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53e1b683 | 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */ |
1988a9d1 DM |
2 | /*** |
3 | This file is part of systemd. | |
4 | ||
5 | Copyright 2016 Daniel Mack | |
6 | ||
7 | systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
8 | under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by | |
9 | the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or | |
10 | (at your option) any later version. | |
11 | ||
12 | systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but | |
13 | WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
14 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU | |
15 | Lesser General Public License for more details. | |
16 | ||
17 | You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License | |
18 | along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. | |
19 | ***/ | |
20 | ||
21 | #include <arpa/inet.h> | |
22 | #include <assert.h> | |
23 | #include <errno.h> | |
24 | #include <fcntl.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/libbpf.h> | |
26 | #include <net/ethernet.h> | |
27 | #include <net/if.h> | |
28 | #include <netinet/ip.h> | |
29 | #include <netinet/ip6.h> | |
30 | #include <stddef.h> | |
31 | #include <stdio.h> | |
32 | #include <stdlib.h> | |
33 | #include <string.h> | |
34 | #include <unistd.h> | |
35 | ||
36 | #include "alloc-util.h" | |
37 | #include "bpf-firewall.h" | |
38 | #include "bpf-program.h" | |
39 | #include "fd-util.h" | |
40 | #include "ip-address-access.h" | |
41 | #include "unit.h" | |
42 | ||
43 | enum { | |
44 | MAP_KEY_PACKETS, | |
45 | MAP_KEY_BYTES, | |
46 | }; | |
47 | ||
48 | enum { | |
49 | ACCESS_ALLOWED = 1, | |
50 | ACCESS_DENIED = 2, | |
51 | }; | |
52 | ||
53 | /* Compile instructions for one list of addresses, one direction and one specific verdict on matches. */ | |
54 | ||
55 | static int add_lookup_instructions( | |
56 | BPFProgram *p, | |
57 | int map_fd, | |
58 | int protocol, | |
59 | bool is_ingress, | |
60 | int verdict) { | |
61 | ||
62 | int r, addr_offset, addr_size; | |
63 | ||
64 | assert(p); | |
65 | assert(map_fd >= 0); | |
66 | ||
67 | switch (protocol) { | |
68 | ||
69 | case ETH_P_IP: | |
70 | addr_size = sizeof(uint32_t); | |
71 | addr_offset = is_ingress ? | |
72 | offsetof(struct iphdr, saddr) : | |
73 | offsetof(struct iphdr, daddr); | |
74 | break; | |
75 | ||
76 | case ETH_P_IPV6: | |
77 | addr_size = 4 * sizeof(uint32_t); | |
78 | addr_offset = is_ingress ? | |
79 | offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_src.s6_addr) : | |
80 | offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_dst.s6_addr); | |
81 | break; | |
82 | ||
83 | default: | |
84 | return -EAFNOSUPPORT; | |
85 | } | |
86 | ||
87 | do { | |
88 | /* Compare IPv4 with one word instruction (32bit) */ | |
89 | struct bpf_insn insn[] = { | |
90 | /* If skb->protocol != ETH_P_IP, skip this whole block. The offset will be set later. */ | |
91 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_7, htobe16(protocol), 0), | |
92 | ||
93 | /* | |
94 | * Call into BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes to load the dst/src IP address | |
95 | * | |
96 | * R1: Pointer to the skb | |
97 | * R2: Data offset | |
98 | * R3: Destination buffer on the stack (r10 - 4) | |
99 | * R4: Number of bytes to read (4) | |
100 | */ | |
101 | ||
102 | BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6), | |
103 | BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_2, addr_offset), | |
104 | ||
105 | BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_10), | |
106 | BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, -addr_size), | |
107 | ||
108 | BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_4, addr_size), | |
109 | BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes), | |
110 | ||
111 | /* | |
112 | * Call into BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem to see if the address matches any entry in the | |
113 | * LPM trie map. For this to work, the prefixlen field of 'struct bpf_lpm_trie_key' | |
114 | * has to be set to the maximum possible value. | |
115 | * | |
116 | * On success, the looked up value is stored in R0. For this application, the actual | |
117 | * value doesn't matter, however; we just set the bit in @verdict in R8 if we found any | |
118 | * matching value. | |
119 | */ | |
120 | ||
121 | BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), | |
122 | BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), | |
123 | BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -addr_size - sizeof(uint32_t)), | |
124 | BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, 0, addr_size * 8), | |
125 | ||
126 | BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), | |
127 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), | |
128 | BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_8, verdict), | |
129 | }; | |
130 | ||
131 | /* Jump label fixup */ | |
132 | insn[0].off = ELEMENTSOF(insn) - 1; | |
133 | ||
134 | r = bpf_program_add_instructions(p, insn, ELEMENTSOF(insn)); | |
135 | if (r < 0) | |
136 | return r; | |
137 | ||
138 | } while (false); | |
139 | ||
140 | return 0; | |
141 | } | |
142 | ||
143 | static int bpf_firewall_compile_bpf( | |
144 | Unit *u, | |
145 | bool is_ingress, | |
146 | BPFProgram **ret) { | |
147 | ||
148 | struct bpf_insn pre_insn[] = { | |
149 | /* | |
150 | * When the eBPF program is entered, R1 contains the address of the skb. | |
151 | * However, R1-R5 are scratch registers that are not preserved when calling | |
152 | * into kernel functions, so we need to save anything that's supposed to | |
153 | * stay around to R6-R9. Save the skb to R6. | |
154 | */ | |
155 | BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1), | |
156 | ||
157 | /* | |
158 | * Although we cannot access the skb data directly from eBPF programs used in this | |
159 | * scenario, the kernel has prepared some fields for us to access through struct __sk_buff. | |
160 | * Load the protocol (IPv4, IPv6) used by the packet in flight once and cache it in R7 | |
161 | * for later use. | |
162 | */ | |
163 | BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, protocol)), | |
164 | ||
165 | /* | |
166 | * R8 is used to keep track of whether any address check has explicitly allowed or denied the packet | |
167 | * through ACCESS_DENIED or ACCESS_ALLOWED bits. Reset them both to 0 in the beginning. | |
168 | */ | |
169 | BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_8, 0), | |
170 | }; | |
171 | ||
172 | /* | |
173 | * The access checkers compiled for the configured allowance and denial lists | |
174 | * write to R8 at runtime. The following code prepares for an early exit that | |
175 | * skip the accounting if the packet is denied. | |
176 | * | |
177 | * R0 = 1 | |
178 | * if (R8 == ACCESS_DENIED) | |
179 | * R0 = 0 | |
180 | * | |
181 | * This means that if both ACCESS_DENIED and ACCESS_ALLOWED are set, the packet | |
182 | * is allowed to pass. | |
183 | */ | |
184 | struct bpf_insn post_insn[] = { | |
185 | BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), | |
186 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_8, ACCESS_DENIED, 1), | |
187 | BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), | |
188 | }; | |
189 | ||
190 | _cleanup_(bpf_program_unrefp) BPFProgram *p = NULL; | |
191 | int accounting_map_fd, r; | |
192 | bool access_enabled; | |
193 | ||
194 | assert(u); | |
195 | assert(ret); | |
196 | ||
197 | accounting_map_fd = is_ingress ? | |
198 | u->ip_accounting_ingress_map_fd : | |
199 | u->ip_accounting_egress_map_fd; | |
200 | ||
201 | access_enabled = | |
202 | u->ipv4_allow_map_fd >= 0 || | |
203 | u->ipv6_allow_map_fd >= 0 || | |
204 | u->ipv4_deny_map_fd >= 0 || | |
205 | u->ipv6_deny_map_fd >= 0; | |
206 | ||
207 | if (accounting_map_fd < 0 && !access_enabled) { | |
208 | *ret = NULL; | |
209 | return 0; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
212 | r = bpf_program_new(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, &p); | |
213 | if (r < 0) | |
214 | return r; | |
215 | ||
216 | r = bpf_program_add_instructions(p, pre_insn, ELEMENTSOF(pre_insn)); | |
217 | if (r < 0) | |
218 | return r; | |
219 | ||
220 | if (access_enabled) { | |
221 | /* | |
222 | * The simple rule this function translates into eBPF instructions is: | |
223 | * | |
224 | * - Access will be granted when an address matches an entry in @list_allow | |
225 | * - Otherwise, access will be denied when an address matches an entry in @list_deny | |
226 | * - Otherwise, access will be granted | |
227 | */ | |
228 | ||
229 | if (u->ipv4_deny_map_fd >= 0) { | |
230 | r = add_lookup_instructions(p, u->ipv4_deny_map_fd, ETH_P_IP, is_ingress, ACCESS_DENIED); | |
231 | if (r < 0) | |
232 | return r; | |
233 | } | |
234 | ||
235 | if (u->ipv6_deny_map_fd >= 0) { | |
236 | r = add_lookup_instructions(p, u->ipv6_deny_map_fd, ETH_P_IPV6, is_ingress, ACCESS_DENIED); | |
237 | if (r < 0) | |
238 | return r; | |
239 | } | |
240 | ||
241 | if (u->ipv4_allow_map_fd >= 0) { | |
242 | r = add_lookup_instructions(p, u->ipv4_allow_map_fd, ETH_P_IP, is_ingress, ACCESS_ALLOWED); | |
243 | if (r < 0) | |
244 | return r; | |
245 | } | |
246 | ||
247 | if (u->ipv6_allow_map_fd >= 0) { | |
248 | r = add_lookup_instructions(p, u->ipv6_allow_map_fd, ETH_P_IPV6, is_ingress, ACCESS_ALLOWED); | |
249 | if (r < 0) | |
250 | return r; | |
251 | } | |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
254 | r = bpf_program_add_instructions(p, post_insn, ELEMENTSOF(post_insn)); | |
255 | if (r < 0) | |
256 | return r; | |
257 | ||
258 | if (accounting_map_fd >= 0) { | |
259 | struct bpf_insn insn[] = { | |
260 | /* | |
261 | * If R0 == 0, the packet will be denied; skip the accounting instructions in this case. | |
262 | * The jump label will be fixed up later. | |
263 | */ | |
264 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0), | |
265 | ||
266 | /* Count packets */ | |
267 | BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, MAP_KEY_PACKETS), /* r0 = 0 */ | |
268 | BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -4), /* *(u32 *)(fp - 4) = r0 */ | |
269 | BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), | |
270 | BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), /* r2 = fp - 4 */ | |
271 | BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, accounting_map_fd), /* load map fd to r1 */ | |
272 | BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), | |
273 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), | |
274 | BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 1), /* r1 = 1 */ | |
275 | BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 0, 0), /* xadd r0 += r1 */ | |
276 | ||
277 | /* Count bytes */ | |
278 | BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, MAP_KEY_BYTES), /* r0 = 1 */ | |
279 | BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -4), /* *(u32 *)(fp - 4) = r0 */ | |
280 | BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), | |
281 | BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), /* r2 = fp - 4 */ | |
282 | BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, accounting_map_fd), | |
283 | BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), | |
284 | BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), | |
285 | BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, len)), /* r1 = skb->len */ | |
286 | BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 0, 0), /* xadd r0 += r1 */ | |
287 | ||
288 | /* Allow the packet to pass */ | |
289 | BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), | |
290 | }; | |
291 | ||
292 | /* Jump label fixup */ | |
293 | insn[0].off = ELEMENTSOF(insn) - 1; | |
294 | ||
295 | r = bpf_program_add_instructions(p, insn, ELEMENTSOF(insn)); | |
296 | if (r < 0) | |
297 | return r; | |
298 | } | |
299 | ||
300 | do { | |
301 | /* | |
302 | * Exit from the eBPF program, R0 contains the verdict. | |
303 | * 0 means the packet is denied, 1 means the packet may pass. | |
304 | */ | |
305 | struct bpf_insn insn[] = { | |
306 | BPF_EXIT_INSN() | |
307 | }; | |
308 | ||
309 | r = bpf_program_add_instructions(p, insn, ELEMENTSOF(insn)); | |
310 | if (r < 0) | |
311 | return r; | |
312 | } while (false); | |
313 | ||
1cc6c93a | 314 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(p); |
1988a9d1 DM |
315 | |
316 | return 0; | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | static int bpf_firewall_count_access_items(IPAddressAccessItem *list, size_t *n_ipv4, size_t *n_ipv6) { | |
320 | IPAddressAccessItem *a; | |
321 | ||
322 | assert(n_ipv4); | |
323 | assert(n_ipv6); | |
324 | ||
325 | LIST_FOREACH(items, a, list) { | |
326 | switch (a->family) { | |
327 | ||
328 | case AF_INET: | |
329 | (*n_ipv4)++; | |
330 | break; | |
331 | ||
332 | case AF_INET6: | |
333 | (*n_ipv6)++; | |
334 | break; | |
335 | ||
336 | default: | |
337 | return -EAFNOSUPPORT; | |
338 | } | |
339 | } | |
340 | ||
341 | return 0; | |
342 | } | |
343 | ||
344 | static int bpf_firewall_add_access_items( | |
345 | IPAddressAccessItem *list, | |
346 | int ipv4_map_fd, | |
347 | int ipv6_map_fd, | |
348 | int verdict) { | |
349 | ||
350 | struct bpf_lpm_trie_key *key_ipv4, *key_ipv6; | |
351 | uint64_t value = verdict; | |
352 | IPAddressAccessItem *a; | |
353 | int r; | |
354 | ||
355 | key_ipv4 = alloca0(offsetof(struct bpf_lpm_trie_key, data) + sizeof(uint32_t)); | |
356 | key_ipv6 = alloca0(offsetof(struct bpf_lpm_trie_key, data) + sizeof(uint32_t) * 4); | |
357 | ||
358 | LIST_FOREACH(items, a, list) { | |
359 | switch (a->family) { | |
360 | ||
361 | case AF_INET: | |
362 | key_ipv4->prefixlen = a->prefixlen; | |
363 | memcpy(key_ipv4->data, &a->address, sizeof(uint32_t)); | |
364 | ||
365 | r = bpf_map_update_element(ipv4_map_fd, key_ipv4, &value); | |
366 | if (r < 0) | |
367 | return r; | |
368 | ||
369 | break; | |
370 | ||
371 | case AF_INET6: | |
372 | key_ipv6->prefixlen = a->prefixlen; | |
373 | memcpy(key_ipv6->data, &a->address, 4 * sizeof(uint32_t)); | |
374 | ||
375 | r = bpf_map_update_element(ipv6_map_fd, key_ipv6, &value); | |
376 | if (r < 0) | |
377 | return r; | |
378 | ||
379 | break; | |
380 | ||
381 | default: | |
382 | return -EAFNOSUPPORT; | |
383 | } | |
384 | } | |
385 | ||
386 | return 0; | |
387 | } | |
388 | ||
389 | static int bpf_firewall_prepare_access_maps( | |
390 | Unit *u, | |
391 | int verdict, | |
392 | int *ret_ipv4_map_fd, | |
393 | int *ret_ipv6_map_fd) { | |
394 | ||
395 | _cleanup_close_ int ipv4_map_fd = -1, ipv6_map_fd = -1; | |
396 | size_t n_ipv4 = 0, n_ipv6 = 0; | |
397 | Unit *p; | |
398 | int r; | |
399 | ||
400 | assert(ret_ipv4_map_fd); | |
401 | assert(ret_ipv6_map_fd); | |
402 | ||
403 | for (p = u; p; p = UNIT_DEREF(p->slice)) { | |
404 | CGroupContext *cc; | |
405 | ||
406 | cc = unit_get_cgroup_context(p); | |
407 | if (!cc) | |
408 | continue; | |
409 | ||
410 | bpf_firewall_count_access_items(verdict == ACCESS_ALLOWED ? cc->ip_address_allow : cc->ip_address_deny, &n_ipv4, &n_ipv6); | |
411 | } | |
412 | ||
413 | if (n_ipv4 > 0) { | |
414 | ipv4_map_fd = bpf_map_new( | |
415 | BPF_MAP_TYPE_LPM_TRIE, | |
416 | offsetof(struct bpf_lpm_trie_key, data) + sizeof(uint32_t), | |
417 | sizeof(uint64_t), | |
418 | n_ipv4, | |
419 | BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); | |
420 | if (ipv4_map_fd < 0) | |
421 | return ipv4_map_fd; | |
422 | } | |
423 | ||
424 | if (n_ipv6 > 0) { | |
425 | ipv6_map_fd = bpf_map_new( | |
426 | BPF_MAP_TYPE_LPM_TRIE, | |
427 | offsetof(struct bpf_lpm_trie_key, data) + sizeof(uint32_t)*4, | |
428 | sizeof(uint64_t), | |
429 | n_ipv6, | |
430 | BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); | |
431 | if (ipv6_map_fd < 0) | |
432 | return ipv6_map_fd; | |
433 | } | |
434 | ||
435 | for (p = u; p; p = UNIT_DEREF(p->slice)) { | |
436 | CGroupContext *cc; | |
437 | ||
438 | cc = unit_get_cgroup_context(p); | |
439 | if (!cc) | |
440 | continue; | |
441 | ||
442 | r = bpf_firewall_add_access_items(verdict == ACCESS_ALLOWED ? cc->ip_address_allow : cc->ip_address_deny, | |
443 | ipv4_map_fd, ipv6_map_fd, verdict); | |
444 | if (r < 0) | |
445 | return r; | |
446 | } | |
447 | ||
448 | *ret_ipv4_map_fd = ipv4_map_fd; | |
449 | *ret_ipv6_map_fd = ipv6_map_fd; | |
450 | ||
451 | ipv4_map_fd = ipv6_map_fd = -1; | |
452 | return 0; | |
453 | } | |
454 | ||
51283461 | 455 | static int bpf_firewall_prepare_accounting_maps(Unit *u, bool enabled, int *fd_ingress, int *fd_egress) { |
1988a9d1 DM |
456 | int r; |
457 | ||
51283461 | 458 | assert(u); |
1988a9d1 DM |
459 | assert(fd_ingress); |
460 | assert(fd_egress); | |
461 | ||
462 | if (enabled) { | |
463 | if (*fd_ingress < 0) { | |
464 | r = bpf_map_new(BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, sizeof(int), sizeof(uint64_t), 2, 0); | |
465 | if (r < 0) | |
466 | return r; | |
467 | ||
468 | *fd_ingress = r; | |
469 | } | |
470 | ||
471 | if (*fd_egress < 0) { | |
472 | ||
473 | r = bpf_map_new(BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, sizeof(int), sizeof(uint64_t), 2, 0); | |
474 | if (r < 0) | |
475 | return r; | |
476 | ||
477 | *fd_egress = r; | |
478 | } | |
51283461 | 479 | |
1988a9d1 DM |
480 | } else { |
481 | *fd_ingress = safe_close(*fd_ingress); | |
482 | *fd_egress = safe_close(*fd_egress); | |
51283461 LP |
483 | |
484 | zero(u->ip_accounting_extra); | |
1988a9d1 DM |
485 | } |
486 | ||
487 | return 0; | |
488 | } | |
489 | ||
490 | int bpf_firewall_compile(Unit *u) { | |
491 | CGroupContext *cc; | |
acf7f253 | 492 | int r, supported; |
1988a9d1 DM |
493 | |
494 | assert(u); | |
495 | ||
51283461 LP |
496 | cc = unit_get_cgroup_context(u); |
497 | if (!cc) | |
498 | return -EINVAL; | |
499 | ||
acf7f253 LP |
500 | supported = bpf_firewall_supported(); |
501 | if (supported < 0) | |
502 | return supported; | |
503 | if (supported == BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED) { | |
418cdd69 | 504 | log_debug("BPF firewalling not supported on this manager, proceeding without."); |
1988a9d1 DM |
505 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
506 | } | |
acf7f253 LP |
507 | if (supported != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI && u->type == UNIT_SLICE) { |
508 | /* If BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI is not supported we don't support any BPF magic on inner nodes (i.e. on slice | |
509 | * units), since that would mean leaf nodes couldn't do any BPF anymore at all. Under the assumption | |
510 | * that BPF is more interesting on leaf nodes we hence avoid it on inner nodes in that case. This is | |
511 | * consistent with old systemd behaviour from before v238, where BPF wasn't supported in inner nodes at | |
512 | * all, either. */ | |
513 | log_debug("BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI is not supported on this manager, not doing BPF firewall on slice units."); | |
514 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
515 | } | |
1988a9d1 DM |
516 | |
517 | /* Note that when we compile a new firewall we first flush out the access maps and the BPF programs themselves, | |
518 | * but we reuse the the accounting maps. That way the firewall in effect always maps to the actual | |
519 | * configuration, but we don't flush out the accounting unnecessarily */ | |
520 | ||
521 | u->ip_bpf_ingress = bpf_program_unref(u->ip_bpf_ingress); | |
522 | u->ip_bpf_egress = bpf_program_unref(u->ip_bpf_egress); | |
523 | ||
524 | u->ipv4_allow_map_fd = safe_close(u->ipv4_allow_map_fd); | |
525 | u->ipv4_deny_map_fd = safe_close(u->ipv4_deny_map_fd); | |
526 | ||
527 | u->ipv6_allow_map_fd = safe_close(u->ipv6_allow_map_fd); | |
528 | u->ipv6_deny_map_fd = safe_close(u->ipv6_deny_map_fd); | |
529 | ||
acf7f253 LP |
530 | if (u->type != UNIT_SLICE) { |
531 | /* In inner nodes we only do accounting, we do not actually bother with access control. However, leaf | |
532 | * nodes will incorporate all IP access rules set on all their parent nodes. This has the benefit that | |
533 | * they can optionally cancel out system-wide rules. Since inner nodes can't contain processes this | |
534 | * means that all configure IP access rules *will* take effect on processes, even though we never | |
535 | * compile them for inner nodes. */ | |
1988a9d1 | 536 | |
acf7f253 LP |
537 | r = bpf_firewall_prepare_access_maps(u, ACCESS_ALLOWED, &u->ipv4_allow_map_fd, &u->ipv6_allow_map_fd); |
538 | if (r < 0) | |
539 | return log_error_errno(r, "Preparation of eBPF allow maps failed: %m"); | |
540 | ||
541 | r = bpf_firewall_prepare_access_maps(u, ACCESS_DENIED, &u->ipv4_deny_map_fd, &u->ipv6_deny_map_fd); | |
542 | if (r < 0) | |
543 | return log_error_errno(r, "Preparation of eBPF deny maps failed: %m"); | |
544 | } | |
1988a9d1 | 545 | |
51283461 | 546 | r = bpf_firewall_prepare_accounting_maps(u, cc->ip_accounting, &u->ip_accounting_ingress_map_fd, &u->ip_accounting_egress_map_fd); |
1988a9d1 DM |
547 | if (r < 0) |
548 | return log_error_errno(r, "Preparation of eBPF accounting maps failed: %m"); | |
549 | ||
550 | r = bpf_firewall_compile_bpf(u, true, &u->ip_bpf_ingress); | |
551 | if (r < 0) | |
552 | return log_error_errno(r, "Compilation for ingress BPF program failed: %m"); | |
553 | ||
554 | r = bpf_firewall_compile_bpf(u, false, &u->ip_bpf_egress); | |
555 | if (r < 0) | |
556 | return log_error_errno(r, "Compilation for egress BPF program failed: %m"); | |
557 | ||
558 | return 0; | |
559 | } | |
560 | ||
561 | int bpf_firewall_install(Unit *u) { | |
562 | _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL; | |
9f2e6892 | 563 | CGroupContext *cc; |
acf7f253 | 564 | int r, supported; |
aa2b6f1d | 565 | uint32_t flags; |
1988a9d1 DM |
566 | |
567 | assert(u); | |
568 | ||
9f2e6892 LP |
569 | cc = unit_get_cgroup_context(u); |
570 | if (!cc) | |
571 | return -EINVAL; | |
aa2b6f1d LP |
572 | if (!u->cgroup_path) |
573 | return -EINVAL; | |
574 | if (!u->cgroup_realized) | |
575 | return -EINVAL; | |
9f2e6892 | 576 | |
acf7f253 LP |
577 | supported = bpf_firewall_supported(); |
578 | if (supported < 0) | |
579 | return supported; | |
580 | if (supported == BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED) { | |
418cdd69 | 581 | log_debug("BPF firewalling not supported on this manager, proceeding without."); |
1988a9d1 DM |
582 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
583 | } | |
acf7f253 LP |
584 | if (supported != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI && u->type == UNIT_SLICE) { |
585 | log_debug("BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI is not supported on this manager, not doing BPF firewall on slice units."); | |
586 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
587 | } | |
1988a9d1 DM |
588 | |
589 | r = cg_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, u->cgroup_path, NULL, &path); | |
590 | if (r < 0) | |
591 | return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine cgroup path: %m"); | |
592 | ||
acf7f253 LP |
593 | flags = (supported == BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI && |
594 | (u->type == UNIT_SLICE || unit_cgroup_delegate(u))) ? BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI : 0; | |
595 | ||
aa2b6f1d LP |
596 | /* Unref the old BPF program (which will implicitly detach it) right before attaching the new program, to |
597 | * minimize the time window when we don't account for IP traffic. */ | |
598 | u->ip_bpf_egress_installed = bpf_program_unref(u->ip_bpf_egress_installed); | |
599 | u->ip_bpf_ingress_installed = bpf_program_unref(u->ip_bpf_ingress_installed); | |
1988a9d1 | 600 | |
aa2b6f1d | 601 | if (u->ip_bpf_egress) { |
acf7f253 | 602 | r = bpf_program_cgroup_attach(u->ip_bpf_egress, BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS, path, flags); |
1988a9d1 DM |
603 | if (r < 0) |
604 | return log_error_errno(r, "Attaching egress BPF program to cgroup %s failed: %m", path); | |
aa2b6f1d LP |
605 | |
606 | /* Remember that this BPF program is installed now. */ | |
607 | u->ip_bpf_egress_installed = bpf_program_ref(u->ip_bpf_egress); | |
1988a9d1 DM |
608 | } |
609 | ||
610 | if (u->ip_bpf_ingress) { | |
acf7f253 | 611 | r = bpf_program_cgroup_attach(u->ip_bpf_ingress, BPF_CGROUP_INET_INGRESS, path, flags); |
1988a9d1 DM |
612 | if (r < 0) |
613 | return log_error_errno(r, "Attaching ingress BPF program to cgroup %s failed: %m", path); | |
aa2b6f1d LP |
614 | |
615 | u->ip_bpf_ingress_installed = bpf_program_ref(u->ip_bpf_ingress); | |
1988a9d1 DM |
616 | } |
617 | ||
618 | return 0; | |
619 | } | |
620 | ||
621 | int bpf_firewall_read_accounting(int map_fd, uint64_t *ret_bytes, uint64_t *ret_packets) { | |
622 | uint64_t key, packets; | |
623 | int r; | |
624 | ||
625 | if (map_fd < 0) | |
626 | return -EBADF; | |
627 | ||
628 | if (ret_packets) { | |
629 | key = MAP_KEY_PACKETS; | |
630 | r = bpf_map_lookup_element(map_fd, &key, &packets); | |
631 | if (r < 0) | |
632 | return r; | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
635 | if (ret_bytes) { | |
636 | key = MAP_KEY_BYTES; | |
637 | r = bpf_map_lookup_element(map_fd, &key, ret_bytes); | |
638 | if (r < 0) | |
639 | return r; | |
640 | } | |
641 | ||
642 | if (ret_packets) | |
643 | *ret_packets = packets; | |
644 | ||
645 | return 0; | |
646 | } | |
647 | ||
648 | int bpf_firewall_reset_accounting(int map_fd) { | |
649 | uint64_t key, value = 0; | |
650 | int r; | |
651 | ||
652 | if (map_fd < 0) | |
653 | return -EBADF; | |
654 | ||
655 | key = MAP_KEY_PACKETS; | |
656 | r = bpf_map_update_element(map_fd, &key, &value); | |
657 | if (r < 0) | |
658 | return r; | |
659 | ||
660 | key = MAP_KEY_BYTES; | |
661 | return bpf_map_update_element(map_fd, &key, &value); | |
662 | } | |
663 | ||
1988a9d1 | 664 | int bpf_firewall_supported(void) { |
93e93da5 LP |
665 | struct bpf_insn trivial[] = { |
666 | BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), | |
667 | BPF_EXIT_INSN() | |
668 | }; | |
669 | ||
670 | _cleanup_(bpf_program_unrefp) BPFProgram *program = NULL; | |
1988a9d1 | 671 | static int supported = -1; |
e583759b | 672 | union bpf_attr attr; |
1988a9d1 DM |
673 | int fd, r; |
674 | ||
e583759b | 675 | /* Checks whether BPF firewalling is supported. For this, we check five things: |
1988a9d1 DM |
676 | * |
677 | * a) whether we are privileged | |
678 | * b) whether the unified hierarchy is being used | |
679 | * c) the BPF implementation in the kernel supports BPF LPM TRIE maps, which we require | |
e583759b LP |
680 | * d) the BPF implementation in the kernel supports BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB programs, which we require |
681 | * e) the BPF implementation in the kernel supports the BPF_PROG_ATTACH call, which we require | |
1988a9d1 DM |
682 | * |
683 | */ | |
684 | ||
685 | if (supported >= 0) | |
686 | return supported; | |
687 | ||
93e93da5 LP |
688 | if (geteuid() != 0) { |
689 | log_debug("Not enough privileges, BPF firewalling is not supported."); | |
2ae7ee58 | 690 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; |
93e93da5 | 691 | } |
1988a9d1 DM |
692 | |
693 | r = cg_unified_controller(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER); | |
694 | if (r < 0) | |
695 | return log_error_errno(r, "Can't determine whether the unified hierarchy is used: %m"); | |
e583759b LP |
696 | if (r == 0) { |
697 | log_debug("Not running with unified cgroups, BPF firewalling is not supported."); | |
2ae7ee58 | 698 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; |
e583759b | 699 | } |
1988a9d1 DM |
700 | |
701 | fd = bpf_map_new(BPF_MAP_TYPE_LPM_TRIE, | |
702 | offsetof(struct bpf_lpm_trie_key, data) + sizeof(uint64_t), | |
703 | sizeof(uint64_t), | |
704 | 1, | |
705 | BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC); | |
706 | if (fd < 0) { | |
707 | log_debug_errno(r, "Can't allocate BPF LPM TRIE map, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m"); | |
2ae7ee58 | 708 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; |
1988a9d1 DM |
709 | } |
710 | ||
711 | safe_close(fd); | |
712 | ||
93e93da5 LP |
713 | if (bpf_program_new(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, &program) < 0) { |
714 | log_debug_errno(r, "Can't allocate CGROUP SKB BPF program, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m"); | |
2ae7ee58 | 715 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; |
93e93da5 LP |
716 | } |
717 | ||
718 | r = bpf_program_add_instructions(program, trivial, ELEMENTSOF(trivial)); | |
719 | if (r < 0) { | |
720 | log_debug_errno(r, "Can't add trivial instructions to CGROUP SKB BPF program, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m"); | |
2ae7ee58 | 721 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; |
93e93da5 LP |
722 | } |
723 | ||
724 | r = bpf_program_load_kernel(program, NULL, 0); | |
725 | if (r < 0) { | |
726 | log_debug_errno(r, "Can't load kernel CGROUP SKB BPF program, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m"); | |
2ae7ee58 | 727 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; |
93e93da5 LP |
728 | } |
729 | ||
e583759b LP |
730 | /* Unfortunately the kernel allows us to create BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB programs even when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF |
731 | * is turned off at kernel compilation time. This sucks of course: why does it allow us to create a cgroup BPF | |
732 | * program if we can't do a thing with it later? | |
733 | * | |
734 | * We detect this case by issuing the BPF_PROG_ATTACH bpf() call with invalid file descriptors: if | |
735 | * CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF is turned off, then the call will fail early with EINVAL. If it is turned on the | |
736 | * parameters are validated however, and that'll fail with EBADF then. */ | |
737 | ||
738 | attr = (union bpf_attr) { | |
739 | .attach_type = BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS, | |
740 | .target_fd = -1, | |
741 | .attach_bpf_fd = -1, | |
742 | }; | |
743 | ||
744 | r = bpf(BPF_PROG_ATTACH, &attr, sizeof(attr)); | |
745 | if (r < 0) { | |
2ae7ee58 LP |
746 | if (errno != EBADF) { |
747 | log_debug_errno(errno, "Didn't get EBADF from BPF_PROG_ATTACH, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m"); | |
748 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; | |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
751 | /* YAY! */ | |
752 | } else { | |
753 | log_debug("Wut? Kernel accepted our invalid BPF_PROG_ATTACH call? Something is weird, assuming BPF firewalling is broken and hence not supported."); | |
754 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; | |
755 | } | |
e583759b | 756 | |
2ae7ee58 LP |
757 | /* So now we know that the BPF program is generally available, let's see if BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI is also supported |
758 | * (which was added in kernel 4.15). We use a similar logic as before, but this time we use | |
759 | * BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI. Since the flags are checked early in the system call we'll get EINVAL if it's not | |
760 | * supported, and EBADF as before if it is available. */ | |
e583759b | 761 | |
2ae7ee58 LP |
762 | attr = (union bpf_attr) { |
763 | .attach_type = BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS, | |
764 | .target_fd = -1, | |
765 | .attach_bpf_fd = -1, | |
766 | .attach_flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, | |
767 | }; | |
768 | ||
769 | r = bpf(BPF_PROG_ATTACH, &attr, sizeof(attr)); | |
770 | if (r < 0) { | |
771 | if (errno == EBADF) { | |
772 | log_debug_errno(errno, "Got EBADF when using BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, which indicates it is supported. Yay!"); | |
773 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI; | |
774 | } | |
775 | ||
776 | if (errno == EINVAL) | |
777 | log_debug_errno(errno, "Got EINVAL error when using BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, which indicates it's not supported."); | |
778 | else | |
779 | log_debug_errno(errno, "Got unexpected error when using BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, assuming it's not supported: %m"); | |
780 | ||
781 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED; | |
782 | } else { | |
783 | log_debug("Wut? Kernel accepted our invalid BPF_PROG_ATTACH+BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI call? Something is weird, assuming BPF firewalling is broken and hence not supported."); | |
784 | return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED; | |
785 | } | |
1988a9d1 | 786 | } |