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Commit | Line | Data |
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2b442ac8 LP |
1 | /*** |
2 | This file is part of systemd. | |
3 | ||
4 | Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering | |
5 | ||
6 | systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
7 | under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by | |
8 | the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or | |
9 | (at your option) any later version. | |
10 | ||
11 | systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but | |
12 | WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
13 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU | |
14 | Lesser General Public License for more details. | |
15 | ||
16 | You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License | |
17 | along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. | |
18 | ***/ | |
19 | ||
47091522 | 20 | #ifdef HAVE_GCRYPT |
2b442ac8 | 21 | #include <gcrypt.h> |
47091522 | 22 | #endif |
2b442ac8 LP |
23 | |
24 | #include "alloc-util.h" | |
25 | #include "dns-domain.h" | |
91e023d8 | 26 | #include "gcrypt-util.h" |
72667f08 | 27 | #include "hexdecoct.h" |
2b442ac8 LP |
28 | #include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" |
29 | #include "resolved-dns-packet.h" | |
24710c48 | 30 | #include "string-table.h" |
2b442ac8 | 31 | |
2b442ac8 LP |
32 | #define VERIFY_RRS_MAX 256 |
33 | #define MAX_KEY_SIZE (32*1024) | |
34 | ||
896c5672 LP |
35 | /* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */ |
36 | #define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE) | |
37 | ||
3a33c81b LP |
38 | /* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. RFC5155 says 2500 shall be the maximum useful value */ |
39 | #define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 2500 | |
a8f158b9 | 40 | |
2b442ac8 LP |
41 | /* |
42 | * The DNSSEC Chain of trust: | |
43 | * | |
44 | * Normal RRs are protected via RRSIG RRs in combination with DNSKEY RRs, all in the same zone | |
45 | * DNSKEY RRs are either protected like normal RRs, or via a DS from a zone "higher" up the tree | |
46 | * DS RRs are protected like normal RRs | |
47 | * | |
48 | * Example chain: | |
49 | * Normal RR → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → ... → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS | |
50 | */ | |
51 | ||
0c857028 | 52 | uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 53 | const uint8_t *p; |
0c857028 | 54 | uint32_t sum, f; |
2b442ac8 LP |
55 | size_t i; |
56 | ||
57 | /* The algorithm from RFC 4034, Appendix B. */ | |
58 | ||
59 | assert(dnskey); | |
60 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
61 | ||
0c857028 LP |
62 | f = (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.flags; |
63 | ||
64 | if (mask_revoke) | |
65 | f &= ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE; | |
66 | ||
67 | sum = f + ((((uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.protocol) << 8) + (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
68 | |
69 | p = dnskey->dnskey.key; | |
70 | ||
71 | for (i = 0; i < dnskey->dnskey.key_size; i++) | |
72 | sum += (i & 1) == 0 ? (uint32_t) p[i] << 8 : (uint32_t) p[i]; | |
73 | ||
74 | sum += (sum >> 16) & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
75 | ||
76 | return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
77 | } | |
78 | ||
dbf0b8a2 MO |
79 | int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max) { |
80 | size_t c = 0; | |
81 | int r; | |
82 | ||
83 | /* Converts the specified hostname into DNSSEC canonicalized | |
84 | * form. */ | |
85 | ||
86 | if (buffer_max < 2) | |
87 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
88 | ||
89 | for (;;) { | |
90 | r = dns_label_unescape(&n, buffer, buffer_max); | |
91 | if (r < 0) | |
92 | return r; | |
93 | if (r == 0) | |
94 | break; | |
95 | ||
96 | if (buffer_max < (size_t) r + 2) | |
97 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
98 | ||
99 | /* The DNSSEC canonical form is not clear on what to | |
100 | * do with dots appearing in labels, the way DNS-SD | |
101 | * does it. Refuse it for now. */ | |
102 | ||
103 | if (memchr(buffer, '.', r)) | |
104 | return -EINVAL; | |
105 | ||
106 | ascii_strlower_n(buffer, (size_t) r); | |
107 | buffer[r] = '.'; | |
108 | ||
109 | buffer += r + 1; | |
110 | c += r + 1; | |
111 | ||
112 | buffer_max -= r + 1; | |
113 | } | |
114 | ||
115 | if (c <= 0) { | |
116 | /* Not even a single label: this is the root domain name */ | |
117 | ||
118 | assert(buffer_max > 2); | |
119 | buffer[0] = '.'; | |
120 | buffer[1] = 0; | |
121 | ||
122 | return 1; | |
123 | } | |
124 | ||
125 | return (int) c; | |
126 | } | |
127 | ||
47091522 MO |
128 | #ifdef HAVE_GCRYPT |
129 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
130 | static int rr_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { |
131 | DnsResourceRecord **x = (DnsResourceRecord**) a, **y = (DnsResourceRecord**) b; | |
132 | size_t m; | |
133 | int r; | |
134 | ||
135 | /* Let's order the RRs according to RFC 4034, Section 6.3 */ | |
136 | ||
137 | assert(x); | |
138 | assert(*x); | |
139 | assert((*x)->wire_format); | |
140 | assert(y); | |
141 | assert(*y); | |
142 | assert((*y)->wire_format); | |
143 | ||
85aeaccc | 144 | m = MIN(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)); |
2b442ac8 | 145 | |
85aeaccc | 146 | r = memcmp(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*y), m); |
2b442ac8 LP |
147 | if (r != 0) |
148 | return r; | |
149 | ||
85aeaccc | 150 | if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) < DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 | 151 | return -1; |
85aeaccc | 152 | else if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) > DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 LP |
153 | return 1; |
154 | ||
155 | return 0; | |
156 | } | |
157 | ||
ea3a892f | 158 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( |
2b442ac8 LP |
159 | const char *hash_algorithm, |
160 | const void *signature, size_t signature_size, | |
161 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
162 | const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size, | |
163 | const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) { | |
164 | ||
165 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
166 | gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL; | |
167 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
168 | int r; | |
169 | ||
170 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
171 | ||
172 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature, signature_size, NULL); | |
173 | if (ge != 0) { | |
174 | r = -EIO; | |
175 | goto finish; | |
176 | } | |
177 | ||
178 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, exponent, exponent_size, NULL); | |
179 | if (ge != 0) { | |
180 | r = -EIO; | |
181 | goto finish; | |
182 | } | |
183 | ||
184 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&n, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, modulus, modulus_size, NULL); | |
185 | if (ge != 0) { | |
186 | r = -EIO; | |
187 | goto finish; | |
188 | } | |
189 | ||
190 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
191 | NULL, | |
192 | "(sig-val (rsa (s %m)))", | |
193 | s); | |
194 | ||
195 | if (ge != 0) { | |
196 | r = -EIO; | |
197 | goto finish; | |
198 | } | |
199 | ||
200 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
201 | NULL, | |
202 | "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", | |
203 | hash_algorithm, | |
204 | (int) data_size, | |
205 | data); | |
206 | if (ge != 0) { | |
207 | r = -EIO; | |
208 | goto finish; | |
209 | } | |
210 | ||
211 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
212 | NULL, | |
213 | "(public-key (rsa (n %m) (e %m)))", | |
214 | n, | |
215 | e); | |
216 | if (ge != 0) { | |
217 | r = -EIO; | |
218 | goto finish; | |
219 | } | |
220 | ||
221 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
d12bf2bd | 222 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) |
2b442ac8 | 223 | r = 0; |
d12bf2bd LP |
224 | else if (ge != 0) { |
225 | log_debug("RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
2b442ac8 | 226 | r = -EIO; |
d12bf2bd | 227 | } else |
2b442ac8 LP |
228 | r = 1; |
229 | ||
230 | finish: | |
231 | if (e) | |
232 | gcry_mpi_release(e); | |
233 | if (n) | |
234 | gcry_mpi_release(n); | |
235 | if (s) | |
236 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
237 | ||
238 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
239 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
240 | if (signature_sexp) | |
241 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
242 | if (data_sexp) | |
243 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
244 | ||
245 | return r; | |
246 | } | |
247 | ||
ea3a892f LP |
248 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify( |
249 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
250 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
251 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
252 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
253 | ||
254 | size_t exponent_size, modulus_size; | |
255 | void *exponent, *modulus; | |
256 | ||
257 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
258 | assert(hash); | |
259 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
260 | assert(rrsig); | |
261 | assert(dnskey); | |
262 | ||
263 | if (*(uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key == 0) { | |
264 | /* exponent is > 255 bytes long */ | |
265 | ||
266 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; | |
267 | exponent_size = | |
ac04adbe TG |
268 | ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) | |
269 | ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]); | |
ea3a892f LP |
270 | |
271 | if (exponent_size < 256) | |
272 | return -EINVAL; | |
273 | ||
274 | if (3 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
275 | return -EINVAL; | |
276 | ||
277 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3 + exponent_size; | |
278 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 3 - exponent_size; | |
279 | ||
280 | } else { | |
281 | /* exponent is <= 255 bytes long */ | |
282 | ||
283 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1; | |
284 | exponent_size = (size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]; | |
285 | ||
286 | if (exponent_size <= 0) | |
287 | return -EINVAL; | |
288 | ||
289 | if (1 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
290 | return -EINVAL; | |
291 | ||
292 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1 + exponent_size; | |
293 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 1 - exponent_size; | |
294 | } | |
295 | ||
296 | return dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( | |
297 | hash_algorithm, | |
298 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, | |
299 | hash, hash_size, | |
300 | exponent, exponent_size, | |
301 | modulus, modulus_size); | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
304 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( |
305 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
306 | const char *curve, | |
307 | const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size, | |
308 | const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size, | |
309 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
310 | const void *key, size_t key_size) { | |
311 | ||
312 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
313 | gcry_mpi_t q = NULL, r = NULL, s = NULL; | |
314 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
315 | int k; | |
316 | ||
317 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
318 | ||
319 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&r, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); | |
320 | if (ge != 0) { | |
321 | k = -EIO; | |
322 | goto finish; | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); | |
326 | if (ge != 0) { | |
327 | k = -EIO; | |
328 | goto finish; | |
329 | } | |
330 | ||
331 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, key, key_size, NULL); | |
332 | if (ge != 0) { | |
333 | k = -EIO; | |
334 | goto finish; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
338 | NULL, | |
339 | "(sig-val (ecdsa (r %m) (s %m)))", | |
340 | r, | |
341 | s); | |
342 | if (ge != 0) { | |
343 | k = -EIO; | |
344 | goto finish; | |
345 | } | |
346 | ||
347 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
348 | NULL, | |
349 | "(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))", | |
350 | hash_algorithm, | |
351 | (int) data_size, | |
352 | data); | |
353 | if (ge != 0) { | |
354 | k = -EIO; | |
355 | goto finish; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
359 | NULL, | |
360 | "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (q %m)))", | |
361 | curve, | |
362 | q); | |
363 | if (ge != 0) { | |
364 | k = -EIO; | |
365 | goto finish; | |
366 | } | |
367 | ||
368 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
369 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) | |
370 | k = 0; | |
371 | else if (ge != 0) { | |
372 | log_debug("ECDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
373 | k = -EIO; | |
374 | } else | |
375 | k = 1; | |
376 | finish: | |
377 | if (r) | |
378 | gcry_mpi_release(r); | |
379 | if (s) | |
380 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
381 | if (q) | |
382 | gcry_mpi_release(q); | |
383 | ||
384 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
385 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
386 | if (signature_sexp) | |
387 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
388 | if (data_sexp) | |
389 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
390 | ||
391 | return k; | |
392 | } | |
393 | ||
394 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
395 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
396 | int algorithm, | |
397 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
398 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
399 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
400 | ||
401 | const char *curve; | |
402 | size_t key_size; | |
403 | uint8_t *q; | |
404 | ||
405 | assert(hash); | |
406 | assert(hash_size); | |
407 | assert(rrsig); | |
408 | assert(dnskey); | |
409 | ||
410 | if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256) { | |
411 | key_size = 32; | |
412 | curve = "NIST P-256"; | |
413 | } else if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384) { | |
414 | key_size = 48; | |
415 | curve = "NIST P-384"; | |
416 | } else | |
417 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
418 | ||
419 | if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size * 2) | |
420 | return -EINVAL; | |
421 | ||
422 | if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) | |
423 | return -EINVAL; | |
424 | ||
425 | q = alloca(key_size*2 + 1); | |
426 | q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ | |
427 | memcpy(q+1, dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size*2); | |
428 | ||
429 | return dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( | |
430 | hash_algorithm, | |
431 | curve, | |
432 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, key_size, | |
433 | (uint8_t*) rrsig->rrsig.signature + key_size, key_size, | |
434 | hash, hash_size, | |
435 | q, key_size*2+1); | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
438 | static void md_add_uint8(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint8_t v) { |
439 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
440 | } | |
441 | ||
442 | static void md_add_uint16(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint16_t v) { | |
443 | v = htobe16(v); | |
444 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
445 | } | |
446 | ||
447 | static void md_add_uint32(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint32_t v) { | |
448 | v = htobe32(v); | |
449 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
450 | } | |
451 | ||
97c67192 LP |
452 | static int dnssec_rrsig_prepare(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { |
453 | int n_key_labels, n_signer_labels; | |
454 | const char *name; | |
455 | int r; | |
456 | ||
457 | /* Checks whether the specified RRSIG RR is somewhat valid, and initializes the .n_skip_labels_source and | |
458 | * .n_skip_labels_signer fields so that we can use them later on. */ | |
459 | ||
460 | assert(rrsig); | |
461 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); | |
462 | ||
463 | /* Check if this RRSIG RR is already prepared */ | |
464 | if (rrsig->n_skip_labels_source != (unsigned) -1) | |
465 | return 0; | |
466 | ||
467 | if (rrsig->rrsig.inception > rrsig->rrsig.expiration) | |
468 | return -EINVAL; | |
469 | ||
1c02e7ba | 470 | name = dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key); |
97c67192 LP |
471 | |
472 | n_key_labels = dns_name_count_labels(name); | |
473 | if (n_key_labels < 0) | |
474 | return n_key_labels; | |
475 | if (rrsig->rrsig.labels > n_key_labels) | |
476 | return -EINVAL; | |
477 | ||
478 | n_signer_labels = dns_name_count_labels(rrsig->rrsig.signer); | |
479 | if (n_signer_labels < 0) | |
480 | return n_signer_labels; | |
481 | if (n_signer_labels > rrsig->rrsig.labels) | |
482 | return -EINVAL; | |
483 | ||
484 | r = dns_name_skip(name, n_key_labels - n_signer_labels, &name); | |
485 | if (r < 0) | |
486 | return r; | |
487 | if (r == 0) | |
488 | return -EINVAL; | |
489 | ||
490 | /* Check if the signer is really a suffix of us */ | |
491 | r = dns_name_equal(name, rrsig->rrsig.signer); | |
492 | if (r < 0) | |
493 | return r; | |
494 | if (r == 0) | |
495 | return -EINVAL; | |
496 | ||
497 | rrsig->n_skip_labels_source = n_key_labels - rrsig->rrsig.labels; | |
498 | rrsig->n_skip_labels_signer = n_key_labels - n_signer_labels; | |
499 | ||
500 | return 0; | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
2a326321 LP |
503 | static int dnssec_rrsig_expired(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { |
504 | usec_t expiration, inception, skew; | |
505 | ||
506 | assert(rrsig); | |
507 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); | |
508 | ||
509 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
510 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
511 | ||
512 | expiration = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
513 | inception = rrsig->rrsig.inception * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
514 | ||
5ae5cd40 | 515 | /* Consider inverted validity intervals as expired */ |
2a326321 | 516 | if (inception > expiration) |
5ae5cd40 | 517 | return true; |
2a326321 | 518 | |
896c5672 LP |
519 | /* Permit a certain amount of clock skew of 10% of the valid |
520 | * time range. This takes inspiration from unbound's | |
521 | * resolver. */ | |
2a326321 | 522 | skew = (expiration - inception) / 10; |
896c5672 LP |
523 | if (skew > SKEW_MAX) |
524 | skew = SKEW_MAX; | |
2a326321 LP |
525 | |
526 | if (inception < skew) | |
527 | inception = 0; | |
528 | else | |
529 | inception -= skew; | |
530 | ||
531 | if (expiration + skew < expiration) | |
532 | expiration = USEC_INFINITY; | |
533 | else | |
534 | expiration += skew; | |
535 | ||
536 | return realtime < inception || realtime > expiration; | |
537 | } | |
538 | ||
ca994e85 | 539 | static int algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
fbf1a66d | 540 | |
6af47493 LP |
541 | /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into a gcrypt |
542 | * digest identifier. | |
543 | * | |
544 | * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must | |
545 | * implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in RFC6944. We | |
546 | * don't implement any algorithms that are listed as | |
547 | * "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". Specifically, we do not | |
548 | * implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and | |
549 | * GOST-ECC. */ | |
fbf1a66d LP |
550 | |
551 | switch (algorithm) { | |
552 | ||
553 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
554 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
555 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
556 | ||
557 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
e0240c64 | 558 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: |
fbf1a66d LP |
559 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; |
560 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
561 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: |
562 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
563 | ||
fbf1a66d LP |
564 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: |
565 | return GCRY_MD_SHA512; | |
566 | ||
567 | default: | |
568 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
569 | } | |
570 | } | |
571 | ||
97c67192 LP |
572 | static void dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl( |
573 | DnsResourceRecord *list[], | |
574 | unsigned n, | |
575 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
576 | usec_t realtime) { | |
577 | ||
578 | unsigned k; | |
579 | ||
580 | assert(list); | |
581 | assert(n > 0); | |
582 | assert(rrsig); | |
583 | ||
584 | for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { | |
585 | DnsResourceRecord *rr = list[k]; | |
586 | ||
587 | /* Pick the TTL as the minimum of the RR's TTL, the | |
588 | * RR's original TTL according to the RRSIG and the | |
589 | * RRSIG's own TTL, see RFC 4035, Section 5.3.3 */ | |
590 | rr->ttl = MIN3(rr->ttl, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl, rrsig->ttl); | |
591 | rr->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
592 | ||
593 | /* Copy over information about the signer and wildcard source of synthesis */ | |
594 | rr->n_skip_labels_source = rrsig->n_skip_labels_source; | |
595 | rr->n_skip_labels_signer = rrsig->n_skip_labels_signer; | |
596 | } | |
597 | ||
598 | rrsig->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
599 | } | |
600 | ||
2a326321 LP |
601 | int dnssec_verify_rrset( |
602 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 603 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 LP |
604 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, |
605 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, | |
547973de LP |
606 | usec_t realtime, |
607 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2a326321 | 608 | |
2b442ac8 | 609 | uint8_t wire_format_name[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
2b442ac8 | 610 | DnsResourceRecord **list, *rr; |
588c53d0 | 611 | const char *source, *name; |
2b442ac8 | 612 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; |
ca994e85 | 613 | int r, md_algorithm; |
2b442ac8 | 614 | size_t k, n = 0; |
588c53d0 LP |
615 | size_t hash_size; |
616 | void *hash; | |
7715f91d | 617 | bool wildcard; |
2b442ac8 LP |
618 | |
619 | assert(key); | |
620 | assert(rrsig); | |
621 | assert(dnskey); | |
547973de | 622 | assert(result); |
2a326321 LP |
623 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); |
624 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
2b442ac8 | 625 | |
c629ff58 | 626 | /* Verifies that the RRSet matches the specified "key" in "a", |
2b442ac8 | 627 | * using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's |
c629ff58 | 628 | * assumed that RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */ |
2b442ac8 | 629 | |
ca994e85 LP |
630 | md_algorithm = algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); |
631 | if (md_algorithm == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | |
203f1b35 LP |
632 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; |
633 | return 0; | |
634 | } | |
ca994e85 LP |
635 | if (md_algorithm < 0) |
636 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 637 | |
97c67192 LP |
638 | r = dnssec_rrsig_prepare(rrsig); |
639 | if (r == -EINVAL) { | |
640 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; | |
641 | return r; | |
642 | } | |
643 | if (r < 0) | |
644 | return r; | |
645 | ||
2a326321 LP |
646 | r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime); |
647 | if (r < 0) | |
648 | return r; | |
547973de LP |
649 | if (r > 0) { |
650 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
651 | return 0; | |
652 | } | |
2a326321 | 653 | |
1c02e7ba | 654 | name = dns_resource_key_name(key); |
588c53d0 LP |
655 | |
656 | /* Some keys may only appear signed in the zone apex, and are invalid anywhere else. (SOA, NS...) */ | |
657 | if (dns_type_apex_only(rrsig->rrsig.type_covered)) { | |
658 | r = dns_name_equal(rrsig->rrsig.signer, name); | |
659 | if (r < 0) | |
660 | return r; | |
661 | if (r == 0) { | |
662 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; | |
663 | return 0; | |
664 | } | |
665 | } | |
666 | ||
667 | /* OTOH DS RRs may not appear in the zone apex, but are valid everywhere else. */ | |
668 | if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered == DNS_TYPE_DS) { | |
669 | r = dns_name_equal(rrsig->rrsig.signer, name); | |
670 | if (r < 0) | |
671 | return r; | |
672 | if (r > 0) { | |
673 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; | |
674 | return 0; | |
675 | } | |
676 | } | |
677 | ||
7715f91d | 678 | /* Determine the "Source of Synthesis" and whether this is a wildcard RRSIG */ |
588c53d0 | 679 | r = dns_name_suffix(name, rrsig->rrsig.labels, &source); |
7715f91d LP |
680 | if (r < 0) |
681 | return r; | |
e8233bce LP |
682 | if (r > 0 && !dns_type_may_wildcard(rrsig->rrsig.type_covered)) { |
683 | /* We refuse to validate NSEC3 or SOA RRs that are synthesized from wildcards */ | |
684 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; | |
685 | return 0; | |
686 | } | |
7160eb1b LP |
687 | if (r == 1) { |
688 | /* If we stripped a single label, then let's see if that maybe was "*". If so, we are not really | |
689 | * synthesized from a wildcard, we are the wildcard itself. Treat that like a normal name. */ | |
588c53d0 | 690 | r = dns_name_startswith(name, "*"); |
7160eb1b LP |
691 | if (r < 0) |
692 | return r; | |
693 | if (r > 0) | |
588c53d0 | 694 | source = name; |
7160eb1b LP |
695 | |
696 | wildcard = r == 0; | |
697 | } else | |
698 | wildcard = r > 0; | |
7715f91d | 699 | |
2b442ac8 | 700 | /* Collect all relevant RRs in a single array, so that we can look at the RRset */ |
0f23174c | 701 | list = newa(DnsResourceRecord *, dns_answer_size(a)); |
2b442ac8 LP |
702 | |
703 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
704 | r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); | |
705 | if (r < 0) | |
706 | return r; | |
707 | if (r == 0) | |
708 | continue; | |
709 | ||
710 | /* We need the wire format for ordering, and digest calculation */ | |
711 | r = dns_resource_record_to_wire_format(rr, true); | |
712 | if (r < 0) | |
713 | return r; | |
714 | ||
715 | list[n++] = rr; | |
935a999f TG |
716 | |
717 | if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) | |
718 | return -E2BIG; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
719 | } |
720 | ||
721 | if (n <= 0) | |
722 | return -ENODATA; | |
723 | ||
724 | /* Bring the RRs into canonical order */ | |
6c5e8fbf | 725 | qsort_safe(list, n, sizeof(DnsResourceRecord*), rr_compare); |
2b442ac8 LP |
726 | |
727 | /* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */ | |
91e023d8 | 728 | initialize_libgcrypt(false); |
2b442ac8 | 729 | |
ca994e85 | 730 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
fbf1a66d | 731 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 732 | |
ca994e85 | 733 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
734 | if (!md) |
735 | return -EIO; | |
736 | ||
737 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.type_covered); | |
738 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); | |
739 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.labels); | |
740 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
741 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.expiration); | |
742 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.inception); | |
743 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.key_tag); | |
744 | ||
745 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(rrsig->rrsig.signer, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
746 | if (r < 0) | |
747 | goto finish; | |
748 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); | |
749 | ||
7715f91d LP |
750 | /* Convert the source of synthesis into wire format */ |
751 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(source, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
752 | if (r < 0) | |
753 | goto finish; | |
754 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
755 | for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { |
756 | size_t l; | |
7715f91d | 757 | |
2b442ac8 LP |
758 | rr = list[k]; |
759 | ||
7715f91d LP |
760 | /* Hash the source of synthesis. If this is a wildcard, then prefix it with the *. label */ |
761 | if (wildcard) | |
e7ff0e0b | 762 | gcry_md_write(md, (uint8_t[]) { 1, '*'}, 2); |
2b442ac8 LP |
763 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); |
764 | ||
765 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->type); | |
766 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->class); | |
767 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
768 | ||
85aeaccc | 769 | l = DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(rr); |
2b442ac8 LP |
770 | assert(l <= 0xFFFF); |
771 | ||
772 | md_add_uint16(md, (uint16_t) l); | |
85aeaccc | 773 | gcry_md_write(md, DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(rr), l); |
2b442ac8 LP |
774 | } |
775 | ||
776 | hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
777 | if (!hash) { | |
778 | r = -EIO; | |
779 | goto finish; | |
780 | } | |
781 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
782 | switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { |
783 | ||
784 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
785 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
786 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
787 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: | |
788 | r = dnssec_rsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 789 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
790 | hash, hash_size, |
791 | rrsig, | |
792 | dnskey); | |
793 | break; | |
794 | ||
795 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: | |
796 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: | |
797 | r = dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 798 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
799 | rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, |
800 | hash, hash_size, | |
801 | rrsig, | |
802 | dnskey); | |
803 | break; | |
804 | } | |
805 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
806 | if (r < 0) |
807 | goto finish; | |
808 | ||
97c67192 LP |
809 | /* Now, fix the ttl, expiry, and remember the synthesizing source and the signer */ |
810 | if (r > 0) | |
811 | dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(list, n, rrsig, realtime); | |
812 | ||
813 | if (r == 0) | |
0c7bff0a LP |
814 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; |
815 | else if (wildcard) | |
816 | *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD; | |
817 | else | |
818 | *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; | |
97c67192 | 819 | |
547973de | 820 | r = 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
821 | |
822 | finish: | |
823 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
824 | return r; | |
825 | } | |
826 | ||
0c857028 | 827 | int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
828 | |
829 | assert(rrsig); | |
830 | assert(dnskey); | |
831 | ||
832 | /* Checks if the specified DNSKEY RR matches the key used for | |
833 | * the signature in the specified RRSIG RR */ | |
834 | ||
835 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
836 | return -EINVAL; | |
837 | ||
838 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
839 | return 0; | |
840 | if (dnskey->key->class != rrsig->key->class) | |
841 | return 0; | |
842 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
843 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 844 | if (!revoked_ok && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
28b8191e | 845 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
846 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
847 | return 0; | |
848 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) | |
849 | return 0; | |
850 | ||
0c857028 | 851 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, false) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
852 | return 0; |
853 | ||
1c02e7ba | 854 | return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); |
2b442ac8 LP |
855 | } |
856 | ||
105e1512 | 857 | int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
858 | assert(key); |
859 | assert(rrsig); | |
860 | ||
861 | /* Checks if the specified RRSIG RR protects the RRSet of the specified RR key. */ | |
862 | ||
863 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
864 | return 0; | |
865 | if (rrsig->key->class != key->class) | |
866 | return 0; | |
867 | if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type) | |
868 | return 0; | |
869 | ||
1c02e7ba | 870 | return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key), dns_resource_key_name(key)); |
2b442ac8 LP |
871 | } |
872 | ||
2a326321 LP |
873 | int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( |
874 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 875 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 | 876 | DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, |
547973de | 877 | usec_t realtime, |
0c7bff0a LP |
878 | DnssecResult *result, |
879 | DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) { | |
2a326321 | 880 | |
203f1b35 | 881 | bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false; |
2b442ac8 LP |
882 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; |
883 | int r; | |
884 | ||
885 | assert(key); | |
547973de | 886 | assert(result); |
2b442ac8 | 887 | |
105e1512 | 888 | /* Verifies all RRs from "a" that match the key "key" against DNSKEYs in "validated_dnskeys" */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
889 | |
890 | if (!a || a->n_rrs <= 0) | |
891 | return -ENODATA; | |
892 | ||
893 | /* Iterate through each RRSIG RR. */ | |
894 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, a) { | |
895 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey; | |
105e1512 | 896 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
2b442ac8 | 897 | |
203f1b35 | 898 | /* Is this an RRSIG RR that applies to RRs matching our key? */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
899 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rrsig); |
900 | if (r < 0) | |
901 | return r; | |
902 | if (r == 0) | |
903 | continue; | |
904 | ||
905 | found_rrsig = true; | |
906 | ||
547973de | 907 | /* Look for a matching key */ |
105e1512 | 908 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(dnskey, flags, validated_dnskeys) { |
547973de | 909 | DnssecResult one_result; |
2b442ac8 | 910 | |
105e1512 LP |
911 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) |
912 | continue; | |
913 | ||
203f1b35 | 914 | /* Is this a DNSKEY RR that matches they key of our RRSIG? */ |
0c857028 | 915 | r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, false); |
2b442ac8 LP |
916 | if (r < 0) |
917 | return r; | |
918 | if (r == 0) | |
919 | continue; | |
920 | ||
2a326321 LP |
921 | /* Take the time here, if it isn't set yet, so |
922 | * that we do all validations with the same | |
923 | * time. */ | |
924 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
925 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
926 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
927 | /* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching |
928 | * DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of | |
929 | * the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY | |
930 | * combination. */ | |
931 | ||
547973de | 932 | r = dnssec_verify_rrset(a, key, rrsig, dnskey, realtime, &one_result); |
203f1b35 | 933 | if (r < 0) |
2b442ac8 | 934 | return r; |
203f1b35 LP |
935 | |
936 | switch (one_result) { | |
937 | ||
938 | case DNSSEC_VALIDATED: | |
0c7bff0a | 939 | case DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD: |
203f1b35 | 940 | /* Yay, the RR has been validated, |
ee3d6aff | 941 | * return immediately, but fix up the expiry */ |
0c7bff0a LP |
942 | if (ret_rrsig) |
943 | *ret_rrsig = rrsig; | |
944 | ||
945 | *result = one_result; | |
547973de | 946 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 | 947 | |
203f1b35 LP |
948 | case DNSSEC_INVALID: |
949 | /* If the signature is invalid, let's try another | |
950 | key and/or signature. After all they | |
951 | key_tags and stuff are not unique, and | |
952 | might be shared by multiple keys. */ | |
953 | found_invalid = true; | |
954 | continue; | |
955 | ||
956 | case DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: | |
957 | /* If the key algorithm is | |
958 | unsupported, try another | |
959 | RRSIG/DNSKEY pair, but remember we | |
960 | encountered this, so that we can | |
961 | return a proper error when we | |
962 | encounter nothing better. */ | |
963 | found_unsupported_algorithm = true; | |
964 | continue; | |
965 | ||
966 | case DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED: | |
967 | /* If the signature is expired, try | |
968 | another one, but remember it, so | |
969 | that we can return this */ | |
970 | found_expired_rrsig = true; | |
971 | continue; | |
972 | ||
973 | default: | |
974 | assert_not_reached("Unexpected DNSSEC validation result"); | |
975 | } | |
2b442ac8 LP |
976 | } |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
203f1b35 LP |
979 | if (found_expired_rrsig) |
980 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
981 | else if (found_unsupported_algorithm) | |
982 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
983 | else if (found_invalid) | |
547973de LP |
984 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; |
985 | else if (found_rrsig) | |
986 | *result = DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY; | |
987 | else | |
988 | *result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; | |
2b442ac8 | 989 | |
0c7bff0a LP |
990 | if (ret_rrsig) |
991 | *ret_rrsig = NULL; | |
992 | ||
547973de | 993 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
994 | } |
995 | ||
105e1512 LP |
996 | int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { |
997 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; | |
998 | int r; | |
999 | ||
1000 | /* Checks whether there's at least one RRSIG in 'a' that proctects RRs of the specified key */ | |
1001 | ||
1002 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
1003 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rr); | |
1004 | if (r < 0) | |
1005 | return r; | |
1006 | if (r > 0) | |
1007 | return 1; | |
1008 | } | |
1009 | ||
1010 | return 0; | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | ||
ca994e85 | 1013 | static int digest_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
a1972a91 | 1014 | |
fbf1a66d | 1015 | /* Translates a DNSSEC digest algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ |
a1972a91 LP |
1016 | |
1017 | switch (algorithm) { | |
1018 | ||
1019 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1: | |
1020 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
1021 | ||
1022 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256: | |
1023 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; | |
1024 | ||
af22c65b LP |
1025 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384: |
1026 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
1027 | ||
a1972a91 LP |
1028 | default: |
1029 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
1030 | } | |
1031 | } | |
1032 | ||
96bb7673 | 1033 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 1034 | char owner_name[DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
a1972a91 LP |
1035 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; |
1036 | size_t hash_size; | |
ca994e85 | 1037 | int md_algorithm, r; |
2b442ac8 | 1038 | void *result; |
2b442ac8 LP |
1039 | |
1040 | assert(dnskey); | |
1041 | assert(ds); | |
1042 | ||
1043 | /* Implements DNSKEY verification by a DS, according to RFC 4035, section 5.2 */ | |
1044 | ||
1045 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
1046 | return -EINVAL; | |
1047 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
1048 | return -EINVAL; | |
1049 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
1050 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
0c857028 LP |
1051 | if (!mask_revoke && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
1052 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
1053 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
1054 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
1055 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
1056 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != ds->ds.algorithm) |
1057 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 1058 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, mask_revoke) != ds->ds.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
1059 | return 0; |
1060 | ||
91e023d8 | 1061 | initialize_libgcrypt(false); |
0638401a | 1062 | |
ca994e85 LP |
1063 | md_algorithm = digest_to_gcrypt_md(ds->ds.digest_type); |
1064 | if (md_algorithm < 0) | |
1065 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 1066 | |
ca994e85 | 1067 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
a1972a91 | 1068 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 1069 | |
a1972a91 LP |
1070 | if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) |
1071 | return 0; | |
2b442ac8 | 1072 | |
1c02e7ba | 1073 | r = dnssec_canonicalize(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), owner_name, sizeof(owner_name)); |
a1972a91 LP |
1074 | if (r < 0) |
1075 | return r; | |
2b442ac8 | 1076 | |
ca994e85 | 1077 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
1078 | if (!md) |
1079 | return -EIO; | |
1080 | ||
2b442ac8 | 1081 | gcry_md_write(md, owner_name, r); |
0c857028 LP |
1082 | if (mask_revoke) |
1083 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); | |
1084 | else | |
1085 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
1086 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); |
1087 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
1088 | gcry_md_write(md, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size); | |
1089 | ||
1090 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1091 | if (!result) { | |
1092 | r = -EIO; | |
1093 | goto finish; | |
1094 | } | |
1095 | ||
1096 | r = memcmp(result, ds->ds.digest, ds->ds.digest_size) != 0; | |
1097 | ||
1098 | finish: | |
1099 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1100 | return r; | |
1101 | } | |
24710c48 | 1102 | |
96bb7673 | 1103 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { |
547973de | 1104 | DnsResourceRecord *ds; |
105e1512 | 1105 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
547973de LP |
1106 | int r; |
1107 | ||
1108 | assert(dnskey); | |
1109 | ||
1110 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
1111 | return 0; | |
1112 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1113 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(ds, flags, validated_ds) { |
1114 | ||
1115 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) | |
1116 | continue; | |
547973de LP |
1117 | |
1118 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
1119 | continue; | |
d1c4ee32 LP |
1120 | if (ds->key->class != dnskey->key->class) |
1121 | continue; | |
1122 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1123 | r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), dns_resource_key_name(ds->key)); |
d1c4ee32 LP |
1124 | if (r < 0) |
1125 | return r; | |
1126 | if (r == 0) | |
1127 | continue; | |
1128 | ||
96bb7673 | 1129 | r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(dnskey, ds, false); |
54b778e7 LP |
1130 | if (IN_SET(r, -EKEYREJECTED, -EOPNOTSUPP)) |
1131 | return 0; /* The DNSKEY is revoked or otherwise invalid, or we don't support the digest algorithm */ | |
547973de LP |
1132 | if (r < 0) |
1133 | return r; | |
1134 | if (r > 0) | |
1135 | return 1; | |
1136 | } | |
1137 | ||
1138 | return 0; | |
1139 | } | |
1140 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1141 | static int nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
1142 | ||
1143 | /* Translates a DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ | |
1144 | ||
1145 | switch (algorithm) { | |
1146 | ||
1147 | case NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1: | |
1148 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
1149 | ||
1150 | default: | |
1151 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
1152 | } | |
1153 | } | |
1154 | ||
1d3db294 | 1155 | int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { |
72667f08 LP |
1156 | uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
1157 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; | |
1158 | size_t hash_size; | |
1159 | int algorithm; | |
1160 | void *result; | |
1161 | unsigned k; | |
1162 | int r; | |
1163 | ||
1164 | assert(nsec3); | |
1165 | assert(name); | |
1166 | assert(ret); | |
1167 | ||
1168 | if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) | |
1169 | return -EINVAL; | |
1170 | ||
1d3db294 LP |
1171 | if (nsec3->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) { |
1172 | log_debug("Ignoring NSEC3 RR %s with excessive number of iterations.", dns_resource_record_to_string(nsec3)); | |
a8f158b9 | 1173 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1d3db294 | 1174 | } |
a8f158b9 | 1175 | |
d15ad742 | 1176 | algorithm = nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm); |
72667f08 LP |
1177 | if (algorithm < 0) |
1178 | return algorithm; | |
1179 | ||
91e023d8 | 1180 | initialize_libgcrypt(false); |
72667f08 LP |
1181 | |
1182 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm); | |
1183 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
1184 | ||
1185 | if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) | |
1186 | return -EINVAL; | |
1187 | ||
1188 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); | |
1189 | if (r < 0) | |
1190 | return r; | |
1191 | ||
1192 | gcry_md_open(&md, algorithm, 0); | |
1193 | if (!md) | |
1194 | return -EIO; | |
1195 | ||
1196 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); | |
1197 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1198 | ||
1199 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1200 | if (!result) { | |
1201 | r = -EIO; | |
1202 | goto finish; | |
1203 | } | |
1204 | ||
1205 | for (k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { | |
1206 | uint8_t tmp[hash_size]; | |
1207 | memcpy(tmp, result, hash_size); | |
1208 | ||
1209 | gcry_md_reset(md); | |
1210 | gcry_md_write(md, tmp, hash_size); | |
1211 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1212 | ||
1213 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1214 | if (!result) { | |
1215 | r = -EIO; | |
1216 | goto finish; | |
1217 | } | |
1218 | } | |
1219 | ||
1220 | memcpy(ret, result, hash_size); | |
1221 | r = (int) hash_size; | |
1222 | ||
1223 | finish: | |
1224 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1225 | return r; | |
1226 | } | |
1227 | ||
3f5ecaad | 1228 | static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsResourceRecord *nsec3) { |
db5b0e92 LP |
1229 | const char *a, *b; |
1230 | int r; | |
1231 | ||
1232 | assert(rr); | |
1233 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1234 | if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) |
1235 | return 0; | |
1236 | ||
1f133e0d | 1237 | /* RFC 5155, Section 8.2 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with flags != 0 or 1 */ |
db5b0e92 LP |
1238 | if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1)) |
1239 | return 0; | |
1240 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1241 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs whose algorithm we don't know */ |
1242 | if (nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm) < 0) | |
1243 | return 0; | |
a8f158b9 LP |
1244 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs with an excessive number of required iterations */ |
1245 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) | |
1246 | return 0; | |
d15ad742 | 1247 | |
cbd100ac LP |
1248 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs generated from wildcards. If these NSEC3 RRs weren't correctly signed we can't make this |
1249 | * check (since rr->n_skip_labels_source is -1), but that's OK, as we won't trust them anyway in that case. */ | |
1250 | if (rr->n_skip_labels_source != 0 && rr->n_skip_labels_source != (unsigned) -1) | |
93a3b929 LP |
1251 | return 0; |
1252 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs that are located anywhere else than one label below the zone */ | |
cbd100ac | 1253 | if (rr->n_skip_labels_signer != 1 && rr->n_skip_labels_signer != (unsigned) -1) |
93a3b929 LP |
1254 | return 0; |
1255 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1256 | if (!nsec3) |
1257 | return 1; | |
1258 | ||
1259 | /* If a second NSEC3 RR is specified, also check if they are from the same zone. */ | |
1260 | ||
1261 | if (nsec3 == rr) /* Shortcut */ | |
1262 | return 1; | |
1263 | ||
1264 | if (rr->key->class != nsec3->key->class) | |
1265 | return 0; | |
1266 | if (rr->nsec3.algorithm != nsec3->nsec3.algorithm) | |
1267 | return 0; | |
1268 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations != nsec3->nsec3.iterations) | |
1269 | return 0; | |
1270 | if (rr->nsec3.salt_size != nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) | |
1271 | return 0; | |
1272 | if (memcmp(rr->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt, rr->nsec3.salt_size) != 0) | |
1273 | return 0; | |
1274 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1275 | a = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); |
db5b0e92 LP |
1276 | r = dns_name_parent(&a); /* strip off hash */ |
1277 | if (r < 0) | |
1278 | return r; | |
1279 | if (r == 0) | |
1280 | return 0; | |
1281 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1282 | b = dns_resource_key_name(nsec3->key); |
db5b0e92 LP |
1283 | r = dns_name_parent(&b); /* strip off hash */ |
1284 | if (r < 0) | |
1285 | return r; | |
1286 | if (r == 0) | |
1287 | return 0; | |
1288 | ||
93a3b929 | 1289 | /* Make sure both have the same parent */ |
db5b0e92 LP |
1290 | return dns_name_equal(a, b); |
1291 | } | |
1292 | ||
cdbffec0 LP |
1293 | static int nsec3_hashed_domain_format(const uint8_t *hashed, size_t hashed_size, const char *zone, char **ret) { |
1294 | _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; | |
1295 | char *j; | |
1296 | ||
1297 | assert(hashed); | |
1298 | assert(hashed_size > 0); | |
1299 | assert(zone); | |
1300 | assert(ret); | |
1301 | ||
1302 | l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); | |
1303 | if (!l) | |
1304 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1305 | ||
1306 | j = strjoin(l, ".", zone, NULL); | |
1307 | if (!j) | |
1308 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1309 | ||
1310 | *ret = j; | |
1311 | return (int) hashed_size; | |
1312 | } | |
1313 | ||
1314 | static int nsec3_hashed_domain_make(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) { | |
105e1512 | 1315 | uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX]; |
6f76ec5a TG |
1316 | int hashed_size; |
1317 | ||
1318 | assert(nsec3); | |
1319 | assert(domain); | |
1320 | assert(zone); | |
1321 | assert(ret); | |
1322 | ||
1323 | hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed); | |
1324 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1325 | return hashed_size; | |
1326 | ||
cdbffec0 | 1327 | return nsec3_hashed_domain_format(hashed, (size_t) hashed_size, zone, ret); |
6f76ec5a TG |
1328 | } |
1329 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1330 | /* See RFC 5155, Section 8 |
1331 | * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest | |
1332 | * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there | |
1333 | * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that | |
1334 | * matches the wildcard domain. | |
1335 | * | |
1336 | * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or | |
1337 | * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a the proof of non-existence of a given | |
1338 | * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records | |
1339 | * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */ | |
d3760be0 | 1340 | static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { |
d41084a5 LP |
1341 | _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL; |
1342 | const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL, *wildcard; | |
7e35195f | 1343 | DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *zone_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL; |
105e1512 LP |
1344 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
1345 | int hashed_size, r; | |
35ad41d3 | 1346 | bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false; |
72667f08 LP |
1347 | |
1348 | assert(key); | |
1349 | assert(result); | |
1350 | ||
d1511b33 TG |
1351 | /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone. |
1352 | * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with | |
1353 | * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3 | |
1354 | * records from a given zone in a response must use the same | |
1355 | * parameters. */ | |
1c02e7ba | 1356 | zone = dns_resource_key_name(key); |
13b78323 | 1357 | for (;;) { |
7e35195f | 1358 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(zone_rr, flags, answer) { |
3f5ecaad | 1359 | r = nsec3_is_good(zone_rr, NULL); |
db5b0e92 LP |
1360 | if (r < 0) |
1361 | return r; | |
1362 | if (r == 0) | |
13b78323 LP |
1363 | continue; |
1364 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1365 | r = dns_name_equal_skip(dns_resource_key_name(zone_rr->key), 1, zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1366 | if (r < 0) |
1367 | return r; | |
1368 | if (r > 0) | |
d1511b33 | 1369 | goto found_zone; |
13b78323 LP |
1370 | } |
1371 | ||
1372 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
d1511b33 | 1373 | r = dns_name_parent(&zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1374 | if (r < 0) |
1375 | return r; | |
1376 | if (r == 0) | |
1377 | break; | |
1378 | } | |
1379 | ||
1380 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1381 | return 0; | |
1382 | ||
d1511b33 | 1383 | found_zone: |
13b78323 | 1384 | /* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */ |
1c02e7ba | 1385 | p = dns_resource_key_name(key); |
105e1512 | 1386 | for (;;) { |
6f76ec5a | 1387 | _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL; |
72667f08 | 1388 | |
cdbffec0 | 1389 | hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(zone_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain); |
db5b0e92 LP |
1390 | if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
1391 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
1392 | return 0; | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1395 | return hashed_size; | |
72667f08 | 1396 | |
d1511b33 | 1397 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) { |
db5b0e92 | 1398 | |
3f5ecaad | 1399 | r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, zone_rr); |
72667f08 LP |
1400 | if (r < 0) |
1401 | return r; | |
105e1512 LP |
1402 | if (r == 0) |
1403 | continue; | |
1404 | ||
d1511b33 | 1405 | if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) |
db5b0e92 | 1406 | continue; |
105e1512 | 1407 | |
1c02e7ba | 1408 | r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain); |
72667f08 LP |
1409 | if (r < 0) |
1410 | return r; | |
ed29bfdc LP |
1411 | if (r > 0) { |
1412 | a = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
13b78323 | 1413 | goto found_closest_encloser; |
ed29bfdc | 1414 | } |
105e1512 LP |
1415 | } |
1416 | ||
1417 | /* We didn't find the closest encloser with this name, | |
1418 | * but let's remember this domain name, it might be | |
1419 | * the next closer name */ | |
1420 | ||
1421 | pp = p; | |
1422 | ||
1423 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
1424 | r = dns_name_parent(&p); | |
1425 | if (r < 0) | |
1426 | return r; | |
1427 | if (r == 0) | |
72667f08 | 1428 | break; |
105e1512 | 1429 | } |
72667f08 | 1430 | |
105e1512 LP |
1431 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; |
1432 | return 0; | |
72667f08 | 1433 | |
13b78323 | 1434 | found_closest_encloser: |
105e1512 | 1435 | /* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */ |
72667f08 | 1436 | |
105e1512 | 1437 | if (!pp) { |
352af308 LP |
1438 | /* We have an exact match! If we area looking for a DS RR, then we must insist that we got the NSEC3 RR |
1439 | * from the parent. Otherwise the one from the child. Do so, by checking whether SOA and NS are | |
1440 | * appropriately set. */ | |
1441 | ||
1442 | if (key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { | |
1443 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
1444 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1445 | } else { | |
1446 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && | |
1447 | !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
1448 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | ||
105e1512 | 1451 | /* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */ |
146035b3 TG |
1452 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) |
1453 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1454 | else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1455 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1456 | else | |
1457 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1458 | ||
d3760be0 LP |
1459 | if (authenticated) |
1460 | *authenticated = a; | |
1461 | if (ttl) | |
1462 | *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; | |
146035b3 | 1463 | |
105e1512 LP |
1464 | return 0; |
1465 | } | |
72667f08 | 1466 | |
352af308 LP |
1467 | /* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */ |
1468 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) | |
1469 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1470 | ||
1471 | /* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain | |
1472 | * (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't | |
1473 | * just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper" | |
1474 | * DNS server). */ | |
1475 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && | |
1476 | !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
1477 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1478 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1479 | /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */ |
1480 | ||
d41084a5 | 1481 | wildcard = strjoina("*.", p); |
cdbffec0 | 1482 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain); |
105e1512 LP |
1483 | if (r < 0) |
1484 | return r; | |
1485 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1486 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1487 | |
cdbffec0 | 1488 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain); |
105e1512 LP |
1489 | if (r < 0) |
1490 | return r; | |
1491 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1492 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1493 | |
105e1512 | 1494 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { |
cdbffec0 | 1495 | _cleanup_free_ char *next_hashed_domain = NULL; |
105e1512 | 1496 | |
3f5ecaad | 1497 | r = nsec3_is_good(rr, zone_rr); |
105e1512 LP |
1498 | if (r < 0) |
1499 | return r; | |
1500 | if (r == 0) | |
1501 | continue; | |
1502 | ||
cdbffec0 LP |
1503 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain_format(rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, zone, &next_hashed_domain); |
1504 | if (r < 0) | |
1505 | return r; | |
105e1512 | 1506 | |
1c02e7ba | 1507 | r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain); |
105e1512 LP |
1508 | if (r < 0) |
1509 | return r; | |
1510 | if (r > 0) { | |
1511 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
35ad41d3 | 1512 | optout = true; |
105e1512 | 1513 | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1514 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); |
1515 | ||
1516 | no_closer = true; | |
1517 | } | |
1518 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1519 | r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain); |
35ad41d3 TG |
1520 | if (r < 0) |
1521 | return r; | |
1522 | if (r > 0) { | |
1523 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1524 | ||
1525 | wildcard_rr = rr; | |
1526 | } | |
1527 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1528 | r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain); |
35ad41d3 TG |
1529 | if (r < 0) |
1530 | return r; | |
1531 | if (r > 0) { | |
1532 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
1533 | /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is | |
1534 | * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on | |
1535 | * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as | |
1536 | * we would wish */ | |
1537 | optout = true; | |
1538 | ||
1539 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1540 | ||
1541 | no_wildcard = true; | |
105e1512 LP |
1542 | } |
1543 | } | |
1544 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1545 | if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard) |
1546 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1547 | ||
1548 | if (!no_closer) { | |
1549 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1550 | return 0; |
1551 | } | |
1552 | ||
1553 | if (wildcard_rr) { | |
1554 | /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */ | |
1555 | if (optout) | |
1556 | /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but | |
1557 | * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR | |
1558 | * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is | |
1559 | * correct, as there may be a closer match. */ | |
1560 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1561 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) | |
1562 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1563 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1564 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1565 | else | |
1566 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1567 | } else { | |
1568 | if (optout) | |
1569 | /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for | |
1570 | * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should | |
1571 | * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN. | |
1572 | * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the | |
1573 | * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide | |
1574 | * any additional information. */ | |
1575 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1576 | else if (no_wildcard) | |
1577 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
1578 | else { | |
1579 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1580 | ||
1581 | return 0; | |
1582 | } | |
1583 | } | |
1584 | ||
d3760be0 LP |
1585 | if (authenticated) |
1586 | *authenticated = a; | |
1587 | ||
1588 | if (ttl) | |
1589 | *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; | |
35ad41d3 | 1590 | |
105e1512 LP |
1591 | return 0; |
1592 | } | |
1593 | ||
ab481675 LP |
1594 | static int dnssec_nsec_wildcard_equal(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { |
1595 | char label[DNS_LABEL_MAX]; | |
1596 | const char *n; | |
1597 | int r; | |
1598 | ||
1599 | assert(rr); | |
1600 | assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); | |
1601 | ||
1602 | /* Checks whether the specified RR has a name beginning in "*.", and if the rest is a suffix of our name */ | |
1603 | ||
1604 | if (rr->n_skip_labels_source != 1) | |
1605 | return 0; | |
1606 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1607 | n = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); |
ab481675 LP |
1608 | r = dns_label_unescape(&n, label, sizeof(label)); |
1609 | if (r <= 0) | |
1610 | return r; | |
1611 | if (r != 1 || label[0] != '*') | |
1612 | return 0; | |
1613 | ||
1614 | return dns_name_endswith(name, n); | |
1615 | } | |
1616 | ||
1617 | static int dnssec_nsec_in_path(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { | |
b9282bc1 LP |
1618 | const char *nn, *common_suffix; |
1619 | int r; | |
1620 | ||
1621 | assert(rr); | |
1622 | assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); | |
1623 | ||
1624 | /* Checks whether the specified nsec RR indicates that name is an empty non-terminal (ENT) | |
1625 | * | |
1626 | * A couple of examples: | |
1627 | * | |
1628 | * NSEC bar → waldo.foo.bar: indicates that foo.bar exists and is an ENT | |
1629 | * NSEC waldo.foo.bar → yyy.zzz.xoo.bar: indicates that xoo.bar and zzz.xoo.bar exist and are ENTs | |
1630 | * NSEC yyy.zzz.xoo.bar → bar: indicates pretty much nothing about ENTs | |
1631 | */ | |
1632 | ||
1633 | /* First, determine parent of next domain. */ | |
1634 | nn = rr->nsec.next_domain_name; | |
1635 | r = dns_name_parent(&nn); | |
1636 | if (r <= 0) | |
1637 | return r; | |
1638 | ||
1639 | /* If the name we just determined is not equal or child of the name we are interested in, then we can't say | |
1640 | * anything at all. */ | |
1641 | r = dns_name_endswith(nn, name); | |
1642 | if (r <= 0) | |
1643 | return r; | |
1644 | ||
1645 | /* If the name we we are interested in is not a prefix of the common suffix of the NSEC RR's owner and next domain names, then we can't say anything either. */ | |
1c02e7ba | 1646 | r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix); |
b9282bc1 LP |
1647 | if (r < 0) |
1648 | return r; | |
1649 | ||
1650 | return dns_name_endswith(name, common_suffix); | |
1651 | } | |
1652 | ||
ab481675 LP |
1653 | static int dnssec_nsec_from_parent_zone(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { |
1654 | int r; | |
1655 | ||
1656 | assert(rr); | |
1657 | assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); | |
1658 | ||
1659 | /* Checks whether this NSEC originates to the parent zone or the child zone. */ | |
1660 | ||
1661 | r = dns_name_parent(&name); | |
1662 | if (r <= 0) | |
1663 | return r; | |
1664 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1665 | r = dns_name_equal(name, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); |
ab481675 LP |
1666 | if (r <= 0) |
1667 | return r; | |
1668 | ||
1669 | /* DNAME, and NS without SOA is an indication for a delegation. */ | |
1670 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) | |
1671 | return 1; | |
1672 | ||
1673 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
1674 | return 1; | |
1675 | ||
1676 | return 0; | |
1677 | } | |
1678 | ||
1679 | static int dnssec_nsec_covers(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { | |
1680 | const char *common_suffix, *p; | |
1681 | int r; | |
1682 | ||
1683 | assert(rr); | |
1684 | assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); | |
1685 | ||
1686 | /* Checks whether the "Next Closer" is witin the space covered by the specified RR. */ | |
1687 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1688 | r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix); |
ab481675 LP |
1689 | if (r < 0) |
1690 | return r; | |
1691 | ||
1692 | for (;;) { | |
1693 | p = name; | |
1694 | r = dns_name_parent(&name); | |
1695 | if (r < 0) | |
1696 | return r; | |
1697 | if (r == 0) | |
1698 | return 0; | |
1699 | ||
1700 | r = dns_name_equal(name, common_suffix); | |
1701 | if (r < 0) | |
1702 | return r; | |
1703 | if (r > 0) | |
1704 | break; | |
1705 | } | |
1706 | ||
1707 | /* p is now the "Next Closer". */ | |
1708 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1709 | return dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), p, rr->nsec.next_domain_name); |
ab481675 LP |
1710 | } |
1711 | ||
1712 | static int dnssec_nsec_covers_wildcard(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { | |
d86c982a LP |
1713 | const char *common_suffix, *wc; |
1714 | int r; | |
1715 | ||
1716 | assert(rr); | |
1717 | assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); | |
1718 | ||
1719 | /* Checks whether the "Wildcard at the Closest Encloser" is within the space covered by the specified | |
1720 | * RR. Specifically, checks whether 'name' has the common suffix of the NSEC RR's owner and next names as | |
1721 | * suffix, and whether the NSEC covers the name generated by that suffix prepended with an asterisk label. | |
1722 | * | |
1723 | * NSEC bar → waldo.foo.bar: indicates that *.bar and *.foo.bar do not exist | |
1724 | * NSEC waldo.foo.bar → yyy.zzz.xoo.bar: indicates that *.xoo.bar and *.zzz.xoo.bar do not exist (and more ...) | |
1725 | * NSEC yyy.zzz.xoo.bar → bar: indicates that a number of wildcards don#t exist either... | |
1726 | */ | |
1727 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1728 | r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix); |
d86c982a LP |
1729 | if (r < 0) |
1730 | return r; | |
1731 | ||
1732 | /* If the common suffix is not shared by the name we are interested in, it has nothing to say for us. */ | |
1733 | r = dns_name_endswith(name, common_suffix); | |
1734 | if (r <= 0) | |
1735 | return r; | |
1736 | ||
81d62103 | 1737 | wc = strjoina("*.", common_suffix); |
1c02e7ba | 1738 | return dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wc, rr->nsec.next_domain_name); |
d86c982a LP |
1739 | } |
1740 | ||
0c7bff0a | 1741 | int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { |
d86c982a LP |
1742 | bool have_nsec3 = false, covering_rr_authenticated = false, wildcard_rr_authenticated = false; |
1743 | DnsResourceRecord *rr, *covering_rr = NULL, *wildcard_rr = NULL; | |
105e1512 | 1744 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
b9282bc1 | 1745 | const char *name; |
105e1512 LP |
1746 | int r; |
1747 | ||
1748 | assert(key); | |
1749 | assert(result); | |
1750 | ||
1751 | /* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */ | |
1752 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1753 | name = dns_resource_key_name(key); |
b9282bc1 | 1754 | |
105e1512 LP |
1755 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { |
1756 | ||
1757 | if (rr->key->class != key->class) | |
1758 | continue; | |
1759 | ||
ab481675 | 1760 | have_nsec3 = have_nsec3 || (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC3); |
105e1512 | 1761 | |
ab481675 LP |
1762 | if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC) |
1763 | continue; | |
1764 | ||
1765 | /* The following checks only make sense for NSEC RRs that are not expanded from a wildcard */ | |
1766 | r = dns_resource_record_is_synthetic(rr); | |
1767 | if (r < 0) | |
1768 | return r; | |
1769 | if (r > 0) | |
1770 | continue; | |
105e1512 | 1771 | |
ab481675 | 1772 | /* Check if this is a direct match. If so, we have encountered a NODATA case */ |
1c02e7ba | 1773 | r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name); |
ab481675 LP |
1774 | if (r < 0) |
1775 | return r; | |
1776 | if (r == 0) { | |
1777 | /* If it's not a direct match, maybe it's a wild card match? */ | |
1778 | r = dnssec_nsec_wildcard_equal(rr, name); | |
105e1512 LP |
1779 | if (r < 0) |
1780 | return r; | |
ab481675 LP |
1781 | } |
1782 | if (r > 0) { | |
1783 | if (key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { | |
1784 | /* If we look for a DS RR and the server sent us the NSEC RR of the child zone | |
1785 | * we have a problem. For DS RRs we want the NSEC RR from the parent */ | |
1786 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
1787 | continue; | |
1788 | } else { | |
1789 | /* For all RR types, ensure that if NS is set SOA is set too, so that we know | |
1790 | * we got the child's NSEC. */ | |
1791 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && | |
1792 | !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
1793 | continue; | |
72667f08 LP |
1794 | } |
1795 | ||
ab481675 LP |
1796 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type)) |
1797 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1798 | else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1799 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1800 | else | |
b9282bc1 | 1801 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; |
d3760be0 | 1802 | |
ab481675 LP |
1803 | if (authenticated) |
1804 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1805 | if (ttl) | |
1806 | *ttl = rr->ttl; | |
d3760be0 | 1807 | |
ab481675 LP |
1808 | return 0; |
1809 | } | |
b9282bc1 | 1810 | |
ab481675 LP |
1811 | /* Check if the name we are looking for is an empty non-terminal within the owner or next name |
1812 | * of the NSEC RR. */ | |
1813 | r = dnssec_nsec_in_path(rr, name); | |
1814 | if (r < 0) | |
1815 | return r; | |
1816 | if (r > 0) { | |
1817 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
b9282bc1 | 1818 | |
ab481675 LP |
1819 | if (authenticated) |
1820 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1821 | if (ttl) | |
1822 | *ttl = rr->ttl; | |
b9282bc1 | 1823 | |
ab481675 LP |
1824 | return 0; |
1825 | } | |
72667f08 | 1826 | |
ab481675 LP |
1827 | /* The following two "covering" checks, are not useful if the NSEC is from the parent */ |
1828 | r = dnssec_nsec_from_parent_zone(rr, name); | |
1829 | if (r < 0) | |
1830 | return r; | |
1831 | if (r > 0) | |
1832 | continue; | |
1833 | ||
1834 | /* Check if this NSEC RR proves the absence of an explicit RR under this name */ | |
1835 | r = dnssec_nsec_covers(rr, name); | |
1836 | if (r < 0) | |
1837 | return r; | |
1838 | if (r > 0 && (!covering_rr || !covering_rr_authenticated)) { | |
1839 | covering_rr = rr; | |
1840 | covering_rr_authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1841 | } | |
1842 | ||
1843 | /* Check if this NSEC RR proves the absence of a wildcard RR under this name */ | |
1844 | r = dnssec_nsec_covers_wildcard(rr, name); | |
1845 | if (r < 0) | |
1846 | return r; | |
1847 | if (r > 0 && (!wildcard_rr || !wildcard_rr_authenticated)) { | |
1848 | wildcard_rr = rr; | |
1849 | wildcard_rr_authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
72667f08 LP |
1850 | } |
1851 | } | |
1852 | ||
d86c982a LP |
1853 | if (covering_rr && wildcard_rr) { |
1854 | /* If we could prove that neither the name itself, nor the wildcard at the closest encloser exists, we | |
1855 | * proved the NXDOMAIN case. */ | |
1856 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
1857 | ||
1858 | if (authenticated) | |
1859 | *authenticated = covering_rr_authenticated && wildcard_rr_authenticated; | |
1860 | if (ttl) | |
1861 | *ttl = MIN(covering_rr->ttl, wildcard_rr->ttl); | |
1862 | ||
1863 | return 0; | |
1864 | } | |
1865 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1866 | /* OK, this was not sufficient. Let's see if NSEC3 can help. */ |
1867 | if (have_nsec3) | |
d3760be0 | 1868 | return dnssec_test_nsec3(answer, key, result, authenticated, ttl); |
105e1512 | 1869 | |
72667f08 LP |
1870 | /* No approproate NSEC RR found, report this. */ |
1871 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1872 | return 0; | |
1873 | } | |
1874 | ||
421cc89d | 1875 | static int dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(DnsAnswer *answer, uint16_t type, const char *name, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { |
0c7bff0a LP |
1876 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
1877 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; | |
1878 | int r; | |
1879 | ||
1880 | assert(name); | |
1881 | assert(zone); | |
1882 | ||
1883 | /* Checks whether there's an NSEC/NSEC3 that proves that the specified 'name' is non-existing in the specified | |
1884 | * 'zone'. The 'zone' must be a suffix of the 'name'. */ | |
1885 | ||
1886 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { | |
1887 | bool found = false; | |
1888 | ||
e926785a LP |
1889 | if (rr->key->type != type && type != DNS_TYPE_ANY) |
1890 | continue; | |
1891 | ||
0c7bff0a LP |
1892 | switch (rr->key->type) { |
1893 | ||
1894 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC: | |
97c67192 LP |
1895 | |
1896 | /* We only care for NSEC RRs from the indicated zone */ | |
1897 | r = dns_resource_record_is_signer(rr, zone); | |
1898 | if (r < 0) | |
1899 | return r; | |
1900 | if (r == 0) | |
1901 | continue; | |
1902 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1903 | r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name); |
0c7bff0a LP |
1904 | if (r < 0) |
1905 | return r; | |
1906 | ||
1907 | found = r > 0; | |
1908 | break; | |
1909 | ||
1910 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: { | |
1911 | _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL; | |
1912 | ||
97c67192 LP |
1913 | /* We only care for NSEC3 RRs from the indicated zone */ |
1914 | r = dns_resource_record_is_signer(rr, zone); | |
1915 | if (r < 0) | |
1916 | return r; | |
1917 | if (r == 0) | |
1918 | continue; | |
1919 | ||
0c7bff0a LP |
1920 | r = nsec3_is_good(rr, NULL); |
1921 | if (r < 0) | |
1922 | return r; | |
1923 | if (r == 0) | |
1924 | break; | |
1925 | ||
1926 | /* Format the domain we are testing with the NSEC3 RR's hash function */ | |
1927 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make( | |
1928 | rr, | |
1929 | name, | |
1930 | zone, | |
1931 | &hashed_domain); | |
1932 | if (r < 0) | |
1933 | return r; | |
1934 | if ((size_t) r != rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size) | |
1935 | break; | |
1936 | ||
1937 | /* Format the NSEC3's next hashed name as proper domain name */ | |
1938 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain_format( | |
1939 | rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, | |
1940 | rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, | |
1941 | zone, | |
1942 | &next_hashed_domain); | |
1943 | if (r < 0) | |
1944 | return r; | |
1945 | ||
1c02e7ba | 1946 | r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), hashed_domain, next_hashed_domain); |
0c7bff0a LP |
1947 | if (r < 0) |
1948 | return r; | |
1949 | ||
1950 | found = r > 0; | |
1951 | break; | |
1952 | } | |
1953 | ||
1954 | default: | |
1955 | continue; | |
1956 | } | |
1957 | ||
1958 | if (found) { | |
1959 | if (authenticated) | |
1960 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1961 | return 1; | |
1962 | } | |
1963 | } | |
1964 | ||
1965 | return 0; | |
1966 | } | |
1967 | ||
e926785a LP |
1968 | static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3( |
1969 | DnsAnswer *answer, | |
1970 | const char *name, | |
1971 | const char *source, | |
1972 | const char *zone, | |
1973 | bool *authenticated) { | |
1974 | ||
1975 | const char *next_closer = NULL; | |
1976 | int r; | |
1977 | ||
1978 | /* Run a positive NSEC3 wildcard proof. Specifically: | |
1979 | * | |
c629ff58 | 1980 | * A proof that the "next closer" of the generating wildcard does not exist. |
e926785a LP |
1981 | * |
1982 | * Note a key difference between the NSEC3 and NSEC versions of the proof. NSEC RRs don't have to exist for | |
1983 | * empty non-transients. NSEC3 RRs however have to. This means it's sufficient to check if the next closer name | |
1984 | * exists for the NSEC3 RR and we are done. | |
1985 | * | |
1986 | * To prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f all we have to check is that | |
1987 | * c.d.e.f does not exist. */ | |
1988 | ||
1989 | for (;;) { | |
1990 | next_closer = name; | |
1991 | r = dns_name_parent(&name); | |
1992 | if (r < 0) | |
1993 | return r; | |
1994 | if (r == 0) | |
1995 | return 0; | |
1996 | ||
1997 | r = dns_name_equal(name, source); | |
1998 | if (r < 0) | |
1999 | return r; | |
2000 | if (r > 0) | |
2001 | break; | |
2002 | } | |
2003 | ||
2004 | return dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC3, next_closer, zone, authenticated); | |
2005 | } | |
2006 | ||
2007 | static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec( | |
2008 | DnsAnswer *answer, | |
2009 | const char *name, | |
2010 | const char *source, | |
2011 | const char *zone, | |
2012 | bool *_authenticated) { | |
2013 | ||
2014 | bool authenticated = true; | |
2015 | int r; | |
2016 | ||
2017 | /* Run a positive NSEC wildcard proof. Specifically: | |
2018 | * | |
2019 | * A proof that there's neither a wildcard name nor a non-wildcard name that is a suffix of the name "name" and | |
2020 | * a prefix of the synthesizing source "source" in the zone "zone". | |
2021 | * | |
2022 | * See RFC 5155, Section 8.8 and RFC 4035, Section 5.3.4 | |
2023 | * | |
2024 | * Note that if we want to prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f, then we | |
2025 | * have to prove that none of the following exist: | |
2026 | * | |
2027 | * 1) a.b.c.d.e.f | |
2028 | * 2) *.b.c.d.e.f | |
2029 | * 3) b.c.d.e.f | |
2030 | * 4) *.c.d.e.f | |
2031 | * 5) c.d.e.f | |
2032 | * | |
2033 | */ | |
2034 | ||
2035 | for (;;) { | |
2036 | _cleanup_free_ char *wc = NULL; | |
2037 | bool a = false; | |
2038 | ||
2039 | /* Check if there's an NSEC or NSEC3 RR that proves that the mame we determined is really non-existing, | |
2040 | * i.e between the owner name and the next name of an NSEC RR. */ | |
2041 | r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, name, zone, &a); | |
2042 | if (r <= 0) | |
2043 | return r; | |
2044 | ||
2045 | authenticated = authenticated && a; | |
2046 | ||
2047 | /* Strip one label off */ | |
2048 | r = dns_name_parent(&name); | |
2049 | if (r <= 0) | |
2050 | return r; | |
2051 | ||
2052 | /* Did we reach the source of synthesis? */ | |
2053 | r = dns_name_equal(name, source); | |
2054 | if (r < 0) | |
2055 | return r; | |
2056 | if (r > 0) { | |
2057 | /* Successful exit */ | |
2058 | *_authenticated = authenticated; | |
2059 | return 1; | |
2060 | } | |
2061 | ||
2062 | /* Safety check, that the source of synthesis is still our suffix */ | |
2063 | r = dns_name_endswith(name, source); | |
2064 | if (r < 0) | |
2065 | return r; | |
2066 | if (r == 0) | |
2067 | return -EBADMSG; | |
2068 | ||
2069 | /* Replace the label we stripped off with an asterisk */ | |
2070 | wc = strappend("*.", name); | |
2071 | if (!wc) | |
2072 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2073 | ||
2074 | /* And check if the proof holds for the asterisk name, too */ | |
2075 | r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, wc, zone, &a); | |
2076 | if (r <= 0) | |
2077 | return r; | |
2078 | ||
2079 | authenticated = authenticated && a; | |
2080 | /* In the next iteration we'll check the non-asterisk-prefixed version */ | |
2081 | } | |
2082 | } | |
2083 | ||
2084 | int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard( | |
2085 | DnsAnswer *answer, | |
2086 | const char *name, | |
2087 | const char *source, | |
2088 | const char *zone, | |
2089 | bool *authenticated) { | |
2090 | ||
2091 | int r; | |
2092 | ||
2093 | assert(name); | |
2094 | assert(source); | |
2095 | assert(zone); | |
2096 | assert(authenticated); | |
2097 | ||
2098 | r = dns_answer_contains_zone_nsec3(answer, zone); | |
2099 | if (r < 0) | |
2100 | return r; | |
2101 | if (r > 0) | |
2102 | return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); | |
2103 | else | |
2104 | return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); | |
2105 | } | |
2106 | ||
47091522 MO |
2107 | #else |
2108 | ||
2109 | int dnssec_verify_rrset( | |
2110 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
2111 | const DnsResourceKey *key, | |
2112 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
2113 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, | |
2114 | usec_t realtime, | |
2115 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2116 | ||
2117 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2118 | } | |
2119 | ||
2120 | int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { | |
2121 | ||
2122 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2123 | } | |
2124 | ||
2125 | int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { | |
2126 | ||
2127 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2128 | } | |
2129 | ||
2130 | int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( | |
2131 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
2132 | const DnsResourceKey *key, | |
2133 | DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, | |
2134 | usec_t realtime, | |
2135 | DnssecResult *result, | |
2136 | DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) { | |
2137 | ||
2138 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2139 | } | |
2140 | ||
2141 | int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { | |
2142 | ||
2143 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2144 | } | |
2145 | ||
2146 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { | |
2147 | ||
2148 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2149 | } | |
2150 | ||
2151 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { | |
2152 | ||
2153 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2154 | } | |
2155 | ||
2156 | int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { | |
2157 | ||
2158 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | ||
2161 | int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { | |
2162 | ||
2163 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2164 | } | |
2165 | ||
2166 | int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard( | |
2167 | DnsAnswer *answer, | |
2168 | const char *name, | |
2169 | const char *source, | |
2170 | const char *zone, | |
2171 | bool *authenticated) { | |
2172 | ||
2173 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
2174 | } | |
2175 | ||
2176 | #endif | |
2177 | ||
547973de LP |
2178 | static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = { |
2179 | [DNSSEC_VALIDATED] = "validated", | |
0c7bff0a | 2180 | [DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD] = "validated-wildcard", |
547973de | 2181 | [DNSSEC_INVALID] = "invalid", |
203f1b35 LP |
2182 | [DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED] = "signature-expired", |
2183 | [DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM] = "unsupported-algorithm", | |
547973de LP |
2184 | [DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE] = "no-signature", |
2185 | [DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY] = "missing-key", | |
203f1b35 | 2186 | [DNSSEC_UNSIGNED] = "unsigned", |
547973de | 2187 | [DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary", |
72667f08 | 2188 | [DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch", |
b652d4a2 | 2189 | [DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server", |
547973de LP |
2190 | }; |
2191 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult); | |
59c5b597 LP |
2192 | |
2193 | static const char* const dnssec_verdict_table[_DNSSEC_VERDICT_MAX] = { | |
2194 | [DNSSEC_SECURE] = "secure", | |
2195 | [DNSSEC_INSECURE] = "insecure", | |
2196 | [DNSSEC_BOGUS] = "bogus", | |
2197 | [DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE] = "indeterminate", | |
2198 | }; | |
2199 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_verdict, DnssecVerdict); |