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db9ecf05 1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
15ae422b
LP
2
3#include <errno.h>
e08f94ac 4#include <linux/loop.h>
07630cea 5#include <sched.h>
15ae422b 6#include <stdio.h>
19df770f 7#include <sys/file.h>
07630cea 8#include <sys/mount.h>
07630cea 9#include <unistd.h>
3657d3a0 10#if WANT_LINUX_FS_H
25e870b5 11#include <linux/fs.h>
3657d3a0 12#endif
15ae422b 13
b5efdb8a 14#include "alloc-util.h"
10404d52 15#include "base-filesystem.h"
f4351959 16#include "chase-symlinks.h"
7f112f50 17#include "dev-setup.h"
ec61371f 18#include "devnum-util.h"
93f59701
LB
19#include "env-util.h"
20#include "escape.h"
21#include "extension-release.h"
3ffd4af2 22#include "fd-util.h"
e5f10caf 23#include "format-util.h"
e2341b6b 24#include "glyph-util.h"
e908468b 25#include "label.h"
b3d13314 26#include "list.h"
915e6d16 27#include "loop-util.h"
07630cea 28#include "loopback-setup.h"
1c265fcd 29#include "missing_syscall.h"
35cd0ba5 30#include "mkdir-label.h"
4349cd7c 31#include "mount-util.h"
049af8ad 32#include "mountpoint-util.h"
0cb8e3d1 33#include "namespace-util.h"
3ffd4af2 34#include "namespace.h"
54c2459d 35#include "nsflags.h"
d8b4d14d 36#include "nulstr-util.h"
93f59701 37#include "os-util.h"
07630cea 38#include "path-util.h"
d7b8eec7 39#include "selinux-util.h"
2583fbea 40#include "socket-util.h"
760877e9 41#include "sort-util.h"
36ce7110 42#include "stat-util.h"
8b43440b 43#include "string-table.h"
07630cea
LP
44#include "string-util.h"
45#include "strv.h"
a652f050 46#include "tmpfile-util.h"
affb60b1 47#include "umask-util.h"
ee104e11 48#include "user-util.h"
15ae422b 49
737ba3c8 50#define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
51
c17ec25e 52typedef enum MountMode {
15ae422b
LP
53 /* This is ordered by priority! */
54 INACCESSIBLE,
93f59701 55 OVERLAY_MOUNT,
b3d13314 56 MOUNT_IMAGES,
d2d6c096
LP
57 BIND_MOUNT,
58 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
ac0930c8 59 PRIVATE_TMP,
56a13a49 60 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
7f112f50 61 PRIVATE_DEV,
5d997827 62 BIND_DEV,
6c47cd7d 63 EMPTY_DIR,
5d997827
LP
64 SYSFS,
65 PROCFS,
66 READONLY,
59eeb84b 67 READWRITE,
ddc155b2
TM
68 NOEXEC,
69 EXEC,
2abd4e38 70 TMPFS,
12413985 71 RUN,
a07b9926 72 EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
93f59701 73 EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
80271a44 74 MQUEUEFS,
1e05071d 75 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
5beb8688 76 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
c17ec25e 77} MountMode;
15ae422b 78
34de407a 79typedef struct MountEntry {
5327c910 80 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
cfbeb4ef 81 MountMode mode:5;
5327c910
LP
82 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
83 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
cfbeb4ef 84 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
9ce4e4b0 85 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
ddc155b2
TM
86 bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
87 bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
088696fe 88 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
55fe7432 89 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
809ceb82
LB
90 const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */
91 char *unprefixed_path_malloc;
b3d13314 92 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
d2d6c096 93 char *source_malloc;
2abd4e38
YW
94 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
95 char *options_malloc;
96 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
088696fe 97 unsigned n_followed;
427353f6 98 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
34de407a 99} MountEntry;
15ae422b 100
94293d65 101/* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
3fe91079 102 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
5d997827
LP
103static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
104 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
105 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
106 { "/sys", SYSFS, false },
94293d65 107 { "/run", RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
5d997827 108};
f471b2af 109
11a30cec 110/* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
788e7201 111static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = {
1e05071d
YW
112 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
113 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
114 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
115 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
116 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
117 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
118 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
119 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
120 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
121 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
122 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
4e399953 123 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
1e05071d
YW
124 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
125 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
788e7201
TM
126};
127
128static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = {
1e05071d
YW
129 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
130 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
131 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
132 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
133 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
134 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
11a30cec
DH
135};
136
c575770b 137/* ProtectKernelModules= option */
34de407a 138static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
349cc4a5 139#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
c6232fb0 140 { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
c575770b 141#endif
c6232fb0 142 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
c575770b
DH
143};
144
94a7b275 145/* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
788e7201 146static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = {
94a7b275 147 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
788e7201
TM
148};
149
150static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = {
94a7b275
KK
151 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
152};
153
b6c432ca
DH
154/*
155 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
156 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
157 */
34de407a 158static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
159 { "/home", READONLY, true },
160 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
161 { "/root", READONLY, true },
b6c432ca
DH
162};
163
e4da7d8c
YW
164/* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
165static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
7d85383e
TM
166 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
167 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
168 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
e4da7d8c
YW
169};
170
b6c432ca 171/* ProtectHome=yes table */
34de407a 172static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
173 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
174 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
175 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
b6c432ca
DH
176};
177
f471b2af 178/* ProtectSystem=yes table */
34de407a 179static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
180 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
181 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
182 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
7486f305
AB
183#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
184 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
185 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
186 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 187# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
7486f305 188 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 189# endif
7486f305 190#endif
f471b2af
DH
191};
192
193/* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
34de407a 194static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
195 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
196 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
197 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
198 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
7486f305
AB
199#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
200 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
201 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
202 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 203# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
7486f305 204 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 205# endif
7486f305 206#endif
f471b2af
DH
207};
208
209/*
210 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
211 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
212 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
213 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
214 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
215 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
216 */
34de407a 217static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
1e05071d
YW
218 { "/", READONLY, false },
219 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
220 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
221 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
222 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
223 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
224 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
f471b2af
DH
225};
226
5beb8688
YW
227static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
228 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
93f59701 229 [OVERLAY_MOUNT] = "overlay",
5beb8688
YW
230 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
231 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
232 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
233 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
234 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
235 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
236 [SYSFS] = "sysfs",
237 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
238 [READONLY] = "read-only",
239 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
240 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
b3d13314 241 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
5beb8688 242 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit",
ddc155b2
TM
243 [EXEC] = "exec",
244 [NOEXEC] = "noexec",
80271a44 245 [MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
5beb8688
YW
246};
247
248DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
249
34de407a 250static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
f0a4feb0
DH
251 assert(p);
252
5327c910
LP
253 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
254 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
f0a4feb0 255
5327c910 256 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
f0a4feb0
DH
257}
258
809ceb82
LB
259static const char *mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) {
260 assert(p);
261
262 /* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */
263
264 return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p);
265}
266
267static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) {
268 assert(p);
269 assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const);
270 assert(new_path);
271
272 /* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */
273
274 free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc);
275 /* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */
276 if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc)
277 p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const;
278 p->path_malloc = new_path;
279 p->has_prefix = true;
280}
281
34de407a 282static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
cfbeb4ef
LP
283 assert(p);
284
56a13a49 285 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
cfbeb4ef
LP
286}
287
ddc155b2
TM
288static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) {
289 assert(p);
290
988bcc7c 291 return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, NOEXEC, INACCESSIBLE, SYSFS, PROCFS);
ddc155b2
TM
292}
293
294static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) {
295 assert(p);
296
297 return p->exec || p->mode == EXEC;
298}
299
d2d6c096
LP
300static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
301 assert(p);
302
303 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
304}
305
2abd4e38
YW
306static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
307 assert(p);
308
309 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
310}
311
1eb7e08e
LP
312static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
313 assert(p);
314
315 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
809ceb82 316 p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc);
1eb7e08e 317 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
2abd4e38 318 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
427353f6 319 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
1eb7e08e
LP
320}
321
d18aff04 322static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
613b411c
LP
323 assert(p);
324
1e05071d 325 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
5327c910 326
15ae422b 327 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
5327c910
LP
328 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
329 const char *e = *i;
15ae422b 330
5327c910
LP
331 /* Look for any prefixes */
332 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
333 e++;
9c94d52e 334 ignore = true;
ea92ae33 335 }
5327c910
LP
336 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
337 e++;
338 needs_prefix = true;
339 }
ea92ae33 340
baaa35ad
ZJS
341 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
342 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
343 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
15ae422b 344
34de407a 345 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910
LP
346 .path_const = e,
347 .mode = mode,
348 .ignore = ignore,
d18aff04 349 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
5327c910 350 };
15ae422b
LP
351 }
352
353 return 0;
354}
355
6c47cd7d 356static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
6c47cd7d
LP
357 assert(p);
358
359 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
360 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
361
362 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
363
364 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
365 .path_const = *i,
366 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
367 .ignore = false,
6c47cd7d 368 .read_only = true,
7d85383e 369 .options_const = "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2abd4e38 370 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
6c47cd7d
LP
371 };
372 }
373
374 return 0;
375}
376
da6053d0 377static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
d2d6c096
LP
378 assert(p);
379
fe96c0f8 380 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
d2d6c096
LP
381 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
382
383 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
384 .path_const = b->destination,
385 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
386 .read_only = b->read_only,
9ce4e4b0 387 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
d2d6c096 388 .source_const = b->source,
4ca763a9 389 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
d2d6c096
LP
390 };
391 }
392
393 return 0;
394}
395
b3d13314
LB
396static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
397 assert(p);
398
399 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
400 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
401
402 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
403 .path_const = m->destination,
404 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
405 .source_const = m->source,
427353f6 406 .image_options = m->mount_options,
b3d13314
LB
407 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
408 };
409 }
410
411 return 0;
412}
413
a07b9926 414static int append_extensions(
93f59701
LB
415 MountEntry **p,
416 const char *root,
417 const char *extension_dir,
418 char **hierarchies,
419 const MountImage *mount_images,
a07b9926
LB
420 size_t n,
421 char **extension_directories) {
93f59701
LB
422
423 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **overlays = NULL;
93f59701
LB
424 int r;
425
a07b9926 426 if (n == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories))
93f59701
LB
427 return 0;
428
24759d8f
LB
429 assert(p);
430 assert(extension_dir);
431
93f59701 432 /* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a string suitable for being
7a7d2f16 433 * passed as a lowerdir= parameter, so start with the hierarchy on the root.
93f59701
LB
434 * The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the
435 * hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */
436 STRV_FOREACH(hierarchy, hierarchies) {
437 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
438
439 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, *hierarchy);
440 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
441 return -ENOMEM;
442
443 r = strv_consume(&overlays, TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
444 if (r < 0)
445 return r;
446 }
447
448 /* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead
449 * they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */
450 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
451 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
452 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
453
454 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, i);
455 if (r < 0)
456 return -ENOMEM;
457
458 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
459 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
460
461 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
462 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
463 return -ENOMEM;
464
465 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
466 if (!escaped)
467 return -ENOMEM;
468
469 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
470 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
471 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
472 if (!lowerdir)
473 return -ENOMEM;
474
475 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
476 }
477
478 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
479 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
480 .image_options = m->mount_options,
481 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
482 .source_const = m->source,
483 .mode = EXTENSION_IMAGES,
484 .has_prefix = true,
485 };
486 }
487
a07b9926
LB
488 /* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory.
489 * Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we
490 * can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */
491 STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) {
492 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL, *source = NULL;
493 const char *e = *extension_directory;
494 bool ignore_enoent = false;
495
496 /* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */
497 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, n++);
498 if (r < 0)
499 return -ENOMEM;
500
501 /* Look for any prefixes */
502 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
503 e++;
504 ignore_enoent = true;
505 }
506 /* Ignore this for now */
507 if (startswith(e, "+"))
508 e++;
509
510 source = strdup(e);
511 if (!source)
512 return -ENOMEM;
513
514 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
515 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
516
517 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
518 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
519 return -ENOMEM;
520
521 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
522 if (!escaped)
523 return -ENOMEM;
524
525 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
526 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
527 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
528 if (!lowerdir)
529 return -ENOMEM;
530
531 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
532 }
533
534 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
535 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
536 .source_const = TAKE_PTR(source),
537 .mode = EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES,
538 .ignore = ignore_enoent,
539 .has_prefix = true,
540 .read_only = true,
541 };
542 }
543
93f59701
LB
544 /* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings
545 * set up earlier. */
546 for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) {
547 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
548
549 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]);
550 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
551 return -ENOMEM;
552
553 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
554 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy),
555 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]),
556 .mode = OVERLAY_MOUNT,
557 .has_prefix = true,
558 .ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */
559 };
560 }
561
562 return 0;
563}
564
da6053d0 565static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
2abd4e38
YW
566 assert(p);
567
b67ec8e5 568 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2abd4e38
YW
569 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
570 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
ad8e66dc 571 unsigned long flags;
2abd4e38 572 bool ro = false;
b67ec8e5 573 int r;
2abd4e38 574
baaa35ad
ZJS
575 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
576 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
577 "Path is not absolute: %s",
578 t->path);
2abd4e38 579
b67ec8e5 580 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
ad8e66dc
AJ
581 if (!str)
582 return -ENOMEM;
2abd4e38 583
ad8e66dc
AJ
584 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
585 if (r < 0)
586 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
2abd4e38 587
ad8e66dc
AJ
588 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
589 if (ro)
590 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
2abd4e38
YW
591
592 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
593 .path_const = t->path,
594 .mode = TMPFS,
595 .read_only = ro,
ad8e66dc 596 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
2abd4e38
YW
597 .flags = flags,
598 };
2abd4e38
YW
599 }
600
601 return 0;
602}
603
da6053d0 604static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
11a30cec 605 assert(p);
f471b2af 606 assert(mounts);
11a30cec 607
5327c910 608 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
f471b2af 609
fe96c0f8 610 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
34de407a
LP
611 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
612 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
5327c910
LP
613 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
614 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
615 };
f471b2af
DH
616
617 return 0;
618}
619
34de407a 620static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
c575770b
DH
621 assert(p);
622
5327c910 623 switch (protect_home) {
b6c432ca 624
5327c910 625 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
b6c432ca
DH
626 return 0;
627
b6c432ca 628 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
5327c910
LP
629 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
630
e4da7d8c
YW
631 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
632 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
633
b6c432ca 634 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
5327c910
LP
635 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
636
b6c432ca 637 default:
04499a70 638 assert_not_reached();
b6c432ca 639 }
b6c432ca
DH
640}
641
34de407a 642static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
f471b2af
DH
643 assert(p);
644
5327c910
LP
645 switch (protect_system) {
646
647 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
f471b2af
DH
648 return 0;
649
f471b2af 650 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
5327c910
LP
651 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
652
f471b2af 653 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
5327c910
LP
654 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
655
f471b2af 656 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
5327c910
LP
657 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
658
f471b2af 659 default:
04499a70 660 assert_not_reached();
f471b2af 661 }
11a30cec
DH
662}
663
93bab288 664static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
a0827e2b 665 int d;
15ae422b 666
a07b9926 667 /* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first
93f59701
LB
668 * regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */
669 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES, b->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES);
a07b9926
LB
670 if (d != 0)
671 return d;
672 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, b->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES);
93f59701
LB
673 if (d != 0)
674 return d;
675
6ee1a919 676 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
93bab288 677 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
6ee1a919
LP
678 if (d != 0)
679 return d;
15ae422b 680
6ee1a919 681 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
93bab288 682 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
15ae422b
LP
683}
684
da6053d0 685static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
4a756839 686 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
5327c910 687
fe96c0f8
SS
688 assert(m || n == 0);
689
690 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
5327c910
LP
691 char *s;
692
693 if (m[i].has_prefix)
694 continue;
695
c6134d3e 696 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
5327c910
LP
697 if (!s)
698 return -ENOMEM;
699
809ceb82 700 mount_entry_consume_prefix(&m[i], s);
5327c910
LP
701 }
702
703 return 0;
704}
705
da6053d0 706static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 707 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
15ae422b 708
c17ec25e 709 assert(m);
15ae422b 710 assert(n);
15ae422b 711
fe3c2583
LP
712 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
713
1d54cd5d 714 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
15ae422b 715
fe3c2583 716 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
088696fe
LP
717 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
718 if (previous &&
719 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
720 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
5beb8688 721 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
ddc155b2
TM
722 /* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */
723 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f);
724 previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f);
725 previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f);
1eb7e08e 726 mount_entry_done(f);
15ae422b 727 continue;
fe3c2583 728 }
15ae422b 729
e2d7c1a0 730 *t = *f;
15ae422b 731 previous = t;
fe3c2583
LP
732 t++;
733 }
734
735 *n = t - m;
736}
737
da6053d0 738static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 739 MountEntry *f, *t;
fe3c2583
LP
740 const char *clear = NULL;
741
742 assert(m);
743 assert(n);
744
745 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
746 * ordered already. */
747
1d54cd5d 748 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
fe3c2583
LP
749
750 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
751 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
34de407a
LP
752 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
753 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
1eb7e08e 754 mount_entry_done(f);
fe3c2583
LP
755 continue;
756 }
15ae422b 757
34de407a 758 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
fe3c2583
LP
759
760 *t = *f;
15ae422b
LP
761 t++;
762 }
763
c17ec25e 764 *n = t - m;
15ae422b
LP
765}
766
da6053d0 767static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 768 MountEntry *f, *t;
7648a565
LP
769
770 assert(m);
771 assert(n);
772
773 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
774 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
775
1d54cd5d 776 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
7648a565 777
1e05071d
YW
778 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
779 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
e7bf2fca 780 MountEntry *found = NULL;
7648a565
LP
781
782 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
e7bf2fca 783 for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, m); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, m))
34de407a 784 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
e7bf2fca 785 found = p;
7648a565
LP
786 break;
787 }
7648a565
LP
788
789 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
e7bf2fca 790 if (found && found->mode == f->mode) {
5beb8688
YW
791 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
792 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
e7bf2fca 793 mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode));
1eb7e08e 794 mount_entry_done(f);
7648a565
LP
795 continue;
796 }
797 }
798
799 *t = *f;
800 t++;
801 }
802
803 *n = t - m;
804}
805
da6053d0 806static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 807 MountEntry *f, *t;
cd2902c9
LP
808
809 assert(m);
810 assert(n);
811
1d54cd5d 812 /* Nothing to do */
cd2902c9
LP
813 if (!root_directory)
814 return;
815
816 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
817
1d54cd5d 818 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
cd2902c9 819
a07b9926
LB
820 /* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/systemd/unit-extensions on the host */
821 if (!IN_SET(f->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) && !path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
34de407a 822 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
1eb7e08e 823 mount_entry_done(f);
cd2902c9
LP
824 continue;
825 }
826
827 *t = *f;
828 t++;
829 }
830
831 *n = t - m;
832}
833
b2a60844
LP
834static int clone_device_node(
835 const char *d,
836 const char *temporary_mount,
837 bool *make_devnode) {
838
839 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
840 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
b5e99f23
ДГ
841 struct stat st;
842 int r;
843
414b304b 844 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
b2a60844
LP
845 if (errno == ENOENT) {
846 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
af984e13 847 return -ENXIO;
b2a60844
LP
848 }
849
850 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
b5e99f23
ДГ
851 }
852
853 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
baaa35ad
ZJS
854 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
855 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
856 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
857 d);
b5e99f23 858
6f7f3a33 859 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
b5e99f23 860
b2a60844 861 /* First, try to create device node properly */
16498617
CB
862 if (*make_devnode) {
863 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
864 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
865 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
b2a60844
LP
866 if (r >= 0)
867 goto add_symlink;
16498617
CB
868 if (errno != EPERM)
869 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
870
b2a60844 871 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
16498617
CB
872 *make_devnode = false;
873 }
874
d73020f2 875 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
1acf344d 876 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
16498617 877 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
16498617 878 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
b2a60844 879 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
16498617 880
21935150
LP
881 /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
882 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
883 * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
884 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
885 if (r < 0)
886 return r;
b2a60844
LP
887
888add_symlink:
889 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
890 if (!bn)
891 return 0;
892
893 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
ec61371f 894 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR,
cbc056c8
ZJS
895 temporary_mount,
896 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
ec61371f 897 DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
b2a60844
LP
898 return log_oom();
899
900 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
901
902 t = strjoina("../", bn);
b2a60844 903 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
2e4a4fae 904 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
b5e99f23 905
af984e13 906 return 0;
b5e99f23
ДГ
907}
908
5d997827 909static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) {
7f112f50
LP
910 static const char devnodes[] =
911 "/dev/null\0"
912 "/dev/zero\0"
913 "/dev/full\0"
914 "/dev/random\0"
915 "/dev/urandom\0"
916 "/dev/tty\0";
917
2b85f4e1 918 char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX";
12e2b70f 919 const char *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
16498617 920 bool can_mknod = true;
7f112f50
LP
921 int r;
922
923 assert(m);
924
2b85f4e1 925 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
2e4a4fae 926 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
2b85f4e1 927
63c372cb 928 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
dc751688 929 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
570fe6f1 930 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV);
21935150 931 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 932 goto fail;
21935150 933
03bc11d1 934 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0);
c3151977 935 if (r < 0) {
1ce268c7 936 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
c3151977
TM
937 goto fail;
938 }
2b85f4e1 939
63c372cb 940 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
dc751688 941 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
21935150
LP
942 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
943 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 944 goto fail;
2b85f4e1 945
2e4a4fae
YW
946 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
947 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
948 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
949 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
36ce7110 950 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
2e4a4fae
YW
951 if (r < 0) {
952 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
3164e3cb 953 goto fail;
2e4a4fae 954 } else if (r > 0) {
414b304b
ДГ
955 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
956 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
2e4a4fae 957 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
414b304b
ДГ
958 goto fail;
959 }
960 } else {
16498617 961 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
152c475f
LP
962 if (r < 0)
963 goto fail;
414b304b 964 }
e06b6479 965
63c372cb 966 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
8d953682 967 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
21935150
LP
968 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
969 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 970 goto fail;
2b85f4e1 971
63c372cb 972 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
dc751688 973 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
21935150 974 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
2b85f4e1 975
63c372cb 976 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
dc751688 977 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
21935150 978 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
2b85f4e1 979
63c372cb 980 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
2e4a4fae
YW
981 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
982 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
82d25240 983
7f112f50 984 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
16498617 985 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
37b22b3b 986 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
af984e13 987 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
2b85f4e1 988 goto fail;
7f112f50
LP
989 }
990
2e4a4fae
YW
991 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
992 if (r < 0)
105a1a36 993 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
7f112f50 994
d73020f2
LP
995 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started
996 * with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */
34de407a 997 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
ee818b89 998
9e5f8252 999 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
2e4a4fae
YW
1000 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1001 if (r < 0)
1002 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1003
21935150
LP
1004 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
1005 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 1006 goto fail;
7f112f50 1007
1019a48f
LP
1008 (void) rmdir(dev);
1009 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
7f112f50 1010
2b85f4e1 1011 return 0;
7f112f50 1012
2b85f4e1
LP
1013fail:
1014 if (devpts)
21935150 1015 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 1016
2b85f4e1 1017 if (devshm)
21935150 1018 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 1019
2b85f4e1 1020 if (devhugepages)
21935150 1021 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 1022
2b85f4e1 1023 if (devmqueue)
21935150 1024 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 1025
21935150 1026 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1019a48f
LP
1027 (void) rmdir(dev);
1028 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
7f112f50 1029
2b85f4e1 1030 return r;
7f112f50
LP
1031}
1032
2a2969fd 1033static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
5d997827
LP
1034 int r;
1035
1036 assert(m);
1037
d73020f2
LP
1038 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the
1039 * service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
5d997827 1040
645767d6
LP
1041 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1042
5d997827
LP
1043 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1044 if (r < 0)
1045 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
1046 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
1047 return 0;
1048
21935150
LP
1049 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1050 if (r < 0)
1051 return r;
5d997827
LP
1052
1053 return 1;
1054}
1055
2a2969fd 1056static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
5d997827
LP
1057 int r;
1058
1059 assert(m);
1060
645767d6
LP
1061 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1062
5d997827
LP
1063 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1064 if (r < 0)
1065 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
1066 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
1067 return 0;
1068
1069 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
21935150
LP
1070 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1071 if (r < 0)
1072 return r;
5d997827
LP
1073
1074 return 1;
1075}
1076
1c265fcd
DDM
1077static bool mount_option_supported(const char *fstype, const char *key, const char *value) {
1078 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
1079 int r;
1080
1081 /* This function assumes support by default. Only if the fsconfig() call fails with -EINVAL/-EOPNOTSUPP
1082 * will it report that the option/value is not supported. */
1083
1084 fd = fsopen(fstype, FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
1085 if (fd < 0) {
1086 if (errno != ENOSYS)
1087 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open superblock context for '%s': %m", fstype);
1088 return true; /* If fsopen() fails for whatever reason, assume the value is supported. */
1089 }
1090
1091 r = fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, key, value, 0);
1092 if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, EOPNOTSUPP, ENOSYS))
1093 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to set '%s=%s' on '%s' superblock context: %m", key, value, fstype);
1094
1095 return r >= 0 || !IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, EOPNOTSUPP);
1096}
1097
4e399953 1098static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
61f8a7bd 1099 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
4e399953 1100 const char *entry_path;
61f8a7bd 1101 int r, n;
5d997827
LP
1102
1103 assert(m);
4e399953 1104 assert(ns_info);
5d997827 1105
4e399953
LP
1106 if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1107 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
4e399953
LP
1108
1109 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
1110 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
1111 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
1112 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
1113 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
1114
1c265fcd
DDM
1115 const char *hpv = ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
1116 "off" :
1117 protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc);
1118
1119 /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
1120 * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
1121 * trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=.
1122 * fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect
1123 * hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */
1124
1125 if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv)) {
1126 opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv);
1127 if (!opts)
1128 return -ENOMEM;
1129 }
1130
1131 if (ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID && mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid"))
1132 if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
1133 return -ENOMEM;
4e399953
LP
1134 }
1135
61f8a7bd
YW
1136 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1137 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1138
1139 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
1140 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
1141 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
1142 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
1143
1144 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1145
1146 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
1147 if (r == -EINVAL && opts)
1148 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
1149 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
1150 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
1151 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
1152 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1153 if (r == -EPERM) {
24ee0f9d 1154 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount /proc, fallback to use existing /proc. */
61f8a7bd
YW
1155
1156 if (n > 0)
1157 /* /proc or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1158 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1159 return -EPERM;
1160
1161 r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path, NULL, 0);
1162 if (r < 0)
1163 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m");
ea63a260
LB
1164 if (r == 0) {
1165 /* We lack permissions to mount a new instance of /proc, and it is not already
1166 * mounted. But we can access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to
1167 * the destination, as most likely we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged
1168 * user namespace. */
1169 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/proc", entry_path, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1170 if (r < 0)
1171 return -EPERM;
1172 }
ad74f28a
YW
1173 } else if (r < 0)
1174 return r;
5d997827
LP
1175
1176 return 1;
1177}
1178
2abd4e38 1179static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
df6b900a 1180 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
abad72be 1181 int r;
abad72be 1182
6c47cd7d
LP
1183 assert(m);
1184
df6b900a 1185 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
809ceb82 1186 inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
df6b900a 1187
d73020f2
LP
1188 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new
1189 * tmpfs */
6c47cd7d 1190
abad72be
CG
1191 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1192 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
6c47cd7d 1193
21935150
LP
1194 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1195 if (r < 0)
1196 return r;
abad72be 1197
03bc11d1 1198 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0);
abad72be 1199 if (r < 0)
df6b900a 1200 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
6c47cd7d
LP
1201
1202 return 1;
1203}
1204
94293d65
LB
1205static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) {
1206 int r;
1207
1208 assert(m);
1209
1210 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1211 if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
1212 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m");
1213 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */
1214 return 0;
1215
1216 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1217}
1218
80271a44
XR
1219static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) {
1220 int r;
1221 const char *entry_path;
1222
1223 assert(m);
1224
1225 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1226
1227 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1228 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1229
1230 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1231 if (r < 0)
1232 return r;
1233
1234 return 0;
1235}
1236
93f59701
LB
1237static int mount_image(const MountEntry *m, const char *root_directory) {
1238
1239 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1240 *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL;
b3d13314
LB
1241 int r;
1242
89e62e0b
LP
1243 assert(m);
1244
93f59701
LB
1245 if (m->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES) {
1246 r = parse_os_release(
1247 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1248 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1249 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1250 "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level,
1251 NULL);
1252 if (r < 0)
1253 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
78ab2b50
LB
1254 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1255 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
93f59701
LB
1256 }
1257
1258 r = verity_dissect_and_mount(
cedf5b1a 1259 /* src_fd= */ -1, mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m), m->image_options,
60c5f700 1260 host_os_release_id, host_os_release_version_id, host_os_release_sysext_level, NULL);
b850a9b2
LB
1261 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1262 return 0;
db4c8a25
LB
1263 if (r == -ESTALE && host_os_release_id)
1264 return log_error_errno(r,
1265 "Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s%s%s%s%s",
1266 mount_entry_source(m),
1267 host_os_release_id,
1268 host_os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "",
1269 strempty(host_os_release_version_id),
1270 host_os_release_sysext_level ? " SYSEXT_LEVEL=" : "",
1271 strempty(host_os_release_sysext_level));
b3d13314 1272 if (r < 0)
4beda316 1273 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m));
b3d13314
LB
1274
1275 return 1;
1276}
1277
93f59701
LB
1278static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) {
1279 const char *options;
1280 int r;
1281
1282 assert(m);
1283
1284 options = strjoina("lowerdir=", mount_entry_options(m));
1285
1286 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1287
1288 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "overlay", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options);
1289 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1290 return 0;
1291 if (r < 0)
1292 return r;
1293
1294 return 1;
1295}
1296
088696fe 1297static int follow_symlink(
d2d6c096 1298 const char *root_directory,
088696fe 1299 MountEntry *m) {
d2d6c096 1300
088696fe 1301 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
8fceda93
LP
1302 int r;
1303
088696fe
LP
1304 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1305 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1306 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1307 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
8fceda93 1308
a5648b80 1309 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
088696fe
LP
1310 if (r < 0)
1311 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1312 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1313 return 1;
8fceda93 1314
baaa35ad
ZJS
1315 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1316 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1317 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1318 mount_entry_path(m));
8fceda93 1319
e2341b6b
DT
1320 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.",
1321 mount_entry_path(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target);
8fceda93 1322
809ceb82 1323 mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target));
8fceda93 1324
088696fe
LP
1325 m->n_followed ++;
1326
1327 return 0;
8fceda93
LP
1328}
1329
82fb2da2 1330static int apply_one_mount(
8fceda93 1331 const char *root_directory,
4e399953
LP
1332 MountEntry *m,
1333 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
ac0930c8 1334
e5f10caf 1335 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
a227a4be 1336 bool rbind = true, make = false;
15ae422b 1337 const char *what;
15ae422b 1338 int r;
15ae422b 1339
c17ec25e 1340 assert(m);
4e399953 1341 assert(ns_info);
15ae422b 1342
34de407a 1343 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
fe3c2583 1344
c17ec25e 1345 switch (m->mode) {
15ae422b 1346
160cfdbe 1347 case INACCESSIBLE: {
e5f10caf
AZ
1348 _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
1349 const char *runtime_dir;
160cfdbe 1350 struct stat target;
6d313367
LP
1351
1352 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1353 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
c4b41707 1354 * inaccessible path. */
34de407a 1355 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
6d313367 1356
088696fe
LP
1357 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1358 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1359 return 0;
1360
cbc056c8
ZJS
1361 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1362 mount_entry_path(m));
088696fe 1363 }
15ae422b 1364
e5f10caf 1365 if (geteuid() == 0)
48b747fa 1366 runtime_dir = "/run";
e5f10caf 1367 else {
48b747fa
LP
1368 if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
1369 return -ENOMEM;
e5f10caf
AZ
1370
1371 runtime_dir = tmp;
1372 }
1373
1374 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1375 if (r < 0)
baaa35ad
ZJS
1376 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1377 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
e5f10caf 1378 what = inaccessible;
c4b41707 1379 break;
160cfdbe 1380 }
fe3c2583 1381
15ae422b 1382 case READONLY:
15ae422b 1383 case READWRITE:
1e05071d 1384 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
ddc155b2
TM
1385 case EXEC:
1386 case NOEXEC:
8fceda93 1387 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
088696fe
LP
1388 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1389 return 0;
d944dc95 1390 if (r < 0)
cbc056c8
ZJS
1391 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1392 mount_entry_path(m));
1393 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
ddc155b2 1394 * and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */
6b7c9f8b 1395 return 0;
6b7c9f8b 1396 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
34de407a 1397 what = mount_entry_path(m);
6b7c9f8b 1398 break;
15ae422b 1399
a07b9926
LB
1400 case EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES: {
1401 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1402 *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1403 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1404
1405 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1406 if (r < 0)
1407 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1408
1409 r = parse_os_release(
1410 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1411 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1412 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1413 "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level,
1414 NULL);
1415 if (r < 0)
1416 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1417 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1418 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1419
06768b90 1420 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
a07b9926
LB
1421 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1422 return 0;
1423 if (r < 0)
1424 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse directory %s extension-release metadata: %m", extension_name);
1425
1426 r = extension_release_validate(
1427 extension_name,
1428 host_os_release_id,
1429 host_os_release_version_id,
1430 host_os_release_sysext_level,
1431 /* host_sysext_scope */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */
1432 extension_release);
1433 if (r == 0)
1434 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", extension_name);
1435 if (r < 0)
1436 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name);
1437
1438 _fallthrough_;
1439 }
1440
d2d6c096
LP
1441 case BIND_MOUNT:
1442 rbind = false;
d2d6c096 1443
4831981d 1444 _fallthrough_;
088696fe
LP
1445 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1446 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
5d997827 1447
cbc056c8
ZJS
1448 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1449 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1450 * root directory to chase_symlinks() here. */
088696fe 1451
a5648b80 1452 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
088696fe
LP
1453 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1454 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1455 return 0;
1456 }
1457 if (r < 0)
1458 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1459
e2341b6b
DT
1460 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.",
1461 mount_entry_source(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased);
088696fe
LP
1462
1463 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
d2d6c096
LP
1464
1465 what = mount_entry_source(m);
a227a4be 1466 make = true;
d2d6c096 1467 break;
088696fe 1468 }
d2d6c096 1469
6c47cd7d 1470 case EMPTY_DIR:
2abd4e38
YW
1471 case TMPFS:
1472 return mount_tmpfs(m);
6c47cd7d 1473
ac0930c8 1474 case PRIVATE_TMP:
56a13a49 1475 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
89bd586c 1476 what = mount_entry_source(m);
a227a4be 1477 make = true;
15ae422b 1478 break;
e364ad06 1479
d6797c92 1480 case PRIVATE_DEV:
5d997827
LP
1481 return mount_private_dev(m);
1482
1483 case BIND_DEV:
1484 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1485
1486 case SYSFS:
1487 return mount_sysfs(m);
1488
1489 case PROCFS:
4e399953 1490 return mount_procfs(m, ns_info);
d6797c92 1491
94293d65
LB
1492 case RUN:
1493 return mount_run(m);
1494
80271a44
XR
1495 case MQUEUEFS:
1496 return mount_mqueuefs(m);
1497
b3d13314 1498 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
93f59701
LB
1499 return mount_image(m, NULL);
1500
1501 case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
1502 return mount_image(m, root_directory);
1503
1504 case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
1505 return mount_overlay(m);
b3d13314 1506
e364ad06 1507 default:
04499a70 1508 assert_not_reached();
15ae422b
LP
1509 }
1510
ac0930c8 1511 assert(what);
15ae422b 1512
21935150
LP
1513 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1514 if (r < 0) {
a227a4be 1515 bool try_again = false;
a227a4be
LP
1516
1517 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
8bab8029 1518 int q;
a227a4be 1519
cbc056c8
ZJS
1520 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1521 the destination, then try again. */
a227a4be 1522
8bab8029 1523 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
a227a4be 1524
8bab8029 1525 q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
9d6d4c30 1526 if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST)
8bab8029
LB
1527 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1528 mount_entry_path(m));
1529 else
1530 try_again = true;
a227a4be
LP
1531 }
1532
21935150
LP
1533 if (try_again)
1534 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
a227a4be 1535 if (r < 0)
5dc60faa 1536 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
a227a4be 1537 }
6b7c9f8b 1538
34de407a 1539 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
6b7c9f8b 1540 return 0;
ac0930c8 1541}
15ae422b 1542
6b000af4 1543static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
9ce4e4b0 1544 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
57ccd9f6
YW
1545 bool submounts;
1546 int r;
15ae422b 1547
c17ec25e 1548 assert(m);
ac9de0b3 1549 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
ac0930c8 1550
9ce4e4b0
LP
1551 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1552 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1553 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1554 }
1555
1556 if (m->nosuid) {
1557 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1558 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1559 }
1560
1561 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
6b7c9f8b
LP
1562 return 0;
1563
9ce4e4b0
LP
1564 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1565 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1566 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1567 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1568 submounts =
1569 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1570 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1571 if (submounts)
6b000af4 1572 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
9ce4e4b0 1573 else
7cce68e1 1574 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
9ce4e4b0 1575
ddc155b2 1576 /* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
867189b5
LP
1577 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1578 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
ac0930c8 1579
8fceda93 1580 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
867189b5 1581 return 0;
763a260a 1582 if (r < 0)
9ce4e4b0 1583 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
763a260a 1584 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
763a260a 1585 return 0;
d944dc95
LP
1586}
1587
ddc155b2
TM
1588static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1589 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
57ccd9f6
YW
1590 bool submounts;
1591 int r;
ddc155b2
TM
1592
1593 assert(m);
1594 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1595
1596 if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) {
1597 new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
1598 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1599 } else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) {
1600 new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC;
1601 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1602 }
1603
1604 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1605 return 0;
1606
1607 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1608
1609 if (submounts)
1610 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1611 else
1612 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1613
1614 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1615 return 0;
1616 if (r < 0)
1617 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1618 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1619 return 0;
1620}
1621
6720e356 1622static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
57ccd9f6
YW
1623 bool submounts;
1624 int r;
6720e356
YW
1625
1626 assert(m);
1627 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1628
1629 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1630
1631 if (submounts)
1632 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
1633 else
1634 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
1635 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1636 return 0;
1637 if (r < 0)
1638 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1639 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1640 return 0;
1641}
1642
9b68367b 1643static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
5d997827
LP
1644 assert(ns_info);
1645
9c988f93
DH
1646 /*
1647 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1648 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
9b68367b 1649 * first place...
9c988f93 1650 */
5d997827 1651
9b68367b
YW
1652 return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
1653 ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
4e399953
LP
1654 ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1655 ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1656 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
5d997827
LP
1657}
1658
da6053d0 1659static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
bb0ff3fb 1660 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
2652c6c1
DH
1661 char** read_write_paths,
1662 char** read_only_paths,
1663 char** inaccessible_paths,
ddc155b2
TM
1664 char** exec_paths,
1665 char** no_exec_paths,
6c47cd7d 1666 char** empty_directories,
da6053d0
LP
1667 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1668 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
b3d13314 1669 size_t n_mount_images,
93f59701 1670 size_t n_extension_images,
a07b9926 1671 size_t n_extension_directories,
93f59701 1672 size_t n_hierarchies,
2652c6c1
DH
1673 const char* tmp_dir,
1674 const char* var_tmp_dir,
bbb4e7f3 1675 const char *creds_path,
5e8deb94 1676 const char* log_namespace,
3bdc25a4
LP
1677 bool setup_propagate,
1678 const char* notify_socket) {
2652c6c1 1679
da6053d0
LP
1680 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1681 size_t protect_system_cnt =
52b3d652 1682 (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
f471b2af 1683 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
52b3d652 1684 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
f471b2af 1685 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
52b3d652 1686 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
f471b2af
DH
1687 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1688
b6c432ca 1689 protect_home_cnt =
52b3d652 1690 (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
b6c432ca 1691 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
52b3d652 1692 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
e4da7d8c 1693 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
52b3d652 1694 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
e4da7d8c 1695 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
b6c432ca 1696
2652c6c1
DH
1697 return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
1698 strv_length(read_write_paths) +
1699 strv_length(read_only_paths) +
1700 strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
ddc155b2
TM
1701 strv_length(exec_paths) +
1702 strv_length(no_exec_paths) +
6c47cd7d 1703 strv_length(empty_directories) +
d2d6c096 1704 n_bind_mounts +
b3d13314 1705 n_mount_images +
a07b9926
LB
1706 (n_extension_images > 0 || n_extension_directories > 0 ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
1707 n_hierarchies + n_extension_images + n_extension_directories: 0) +
2abd4e38 1708 n_temporary_filesystems +
c575770b 1709 ns_info->private_dev +
788e7201
TM
1710 (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ?
1711 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
c575770b 1712 (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
788e7201
TM
1713 (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ?
1714 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
94a7b275 1715 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
5d997827 1716 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
aecd5ac6 1717 (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
91dd5f7c 1718 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
bbb4e7f3 1719 (creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
3bdc25a4
LP
1720 !!log_namespace +
1721 setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
80271a44
XR
1722 !!notify_socket +
1723 ns_info->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
2652c6c1
DH
1724}
1725
fbf90c0d
CB
1726/* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
1727 * mounts:
1728 * - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible
1729 * - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself
1730 * - that are outside of the relevant root directory
1731 * - which are duplicates
1732 */
1733static void drop_unused_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
9b68367b 1734 assert(root_directory);
f8b64b57
LP
1735 assert(n_mounts);
1736 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1737
93bab288 1738 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
f8b64b57
LP
1739
1740 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1741 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1742 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1743 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1744}
1745
df61e79a 1746static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) {
df61e79a
LB
1747 int r;
1748
1749 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) {
1750 _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL;
1751
1752 src_abs = path_join(root, *src);
1753 dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst);
1754 if (!src_abs || !dst_abs)
1755 return -ENOMEM;
1756
1757 r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755);
1758 if (r < 0)
1759 return r;
1760
1761 r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true);
1762 if (r < 0)
1763 return r;
1764 }
1765
1766 return 0;
1767}
1768
82fb2da2
LB
1769static int apply_mounts(
1770 const char *root,
1771 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1772 MountEntry *mounts,
1773 size_t *n_mounts,
df61e79a 1774 char **exec_dir_symlinks,
82fb2da2
LB
1775 char **error_path) {
1776
1777 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
1778 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
82fb2da2
LB
1779 int r;
1780
1781 if (n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */
1782 return 0;
1783
1784 assert(root);
1785 assert(mounts);
1786 assert(n_mounts);
1787
1788 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1789 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
1790 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1791 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
d60e3b40
LP
1792 r = -errno;
1793
82fb2da2
LB
1794 if (error_path)
1795 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
d60e3b40
LP
1796
1797 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
82fb2da2
LB
1798 }
1799
1800 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1801 for (;;) {
1802 bool again = false;
1803
1804 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1805
1806 if (m->applied)
1807 continue;
1808
a07b9926
LB
1809 /* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in the root_directory */
1810 r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) ? root : NULL, m);
82fb2da2
LB
1811 if (r < 0) {
1812 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1813 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1814 return r;
1815 }
1816 if (r == 0) {
1817 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1818 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1819 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1820 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
1821 again = true;
1822 break;
1823 }
1824
1825 r = apply_one_mount(root, m, ns_info);
1826 if (r < 0) {
1827 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1828 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1829 return r;
1830 }
1831
1832 m->applied = true;
1833 }
1834
1835 if (!again)
1836 break;
1837
fbf90c0d 1838 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, n_mounts);
82fb2da2
LB
1839 }
1840
df61e79a
LB
1841 /* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the
1842 * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs symlinks.
1843 * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
1844 * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
1845 r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, exec_dir_symlinks);
1846 if (r < 0)
6d7c999a 1847 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up ExecDirectories symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
df61e79a 1848
82fb2da2
LB
1849 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1850 deny_list = new(char*, (*n_mounts)+1);
1851 if (!deny_list)
1852 return -ENOMEM;
8794e6db 1853 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
82fb2da2 1854 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
8794e6db 1855 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
82fb2da2
LB
1856
1857 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
1858 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1859 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1860 if (r < 0) {
1861 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1862 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1863 return r;
1864 }
1865 }
1866
1867 /* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */
8794e6db 1868 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
82fb2da2
LB
1869 if (IN_SET((mounts+j)->mode, EXEC, NOEXEC))
1870 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
8794e6db 1871 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
82fb2da2
LB
1872
1873 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1874 r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1875 if (r < 0) {
1876 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1877 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1878 return r;
1879 }
1880 }
1881
6720e356
YW
1882 /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
1883 if (ns_info->mount_nosuid)
1884 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1885 r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
1886 if (r < 0) {
1887 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1888 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1889 return r;
1890 }
1891 }
1892
82fb2da2
LB
1893 return 1;
1894}
1895
c8c535d5
LP
1896static bool root_read_only(
1897 char **read_only_paths,
1898 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1899
1900 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1901
1902 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1903 return true;
1904
de46b2be 1905 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
c8c535d5
LP
1906 return true;
1907
1908 return false;
1909}
1910
1911static bool home_read_only(
1912 char** read_only_paths,
1913 char** inaccessible_paths,
1914 char** empty_directories,
1915 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1916 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1917 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1918 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1919 ProtectHome protect_home) {
1920
c8c535d5
LP
1921 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
1922 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
1923 * settings. */
1924
1925 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
1926 return true;
1927
de46b2be
TM
1928 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
1929 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
1930 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
c8c535d5
LP
1931 return true;
1932
8794e6db 1933 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
c8c535d5
LP
1934 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
1935 return true;
1936
1937 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
8794e6db 1938 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
c8c535d5
LP
1939 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
1940 return true;
1941
1942 return false;
1943}
1944
89e62e0b
LP
1945static int verity_settings_prepare(
1946 VeritySettings *verity,
1947 const char *root_image,
1948 const void *root_hash,
1949 size_t root_hash_size,
1950 const char *root_hash_path,
1951 const void *root_hash_sig,
1952 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
1953 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
1954 const char *verity_data_path) {
1955
1956 int r;
1957
1958 assert(verity);
1959
1960 if (root_hash) {
1961 void *d;
1962
1963 d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size);
1964 if (!d)
1965 return -ENOMEM;
1966
1967 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d);
1968 verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
aee36b4e 1969 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
89e62e0b
LP
1970 }
1971
1972 if (root_hash_sig) {
1973 void *d;
1974
1975 d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size);
1976 if (!d)
1977 return -ENOMEM;
1978
1979 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d);
1980 verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size;
aee36b4e 1981 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
89e62e0b
LP
1982 }
1983
1984 if (verity_data_path) {
1985 r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path);
1986 if (r < 0)
1987 return r;
1988 }
1989
1990 r = verity_settings_load(
1991 verity,
1992 root_image,
1993 root_hash_path,
1994 root_hash_sig_path);
1995 if (r < 0)
1996 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
1997
1998 return 0;
1999}
2000
613b411c 2001int setup_namespace(
ee818b89 2002 const char* root_directory,
915e6d16 2003 const char* root_image,
18d73705 2004 const MountOptions *root_image_options,
bb0ff3fb 2005 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
2a624c36
AP
2006 char** read_write_paths,
2007 char** read_only_paths,
2008 char** inaccessible_paths,
ddc155b2
TM
2009 char** exec_paths,
2010 char** no_exec_paths,
6c47cd7d 2011 char** empty_directories,
df61e79a 2012 char** exec_dir_symlinks,
d2d6c096 2013 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
da6053d0 2014 size_t n_bind_mounts,
2abd4e38 2015 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
da6053d0 2016 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
b3d13314
LB
2017 const MountImage *mount_images,
2018 size_t n_mount_images,
a004cb4c
LP
2019 const char* tmp_dir,
2020 const char* var_tmp_dir,
bbb4e7f3 2021 const char *creds_path,
91dd5f7c 2022 const char *log_namespace,
915e6d16 2023 unsigned long mount_flags,
0389f4fa
LB
2024 const void *root_hash,
2025 size_t root_hash_size,
2026 const char *root_hash_path,
d4d55b0d
LB
2027 const void *root_hash_sig,
2028 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
2029 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
89e62e0b 2030 const char *verity_data_path,
93f59701
LB
2031 const MountImage *extension_images,
2032 size_t n_extension_images,
a07b9926 2033 char **extension_directories,
5e8deb94
LB
2034 const char *propagate_dir,
2035 const char *incoming_dir,
24759d8f 2036 const char *extension_dir,
3bdc25a4 2037 const char *notify_socket,
7cc5ef5f 2038 char **error_path) {
15ae422b 2039
915e6d16
LP
2040 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
2041 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
aee36b4e 2042 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
93f59701 2043 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
5f7a690a 2044 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
5e8deb94 2045 bool require_prefix = false, setup_propagate = false;
24759d8f 2046 const char *root;
9cb1709b
LP
2047 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
2048 DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
2049 DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
2050 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
2051 DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
2052 DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
c65f854a
LP
2053 DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
2054 DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS;
89e62e0b
LP
2055 size_t n_mounts;
2056 int r;
15ae422b 2057
915e6d16
LP
2058 assert(ns_info);
2059
cdf42f9b
LP
2060 /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
2061 * we configure take effect */
2062 BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
2063
5e8deb94
LB
2064 if (!isempty(propagate_dir) && !isempty(incoming_dir))
2065 setup_propagate = true;
2066
613b411c 2067 if (mount_flags == 0)
c17ec25e 2068 mount_flags = MS_SHARED;
ac0930c8 2069
915e6d16 2070 if (root_image) {
c8c535d5
LP
2071 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
2072 if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
52b3d652 2073 ns_info->protect_system) &&
c8c535d5
LP
2074 home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
2075 bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
52b3d652 2076 ns_info->protect_home) &&
c9ef8573 2077 strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
915e6d16
LP
2078 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
2079
89e62e0b
LP
2080 r = verity_settings_prepare(
2081 &verity,
2082 root_image,
2083 root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_path,
2084 root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, root_hash_sig_path,
2085 verity_data_path);
915e6d16 2086 if (r < 0)
89e62e0b
LP
2087 return r;
2088
2089 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity.data_path);
915e6d16 2090
89e62e0b
LP
2091 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
2092 root_image,
ef9c184d 2093 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
89e62e0b 2094 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
7f52206a 2095 LOCK_SH,
89e62e0b 2096 &loop_device);
78ebe980 2097 if (r < 0)
89e62e0b
LP
2098 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
2099
bad31660
YW
2100 r = dissect_loop_device(
2101 loop_device,
89e62e0b
LP
2102 &verity,
2103 root_image_options,
2104 dissect_image_flags,
2105 &dissected_image);
78ebe980 2106 if (r < 0)
763a260a 2107 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
78ebe980 2108
88b3300f
LP
2109 r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
2110 dissected_image,
2111 loop_device->fd,
2112 &verity);
2113 if (r < 0)
2114 return r;
2115
89e62e0b
LP
2116 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
2117 dissected_image,
2118 NULL,
2119 &verity,
e330f97a 2120 dissect_image_flags);
915e6d16 2121 if (r < 0)
763a260a 2122 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
915e6d16
LP
2123 }
2124
e908468b
LP
2125 if (root_directory)
2126 root = root_directory;
0722b359 2127 else {
77f16dbd
DDM
2128 /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
2129 * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
2130 * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */
2131 (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
2132
d73020f2
LP
2133 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly
2134 * in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured
2135 * my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is
2136 * safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each
2137 * other. */
e908468b
LP
2138
2139 root = "/run/systemd/unit-root";
2140 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700);
d18aff04 2141 require_prefix = true;
0722b359 2142 }
e908468b 2143
a07b9926 2144 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) {
93f59701
LB
2145 r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies);
2146 if (r < 0)
2147 return r;
2148 }
2149
cfbeb4ef
LP
2150 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
2151 ns_info,
2152 read_write_paths,
2153 read_only_paths,
2154 inaccessible_paths,
ddc155b2
TM
2155 exec_paths,
2156 no_exec_paths,
6c47cd7d 2157 empty_directories,
f5c52a77 2158 n_bind_mounts,
2abd4e38 2159 n_temporary_filesystems,
b3d13314 2160 n_mount_images,
93f59701 2161 n_extension_images,
a07b9926 2162 strv_length(extension_directories),
93f59701 2163 strv_length(hierarchies),
cfbeb4ef 2164 tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
bbb4e7f3 2165 creds_path,
5e8deb94 2166 log_namespace,
3bdc25a4
LP
2167 setup_propagate,
2168 notify_socket);
613b411c 2169
f0a4feb0 2170 if (n_mounts > 0) {
5f7a690a
LP
2171 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
2172 if (!mounts)
2173 return -ENOMEM;
2174
d18aff04 2175 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
613b411c 2176 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 2177 goto finish;
613b411c 2178
d18aff04 2179 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
613b411c 2180 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 2181 goto finish;
613b411c 2182
d18aff04 2183 r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
613b411c 2184 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 2185 goto finish;
7ff7394d 2186
ddc155b2
TM
2187 r = append_access_mounts(&m, exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
2188 if (r < 0)
2189 goto finish;
2190
2191 r = append_access_mounts(&m, no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
2192 if (r < 0)
2193 goto finish;
2194
6c47cd7d
LP
2195 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
2196 if (r < 0)
2197 goto finish;
2198
d2d6c096
LP
2199 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
2200 if (r < 0)
2201 goto finish;
2202
2abd4e38
YW
2203 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
2204 if (r < 0)
2205 goto finish;
2206
613b411c 2207 if (tmp_dir) {
56a13a49
ZJS
2208 bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2209
34de407a 2210 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910 2211 .path_const = "/tmp",
56a13a49 2212 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
89bd586c 2213 .source_const = tmp_dir,
5327c910 2214 };
613b411c 2215 }
7ff7394d 2216
613b411c 2217 if (var_tmp_dir) {
56a13a49
ZJS
2218 bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2219
34de407a 2220 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910 2221 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
56a13a49 2222 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
89bd586c 2223 .source_const = var_tmp_dir,
5327c910 2224 };
7ff7394d 2225 }
ac0930c8 2226
b3d13314
LB
2227 r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
2228 if (r < 0)
2229 goto finish;
2230
a07b9926 2231 r = append_extensions(&m, root, extension_dir, hierarchies, extension_images, n_extension_images, extension_directories);
93f59701
LB
2232 if (r < 0)
2233 goto finish;
2234
d46b79bb 2235 if (ns_info->private_dev)
34de407a 2236 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910
LP
2237 .path_const = "/dev",
2238 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
9ce4e4b0 2239 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
5327c910 2240 };
7f112f50 2241
788e7201
TM
2242 /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
2243 protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
2244 failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
2245 bool ignore_protect_proc = ns_info->ignore_protect_paths || ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
c575770b 2246 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
cbc056c8 2247 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
788e7201
TM
2248 protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
2249 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
2250 ignore_protect_proc);
2251 if (r < 0)
2252 goto finish;
2253
2254 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2255 protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
2256 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
cbc056c8 2257 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
c575770b 2258 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 2259 goto finish;
c575770b
DH
2260 }
2261
2262 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
cbc056c8
ZJS
2263 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2264 protect_kernel_modules_table,
2265 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
2266 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
c575770b 2267 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 2268 goto finish;
c575770b 2269 }
59eeb84b 2270
94a7b275 2271 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
cbc056c8 2272 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
788e7201
TM
2273 protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
2274 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
2275 ignore_protect_proc);
2276 if (r < 0)
2277 goto finish;
2278
2279 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2280 protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
2281 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
cbc056c8 2282 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
94a7b275
KK
2283 if (r < 0)
2284 goto finish;
2285 }
2286
d46b79bb 2287 if (ns_info->protect_control_groups)
34de407a 2288 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910
LP
2289 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
2290 .mode = READONLY,
2291 };
59eeb84b 2292
52b3d652 2293 r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
b6c432ca 2294 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 2295 goto finish;
417116f2 2296
52b3d652 2297 r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false);
f471b2af 2298 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 2299 goto finish;
417116f2 2300
9b68367b 2301 if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
cbc056c8
ZJS
2302 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2303 apivfs_table,
2304 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
2305 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
5d997827
LP
2306 if (r < 0)
2307 goto finish;
2308 }
2309
1361f015
CB
2310 /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
2311 * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
2312 * the mount option. */
aecd5ac6
TM
2313 if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
2314 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2315 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
2316 .mode = READONLY,
1361f015 2317 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
aecd5ac6
TM
2318 };
2319 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2320 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
2321 .mode = READONLY,
1361f015 2322 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
aecd5ac6
TM
2323 };
2324 }
2325
57ac6959 2326 if (ns_info->private_ipc)
80271a44
XR
2327 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2328 .path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
2329 .mode = MQUEUEFS,
2330 .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
2331 };
80271a44 2332
bbb4e7f3
LP
2333 if (creds_path) {
2334 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
2335 * everything else. */
2336
2337 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2338 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2339 .mode = TMPFS,
2340 .read_only = true,
2341 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2342 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
2343 };
2344
2345 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2346 .path_const = creds_path,
2347 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2348 .read_only = true,
2349 .source_const = creds_path,
2350 };
2351 } else {
2352 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
2353 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
2354
2355 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2356 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2357 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
2358 .ignore = true,
2359 };
2360 }
2361
91dd5f7c 2362 if (log_namespace) {
c2b2df60 2363 _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
91dd5f7c
LP
2364
2365 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
2366 if (!q) {
2367 r = -ENOMEM;
2368 goto finish;
2369 }
2370
2371 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2372 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
2373 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
2374 .read_only = true,
2375 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
2376 };
2377 }
2378
5e8deb94
LB
2379 /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
2380 if (setup_propagate)
2381 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2382 .source_const = propagate_dir,
2383 .path_const = incoming_dir,
2384 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2385 .read_only = true,
2386 };
2387
3bdc25a4
LP
2388 if (notify_socket)
2389 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2390 .path_const = notify_socket,
2391 .source_const = notify_socket,
2392 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2393 .read_only = true,
2394 };
2395
f0a4feb0 2396 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
ac0930c8 2397
5327c910 2398 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
e908468b 2399 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
5327c910
LP
2400 if (r < 0)
2401 goto finish;
2402
fbf90c0d 2403 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
15ae422b
LP
2404 }
2405
1beab8b0
LP
2406 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
2407
d944dc95 2408 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
763a260a 2409 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
1beab8b0 2410 if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS))
cbc056c8
ZJS
2411 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
2412 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
2413 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
2414 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
1beab8b0
LP
2415 r = -ENOANO;
2416
d944dc95
LP
2417 goto finish;
2418 }
1e4e94c8 2419
5e8deb94
LB
2420 /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
2421 if (setup_propagate)
2422 (void) mkdir_p(propagate_dir, 0600);
2423
3ebf0b0b
LB
2424 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories))
2425 /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
2426 * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
93f59701 2427 (void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600);
93f59701 2428
9b68367b
YW
2429 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
2430 * shows up in the parent */
2431 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
763a260a 2432 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
9b68367b 2433 goto finish;
ee818b89
AC
2434 }
2435
915e6d16 2436 if (root_image) {
e908468b 2437 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
21b61b1d 2438 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
763a260a
YW
2439 if (r < 0) {
2440 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
41bc4849
LP
2441 goto finish;
2442 }
2443
2444 /* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device
2445 * if it likes. */
2446 r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN);
2447 if (r < 0) {
2448 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m");
915e6d16 2449 goto finish;
763a260a 2450 }
915e6d16 2451
3044d343
YW
2452 r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image);
2453 if (r < 0) {
2454 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");
2455 goto finish;
07ce7407 2456 }
78ebe980 2457
915e6d16
LP
2458 } else if (root_directory) {
2459
e908468b
LP
2460 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
2461 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
763a260a
YW
2462 if (r < 0) {
2463 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
d944dc95 2464 goto finish;
763a260a 2465 }
8f1ad200 2466 if (r == 0) {
21935150
LP
2467 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2468 if (r < 0)
8f1ad200 2469 goto finish;
d944dc95 2470 }
e908468b 2471
9b68367b 2472 } else {
e908468b 2473 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
21935150
LP
2474 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2475 if (r < 0)
e908468b 2476 goto finish;
ee818b89 2477 }
c2c13f2d 2478
4e0c20de
LP
2479 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
2480 if (root_image || root_directory)
2481 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
2482
82fb2da2 2483 /* Now make the magic happen */
df61e79a 2484 r = apply_mounts(root, ns_info, mounts, &n_mounts, exec_dir_symlinks, error_path);
82fb2da2
LB
2485 if (r < 0)
2486 goto finish;
15ae422b 2487
9b68367b 2488 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
2e776ed6 2489 r = mount_pivot_root(root);
ea63a260
LB
2490 if (r == -EINVAL && root_directory) {
2491 /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
2492 * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
2493 * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
2494 * EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a
2495 * mount point) and try again. */
2496 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2497 if (r < 0)
2498 goto finish;
2e776ed6 2499 r = mount_pivot_root(root);
ea63a260 2500 }
763a260a
YW
2501 if (r < 0) {
2502 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
9b68367b 2503 goto finish;
763a260a 2504 }
ee818b89 2505
55fe7432 2506 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not
c2c13f2d
LP
2507 * reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since
2508 * what's disconnected is disconnected. */
d944dc95 2509 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
763a260a 2510 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
d944dc95
LP
2511 goto finish;
2512 }
15ae422b 2513
5e8deb94
LB
2514 /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
2515 * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
2516 if (setup_propagate) {
2517 r = mount(NULL, incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
2518 if (r < 0) {
2519 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", incoming_dir);
2520 goto finish;
2521 }
2522 }
2523
d944dc95 2524 r = 0;
15ae422b 2525
d944dc95 2526finish:
0cd41757
LP
2527 if (n_mounts > 0)
2528 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
2529 mount_entry_done(m);
613b411c 2530
5f7a690a
LP
2531 free(mounts);
2532
613b411c
LP
2533 return r;
2534}
2535
da6053d0 2536void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
d2d6c096
LP
2537 assert(b || n == 0);
2538
fe96c0f8 2539 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
d2d6c096
LP
2540 free(b[i].source);
2541 free(b[i].destination);
2542 }
2543
2544 free(b);
2545}
2546
da6053d0 2547int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
d2d6c096
LP
2548 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2549 BindMount *c;
2550
2551 assert(b);
2552 assert(n);
2553 assert(item);
2554
2555 s = strdup(item->source);
2556 if (!s)
2557 return -ENOMEM;
2558
2559 d = strdup(item->destination);
2560 if (!d)
2561 return -ENOMEM;
2562
aa484f35 2563 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
d2d6c096
LP
2564 if (!c)
2565 return -ENOMEM;
2566
2567 *b = c;
2568
2569 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
1cc6c93a
YW
2570 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2571 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
d2d6c096 2572 .read_only = item->read_only,
9ce4e4b0 2573 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
d2d6c096
LP
2574 .recursive = item->recursive,
2575 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2576 };
2577
d2d6c096
LP
2578 return 0;
2579}
2580
b3d13314 2581MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
b3d13314
LB
2582 assert(n);
2583 assert(m || *n == 0);
2584
fe96c0f8 2585 for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
b3d13314
LB
2586 free(m[i].source);
2587 free(m[i].destination);
427353f6 2588 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
b3d13314
LB
2589 }
2590
2591 free(m);
2592 *n = 0;
2593 return NULL;
2594}
2595
2596int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
2597 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
427353f6 2598 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
b3d13314
LB
2599 MountImage *c;
2600
2601 assert(m);
2602 assert(n);
2603 assert(item);
2604
2605 s = strdup(item->source);
2606 if (!s)
2607 return -ENOMEM;
2608
93f59701
LB
2609 if (item->destination) {
2610 d = strdup(item->destination);
2611 if (!d)
2612 return -ENOMEM;
2613 }
b3d13314 2614
427353f6 2615 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
c2b2df60 2616 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL;
427353f6
LB
2617
2618 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
2619 if (!o)
2620 return -ENOMEM;
2621
2622 *o = (MountOptions) {
2623 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2624 .options = strdup(i->options),
2625 };
2626 if (!o->options)
2627 return -ENOMEM;
2628
2629 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2630 }
2631
b3d13314
LB
2632 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2633 if (!c)
2634 return -ENOMEM;
2635
2636 *m = c;
2637
2638 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2639 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2640 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
427353f6 2641 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
b3d13314 2642 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
93f59701 2643 .type = item->type,
b3d13314
LB
2644 };
2645
2646 return 0;
2647}
2648
da6053d0 2649void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2abd4e38
YW
2650 assert(t || n == 0);
2651
fe96c0f8 2652 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2abd4e38
YW
2653 free(t[i].path);
2654 free(t[i].options);
2655 }
2656
2657 free(t);
2658}
2659
2660int temporary_filesystem_add(
2661 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
da6053d0 2662 size_t *n,
2abd4e38
YW
2663 const char *path,
2664 const char *options) {
2665
2666 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2667 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2668
2669 assert(t);
2670 assert(n);
2671 assert(path);
2672
2673 p = strdup(path);
2674 if (!p)
2675 return -ENOMEM;
2676
2677 if (!isempty(options)) {
2678 o = strdup(options);
2679 if (!o)
2680 return -ENOMEM;
2681 }
2682
aa484f35 2683 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2abd4e38
YW
2684 if (!c)
2685 return -ENOMEM;
2686
2687 *t = c;
2688
2689 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
1cc6c93a
YW
2690 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2691 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2abd4e38
YW
2692 };
2693
2abd4e38
YW
2694 return 0;
2695}
2696
a652f050
JR
2697static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2698 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
96603ea0 2699 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
a652f050
JR
2700 int r;
2701
2702 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2703 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2704 if (r >= 0)
2705 return 0;
2706 if (errno != ENOENT)
2707 return -errno;
2708
30443439
LP
2709 RUN_WITH_UMASK(000)
2710 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
a652f050
JR
2711 if (r < 0)
2712 return r;
2713
2714 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2715 if (r < 0)
2716 return r;
2717
96603ea0
LP
2718 /* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for
2719 * the suid bit, below. */
2720 fd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
2721 if (fd < 0)
2722 return fd;
a652f050 2723
96603ea0
LP
2724 r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777));
2725 if (r < 0) {
a652f050
JR
2726 (void) rmdir(t);
2727 return r;
2728 }
2729
96603ea0
LP
2730 r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix));
2731 if (r < 0) {
a652f050
JR
2732 (void) rmdir(t);
2733 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2734 }
2735
2736 return 0;
2737
2738}
2739
56a13a49 2740static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
613b411c 2741 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
19cd4e19 2742 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
6b46ea73 2743 sd_id128_t boot_id;
56a13a49 2744 bool rw = true;
6b46ea73 2745 int r;
613b411c
LP
2746
2747 assert(id);
2748 assert(prefix);
2749 assert(path);
2750
6b46ea73
LP
2751 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2752 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2753
2754 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2755 if (r < 0)
2756 return r;
2757
85b55869 2758 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
613b411c
LP
2759 if (!x)
2760 return -ENOMEM;
2761
a652f050
JR
2762 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2763 if (r < 0)
2764 return r;
2765
613b411c 2766 RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077)
56a13a49
ZJS
2767 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2768 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2769 rw = false;
2770 else
2771 return -errno;
2772 }
613b411c 2773
56a13a49 2774 if (rw) {
19cd4e19 2775 y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
2776 if (!y)
2777 return -ENOMEM;
2778
30443439 2779 RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000)
19cd4e19 2780 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2781 return -errno;
19cd4e19 2782
03bc11d1 2783 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0);
56a13a49
ZJS
2784 if (r < 0)
2785 return r;
19cd4e19 2786
2787 if (tmp_path)
2788 *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
56a13a49
ZJS
2789 } else {
2790 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2791 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2792 * file system. */
30443439
LP
2793 RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000)
2794 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
56a13a49
ZJS
2795 if (r < 0)
2796 return r;
613b411c 2797
3f181262
LP
2798 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2799 if (r < 0)
2800 return r;
c17ec25e 2801 }
15ae422b 2802
1cc6c93a 2803 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
613b411c
LP
2804 return 0;
2805}
2806
2807int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
56a13a49
ZJS
2808 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2809 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2810 char *b;
613b411c
LP
2811 int r;
2812
2813 assert(id);
2814 assert(tmp_dir);
2815 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2816
56a13a49 2817 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
613b411c
LP
2818 if (r < 0)
2819 return r;
2820
56a13a49
ZJS
2821 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2822 if (r < 0)
613b411c 2823 return r;
613b411c 2824
56a13a49
ZJS
2825 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2826 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2827 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
613b411c
LP
2828
2829 return 0;
2830}
2831
54c2459d
XR
2832int setup_shareable_ns(const int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) {
2833 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -1;
3ee897d6 2834 int r, q;
54c2459d 2835 const char *ns_name, *ns_path;
613b411c 2836
54c2459d
XR
2837 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2838 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2839 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2840
2841 ns_name = namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag);
2842 assert(ns_name);
613b411c
LP
2843
2844 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
76cd584b
LP
2845 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2846 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2847 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2848 * pair.
613b411c
LP
2849 *
2850 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2851
54c2459d 2852 if (lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
613b411c
LP
2853 return -errno;
2854
54c2459d
XR
2855 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2856 if (ns == -EAGAIN) {
44ffcbae 2857 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
613b411c 2858
54c2459d 2859 if (unshare(nsflag) < 0) {
613b411c
LP
2860 r = -errno;
2861 goto fail;
2862 }
2863
44ffcbae 2864 (void) loopback_setup();
613b411c 2865
54c2459d
XR
2866 ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name);
2867 ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2868 if (ns < 0) {
613b411c
LP
2869 r = -errno;
2870 goto fail;
2871 }
2872
2873 r = 1;
613b411c 2874
54c2459d
XR
2875 } else if (ns < 0) {
2876 r = ns;
3ee897d6 2877 goto fail;
613b411c 2878
3ee897d6
LP
2879 } else {
2880 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
54c2459d 2881 if (setns(ns, nsflag) < 0) {
613b411c
LP
2882 r = -errno;
2883 goto fail;
2884 }
2885
2886 r = 0;
2887 }
2888
54c2459d 2889 q = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
3ee897d6
LP
2890 if (q < 0) {
2891 r = q;
613b411c
LP
2892 goto fail;
2893 }
2894
2895fail:
54c2459d 2896 (void) lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
15ae422b
LP
2897 return r;
2898}
417116f2 2899
54c2459d
XR
2900int open_shareable_ns_path(const int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) {
2901 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -1;
51af7fb2
LP
2902 int q, r;
2903
54c2459d
XR
2904 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2905 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2906 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
51af7fb2
LP
2907 assert(path);
2908
54c2459d
XR
2909 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2910 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will
2911 * allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */
51af7fb2 2912
54c2459d 2913 if (lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
51af7fb2
LP
2914 return -errno;
2915
54c2459d
XR
2916 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2917 if (ns == -EAGAIN) {
51af7fb2
LP
2918 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2919
54c2459d
XR
2920 ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2921 if (ns < 0) {
51af7fb2
LP
2922 r = -errno;
2923 goto fail;
2924 }
2925
54c2459d
XR
2926 r = fd_is_ns(ns, nsflag);
2927 if (r == 0) { /* Not a ns of our type? Refuse early. */
51af7fb2
LP
2928 r = -EINVAL;
2929 goto fail;
2930 }
2931 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2932 goto fail;
2933
2934 r = 1;
2935
54c2459d
XR
2936 } else if (ns < 0) {
2937 r = ns;
51af7fb2
LP
2938 goto fail;
2939 } else
2940 r = 0; /* Already allocated */
2941
54c2459d 2942 q = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
51af7fb2
LP
2943 if (q < 0) {
2944 r = q;
2945 goto fail;
2946 }
2947
2948fail:
54c2459d 2949 (void) lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
51af7fb2
LP
2950 return r;
2951}
2952
6e2d7c4f
MS
2953bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2954 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2955
0fa5b831
LP
2956 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2957 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
6e2d7c4f
MS
2958 return false;
2959
6e2d7c4f 2960 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
6e2d7c4f
MS
2961 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2962}
2963
1b8689f9 2964static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
cbc056c8
ZJS
2965 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2966 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
1b8689f9 2967 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
cbc056c8 2968 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
417116f2
LP
2969};
2970
1e8c7bd5 2971DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
5e1c6154 2972
1b8689f9 2973static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
cbc056c8
ZJS
2974 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2975 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2976 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
3f815163 2977 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
1b8689f9
LP
2978};
2979
1e8c7bd5 2980DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
03c791aa 2981
6e2d7c4f 2982static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
cbc056c8 2983 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
6e2d7c4f 2984 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
cbc056c8
ZJS
2985 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2986 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2987 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
2988 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
2989 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
c3b9c418 2990 [NAMESPACE_TIME] = "time",
6e2d7c4f
MS
2991};
2992
2993DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
4e399953
LP
2994
2995static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
2996 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
2997 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
2998 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
2999 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
3000};
3001
3002DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
3003
3004static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
3005 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
3006 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
3007};
3008
3009DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);