manager or system manager can be always set. It would be better to reject
them when parsing config.
+* Clarify what IPAddress* matches (source, destination, both?)
+
External:
* Fedora: add an rpmlint check that verifies that all unit files in the RPM are listed in %systemd_post macros.
Features:
+* when we fork off generators and such, lower LIMIT_NOFILE soft limit to 1K
+
+* rework seccomp/nnp logic that that even if User= is used in combination with
+ a seccomp option we don't have to set NNP. For that, change uid first whil
+ keeping CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then apply seccomp, the drop cap.
+
+* add a concept for automatically loading per-unit secrets off disk and
+ inserting them into the kernel keyring. Maybe SecretsDirectory= similar to
+ ConfigurationDirectory=.
+
+* systemd-gpt-auto: if we find the root dir mounted read-only and the gpt flag
+ doesn't say so generate job that remounts it writable
+
+* when no locale is configured, default to UEFI's PlatformLang variable
+
+* When logind.conf contains HandleLidSwitch=suspend-then-hibernate and we can't
+ hibernate because the swap partition isn't large enough, still suspend
+
* bootctl: implement Type #2 boot loader entry discovery
* bootctl,sd-boot: actually honour the "architecture" key
+* when a socket unit is spawned with an AF_UNIX path in /var/run, complain and
+ patch it to use /run instead
+
* consider splitting out all temporary file creation APIs (we have so many in
fileio.h and elsewhere!) into a new util file of its own.
-* set memory.oom.group in cgroupsv2 for all leaf cgroups
+* set memory.oom.group in cgroupsv2 for all leaf cgroups (kernel v4.19+)
+
+* add a new syscall group "@esoteric" for more esoteric stuff such as bpf() and
+ usefaultd() and make systemd-analyze check for it.
* drop umask() calls and suchlike from our generators, pid1 should set things up correctly anyway
* bootspec.c: also enumerate EFI unified kernel images.
+* maybe set a special xattr on cgroups that have delegate=yes set, to make it
+ easy to mark cut points
+
+* introduce an option (or replacement) for "systemctl show" that outputs all
+ properties as JSON, similar to busctl's new JSON output. In contrast to that
+ it should skip the variant type string though.
+
+* augment CODE_FILE=, CODE_LINE= with something like CODE_BASE= or so which
+ contains some identifier for the project, which allows us to include
+ clickable links to source files generating these log messages. The identifier
+ could be some abberviated URL prefix or so (taking inspiration from Go
+ imports). For example, for systemd we could use
+ CODE_BASE=github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/98b0b1123cc or so which is
+ sufficient to build a link by prefixing "http://" and suffixing the
+ CODE_FILE.
+
+* when outputting log data with journalctl and the log data includes references
+ to configuration files (CONFIG_FILE=), create a clickable link for it.
+
+* Augment MESSAGE_ID with MESSAGE_BASE, in a similar fashion so that we can
+ make clickable links from log messages carrying a MESSAGE_ID, that lead to
+ some explanatory text online.
+
* maybe extend .path units to expose fanotify() per-mount change events
* Add a "systemctl list-units --by-slice" mode or so, which rearranges the
* taint systemd if there are fewer than 65536 users assigned (userns) to the system.
-* deprecate PermissionsStartOnly= and RootDirectoryStartOnly= in favour of the ExecStart= prefix chars
+* deprecate RootDirectoryStartOnly= in favour of a new ExecStart= prefix char
* add a new RuntimeDirectoryPreserve= mode that defines a similar lifecycle for
the runtime dir as we maintain for the fdstore: i.e. keep it around as long
as the unit is running or has a job queued.
-* support projid-based quota in machinectl for containers, and then drop
- implicit btrfs loopback magic in machined
+* support projid-based quota in machinectl for containers
* Add NetworkNamespacePath= to specify a path to a network namespace
* beef up pam_systemd to take unit file settings such as cgroups properties as
parameters
-* a new "systemd-analyze security" tool outputting a checklist of security
- features a service does and does not implement
-
* maybe hook of xfs/ext4 quotactl() with services? i.e. automatically manage
the quota of a the user indicated in User= via unit file settings, like the
other resource management concepts. Would mix nicely with DynamicUser=1. Or
on PID 1 with the relevant signals, and makes relevant files in /sys and
/proc (such as the sysrq stuff) unavailable
-* DeviceAllow= should also generate seccomp filters for mknod()
-
* make sure the ratelimit object can deal with USEC_INFINITY as way to turn off things
* journalctl: make sure -f ends when the container indicated by -M terminates
* add a pam module that on password changes updates any LUKS slot where the password matches
-* maybe add a generator that looks for "systemd.run=" on the kernel cmdline for container usercases...
-
* test/:
- add unit tests for config_parse_device_allow()
- "machinectl commit" that takes a writable snapshot of a tree, invokes a
shell in it, and marks it read-only after use
-* importd:
- - generate a nice warning if mkfs.btrfs is missing
-
* cryptsetup:
- cryptsetup-generator: allow specification of passwords in crypttab itself
- support rd.luks.allow-discards= kernel cmdline params in cryptsetup generator
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / blobdiff