (r < 0)
84 if (errno != ENOENT)
85 return -errno;
86 }
87
88 return 0;
89}
90
f4f15635 91int rename_noreplace(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath, int newdirfd, const char *newpath) {
2f15b625 92 int r;
f4f15635 93
2f15b625
LP
94 /* Try the ideal approach first */
95 if (renameat2(olddirfd, oldpath, newdirfd, newpath, RENAME_NOREPLACE) >= 0)
f4f15635
LP
96 return 0;
97
2f15b625
LP
98 /* renameat2() exists since Linux 3.15, btrfs and FAT added support for it later. If it is not implemented,
99 * fall back to a different method. */
100 if (!IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, ENOSYS, ENOTTY))
f4f15635
LP
101 return -errno;
102
2f15b625
LP
103 /* Let's try to use linkat()+unlinkat() as fallback. This doesn't work on directories and on some file systems
104 * that do not support hard links (such as FAT, most prominently), but for files it's pretty close to what we
105 * want — though not atomic (i.e. for a short period both the new and the old filename will exist). */
106 if (linkat(olddirfd, oldpath, newdirfd, newpath, 0) >= 0) {
107
108 if (unlinkat(olddirfd, oldpath, 0) < 0) {
109 r = -errno; /* Backup errno before the following unlinkat() alters it */
110 (void) unlinkat(newdirfd, newpath, 0);
111 return r;
112 }
113
114 return 0;
f4f15635
LP
115 }
116
2f15b625 117 if (!IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, ENOSYS, ENOTTY, EPERM)) /* FAT returns EPERM on link()… */
f4f15635
LP
118 return -errno;
119
2f15b625
LP
120 /* OK, neither RENAME_NOREPLACE nor linkat()+unlinkat() worked. Let's then fallback to the racy TOCTOU
121 * vulnerable accessat(F_OK) check followed by classic, replacing renameat(), we have nothing better. */
122
123 if (faccessat(newdirfd, newpath, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) >= 0)
124 return -EEXIST;
125 if (errno != ENOENT)
126 return -errno;
127
128 if (renameat(olddirfd, oldpath, newdirfd, newpath) < 0)
f4f15635 129 return -errno;
f4f15635
LP
130
131 return 0;
132}
133
134int readlinkat_malloc(int fd, const char *p, char **ret) {
8e060ec2 135 size_t l = FILENAME_MAX+1;
f4f15635
LP
136 int r;
137
138 assert(p);
139 assert(ret);
140
141 for (;;) {
142 char *c;
143 ssize_t n;
144
145 c = new(char, l);
146 if (!c)
147 return -ENOMEM;
148
149 n = readlinkat(fd, p, c, l-1);
150 if (n < 0) {
151 r = -errno;
152 free(c);
153 return r;
154 }
155
156 if ((size_t) n < l-1) {
157 c[n] = 0;
158 *ret = c;
159 return 0;
160 }
161
162 free(c);
163 l *= 2;
164 }
165}
166
167int readlink_malloc(const char *p, char **ret) {
168 return readlinkat_malloc(AT_FDCWD, p, ret);
169}
170
171int readlink_value(const char *p, char **ret) {
172 _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
173 char *value;
174 int r;
175
176 r = readlink_malloc(p, &link);
177 if (r < 0)
178 return r;
179
180 value = basename(link);
181 if (!value)
182 return -ENOENT;
183
184 value = strdup(value);
185 if (!value)
186 return -ENOMEM;
187
188 *ret = value;
189
190 return 0;
191}
192
193int readlink_and_make_absolute(const char *p, char **r) {
194 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
195 char *k;
196 int j;
197
198 assert(p);
199 assert(r);
200
201 j = readlink_malloc(p, &target);
202 if (j < 0)
203 return j;
204
205 k = file_in_same_dir(p, target);
206 if (!k)
207 return -ENOMEM;
208
209 *r = k;
210 return 0;
211}
212
f4f15635 213int chmod_and_chown(const char *path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
de321f52 214 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
30ff18d8 215
f4f15635
LP
216 assert(path);
217
30ff18d8
LP
218 fd = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW); /* Let's acquire an O_PATH fd, as precaution to change
219 * mode/owner on the same file */
de321f52
LP
220 if (fd < 0)
221 return -errno;
222
2dbb7e94 223 return fchmod_and_chown(fd, mode, uid, gid);
b8da477e
YW
224}
225
226int fchmod_and_chown(int fd, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
2dbb7e94 227 bool do_chown, do_chmod;
30ff18d8 228 struct stat st;
30ff18d8 229
2dbb7e94
LP
230 /* Change ownership and access mode of the specified fd. Tries to do so safely, ensuring that at no
231 * point in time the access mode is above the old access mode under the old ownership or the new
232 * access mode under the new ownership. Note: this call tries hard to leave the access mode
233 * unaffected if the uid/gid is changed, i.e. it undoes implicit suid/sgid dropping the kernel does
234 * on chown().
235 *
71ec74d1 236 * This call is happy with O_PATH fds. */
b8da477e 237
71ec74d1 238 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
2dbb7e94 239 return -errno;
de321f52 240
2dbb7e94
LP
241 do_chown =
242 (uid != UID_INVALID && st.st_uid != uid) ||
243 (gid != GID_INVALID && st.st_gid != gid);
de321f52 244
2dbb7e94
LP
245 do_chmod =
246 !S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) && /* chmod is not defined on symlinks */
247 ((mode != MODE_INVALID && ((st.st_mode ^ mode) & 07777) != 0) ||
248 do_chown); /* If we change ownership, make sure we reset the mode afterwards, since chown()
249 * modifies the access mode too */
30ff18d8 250
2dbb7e94
LP
251 if (mode == MODE_INVALID)
252 mode = st.st_mode; /* If we only shall do a chown(), save original mode, since chown() might break it. */
253 else if ((mode & S_IFMT) != 0 && ((mode ^ st.st_mode) & S_IFMT) != 0)
254 return -EINVAL; /* insist on the right file type if it was specified */
de321f52 255
2dbb7e94
LP
256 if (do_chown && do_chmod) {
257 mode_t minimal = st.st_mode & mode; /* the subset of the old and the new mask */
30ff18d8 258
2dbb7e94 259 if (((minimal ^ st.st_mode) & 07777) != 0)
71ec74d1 260 if (fchmod_opath(fd, minimal & 07777) < 0)
30ff18d8 261 return -errno;
de321f52 262 }
b8da477e 263
2dbb7e94 264 if (do_chown)
71ec74d1 265 if (fchownat(fd, "", uid, gid, AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0)
2dbb7e94 266 return -errno;
30ff18d8 267
2dbb7e94 268 if (do_chmod)
71ec74d1 269 if (fchmod_opath(fd, mode & 07777) < 0)
2dbb7e94 270 return -errno;
30ff18d8 271
2dbb7e94 272 return do_chown || do_chmod;
f4f15635
LP
273}
274
f4f15635
LP
275int fchmod_umask(int fd, mode_t m) {
276 mode_t u;
277 int r;
278
279 u = umask(0777);
280 r = fchmod(fd, m & (~u)) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
281 umask(u);
282
283 return r;
284}
285
4dfaa528 286int fchmod_opath(int fd, mode_t m) {
22dd8d35 287 char procfs_path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
4dfaa528
FB
288
289 /* This function operates also on fd that might have been opened with
290 * O_PATH. Indeed fchmodat() doesn't have the AT_EMPTY_PATH flag like
291 * fchownat() does. */
292
293 xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
4dfaa528
FB
294 if (chmod(procfs_path, m) < 0)
295 return -errno;
296
297 return 0;
298}
299
f4f15635
LP
300int fd_warn_permissions(const char *path, int fd) {
301 struct stat st;
302
303 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
304 return -errno;
305
b6cceaae
LP
306 /* Don't complain if we are reading something that is not a file, for example /dev/null */
307 if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode))
308 return 0;
309
f4f15635
LP
310 if (st.st_mode & 0111)
311 log_warning("Configuration file %s is marked executable. Please remove executable permission bits. Proceeding anyway.", path);
312
313 if (st.st_mode & 0002)
314 log_warning("Configuration file %s is marked world-writable. Please remove world writability permission bits. Proceeding anyway.", path);
315
df0ff127 316 if (getpid_cached() == 1 && (st.st_mode & 0044) != 0044)
f4f15635
LP
317 log_warning("Configuration file %s is marked world-inaccessible. This has no effect as configuration data is accessible via APIs without restrictions. Proceeding anyway.", path);
318
319 return 0;
320}
321
322int touch_file(const char *path, bool parents, usec_t stamp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) {
9e3fa6e8
LP
323 char fdpath[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
324 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
325 int r, ret = 0;
f4f15635
LP
326
327 assert(path);
328
9e3fa6e8
LP
329 /* Note that touch_file() does not follow symlinks: if invoked on an existing symlink, then it is the symlink
330 * itself which is updated, not its target
331 *
332 * Returns the first error we encounter, but tries to apply as much as possible. */
f4f15635 333
9e3fa6e8
LP
334 if (parents)
335 (void) mkdir_parents(path, 0755);
336
337 /* Initially, we try to open the node with O_PATH, so that we get a reference to the node. This is useful in
338 * case the path refers to an existing device or socket node, as we can open it successfully in all cases, and
339 * won't trigger any driver magic or so. */
340 fd = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW);
341 if (fd < 0) {
342 if (errno != ENOENT)
f4f15635 343 return -errno;
f4f15635 344
9e3fa6e8
LP
345 /* if the node doesn't exist yet, we create it, but with O_EXCL, so that we only create a regular file
346 * here, and nothing else */
347 fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, IN_SET(mode, 0, MODE_INVALID) ? 0644 : mode);
348 if (fd < 0)
f4f15635
LP
349 return -errno;
350 }
351
9e3fa6e8
LP
352 /* Let's make a path from the fd, and operate on that. With this logic, we can adjust the access mode,
353 * ownership and time of the file node in all cases, even if the fd refers to an O_PATH object — which is
354 * something fchown(), fchmod(), futimensat() don't allow. */
355 xsprintf(fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
356
4b3b5bc7 357 ret = fchmod_and_chown(fd, mode, uid, gid);
9e3fa6e8 358
f4f15635
LP
359 if (stamp != USEC_INFINITY) {
360 struct timespec ts[2];
361
362 timespec_store(&ts[0], stamp);
363 ts[1] = ts[0];
9e3fa6e8 364 r = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, fdpath, ts, 0);
f4f15635 365 } else
9e3fa6e8
LP
366 r = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, fdpath, NULL, 0);
367 if (r < 0 && ret >= 0)
f4f15635
LP
368 return -errno;
369
9e3fa6e8 370 return ret;
f4f15635
LP
371}
372
373int touch(const char *path) {
ee735086 374 return touch_file(path, false, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, MODE_INVALID);
f4f15635
LP
375}
376
6c9c51e5
YW
377int symlink_idempotent(const char *from, const char *to, bool make_relative) {
378 _cleanup_free_ char *relpath = NULL;
f4f15635
LP
379 int r;
380
381 assert(from);
382 assert(to);
383
6c9c51e5
YW
384 if (make_relative) {
385 _cleanup_free_ char *parent = NULL;
386
387 parent = dirname_malloc(to);
388 if (!parent)
389 return -ENOMEM;
390
391 r = path_make_relative(parent, from, &relpath);
392 if (r < 0)
393 return r;
394
395 from = relpath;
396 }
397
f4f15635 398 if (symlink(from, to) < 0) {
77b79723
LP
399 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
400
f4f15635
LP
401 if (errno != EEXIST)
402 return -errno;
403
404 r = readlink_malloc(to, &p);
77b79723
LP
405 if (r == -EINVAL) /* Not a symlink? In that case return the original error we encountered: -EEXIST */
406 return -EEXIST;
407 if (r < 0) /* Any other error? In that case propagate it as is */
f4f15635
LP
408 return r;
409
77b79723
LP
410 if (!streq(p, from)) /* Not the symlink we want it to be? In that case, propagate the original -EEXIST */
411 return -EEXIST;
f4f15635
LP
412 }
413
414 return 0;
415}
416
417int symlink_atomic(const char *from, const char *to) {
418 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
419 int r;
420
421 assert(from);
422 assert(to);
423
424 r = tempfn_random(to, NULL, &t);
425 if (r < 0)
426 return r;
427
428 if (symlink(from, t) < 0)
429 return -errno;
430
431 if (rename(t, to) < 0) {
432 unlink_noerrno(t);
433 return -errno;
434 }
435
436 return 0;
437}
438
439int mknod_atomic(const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev) {
440 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
441 int r;
442
443 assert(path);
444
445 r = tempfn_random(path, NULL, &t);
446 if (r < 0)
447 return r;
448
449 if (mknod(t, mode, dev) < 0)
450 return -errno;
451
452 if (rename(t, path) < 0) {
453 unlink_noerrno(t);
454 return -errno;
455 }
456
457 return 0;
458}
459
460int mkfifo_atomic(const char *path, mode_t mode) {
461 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
462 int r;
463
464 assert(path);
465
466 r = tempfn_random(path, NULL, &t);
467 if (r < 0)
468 return r;
469
470 if (mkfifo(t, mode) < 0)
471 return -errno;
472
473 if (rename(t, path) < 0) {
4fe3828c
FB
474 unlink_noerrno(t);
475 return -errno;
476 }
477
478 return 0;
479}
480
481int mkfifoat_atomic(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode) {
482 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
483 int r;
484
485 assert(path);
486
487 if (path_is_absolute(path))
488 return mkfifo_atomic(path, mode);
489
490 /* We're only interested in the (random) filename. */
491 r = tempfn_random_child("", NULL, &t);
492 if (r < 0)
493 return r;
494
495 if (mkfifoat(dirfd, t, mode) < 0)
496 return -errno;
497
498 if (renameat(dirfd, t, dirfd, path) < 0) {
f4f15635
LP
499 unlink_noerrno(t);
500 return -errno;
501 }
502
503 return 0;
504}
505
506int get_files_in_directory(const char *path, char ***list) {
507 _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL;
8fb3f009 508 struct dirent *de;
f4f15635
LP
509 size_t bufsize = 0, n = 0;
510 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
511
512 assert(path);
513
514 /* Returns all files in a directory in *list, and the number
515 * of files as return value. If list is NULL returns only the
516 * number. */
517
518 d = opendir(path);
519 if (!d)
520 return -errno;
521
8fb3f009 522 FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, return -errno) {
f4f15635
LP
523 dirent_ensure_type(d, de);
524
525 if (!dirent_is_file(de))
526 continue;
527
528 if (list) {
529 /* one extra slot is needed for the terminating NULL */
530 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(l, bufsize, n + 2))
531 return -ENOMEM;
532
533 l[n] = strdup(de->d_name);
534 if (!l[n])
535 return -ENOMEM;
536
537 l[++n] = NULL;
538 } else
539 n++;
540 }
541
ae2a15bc
LP
542 if (list)
543 *list = TAKE_PTR(l);
f4f15635
LP
544
545 return n;
546}
430fbf8e 547
992e8f22
LP
548static int getenv_tmp_dir(const char **ret_path) {
549 const char *n;
550 int r, ret = 0;
34a8f081 551
992e8f22 552 assert(ret_path);
34a8f081 553
992e8f22
LP
554 /* We use the same order of environment variables python uses in tempfile.gettempdir():
555 * https://docs.python.org/3/library/tempfile.html#tempfile.gettempdir */
556 FOREACH_STRING(n, "TMPDIR", "TEMP", "TMP") {
557 const char *e;
558
559 e = secure_getenv(n);
560 if (!e)
561 continue;
562 if (!path_is_absolute(e)) {
563 r = -ENOTDIR;
564 goto next;
565 }
99be45a4 566 if (!path_is_normalized(e)) {
992e8f22
LP
567 r = -EPERM;
568 goto next;
569 }
570
571 r = is_dir(e, true);
572 if (r < 0)
573 goto next;
574 if (r == 0) {
575 r = -ENOTDIR;
576 goto next;
577 }
578
579 *ret_path = e;
580 return 1;
581
582 next:
583 /* Remember first error, to make this more debuggable */
584 if (ret >= 0)
585 ret = r;
34a8f081
OW
586 }
587
992e8f22
LP
588 if (ret < 0)
589 return ret;
34a8f081 590
992e8f22
LP
591 *ret_path = NULL;
592 return ret;
593}
34a8f081 594
992e8f22
LP
595static int tmp_dir_internal(const char *def, const char **ret) {
596 const char *e;
597 int r, k;
598
599 assert(def);
600 assert(ret);
601
602 r = getenv_tmp_dir(&e);
603 if (r > 0) {
604 *ret = e;
605 return 0;
606 }
607
608 k = is_dir(def, true);
609 if (k == 0)
610 k = -ENOTDIR;
611 if (k < 0)
612 return r < 0 ? r : k;
613
614 *ret = def;
34a8f081
OW
615 return 0;
616}
617
992e8f22
LP
618int var_tmp_dir(const char **ret) {
619
620 /* Returns the location for "larger" temporary files, that is backed by physical storage if available, and thus
621 * even might survive a boot: /var/tmp. If $TMPDIR (or related environment variables) are set, its value is
622 * returned preferably however. Note that both this function and tmp_dir() below are affected by $TMPDIR,
623 * making it a variable that overrides all temporary file storage locations. */
624
625 return tmp_dir_internal("/var/tmp", ret);
626}
627
628int tmp_dir(const char **ret) {
629
630 /* Similar to var_tmp_dir() above, but returns the location for "smaller" temporary files, which is usually
631 * backed by an in-memory file system: /tmp. */
632
633 return tmp_dir_internal("/tmp", ret);
634}
635
af229d7a
ZJS
636int unlink_or_warn(const char *filename) {
637 if (unlink(filename) < 0 && errno != ENOENT)
638 /* If the file doesn't exist and the fs simply was read-only (in which
639 * case unlink() returns EROFS even if the file doesn't exist), don't
640 * complain */
641 if (errno != EROFS || access(filename, F_OK) >= 0)
642 return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to remove \"%s\": %m", filename);
643
644 return 0;
645}
646
430fbf8e 647int inotify_add_watch_fd(int fd, int what, uint32_t mask) {
fbd0b64f 648 char path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int) + 1];
430fbf8e
LP
649 int r;
650
651 /* This is like inotify_add_watch(), except that the file to watch is not referenced by a path, but by an fd */
652 xsprintf(path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", what);
653
654 r = inotify_add_watch(fd, path, mask);
655 if (r < 0)
656 return -errno;
657
658 return r;
659}
d944dc95 660
27c3112d 661int inotify_add_watch_and_warn(int fd, const char *pathname, uint32_t mask) {
27c3112d 662
fe573a79 663 if (inotify_add_watch(fd, pathname, mask) < 0) {
27c3112d 664 if (errno == ENOSPC)
fe573a79 665 return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to add a watch for %s: inotify watch limit reached", pathname);
27c3112d 666
fe573a79 667 return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to add a watch for %s: %m", pathname);
27c3112d
FB
668 }
669
670 return 0;
671}
672
b85ee2ec 673static bool unsafe_transition(const struct stat *a, const struct stat *b) {
f14f1806
LP
674 /* Returns true if the transition from a to b is safe, i.e. that we never transition from unprivileged to
675 * privileged files or directories. Why bother? So that unprivileged code can't symlink to privileged files
676 * making us believe we read something safe even though it isn't safe in the specific context we open it in. */
677
678 if (a->st_uid == 0) /* Transitioning from privileged to unprivileged is always fine */
b85ee2ec 679 return false;
f14f1806 680
b85ee2ec 681 return a->st_uid != b->st_uid; /* Otherwise we need to stay within the same UID */
f14f1806
LP
682}
683
fd74c6f3
FB
684static int log_unsafe_transition(int a, int b, const char *path, unsigned flags) {
685 _cleanup_free_ char *n1 = NULL, *n2 = NULL;
686
687 if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CHASE_WARN))
36c97dec 688 return -ENOLINK;
fd74c6f3
FB
689
690 (void) fd_get_path(a, &n1);
691 (void) fd_get_path(b, &n2);
692
36c97dec 693 return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOLINK),
fd74c6f3 694 "Detected unsafe path transition %s %s %s during canonicalization of %s.",
9a6f746f 695 n1, special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW), n2, path);
fd74c6f3
FB
696}
697
145b8d0f
FB
698static int log_autofs_mount_point(int fd, const char *path, unsigned flags) {
699 _cleanup_free_ char *n1 = NULL;
700
701 if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CHASE_WARN))
702 return -EREMOTE;
703
704 (void) fd_get_path(fd, &n1);
705
706 return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTE),
707 "Detected autofs mount point %s during canonicalization of %s.",
708 n1, path);
f14f1806
LP
709}
710
a5648b80 711int chase_symlinks(const char *path, const char *original_root, unsigned flags, char **ret_path, int *ret_fd) {
d944dc95
LP
712 _cleanup_free_ char *buffer = NULL, *done = NULL, *root = NULL;
713 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
f10f4215 714 unsigned max_follow = CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX; /* how many symlinks to follow before giving up and returning ELOOP */
f14f1806 715 struct stat previous_stat;
a9fb0867 716 bool exists = true;
d944dc95
LP
717 char *todo;
718 int r;
719
720 assert(path);
721
1ed34d75 722 /* Either the file may be missing, or we return an fd to the final object, but both make no sense */
a5648b80 723 if ((flags & CHASE_NONEXISTENT) && ret_fd)
1ed34d75
LP
724 return -EINVAL;
725
a5648b80 726 if ((flags & CHASE_STEP) && ret_fd)
49eb3659
LP
727 return -EINVAL;
728
a49424af
LP
729 if (isempty(path))
730 return -EINVAL;
731
d944dc95
LP
732 /* This is a lot like canonicalize_file_name(), but takes an additional "root" parameter, that allows following
733 * symlinks relative to a root directory, instead of the root of the host.
734 *
fc4b68e5 735 * Note that "root" primarily matters if we encounter an absolute symlink. It is also used when following
c4f4fce7
LP
736 * relative symlinks to ensure they cannot be used to "escape" the root directory. The path parameter passed is
737 * assumed to be already prefixed by it, except if the CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT flag is set, in which case it is first
738 * prefixed accordingly.
d944dc95
LP
739 *
740 * Algorithmically this operates on two path buffers: "done" are the components of the path we already
741 * processed and resolved symlinks, "." and ".." of. "todo" are the components of the path we still need to
742 * process. On each iteration, we move one component from "todo" to "done", processing it's special meaning
743 * each time. The "todo" path always starts with at least one slash, the "done" path always ends in no
744 * slash. We always keep an O_PATH fd to the component we are currently processing, thus keeping lookup races
4293c32b 745 * to a minimum.
fc4b68e5
LP
746 *
747 * Suggested usage: whenever you want to canonicalize a path, use this function. Pass the absolute path you got
748 * as-is: fully qualified and relative to your host's root. Optionally, specify the root parameter to tell this
749 * function what to do when encountering a symlink with an absolute path as directory: prefix it by the
49eb3659
LP
750 * specified path.
751 *
a5648b80 752 * There are five ways to invoke this function:
49eb3659 753 *
a5648b80
ZJS
754 * 1. Without CHASE_STEP or ret_fd: in this case the path is resolved and the normalized path is
755 * returned in `ret_path`. The return value is < 0 on error. If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is also set, 0
756 * is returned if the file doesn't exist, > 0 otherwise. If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is not set, >= 0 is
757 * returned if the destination was found, -ENOENT if it wasn't.
49eb3659 758 *
a5648b80 759 * 2. With ret_fd: in this case the destination is opened after chasing it as O_PATH and this file
49eb3659
LP
760 * descriptor is returned as return value. This is useful to open files relative to some root
761 * directory. Note that the returned O_PATH file descriptors must be converted into a regular one (using
a5648b80 762 * fd_reopen() or such) before it can be used for reading/writing. ret_fd may not be combined with
49eb3659
LP
763 * CHASE_NONEXISTENT.
764 *
765 * 3. With CHASE_STEP: in this case only a single step of the normalization is executed, i.e. only the first
766 * symlink or ".." component of the path is resolved, and the resulting path is returned. This is useful if
767 * a caller wants to trace the a path through the file system verbosely. Returns < 0 on error, > 0 if the
768 * path is fully normalized, and == 0 for each normalization step. This may be combined with
769 * CHASE_NONEXISTENT, in which case 1 is returned when a component is not found.
770 *
36c97dec
FB
771 * 4. With CHASE_SAFE: in this case the path must not contain unsafe transitions, i.e. transitions from
772 * unprivileged to privileged files or directories. In such cases the return value is -ENOLINK. If
4293c32b 773 * CHASE_WARN is also set, a warning describing the unsafe transition is emitted.
36c97dec 774 *
4293c32b
ZJS
775 * 5. With CHASE_NO_AUTOFS: in this case if an autofs mount point is encountered, path normalization
776 * is aborted and -EREMOTE is returned. If CHASE_WARN is also set, a warning showing the path of
777 * the mount point is emitted.
4293c32b 778 */
d944dc95 779
22bc57c5 780 /* A root directory of "/" or "" is identical to none */
57ea45e1 781 if (empty_or_root(original_root))
22bc57c5 782 original_root = NULL;
b1bfb848 783
a5648b80
ZJS
784 if (!original_root && !ret_path && !(flags & (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE|CHASE_STEP)) && ret_fd) {
785 /* Shortcut the ret_fd case if the caller isn't interested in the actual path and has no root set
244d2f07 786 * and doesn't care about any of the other special features we provide either. */
1f56e4ce 787 r = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|((flags & CHASE_NOFOLLOW) ? O_NOFOLLOW : 0));
244d2f07
LP
788 if (r < 0)
789 return -errno;
790
a5648b80
ZJS
791 *ret_fd = r;
792 return 0;
244d2f07
LP
793 }
794
c4f4fce7
LP
795 if (original_root) {
796 r = path_make_absolute_cwd(original_root, &root);
d944dc95
LP
797 if (r < 0)
798 return r;
c4f4fce7 799
382a5078 800 if (flags & CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT) {
382a5078
LP
801 /* We don't support relative paths in combination with a root directory */
802 if (!path_is_absolute(path))
803 return -EINVAL;
804
c4f4fce7 805 path = prefix_roota(root, path);
382a5078 806 }
d944dc95
LP
807 }
808
c4f4fce7
LP
809 r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &buffer);
810 if (r < 0)
811 return r;
812
d944dc95
LP
813 fd = open("/", O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
814 if (fd < 0)
815 return -errno;
816
f14f1806
LP
817 if (flags & CHASE_SAFE) {
818 if (fstat(fd, &previous_stat) < 0)
819 return -errno;
820 }
821
d944dc95
LP
822 todo = buffer;
823 for (;;) {
824 _cleanup_free_ char *first = NULL;
825 _cleanup_close_ int child = -1;
826 struct stat st;
827 size_t n, m;
828
829 /* Determine length of first component in the path */
830 n = strspn(todo, "/"); /* The slashes */
831 m = n + strcspn(todo + n, "/"); /* The entire length of the component */
832
833 /* Extract the first component. */
834 first = strndup(todo, m);
835 if (!first)
836 return -ENOMEM;
837
838 todo += m;
839
b12d25a8
ZJS
840 /* Empty? Then we reached the end. */
841 if (isempty(first))
842 break;
843
d944dc95 844 /* Just a single slash? Then we reached the end. */
b12d25a8
ZJS
845 if (path_equal(first, "/")) {
846 /* Preserve the trailing slash */
62570f6f
LP
847
848 if (flags & CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH)
849 if (!strextend(&done, "/", NULL))
850 return -ENOMEM;
b12d25a8 851
d944dc95 852 break;
b12d25a8 853 }
d944dc95
LP
854
855 /* Just a dot? Then let's eat this up. */
856 if (path_equal(first, "/."))
857 continue;
858
859 /* Two dots? Then chop off the last bit of what we already found out. */
860 if (path_equal(first, "/..")) {
861 _cleanup_free_ char *parent = NULL;
2b6d2dda 862 _cleanup_close_ int fd_parent = -1;
d944dc95 863
a4eaf3cf
LP
864 /* If we already are at the top, then going up will not change anything. This is in-line with
865 * how the kernel handles this. */
57ea45e1 866 if (empty_or_root(done))
a4eaf3cf 867 continue;
d944dc95
LP
868
869 parent = dirname_malloc(done);
870 if (!parent)
871 return -ENOMEM;
872
a4eaf3cf 873 /* Don't allow this to leave the root dir. */
d944dc95
LP
874 if (root &&
875 path_startswith(done, root) &&
876 !path_startswith(parent, root))
a4eaf3cf 877 continue;
d944dc95 878
3b319885 879 free_and_replace(done, parent);
d944dc95 880
49eb3659
LP
881 if (flags & CHASE_STEP)
882 goto chased_one;
883
d944dc95
LP
884 fd_parent = openat(fd, "..", O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
885 if (fd_parent < 0)
886 return -errno;
887
f14f1806
LP
888 if (flags & CHASE_SAFE) {
889 if (fstat(fd_parent, &st) < 0)
890 return -errno;
891
b85ee2ec 892 if (unsafe_transition(&previous_stat, &st))
fd74c6f3 893 return log_unsafe_transition(fd, fd_parent, path, flags);
f14f1806
LP
894
895 previous_stat = st;
896 }
897
d944dc95 898 safe_close(fd);
c10d6bdb 899 fd = TAKE_FD(fd_parent);
d944dc95
LP
900
901 continue;
902 }
903
904 /* Otherwise let's see what this is. */
905 child = openat(fd, first + n, O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
a9fb0867
LP
906 if (child < 0) {
907
908 if (errno == ENOENT &&
cb638b5e 909 (flags & CHASE_NONEXISTENT) &&
99be45a4 910 (isempty(todo) || path_is_normalized(todo))) {
a9fb0867 911
cb638b5e 912 /* If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is set, and the path does not exist, then that's OK, return
a9fb0867
LP
913 * what we got so far. But don't allow this if the remaining path contains "../ or "./"
914 * or something else weird. */
915
a1904a46
YW
916 /* If done is "/", as first also contains slash at the head, then remove this redundant slash. */
917 if (streq_ptr(done, "/"))
918 *done = '\0';
919
a9fb0867
LP
920 if (!strextend(&done, first, todo, NULL))
921 return -ENOMEM;
922
923 exists = false;
924 break;
925 }
926
d944dc95 927 return -errno;
a9fb0867 928 }
d944dc95
LP
929
930 if (fstat(child, &st) < 0)
931 return -errno;
f14f1806 932 if ((flags & CHASE_SAFE) &&
cc14a6c0 933 (empty_or_root(root) || (size_t)(todo - buffer) > strlen(root)) &&
b85ee2ec 934 unsafe_transition(&previous_stat, &st))
fd74c6f3 935 return log_unsafe_transition(fd, child, path, flags);
f14f1806
LP
936
937 previous_stat = st;
938
655f2da0 939 if ((flags & CHASE_NO_AUTOFS) &&
a66fee2e 940 fd_is_fs_type(child, AUTOFS_SUPER_MAGIC) > 0)
145b8d0f 941 return log_autofs_mount_point(child, path, flags);
d944dc95 942
1f56e4ce 943 if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) && !((flags & CHASE_NOFOLLOW) && isempty(todo))) {
877777d7 944 char *joined;
d944dc95
LP
945 _cleanup_free_ char *destination = NULL;
946
947 /* This is a symlink, in this case read the destination. But let's make sure we don't follow
948 * symlinks without bounds. */
949 if (--max_follow <= 0)
950 return -ELOOP;
951
952 r = readlinkat_malloc(fd, first + n, &destination);
953 if (r < 0)
954 return r;
955 if (isempty(destination))
956 return -EINVAL;
957
958 if (path_is_absolute(destination)) {
959
960 /* An absolute destination. Start the loop from the beginning, but use the root
961 * directory as base. */
962
963 safe_close(fd);
964 fd = open(root ?: "/", O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
965 if (fd < 0)
966 return -errno;
967
f14f1806
LP
968 if (flags & CHASE_SAFE) {
969 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
970 return -errno;
971
b85ee2ec 972 if (unsafe_transition(&previous_stat, &st))
fd74c6f3 973 return log_unsafe_transition(child, fd, path, flags);
f14f1806
LP
974
975 previous_stat = st;
976 }
977
b539437a
YW
978 free(done);
979
d944dc95
LP
980 /* Note that we do not revalidate the root, we take it as is. */
981 if (isempty(root))
982 done = NULL;
983 else {
984 done = strdup(root);
985 if (!done)
986 return -ENOMEM;
987 }
988
8c4a8ea2
LP
989 /* Prefix what's left to do with what we just read, and start the loop again, but
990 * remain in the current directory. */
2d9b74ba 991 joined = path_join(destination, todo);
8c4a8ea2 992 } else
2d9b74ba 993 joined = path_join("/", destination, todo);
877777d7
CCW
994 if (!joined)
995 return -ENOMEM;
d944dc95 996
877777d7
CCW
997 free(buffer);
998 todo = buffer = joined;
d944dc95 999
49eb3659
LP
1000 if (flags & CHASE_STEP)
1001 goto chased_one;
1002
d944dc95
LP
1003 continue;
1004 }
1005
1006 /* If this is not a symlink, then let's just add the name we read to what we already verified. */
ae2a15bc
LP
1007 if (!done)
1008 done = TAKE_PTR(first);
1009 else {
a1904a46
YW
1010 /* If done is "/", as first also contains slash at the head, then remove this redundant slash. */
1011 if (streq(done, "/"))
1012 *done = '\0';
1013
d944dc95
LP
1014 if (!strextend(&done, first, NULL))
1015 return -ENOMEM;
1016 }
1017
1018 /* And iterate again, but go one directory further down. */
1019 safe_close(fd);
c10d6bdb 1020 fd = TAKE_FD(child);
d944dc95
LP
1021 }
1022
1023 if (!done) {
1024 /* Special case, turn the empty string into "/", to indicate the root directory. */
1025 done = strdup("/");
1026 if (!done)
1027 return -ENOMEM;
1028 }
1029
a5648b80
ZJS
1030 if (ret_path)
1031 *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(done);
d944dc95 1032
a5648b80
ZJS
1033 if (ret_fd) {
1034 /* Return the O_PATH fd we currently are looking to the caller. It can translate it to a
1035 * proper fd by opening /proc/self/fd/xyz. */
1ed34d75
LP
1036
1037 assert(fd >= 0);
a5648b80 1038 *ret_fd = TAKE_FD(fd);
1ed34d75
LP
1039 }
1040
49eb3659
LP
1041 if (flags & CHASE_STEP)
1042 return 1;
1043
a9fb0867 1044 return exists;
49eb3659
LP
1045
1046chased_one:
a5648b80 1047 if (ret_path) {
49eb3659
LP
1048 char *c;
1049
027cc9c9
ZJS
1050 c = strjoin(strempty(done), todo);
1051 if (!c)
1052 return -ENOMEM;
49eb3659 1053
a5648b80 1054 *ret_path = c;
49eb3659
LP
1055 }
1056
1057 return 0;
d944dc95 1058}
57a4359e 1059
21c692e9
LP
1060int chase_symlinks_and_open(
1061 const char *path,
1062 const char *root,
1063 unsigned chase_flags,
1064 int open_flags,
1065 char **ret_path) {
1066
1067 _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
1068 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
1069 int r;
1070
1071 if (chase_flags & CHASE_NONEXISTENT)
1072 return -EINVAL;
1073
57ea45e1 1074 if (empty_or_root(root) && !ret_path && (chase_flags & (CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE)) == 0) {
21c692e9
LP
1075 /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
1076 r = open(path, open_flags);
1077 if (r < 0)
1078 return -errno;
1079
1080 return r;
1081 }
1082
a5648b80
ZJS
1083 r = chase_symlinks(path, root, chase_flags, ret_path ? &p : NULL, &path_fd);
1084 if (r < 0)
1085 return r;
1086 assert(path_fd >= 0);
21c692e9
LP
1087
1088 r = fd_reopen(path_fd, open_flags);
1089 if (r < 0)
1090 return r;
1091
1092 if (ret_path)
1093 *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
1094
1095 return r;
1096}
1097
1098int chase_symlinks_and_opendir(
1099 const char *path,
1100 const char *root,
1101 unsigned chase_flags,
1102 char **ret_path,
1103 DIR **ret_dir) {
1104
1105 char procfs_path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
1106 _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
1107 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
1108 DIR *d;
a5648b80 1109 int r;
21c692e9
LP
1110
1111 if (!ret_dir)
1112 return -EINVAL;
1113 if (chase_flags & CHASE_NONEXISTENT)
1114 return -EINVAL;
1115
57ea45e1 1116 if (empty_or_root(root) && !ret_path && (chase_flags & (CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE)) == 0) {
21c692e9
LP
1117 /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
1118 d = opendir(path);
1119 if (!d)
1120 return -errno;
1121
1122 *ret_dir = d;
1123 return 0;
1124 }
1125
a5648b80
ZJS
1126 r = chase_symlinks(path, root, chase_flags, ret_path ? &p : NULL, &path_fd);
1127 if (r < 0)
1128 return r;
1129 assert(path_fd >= 0);
21c692e9
LP
1130
1131 xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", path_fd);
1132 d = opendir(procfs_path);
1133 if (!d)
1134 return -errno;
1135
1136 if (ret_path)
1137 *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
1138
1139 *ret_dir = d;
1140 return 0;
1141}
1142
d2bcd0ba
LP
1143int chase_symlinks_and_stat(
1144 const char *path,
1145 const char *root,
1146 unsigned chase_flags,
1147 char **ret_path,
a5648b80
ZJS
1148 struct stat *ret_stat,
1149 int *ret_fd) {
d2bcd0ba
LP
1150
1151 _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
1152 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
a5648b80 1153 int r;
d2bcd0ba
LP
1154
1155 assert(path);
1156 assert(ret_stat);
1157
1158 if (chase_flags & CHASE_NONEXISTENT)
1159 return -EINVAL;
1160
1161 if (empty_or_root(root) && !ret_path && (chase_flags & (CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE)) == 0) {
1162 /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
1163 if (stat(path, ret_stat) < 0)
1164 return -errno;
1165
1166 return 1;
1167 }
1168
a5648b80
ZJS
1169 r = chase_symlinks(path, root, chase_flags, ret_path ? &p : NULL, &path_fd);
1170 if (r < 0)
1171 return r;
1172 assert(path_fd >= 0);
d2bcd0ba
LP
1173
1174 if (fstat(path_fd, ret_stat) < 0)
1175 return -errno;
1176
1177 if (ret_path)
1178 *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
a5648b80
ZJS
1179 if (ret_fd)
1180 *ret_fd = TAKE_FD(path_fd);
d2bcd0ba
LP
1181
1182 return 1;
1183}
1184
57a4359e 1185int access_fd(int fd, int mode) {
fbd0b64f 1186 char p[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(fd) + 1];
57a4359e
LP
1187 int r;
1188
1189 /* Like access() but operates on an already open fd */
1190
1191 xsprintf(p, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
57a4359e
LP
1192 r = access(p, mode);
1193 if (r < 0)
21c692e9 1194 return -errno;
57a4359e
LP
1195
1196 return r;
1197}
43767d9d 1198
627d2bac
ZJS
1199void unlink_tempfilep(char (*p)[]) {
1200 /* If the file is created with mkstemp(), it will (almost always)
1201 * change the suffix. Treat this as a sign that the file was
1202 * successfully created. We ignore both the rare case where the
1203 * original suffix is used and unlink failures. */
1204 if (!endswith(*p, ".XXXXXX"))
69821560 1205 (void) unlink_noerrno(*p);
627d2bac
ZJS
1206}
1207
43767d9d
LP
1208int unlinkat_deallocate(int fd, const char *name, int flags) {
1209 _cleanup_close_ int truncate_fd = -1;
1210 struct stat st;
1211 off_t l, bs;
1212
1213 /* Operates like unlinkat() but also deallocates the file contents if it is a regular file and there's no other
1214 * link to it. This is useful to ensure that other processes that might have the file open for reading won't be
1215 * able to keep the data pinned on disk forever. This call is particular useful whenever we execute clean-up
1216 * jobs ("vacuuming"), where we want to make sure the data is really gone and the disk space released and
1217 * returned to the free pool.
1218 *
1219 * Deallocation is preferably done by FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE|FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE (👊) if supported, which means
1220 * the file won't change size. That's a good thing since we shouldn't needlessly trigger SIGBUS in other
1221 * programs that have mmap()ed the file. (The assumption here is that changing file contents to all zeroes
1222 * underneath those programs is the better choice than simply triggering SIGBUS in them which truncation does.)
1223 * However if hole punching is not implemented in the kernel or file system we'll fall back to normal file
1224 * truncation (🔪), as our goal of deallocating the data space trumps our goal of being nice to readers (💐).
1225 *
1226 * Note that we attempt deallocation, but failure to succeed with that is not considered fatal, as long as the
1227 * primary job – to delete the file – is accomplished. */
1228
1229 if ((flags & AT_REMOVEDIR) == 0) {
1230 truncate_fd = openat(fd, name, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK);
1231 if (truncate_fd < 0) {
1232
1233 /* If this failed because the file doesn't exist propagate the error right-away. Also,
1234 * AT_REMOVEDIR wasn't set, and we tried to open the file for writing, which means EISDIR is
1235 * returned when this is a directory but we are not supposed to delete those, hence propagate
1236 * the error right-away too. */
1237 if (IN_SET(errno, ENOENT, EISDIR))
1238 return -errno;
1239
1240 if (errno != ELOOP) /* don't complain if this is a symlink */
1241 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open file '%s' for deallocation, ignoring: %m", name);
1242 }
1243 }
1244
1245 if (unlinkat(fd, name, flags) < 0)
1246 return -errno;
1247
1248 if (truncate_fd < 0) /* Don't have a file handle, can't do more ☹️ */
1249 return 0;
1250
1251 if (fstat(truncate_fd, &st) < 0) {
011723a4 1252 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat file '%s' for deallocation, ignoring: %m", name);
43767d9d
LP
1253 return 0;
1254 }
1255
1256 if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || st.st_blocks == 0 || st.st_nlink > 0)
1257 return 0;
1258
1259 /* If this is a regular file, it actually took up space on disk and there are no other links it's time to
1260 * punch-hole/truncate this to release the disk space. */
1261
1262 bs = MAX(st.st_blksize, 512);
1263 l = DIV_ROUND_UP(st.st_size, bs) * bs; /* Round up to next block size */
1264
1265 if (fallocate(truncate_fd, FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE|FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE, 0, l) >= 0)
1266 return 0; /* Successfully punched a hole! 😊 */
1267
1268 /* Fall back to truncation */
1269 if (ftruncate(truncate_fd, 0) < 0) {
1270 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to truncate file to 0, ignoring: %m");
1271 return 0;
1272 }
1273
1274 return 0;
1275}
11b29a96
LP
1276
1277int fsync_directory_of_file(int fd) {
0c462ea4 1278 _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
11b29a96
LP
1279 _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -1;
1280 int r;
1281
1282 r = fd_verify_regular(fd);
1283 if (r < 0)
1284 return r;
1285
1286 r = fd_get_path(fd, &path);
3ceae1bc 1287 if (r < 0) {
b8b846d7
LP
1288 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to query /proc/self/fd/%d%s: %m",
1289 fd,
1290 r == -EOPNOTSUPP ? ", ignoring" : "");
3ceae1bc
ZJS
1291
1292 if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP)
1293 /* If /proc is not available, we're most likely running in some
1294 * chroot environment, and syncing the directory is not very
1295 * important in that case. Let's just silently do nothing. */
1296 return 0;
1297
11b29a96 1298 return r;
3ceae1bc 1299 }
11b29a96
LP
1300
1301 if (!path_is_absolute(path))
1302 return -EINVAL;
1303
0c462ea4 1304 dfd = open_parent(path, O_CLOEXEC, 0);
11b29a96 1305 if (dfd < 0)
0c462ea4 1306 return dfd;
11b29a96
LP
1307
1308 if (fsync(dfd) < 0)
1309 return -errno;
1310
1311 return 0;
1312}
ef8becfa 1313
63d59b8d
LP
1314int fsync_full(int fd) {
1315 int r, q;
1316
1317 /* Sync both the file and the directory */
1318
1319 r = fsync(fd) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
1320 q = fsync_directory_of_file(fd);
1321
1322 return r < 0 ? r : q;
1323}
1324
36695e88
LP
1325int fsync_path_at(int at_fd, const char *path) {
1326 _cleanup_close_ int opened_fd = -1;
1327 int fd;
1328
1329 if (isempty(path)) {
1330 if (at_fd == AT_FDCWD) {
1331 opened_fd = open(".", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
1332 if (opened_fd < 0)
1333 return -errno;
1334
1335 fd = opened_fd;
1336 } else
1337 fd = at_fd;
1338 } else {
1339
1340 opened_fd = openat(at_fd, path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
1341 if (opened_fd < 0)
1342 return -errno;
1343
1344 fd = opened_fd;
1345 }
1346
1347 if (fsync(fd) < 0)
1348 return -errno;
1349
1350 return 0;
1351}
1352
71f51416
LP
1353int syncfs_path(int atfd, const char *path) {
1354 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
1355
1356 assert(path);
1357
1358 fd = openat(atfd, path, O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK);
1359 if (fd < 0)
1360 return -errno;
1361
1362 if (syncfs(fd) < 0)
1363 return -errno;
1364
1365 return 0;
1366}
1367
ef8becfa
LP
1368int open_parent(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) {
1369 _cleanup_free_ char *parent = NULL;
1370 int fd;
1371
1372 if (isempty(path))
1373 return -EINVAL;
1374 if (path_equal(path, "/")) /* requesting the parent of the root dir is fishy, let's prohibit that */
1375 return -EINVAL;
1376
1377 parent = dirname_malloc(path);
1378 if (!parent)
1379 return -ENOMEM;
1380
1381 /* Let's insist on O_DIRECTORY since the parent of a file or directory is a directory. Except if we open an
1382 * O_TMPFILE file, because in that case we are actually create a regular file below the parent directory. */
1383
0c21dafb 1384 if (FLAGS_SET(flags, O_PATH))
ef8becfa 1385 flags |= O_DIRECTORY;
0c21dafb 1386 else if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, O_TMPFILE))
ef8becfa
LP
1387 flags |= O_DIRECTORY|O_RDONLY;
1388
1389 fd = open(parent, flags, mode);
1390 if (fd < 0)
1391 return -errno;
1392
1393 return fd;
1394}