#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "hostname-util.h"
#include "id128-util.h"
+#include "mkdir.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
#include "mountpoint-util.h"
+#include "namespace-util.h"
#include "nulstr-util.h"
#include "os-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
log_debug("No type detected on partition %s", node);
goto not_found;
}
- if (r == -2) {
- log_debug("Results ambiguous for partition %s", node);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
+ if (r == -2)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN),
+ "Results ambiguous for partition %s", node);
if (r != 0)
return errno_or_else(EIO);
break;
r = -errno;
if (r == -EINVAL) {
- struct loop_info64 info;
-
- /* If we are running on a loop device that has partition scanning off, return
- * an explicit recognizable error about this, so that callers can generate a
- * proper message explaining the situation. */
+ /* If we are running on a block device that has partition scanning off, return an
+ * explicit recognizable error about this, so that callers can generate a proper
+ * message explaining the situation. */
- if (ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &info) >= 0) {
-#if HAVE_VALGRIND_MEMCHECK_H
- /* Valgrind currently doesn't know LOOP_GET_STATUS64. Remove this once it does */
- VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(&info, sizeof(info));
-#endif
+ r = blockdev_partscan_enabled(fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r == 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(EPROTONOSUPPORT,
+ "Device is a loop device and partition scanning is off!");
- if ((info.lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN) == 0)
- return log_debug_errno(EPROTONOSUPPORT,
- "Device is a loop device and partition scanning is off!");
- }
+ return -EINVAL; /* original error */
}
if (r != -EBUSY)
return r;
int fd,
const void *root_hash,
size_t root_hash_size,
+ const char *verity_data,
+ const MountOptions *mount_options,
DissectImageFlags flags,
DissectedImage **ret) {
assert(fd >= 0);
assert(ret);
assert(root_hash || root_hash_size == 0);
+ assert(!((flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_GPT_ONLY) && (flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE)));
/* Probes a disk image, and returns information about what it found in *ret.
*
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (!(flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_GPT_ONLY) &&
- (flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT)) {
+ if ((!(flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_GPT_ONLY) &&
+ (flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT)) ||
+ (flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE)) {
const char *usage = NULL;
(void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b, "USAGE", &usage, NULL);
if (STRPTR_IN_SET(usage, "filesystem", "crypto")) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
- const char *fstype = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL, *n = NULL, *o = NULL;
+ const char *fstype = NULL, *options = NULL;
/* OK, we have found a file system, that's our root partition then. */
(void) blkid_probe_lookup_value(b, "TYPE", &fstype, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ m->single_file_system = true;
+ m->verity = root_hash && verity_data;
+ m->can_verity = !!verity_data;
+
+ options = mount_options_from_part(mount_options, 0);
+ if (options) {
+ o = strdup(options);
+ if (!o)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
m->partitions[PARTITION_ROOT] = (DissectedPartition) {
.found = true,
- .rw = true,
+ .rw = !m->verity,
.partno = -1,
.architecture = _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID,
.fstype = TAKE_PTR(t),
.node = TAKE_PTR(n),
+ .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(o),
};
m->encrypted = streq_ptr(fstype, "crypto_LUKS");
- if (!streq(usage, "filesystem")) {
- r = loop_wait_for_partitions_to_appear(fd, d, 0, flags, &e);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- }
+ /* Even on a single partition we need to wait for udev to create the
+ * /dev/block/X:Y symlink to /dev/loopZ */
+ r = loop_wait_for_partitions_to_appear(fd, d, 0, flags, &e);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
*ret = TAKE_PTR(m);
return 0;
}
if (designator != _PARTITION_DESIGNATOR_INVALID) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL, *n = NULL, *o = NULL;
+ const char *options = NULL;
/* First one wins */
if (m->partitions[designator].found)
if (!n)
return -ENOMEM;
+ options = mount_options_from_part(mount_options, nr);
+ if (options) {
+ o = strdup(options);
+ if (!o)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
m->partitions[designator] = (DissectedPartition) {
.found = true,
.partno = nr,
.node = TAKE_PTR(n),
.fstype = TAKE_PTR(t),
.uuid = id,
+ .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(o),
};
}
break;
case 0xEA: { /* Boot Loader Spec extended $BOOT partition */
- _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL, *o = NULL;
sd_id128_t id = SD_ID128_NULL;
- const char *sid;
+ const char *sid, *options = NULL;
/* First one wins */
if (m->partitions[PARTITION_XBOOTLDR].found)
if (!n)
return -ENOMEM;
+ options = mount_options_from_part(mount_options, nr);
+ if (options) {
+ o = strdup(options);
+ if (!o)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
m->partitions[PARTITION_XBOOTLDR] = (DissectedPartition) {
.found = true,
.partno = nr,
.architecture = _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID,
.node = TAKE_PTR(n),
.uuid = id,
+ .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(o),
};
break;
zero(m->partitions[PARTITION_ROOT_SECONDARY_VERITY]);
} else if (flags & DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL;
+ const char *options = NULL;
/* If the root has was set, then we won't fallback to a generic node, because the root hash
* decides */
if (multiple_generic)
return -ENOTUNIQ;
+ options = mount_options_from_part(mount_options, generic_nr);
+ if (options) {
+ o = strdup(options);
+ if (!o)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
m->partitions[PARTITION_ROOT] = (DissectedPartition) {
.found = true,
.rw = generic_rw,
.architecture = _ARCHITECTURE_INVALID,
.node = TAKE_PTR(generic_node),
.uuid = generic_uuid,
+ .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(o),
};
}
}
free(m->partitions[i].node);
free(m->partitions[i].decrypted_fstype);
free(m->partitions[i].decrypted_node);
+ free(m->partitions[i].mount_options);
}
free(m->hostname);
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ if (!isempty(m->mount_options))
+ if (!strextend_with_separator(&options, ",", m->mount_options, NULL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
r = mount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, node, p, fstype, MS_NODEV|(rw ? 0 : MS_RDONLY), options);
if (r < 0)
return r;
base = strrchr(original_node, '/');
if (!base)
- return -EINVAL;
- base++;
+ base = original_node;
+ else
+ base++;
if (isempty(base))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
+static int verity_can_reuse(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_size, bool has_sig, const char *name, struct crypt_device **ret_cd) {
+ /* If the same volume was already open, check that the root hashes match, and reuse it if they do */
+ _cleanup_free_ char *root_hash_existing = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_verity crypt_params = {};
+ size_t root_hash_existing_size = root_hash_size;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(ret_cd);
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Error opening verity device, crypt_init_by_name failed: %m");
+ r = crypt_get_verity_info(cd, &crypt_params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Error opening verity device, crypt_get_verity_info failed: %m");
+ root_hash_existing = malloc0(root_hash_size);
+ if (!root_hash_existing)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, root_hash_existing, &root_hash_existing_size, NULL, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Error opening verity device, crypt_volume_key_get failed: %m");
+ if (root_hash_size != root_hash_existing_size || memcmp(root_hash_existing, root_hash, root_hash_size) != 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Error opening verity device, it already exists but root hashes are different.");
+#if HAVE_CRYPT_ACTIVATE_BY_SIGNED_KEY
+ /* Ensure that, if signatures are supported, we only reuse the device if the previous mount
+ * used the same settings, so that a previous unsigned mount will not be reused if the user
+ * asks to use signing for the new one, and viceversa. */
+ if (has_sig != !!(crypt_params.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE))
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Error opening verity device, it already exists but signature settings are not the same.");
+#endif
+
+ *ret_cd = TAKE_PTR(cd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void dm_deferred_remove_clean(char *name) {
+ if (!name)
+ return;
+ (void) crypt_deactivate_by_name(NULL, name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED);
+ free(name);
+}
+DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(char *, dm_deferred_remove_clean);
+
static int verity_partition(
DissectedPartition *m,
DissectedPartition *v,
const void *root_hash,
size_t root_hash_size,
+ const char *verity_data,
+ const char *root_hash_sig_path,
+ const void *root_hash_sig,
+ size_t root_hash_sig_size,
DissectImageFlags flags,
DecryptedImage *d) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *node = NULL, *name = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *node = NULL, *name = NULL, *hash_sig_from_file = NULL;
_cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(dm_deferred_remove_cleanp) char *restore_deferred_remove = NULL;
int r;
assert(m);
- assert(v);
+ assert(v || verity_data);
if (!root_hash)
return 0;
if (!m->found || !m->node || !m->fstype)
return 0;
- if (!v->found || !v->node || !v->fstype)
- return 0;
+ if (!verity_data) {
+ if (!v->found || !v->node || !v->fstype)
+ return 0;
- if (!streq(v->fstype, "DM_verity_hash"))
- return 0;
+ if (!streq(v->fstype, "DM_verity_hash"))
+ return 0;
+ }
- r = make_dm_name_and_node(m->node, "-verity", &name, &node);
+ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE)) {
+ /* Use the roothash, which is unique per volume, as the device node name, so that it can be reused */
+ _cleanup_free_ char *root_hash_encoded = NULL;
+ root_hash_encoded = hexmem(root_hash, root_hash_size);
+ if (!root_hash_encoded)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = make_dm_name_and_node(root_hash_encoded, "-verity", &name, &node);
+ } else
+ r = make_dm_name_and_node(m->node, "-verity", &name, &node);
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (!GREEDY_REALLOC0(d->decrypted, d->n_allocated, d->n_decrypted + 1))
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!root_hash_sig && root_hash_sig_path) {
+ r = read_full_file_full(AT_FDCWD, root_hash_sig_path, 0, &hash_sig_from_file, &root_hash_sig_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
- r = crypt_init(&cd, v->node);
+ r = crypt_init(&cd, verity_data ?: v->node);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, root_hash, root_hash_size, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC0(d->decrypted, d->n_allocated, d->n_decrypted + 1))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* If activating fails because the device already exists, check the metadata and reuse it if it matches.
+ * In case of ENODEV/ENOENT, which can happen if another process is activating at the exact same time,
+ * retry a few times before giving up. */
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < N_DEVICE_NODE_LIST_ATTEMPTS; i++) {
+ if (root_hash_sig || hash_sig_from_file) {
+#if HAVE_CRYPT_ACTIVATE_BY_SIGNED_KEY
+ r = crypt_activate_by_signed_key(cd, name, root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_sig ?: hash_sig_from_file, root_hash_sig_size, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
+#else
+ r = log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "activation of verity device with signature requested, but not supported by cryptsetup due to missing crypt_activate_by_signed_key()");
+#endif
+ } else
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, root_hash, root_hash_size, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
+ /* libdevmapper can return EINVAL when the device is already in the activation stage.
+ * There's no way to distinguish this situation from a genuine error due to invalid
+ * parameters, so immediately fallback to activating the device with a unique name.
+ * Improvements in libcrypsetup can ensure this never happens: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/merge_requests/96 */
+ if (r == -EINVAL && FLAGS_SET(flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE))
+ return verity_partition(m, v, root_hash, root_hash_size, verity_data, NULL, root_hash_sig ?: hash_sig_from_file, root_hash_sig_size, flags & ~DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE, d);
+ if (!IN_SET(r, 0, -EEXIST, -ENODEV))
+ return r;
+ if (r == -EEXIST) {
+ struct crypt_device *existing_cd = NULL;
+
+ if (!restore_deferred_remove){
+ /* To avoid races, disable automatic removal on umount while setting up the new device. Restore it on failure. */
+ r = dm_deferred_remove_cancel(name);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Disabling automated deferred removal for verity device %s failed: %m", node);
+ restore_deferred_remove = strdup(name);
+ if (!restore_deferred_remove)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ r = verity_can_reuse(root_hash, root_hash_size, !!root_hash_sig || !!hash_sig_from_file, name, &existing_cd);
+ /* Same as above, -EINVAL can randomly happen when it actually means -EEXIST */
+ if (r == -EINVAL && FLAGS_SET(flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE))
+ return verity_partition(m, v, root_hash, root_hash_size, verity_data, NULL, root_hash_sig ?: hash_sig_from_file, root_hash_sig_size, flags & ~DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE, d);
+ if (!IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODEV, -ENOENT))
+ return log_debug_errno(r, "Checking whether existing verity device %s can be reused failed: %m", node);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ if (cd)
+ crypt_free(cd);
+ cd = existing_cd;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Sanity check: libdevmapper is known to report that the device already exists and is active,
+ * but it's actually not there, so the later filesystem probe or mount would fail. */
+ if (r == 0)
+ r = access(node, F_OK);
+ /* An existing verity device was reported by libcryptsetup/libdevmapper, but we can't use it at this time.
+ * Fall back to activating it with a unique device name. */
+ if (r != 0 && FLAGS_SET(flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE))
+ return verity_partition(m, v, root_hash, root_hash_size, verity_data, NULL, root_hash_sig ?: hash_sig_from_file, root_hash_sig_size, flags & ~DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE, d);
+
+ /* Everything looks good and we'll be able to mount the device, so deferred remove will be re-enabled at that point. */
+ restore_deferred_remove = mfree(restore_deferred_remove);
d->decrypted[d->n_decrypted].name = TAKE_PTR(name);
d->decrypted[d->n_decrypted].device = TAKE_PTR(cd);
const char *passphrase,
const void *root_hash,
size_t root_hash_size,
+ const char *verity_data,
+ const char *root_hash_sig_path,
+ const void *root_hash_sig,
+ size_t root_hash_sig_size,
DissectImageFlags flags,
DecryptedImage **ret) {
k = PARTITION_VERITY_OF(i);
if (k >= 0) {
- r = verity_partition(p, m->partitions + k, root_hash, root_hash_size, flags, d);
+ r = verity_partition(p, m->partitions + k, root_hash, root_hash_size, verity_data, root_hash_sig_path, root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, flags | DISSECT_IMAGE_VERITY_SHARE, d);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
const char *passphrase,
const void *root_hash,
size_t root_hash_size,
+ const char *verity_data,
+ const char *root_hash_sig_path,
+ const void *root_hash_sig,
+ size_t root_hash_sig_size,
DissectImageFlags flags,
DecryptedImage **ret) {
n--;
for (;;) {
- r = dissected_image_decrypt(m, passphrase, root_hash, root_hash_size, flags, ret);
+ r = dissected_image_decrypt(m, passphrase, root_hash, root_hash_size, verity_data, root_hash_sig_path, root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, flags, ret);
if (r >= 0)
return r;
if (r == -EKEYREJECTED)
if (p->relinquished)
continue;
- r = dm_deferred_remove(p->name);
+ r = crypt_deactivate_by_name(NULL, p->name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mark %s for auto-removal: %m", p->name);
return 0;
}
-int root_hash_load(const char *image, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *text = NULL;
- _cleanup_free_ void *k = NULL;
- size_t l;
+int verity_metadata_load(const char *image, const char *root_hash_path, void **ret_roothash, size_t *ret_roothash_size, char **ret_verity_data, char **ret_roothashsig) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *verity_filename = NULL, *roothashsig_filename = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ void *roothash_decoded = NULL;
+ size_t roothash_decoded_size = 0;
int r;
assert(image);
- assert(ret);
- assert(ret_size);
if (is_device_path(image)) {
/* If we are asked to load the root hash for a device node, exit early */
- *ret = NULL;
- *ret_size = 0;
+ if (ret_roothash)
+ *ret_roothash = NULL;
+ if (ret_roothash_size)
+ *ret_roothash_size = 0;
+ if (ret_verity_data)
+ *ret_verity_data = NULL;
+ if (ret_roothashsig)
+ *ret_roothashsig = NULL;
return 0;
}
- r = getxattr_malloc(image, "user.verity.roothash", &text, true);
- if (r < 0) {
- char *fn, *e, *n;
+ if (ret_verity_data) {
+ char *e;
- if (!IN_SET(r, -ENODATA, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOENT))
- return r;
-
- fn = newa(char, strlen(image) + STRLEN(".roothash") + 1);
- n = stpcpy(fn, image);
- e = endswith(fn, ".raw");
+ verity_filename = new(char, strlen(image) + STRLEN(".verity") + 1);
+ if (!verity_filename)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ strcpy(verity_filename, image);
+ e = endswith(verity_filename, ".raw");
if (e)
- n = e;
+ strcpy(e, ".verity");
+ else
+ strcat(verity_filename, ".verity");
- strcpy(n, ".roothash");
+ r = access(verity_filename, F_OK);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT)
+ return -errno;
+ verity_filename = mfree(verity_filename);
+ }
+ }
- r = read_one_line_file(fn, &text);
- if (r == -ENOENT) {
- *ret = NULL;
- *ret_size = 0;
- return 0;
+ if (ret_roothashsig) {
+ char *e;
+
+ /* Follow naming convention recommended by the relevant RFC:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5751#section-3.2.1 */
+ roothashsig_filename = new(char, strlen(image) + STRLEN(".roothash.p7s") + 1);
+ if (!roothashsig_filename)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ strcpy(roothashsig_filename, image);
+ e = endswith(roothashsig_filename, ".raw");
+ if (e)
+ strcpy(e, ".roothash.p7s");
+ else
+ strcat(roothashsig_filename, ".roothash.p7s");
+
+ r = access(roothashsig_filename, R_OK);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (errno != ENOENT)
+ return -errno;
+ roothashsig_filename = mfree(roothashsig_filename);
}
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
}
- r = unhexmem(text, strlen(text), &k, &l);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- if (l < sizeof(sd_id128_t))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (ret_roothash) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *text = NULL;
+ assert(ret_roothash_size);
+
+ if (root_hash_path) {
+ /* We have the path to a roothash to load and decode, eg: RootHash=/foo/bar.roothash */
+ r = read_one_line_file(root_hash_path, &text);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ r = getxattr_malloc(image, "user.verity.roothash", &text, true);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ char *fn, *e, *n;
+
+ if (!IN_SET(r, -ENODATA, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOENT))
+ return r;
- *ret = TAKE_PTR(k);
- *ret_size = l;
+ fn = newa(char, strlen(image) + STRLEN(".roothash") + 1);
+ n = stpcpy(fn, image);
+ e = endswith(fn, ".raw");
+ if (e)
+ n = e;
+
+ strcpy(n, ".roothash");
+
+ r = read_one_line_file(fn, &text);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (text) {
+ r = unhexmem(text, strlen(text), &roothash_decoded, &roothash_decoded_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (roothash_decoded_size < sizeof(sd_id128_t))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret_roothash) {
+ *ret_roothash = TAKE_PTR(roothash_decoded);
+ *ret_roothash_size = roothash_decoded_size;
+ }
+ if (ret_verity_data)
+ *ret_verity_data = TAKE_PTR(verity_filename);
+ if (roothashsig_filename)
+ *ret_roothashsig = TAKE_PTR(roothashsig_filename);
return 1;
}
const char *name,
const void *root_hash,
size_t root_hash_size,
+ const char *verity_data,
+ const MountOptions *mount_options,
DissectImageFlags flags,
DissectedImage **ret) {
name = buffer;
}
- r = dissect_image(fd, root_hash, root_hash_size, flags, ret);
+ r = dissect_image(fd, root_hash, root_hash_size, verity_data, mount_options, flags, ret);
switch (r) {
}
}
+bool dissected_image_can_do_verity(const DissectedImage *image, unsigned partition_designator) {
+ if (image->single_file_system)
+ return partition_designator == PARTITION_ROOT && image->can_verity;
+
+ return PARTITION_VERITY_OF(partition_designator) >= 0;
+}
+
+bool dissected_image_has_verity(const DissectedImage *image, unsigned partition_designator) {
+ int k;
+
+ if (image->single_file_system)
+ return partition_designator == PARTITION_ROOT && image->verity;
+
+ k = PARTITION_VERITY_OF(partition_designator);
+ return k >= 0 && image->partitions[k].found;
+}
+
+MountOptions* mount_options_free_all(MountOptions *options) {
+ MountOptions *m;
+
+ while ((m = options)) {
+ LIST_REMOVE(mount_options, options, m);
+ free(m->options);
+ free(m);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char* mount_options_from_part(const MountOptions *options, unsigned int partition_number) {
+ MountOptions *m;
+
+ LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, m, (MountOptions *)options)
+ if (partition_number == m->partition_number && !isempty(m->options))
+ return m->options;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int mount_image_privately_interactively(
+ const char *image,
+ DissectImageFlags flags,
+ char **ret_directory,
+ LoopDevice **ret_loop_device,
+ DecryptedImage **ret_decrypted_image) {
+
+ _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *d = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *created_dir = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *temp = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Mounts an OS image at a temporary place, inside a newly created mount namespace of our own. This
+ * is used by tools such as systemd-tmpfiles or systemd-firstboot to operate on some disk image
+ * easily. */
+
+ assert(image);
+ assert(ret_directory);
+ assert(ret_loop_device);
+ assert(ret_decrypted_image);
+
+ r = tempfn_random_child(NULL, program_invocation_short_name, &temp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate temporary mount directory: %m");
+
+ r = loop_device_make_by_path(
+ image,
+ FLAGS_SET(flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR,
+ FLAGS_SET(flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
+ &d);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set up loopback device: %m");
+
+ r = dissect_image_and_warn(d->fd, image, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, flags, &dissected_image);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = dissected_image_decrypt_interactively(dissected_image, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, flags, &decrypted_image);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = detach_mount_namespace();
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to detach mount namespace: %m");
+
+ r = mkdir_p(temp, 0700);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create mount point: %m");
+
+ created_dir = TAKE_PTR(temp);
+
+ r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, created_dir, UID_INVALID, flags);
+ if (r == -EUCLEAN)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "File system check on image failed: %m");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount image: %m");
+
+ if (decrypted_image) {
+ r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish DM devices: %m");
+ }
+
+ loop_device_relinquish(d);
+
+ *ret_directory = TAKE_PTR(created_dir);
+ *ret_loop_device = TAKE_PTR(d);
+ *ret_decrypted_image = TAKE_PTR(decrypted_image);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static const char *const partition_designator_table[] = {
[PARTITION_ROOT] = "root",
[PARTITION_ROOT_SECONDARY] = "root-secondary",
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / blobdiff